CourtListener 10125081•In re C.C. CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/25/24 In re C.C. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re C.C., a Person Coming Under B335806
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP00235)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
HECTOR C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Terence M. Chucas, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Hector C., the father of C.C. (born October 2015), appeals
from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Hector
contends he established the beneficial parental relationship
exception to the termination of his parental rights, and that the
juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to apply the
exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prior Dependency Proceedings
Hector and Isabel C. are C.C.’s parents. The family was
involved in dependency proceedings from 2018 to 2019 after being
referred to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department). In 2018, then two-year-old C.C.
was removed from Hector’s custody (and also from Isabel, who is
not a party to this appeal). The juvenile court sustained a
section 300 petition based on domestic violence between Hector
and Isabel in C.C.’s presence, Isabel’s substance abuse and
mental health challenges, and it ordered reunification services.
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2
In 2019, Hector was permitted unmonitored visits, and
subsequently the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and
granted Hector and Isabel joint legal and physical custody of C.C.
B. The Present Dependency Petition
In February 2022, C.C. was removed from his parents’
physical custody and placed with maternal grandmother
Faviola M. after domestic violence by Hector against Isabel
witnessed by C.C. The Department’s section 300 petition alleged
C.C. was at risk of serious physical harm due to: Hector and
Isabel’s history of engaging in violent altercations in C.C.’s
presence and Isabel’s failure to protect by allowing Hector to
reside with C.C.; Isabel’s substance abuse and Hector’s failure to
protect by allowing Isabel to reside with C.C.; Hector’s substance
abuse and Isabel’s failure to protect; and Isabel’s mental health
diagnoses of major depression and anxiety, history of self-
harming behaviors and involuntary hospitalization, and failure to
take medication. (§ 300, subds. (a) & (b).)2 The juvenile court
detained C.C. from both parents with monitored visitation.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile
court dismissed the substance abuse count as to Hector and
sustained the remaining allegations. The court removed C.C.
from Hector and Isabel’s custody, ordered reunification services
and continued monitored visitation for both parents, and ordered
Hector to complete programs of domestic violence, random drug
testing, and individual counseling.
2 In 2022, the Legislature amended section 300 (Stats. 2022,
ch. 832, § 1), effective January 1, 2023, but the changes do not
affect our analysis.
3
C. The Six-month Review Hearing and Report
At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court found
“the parents are not yet in substantial compliance with the case
plan. They each have made partial progress.” Hector had
completed a two-month drug rehabilitation program and enrolled
in individual counseling and a domestic violence program, but did
not consistently participate in court-ordered programs or drug
testing. Hector had also been charged with vandalism in June
2022, was arrested in August 2022 on an outstanding warrant for
the vandalism charge after Isabel called the police when Hector
refused to exit her car, and he was arrested in October 2022 for
driving without a license and possession of drug paraphernalia.
The Department reported Hector had weekly monitored
visits with C.C., who enjoyed visiting Hector. Hector’s nurturing
behavior during visits was positive, and C.C. counted down the
days until his next visit. C.C. also reported Hector was
sometimes “‘angry’” and yelled during the monitored visits. The
Department further reported C.C. formed a strong bond and
attachment to Faviola. C.C. had behavioral challenges and a
speech impediment, and Faviola had enrolled C.C. in special
education classes, therapy, and speech services. C.C. was
comfortable and adjusted well to living with Faviola, and he
benefited from the stability and consistency she provided as well
as a home free from violence and substance abuse.
D. The 12-month Review Hearing and Report
At the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court found
Hector’s progress was “minimal” in his court-ordered programs,
and noted he had been arrested in February 2023 for possession
of narcotics. Hector missed seven drug tests, and he stopped
4
attending his domestic violence program after completing 27 of
52 sessions. Isabel reported Hector continued his domestic
violence against her and he threatened her with a gun. Isabel
then obtained a temporary restraining order against him.
The Department reported C.C. continued enjoying
monitored visits with Hector. Hector visited C.C. on weekends
from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and took C.C. to baseball practice.
Hector had a positive nurturing relationship and attachment
with C.C., but the Department had concerns about his “reactivity
and not being mindful of the child’s presence during visits,”
including “vent[ing]” his anger and frustration toward Faviola in
front of C.C. Hector requested C.C. be removed from Faviola’s
home but subsequently stated he believed C.C. was safe and
well-cared for there. C.C. made “good progress” in Faviola’s
home. He was comfortable and improved in speech and language
development and was receptive to boundaries and redirection.
Faviola took bonding leave from work to spend more time with
C.C. and volunteered at his school.
E. The 18-month Review Hearing and Report
At the section 366.22 hearing, the juvenile court found the
Department had provided Hector and Isabel with reasonable
reunification services but “[t]he parents haven’t progressed.
They seem to be sort of stuck where they were when the case first
came in.” The parents had ongoing contact with each other in
violation of the temporary restraining order, and the Department
noted Hector’s “explosive” behavior and lack of insight had not
improved. Hector continued to miss drug tests, had not
completed individual counseling, and had yet to complete his
domestic violence program.
5
Hector maintained monitored visitation with C.C. once or
twice a week, occasionally including overnight visits, and C.C.
reported being happy during visits. Hector expressed frustration
and acted out when visitation requests did not go his way, such
as canceling an overnight weekend visit and yelling at the social
worker after he was unable to keep C.C. longer due to a social
worker visit.
Faviola stated she was hesitant about adoption but was
committed to providing permanency for C.C. if his parents could
not reunify. C.C. reported feeling safe and happy in Faviola’s
care, and the Department reported he was well-adjusted to the
household. C.C.’s speech greatly improved and he had decreased
tantrums and behavior problems at school. The Department
attributed C.C.’s improved development to the consistent
schedule, stability, and positive environment provided by Faviola.
C.C. continued to worry about Hector and Isabel “fighting” even
though he had not recently witnessed any incidents of violence.
The Department recommended a permanent plan of legal
guardianship, but opined it was in C.C.’s best interest to be
adopted.
The juvenile court ordered Hector’s reunification services
terminated and set a section 366.26 permanency planning
hearing.
In its next report, the Department reported Faviola was
committed to adoption and recommended terminating parental
rights so C.C. could be adopted. And in its final report before the
section 366.26 hearing, the Department reported Faviola
remained committed to adoption, and C.C. remained well-
adjusted and had progressed emotionally and developmentally.
Hector’s monitored visits with C.C. continued to go well, but
6
sometimes C.C. did not want to visit Hector, and Hector “took
offense” and pressured him to visit.
F. The Section 366.26 Hearing Terminating Parental Rights
At the section 366.26 hearing, C.C.’s counsel asked the
juvenile court to terminate Hector’s and Isabel’s parental rights,
which both parents opposed. Hector asked the court to apply the
beneficial parental relationship exception and to return C.C. to
his custody or, alternatively, order a permanent plan of
guardianship.
Hector testified to his consistent visits and positive bond
with C.C., describing activities they would do together. Hector
described his relationship with C.C. as “easy going, nurturing.
I’m finally beginning to start knowing that my son loves me and
that my son knows that I love him back.” Hector acknowledged
he had not participated in C.C.’s school activities other than
baseball.
As to Hector’s parental rights, the Department and C.C.’s
counsel conceded the first element of the three-element test
under In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.) was met
because of Hector’s consistent visits. They also argued that
Hector and C.C. had a “friendly” bond. But they both argued the
third prong was not met because any detriment to C.C. of
terminating that relationship with Hector was outweighed by the
benefits of adoption. C.C.’s counsel argued C.C. had been
removed from Hector’s custody for several years, Hector and
Isabel had ongoing contact despite a restraining order, and C.C.’s
speech, reading, and special education needs had all improved
under Faviola’s care, with Faviola taking on the role of a parent.
C.C.’s counsel further argued the bond between Hector and C.C.
7
was like that of a “relative or uncle” with Hector “doing more of
the fun things,” and that it did not outweigh the benefits to C.C.
of adoption.
The Department also argued that the bond between Hector
and C.C. was more of a “friendly relationship” that centered on
Hector purchasing C.C. gifts rather than a strong parental bond.
The Department recognized that such a parental presence had
“some benefit” to a child, but the ongoing instability of Isabel and
Hector’s relationship negatively affected C.C., as did Hector’s
drug abuse, and that the security of a permanent adoptive home
“far outweighs any benefit conveyed by a friendly relationship
and visits with [Hector].”
Hector’s counsel asserted that the relationship between
Hector and Isabel was not relevant to the nature of the bond
between Hector and C.C., or to the analysis of whether it was
detrimental to sever that bond. Counsel further argued the
Department’s own reports reflected that C.C. would be negatively
impacted if his parental bond was severed.
The juvenile court stated that it adopted the arguments
made by C.C.’s counsel and the Department. The court agreed
Hector met the first Caden C. element through consistent visits.
The court stated it needed to consider the nature of their bond
and found as follows as to the second and third Caden C.
elements: “Father has a relationship with his son. The
relationship appears to be more of the friendly relationship of an
uncle-type relationship. Father would like it to be more, but he
can’t progress beyond [monitored visitation] because of his own
conduct, so he can’t deepen that bond. There is always some
loss—in most cases where a parent is still in a child’s life, . . . but
I weigh that against the stability and depth of the relationship
8
that an adoption brings, which, here, it would—it clearly
outweighs the benefit of the relationship with father because
[Faviola] has really enriched this child’s life by making sure he
gets the services he needs and the stability he needs. I do not see
that this case stands out as to the many . . . other cases where
parents maintain regular contact. They are able to be fun
parents during a visit, but there is not much more than that . . .
it does not outweigh the benefits of adoption.”
The juvenile court ordered Hector’s and Isabel’s parental
rights terminated and designated Faviola as C.C.’s prospective
adoptive parent.
Hector timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The purpose of a section 366.26 selection and
implementation hearing is “to provide stable, permanent homes”
for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) “If the court has
decided to end parent-child reunification services, the legislative
preference is for adoption.” (In re Elizabeth M. (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 768, 780; accord, In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th
45, 53 [“if the child is adoptable . . . adoption is the norm”]; see
In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307 [state has a
“compelling” interest in “providing stable, permanent homes for
children who have been removed from parental custody” and
reunification efforts have been unsuccessful].)
“When the court finds . . . the child is likely to be adopted,
the statute mandates judicial termination of parental rights
unless the parent opposing termination can demonstrate one of
9
six enumerated exceptions applies.” (In re Elizabeth M., supra,
19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 780-781; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); see In re
Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53; In re Matthew C. (1993)
6 Cal.4th 386, 392.)
The beneficial parental relationship exception allows the
court to order a permanent plan other than adoption if a parent
demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
“(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the
continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631; § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) It applies only in “‘exceptional circumstances.”
(Caden C., at p. 631; accord, In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at
p. 53.)
We apply a “hybrid standard of review” to the beneficial
parental relationship exception. (In re Katherine J. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 303, 317; see In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683,
691.) The first two elements are reviewed for substantial
evidence. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) “[W]e
presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing
party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all
conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H. (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) As a reviewing court, we do “‘not
reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or
resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations
should ‘be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even
though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the
trial court might have reached a different result had it believed
other evidence.’” (Caden C., at p. 640.)
10
As for the third element, we review factual determinations
for substantial evidence and review the “the ultimate decision—
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child due to the child’s relationship with his parent . . . for
abuse of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640; see
In re I.E., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 691.) “A court abuses its
discretion when it ‘“‘has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination’”’” or when it “rest[s] a disposition on an error of
law.” (In re M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836, 848-849; see
Caden C., at p. 641; In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145,
159.)
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Concluding Hector Failed To Establish the Beneficial
Parental Relationship Exception to Adoption
Hector argues that a legal guardianship with Faviola would
better serve C.C.’s interests rather than adoption and
termination of his parental rights. As noted, it was Hector’s
burden to establish all three elements required for the parental
relationship exception to apply in this case. (See § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
1. Regular Visitation and Contact
“The first element—regular visitation and contact—is
straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit
consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court
orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The parties
agree, as do we, that Hector met the first element. The juvenile
court found at the section 366.26 hearing that Hector maintained
11
regular visitation and contact with C.C. during the dependency
proceedings. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
the first Caden C. factor was satisfied.
2. Beneficial Relationship
The second prong of the beneficial parental relationship
exception has two components: the child has a positive emotional
attachment to the parent, and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 636.) Factors the court may consider include “‘[t]he age of the
child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody,
the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent
and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Id. at p. 632; see
In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) Here, the
juvenile court found that Hector had a “friendly relationship”
with C.C. that was akin to “an uncle-type relationship,” and that
there was some benefit to C.C. of having a “fun parent[] during a
visit but there is not much more than that.” Substantial evidence
supports those findings.
Hector’s weekly monitored visits with C.C. over
approximately two years of dependency proceedings were
consistent, friendly, and mostly nurturing. But even assuming a
positive emotional attachment, the record contains evidence that
the benefits to C.C. of continuing a parental relationship with
Hector did not extend beyond a friendly bond. As the juvenile
court noted, eight-year-old C.C. had spent much of his life out of
Hector’s custody. He had been removed from Hector’s custody
between January 2018 and December 2019, and had lived with
Faviola from February 2022 through March 2024. Hector did not
progress to unmonitored visits to deepen his bond with C.C.,
12
despite two years of services. However pleasant their visits may
have been, the record also reflects negative effects of their
interaction. Hector was sometimes “angry” and yelled during
visits, and Hector inappropriately expressed anger and
frustration with Faviola in front of C.C. Sometimes C.C. did not
want to visit, and Hector pressured him to visit. Hector also
acted out to C.C.’s detriment when visitation requests did not go
his way, such as canceling an overnight visit when Faviola stated
he could not keep C.C. past 4:00 p.m. the following day.
C.C. also had special behavioral and developmental needs,
including speech development challenges, special education
needs, tantrums and behavioral issues at school. C.C., who had
previously witnessed domestic violence between his parents, also
continued to worry about Hector and Isabel “fighting.” Hector
admitted he had not been involved with C.C.’s schooling or
individualized education program, and remained in a
relationship with Isabel where he inflicted domestic violence
upon her. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
Hector did not satisfy the second Caden C. factor.
3. Detriment from Termination
The final prong of the beneficial parental relationship
exception is whether the stability and permanence that C.C.’s
adoption would bring were outweighed by the harm to C.C. that
would be caused by terminating his parental relationship with
Hector. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633-634.) As
stated, the statutory preference in a permanency hearing for a
dependent child is adoption. (Id. at p. 631 [“the norm . . . remains
adoption”]; accord, In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)
When the benefits of a stable, adoptive, permanent home
13
outweigh the harm the child would experience from the loss of a
continued parent-child relationship, the juvenile court orders
adoption. (See Caden C., at p. 634.)
The juvenile court concluded that the benefits of
consistency and stability in the adoptive home of Faviola
outweighed the termination of C.C.’s relationship with Hector.
There was substantial evidence supporting the court’s findings
that C.C.’s needs were well met in his adoptive placement and
that Faviola “has really enriched this child’s life by making sure
he gets the services he needs and the stability he needs.” This
evidence included: C.C. had been living with Faviola for over two
years and was strongly bonded with her; Department reports
that C.C. benefited from the stability, consistency, and positivity
in Faviola’s home, and from a home free of domestic violence and
substance abuse; C.C.’s special needs, which Faviola met through
special education, speech services, and therapy and which
resulted in significant progress for C.C.; Faviola setting
boundaries and redirecting C.C.; as well as her bonding leave to
spend more time with C.C. and volunteer at school to observe his
behavior in class.
Hector argues that the court abused its discretion because
C.C.’s primary parental attachment was to him rather than
Isabel (due to Isabel’s mental health rendering her incapable of
consistent or appropriate interactions), and that the
Department’s initial recommendation of guardianship was a
“tacit admission” he had a beneficial relationship with C.C. that
would be detrimental to sever. He also highlights the
Department’s assessment that C.C. was attached to Hector, its
report that “severing ongoing contact with [C.C.’s] parents would
cause emotional instability and preoccupation,” and Faviola’s
14
statement that C.C. would be negatively impacted if his contact
with Hector ceased.
The parties agree C.C. would be negatively impacted if all
visitation with Hector stopped.3 But that is not the end of the
analysis. Caden C. instructs juvenile courts to determine “how
the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—
in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home
without the parent in the child’s life. . . . [T]he effects might
include emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting
out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) On the other hand, “a
new, stable home may alleviate the emotional instability and
preoccupation leading to such problems, providing a new source
of stability that could make the loss of a parent not, at least on
balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.) Here, the record supports the
juvenile court’s determination that the benefit and security
provided by C.C.’s placement with Faviola outweighed the harm
that would be caused by the loss of his relationship with Hector.
(See In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1158-1159 [affirming
finding beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply
where father regularly visited daughter and developed beneficial
bond with her, but she viewed father as “‘a fun, friendly person’
to have visits with,” not a parental figure].)
3 Although Faviola previously stated Hector could continue
visiting C.C., the juvenile court emphasized it would make its
decision assuming all visitation and contact would end once
parental rights were terminated. (See Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 633 [“courts must assume that terminating
parental rights terminates the relationship.”].)
15
In some cases, as here, “a relationship involves tangled
benefits and burdens. In those cases, the court faces the complex
task of disentangling the consequences of removing those
burdens along with the benefits of the relationship.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Under the abuse of discretion
standard of review, we determine whether the juvenile court’s
decision exceeded the bounds of reason; in so doing, we cannot
substitute our view for that of the juvenile court. (See id. at
p. 641; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) In light
of the evidence before the juvenile court, its determination that
Hector did not satisfy the third Caden C. factor—because the
benefits to C.C. of adoption by Faviola outweighed the harm to
C.C. of terminating his parental relationship with Hector—was
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating Hector’s parental
rights is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.
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