CourtListener 10124893•People v. Brown CA2/3
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Filed 9/25/24 P. v. Brown CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B334955
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA086391)
v.
CLIFTON G. BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, John J. Lonergan, Judge. Affirmed.
Clifton Brown, in pro. per.; and Russell S. Babcock, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________________
In 2007, a jury found defendant Clifton G. Brown guilty of
attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder. Brown
appeals from an order after judgment denying his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His appellate
counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 (Delgadillo). Brown filed a supplemental brief asking us to
reverse the order denying his resentencing petition because he
was not found to have personally used a firearm and was
therefore found guilty of aiding and abetting attempted murder.
We find no basis for reversal and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
One afternoon in 2006, Brown and four other individuals,
all gang members, drove up to an apartment complex in
Compton, California in a stolen Hummer vehicle. Members of a
rival gang were seen outside the apartments earlier that day
throwing gang signs toward Brown’s fellow gang members when
they drove by as part of a funeral procession. Two people got out
of the Hummer and started shooting, and shots were also fired
from inside the vehicle. Six people standing outside the
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We therefore refer to the statute as section 1172.6 for the
remainder of this opinion.
2 We derive the background from the Court of Appeal opinion
affirming the judgment of conviction as to Brown and his four
codefendants. (People v. Tempson (Jan. 26, 2010, B203152)
[nonpub. opn.].) We describe the factual background only “to
provide context for the parties’ arguments.” (People v. Flores
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978, fn. 2.)
2
apartment complex were shot. An eyewitness to the shooting
identified Brown as one of the shooters.
The People charged Brown and four codefendants with six
counts each of attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated
murder. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a).) The People argued Brown was
either one of the shooters or a direct aider and abettor. The jury
convicted Brown as charged. On each count as to Brown, the jury
also found true that a principal used or discharged a firearm
under either section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and/or (d).
The jury made no findings as to whether Brown or any of his four
codefendants personally used a firearm, as the section 12022.53
allegations asked the jury to find whether a “principal” “used” or
“discharged” a firearm, without identifying any defendant by
name.3 After a subsequent bifurcated proceeding, the jury
rendered true findings that Brown committed each of the six
counts of attempted murder “for the benefit of, at the direction of,
or in association with a criminal street gang” under section
3 Section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) provides: “The
enhancements provided for in this section shall apply to any
person who is a principal in the commission of an offense if both
of the following are pled and proved: [¶] (A) The person violated
subdivision (b) of Section 186.22 [the participation in a criminal
street gang enhancement]; [¶] (B) Any principal in the offense
committed any act specified in subdivision (b), (c), or (d).”
However, a trial court is prohibited from imposing an additional
15-year minimum parole eligibility on a defendant under the
gang enhancement statute (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5)) “unless the
person personally used or personally discharged a firearm in the
commission of the offense.” (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(2), italics
added.)
3
186.22, subdivision (b)(1). The trial court sentenced Brown to
215 years to life.4
In April 2022, Brown filed a petition alleging he was
eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. The People
opposed Brown’s petition. After a hearing, the trial court
determined that Brown met his prima facie burden for relief,
issued an order to show cause, and set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).
The court held an evidentiary hearing in December 2023.5
No witnesses were called. The court recognized that the jury was
instructed on willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted
murder, and concluded that Brown was convicted as a principal
and was therefore ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
In the alternative, the trial court found that Brown had gunshot
residue particles on his hand and that “numerous witnesses”
identified Brown as one of the shooters. The court further stated:
“If his conduct didn’t aid and abet . . . then I don’t know what
conduct would suffice for that so it’s clear to the court what his
actions were and for those reasons his 1172.6 petition to be
resentenced is denied. I do find the people have met their burden
and have shown that not only did they prosecute him and the
jury found that he had actual malice, but if a reviewing court was
4 On appeal, a different panel of this division upheld his
sentence but struck the trial court’s imposition of a 15-year
minimum parole eligibility for Brown under section 12022.53,
subdivision (e)(2). (People v. Tempson, supra, B203152.)
5 Brown appeared through appointed counsel at the
evidentiary hearing, as he had previously submitted a written
waiver of his appearance.
4
to find he didn’t, then he certainly was aiding and abetting which
would show his intent to kill.”
Brown timely appealed. His appellate counsel filed an
opening brief that raised no issues and asked this court to
independently review the record under Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th 216. We directed appellant’s counsel to send Brown the
record and a copy of the opening brief, and we advised that
within 30 days of the date of the notice, Brown could submit a
supplemental brief or letter stating any grounds for an appeal,
contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider.
Brown timely submitted a supplemental brief in which he argues
that he is eligible for resentencing because he “was not found
guilty of personal use of a firearm” and “was found guilty as an
aider and abett[o]r” of attempted murder.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder and limited the scope of the felony
murder rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708;
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis); People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) Among other
things, Senate Bill No. 775 expanded Senate Bill No. 1437’s
mandate by eliminating the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a means of finding a defendant guilty of attempted
murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) However, a principal in a murder
or attempted murder, including an aider or abettor, can still be
criminally liable if found to personally possess malice
aforethought, whether express or implied. (People v. Silva (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 632, 639–640.)
5
Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775 created a procedure to allow
a person convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter under the former law to seek resentencing if the
person could no longer be convicted under amended section 188.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 847.) Defendants commence the procedure by filing a petition
declaring they were prosecuted under a theory of imputed malice
for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter, and could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to section 188. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3).) If the court
determines the petitioner made a prima facie case for relief, the
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing within 60 days. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
II. Brown is Ineligible for Relief Under Section 1172.6
Because He Was Not Convicted of Attempted Murder
Under the Natural and Probable Consequences
Doctrine
In his supplemental brief, Brown argues he is eligible for
resentencing because he “was not found guilty of personal use of
a firearm” and thus “was found guilty as an aider and abett[o]r.”
However, even after Senate Bill No. 775 eliminated the natural
and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for attempted
murder liability, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid
theory of attempted murder.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley).) Accordingly, even if the jury
determined Brown was not one of the shooters and convicted him
as an aider and abettor, he is ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law.
Although Brown’s supplemental brief does not specifically
argue that he is eligible for resentencing because he may have
6
been convicted under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, we exercise our discretion to address that issue.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
The People charged Brown with six counts of attempted
murder; alleged that each crime was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated; and argued that Brown was either a shooter or a
direct aider and abettor. The jury was not instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, nor did any given
instruction allow the jury to convict Brown based on that
doctrine. CALJIC No. 3.00 instructed the jury that “principals”
in a crime are each “equally guilty” and include direct
perpetrators and aiders and abettors. The trial court further
instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 3.01, which explained that
to convict Brown of aiding and abetting attempted murder, the
jury had to find that he aided, promoted, encouraged, or
instigated the commission of the crime “(1) With knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶] (2) With the intent
or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the
commission of the crime . . . .” As to “the crime,” CALJIC
No. 8.66 instructed the jury that an attempted murder conviction
required a finding that the perpetrator had “a specific intent to
kill unlawfully another human being.” In addition, CALJIC
No. 8.67 instructed the jury that if it determined the shooter
formed a “clear, deliberate intent to kill, which was the result of
deliberation and premeditation,” it must find the attempted
murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
Together, these instructions accurately described the law:
“ ‘when guilt [for attempted murder] does not depend on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . the aider and
abettor must know and share the murderous intent of the actual
7
perpetrator.’ ” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 585.) “ ‘ “[T]his
occurs when the accomplice ‘knows the full extent of the
perpetrator’s criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement
with the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator’s
commission of the crime.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ ”6 (Ibid.)
The jury found Brown guilty of all six attempted murder
counts, and further found that each crime was willful, deliberate,
and premeditated. The record of conviction therefore establishes
that the jury convicted Brown of attempted murder either as a
6 In People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal. App. 5th 588, a different
division of this court reversed the trial court’s denial of two
defendants’ petitions for resentencing under former section
1170.95 without granting an evidentiary hearing, because the
trial court relied on the jury’s true findings under section
12022.53, subdivision (d). The court in Offley reasoned that a
true finding under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) “does not
establish as a matter of law that a defendant acted with malice
aforethought.” (Offley, at p. 597.) Accordingly, the court reversed
and directed the trial court to appoint counsel and conduct an
evidentiary hearing, after which the petitions were denied. (The
court later affirmed the trial court in a subsequent unpublished
opinion in People v. Offley (Aug. 2, 2023, B323993).) However, in
Offley, the jury was instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as follows: “ ‘A member of a conspiracy is
not only guilty of the particular crime that to his knowledge his
confederates agreed to and did commit, but is also liable for the
natural and probable consequences of any crime of a co-
conspirator to further the object of the conspiracy, even though
that crime was not intended as part of the agreed upon objective
and even though he was not present at the time of the
commission of that crime.’ ” (Offley, at p. 599.) Brown’s case is
thus distinguishable.
8
shooter who intended to kill or as a direct aider and abettor who
shared a perpetrator’s intent to kill. There is no possibility that
the jury convicted Brown under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Brown is therefore ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law. (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 548.)7
While we are not obligated to conduct “an independent
review of the entire record” to identify issues not raised in
Brown’s supplemental brief, Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 232, we recognize that the People arguably mischaracterized
aiding and abetting liability during closing arguments. During
closing, the prosecutor asserted that gang members believe “it’s
important to have homies that can back you up” such as “scribes
or the people who would tell the rest of the homies” about gang
shootings. Counsel for one of Brown’s codefendants objected and
argued that the prosecutor improperly implied that a defendant
could be guilty as an aider and abettor without encouraging or
facilitating a crime. The court sustained the objection and
instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s statement to the
extent it suggested that “one who observes a crime and then let’s
[sic] other people know about it later” aids and abets that crime.
CALJIC No. 1.00 similarly directed the jury to follow the court’s
instructions and to ignore any contrary argument from counsel.
Thus, even if the prosecutor misstated the law, we presume the
jury ignored that misstatement and instead followed the court’s
instructions. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852;
People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 206.) Additionally,
7 Accordingly, we do not address the trial court’s alternative
ruling that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt
that Brown was guilty of aiding and abetting attempted murder.
9
even if the jury followed the prosecutor’s statement over the
court’s instructions, Brown would not be entitled to relief. As we
have discussed, by its plain terms, section 1172.6, subdivision (a)
allows an individual convicted of attempted murder to avail
themselves of the statute’s resentencing procedures only if he or
she was convicted “under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” The prosecutor did not invoke the natural and
probable consequences doctrine during Brown’s trial.
Our independent review of the record reveals no other
arguable issues. Brown is ineligible for resentencing under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law and the trial court properly
denied his petition.
10
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BERSHON, J.*
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
11
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