CourtListener 10124889•People v. Martinez CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/25/24 P. v. Martinez CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062679
v. (Super. Ct. No. 22CF2200)
EDGAR MACIAS MARTINEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gary S. Paer, Judge. Affirmed.
Joshua L. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Elana Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
In the first (guilt) phase of a bifurcated trial, a jury found Edgar
Macias Martinez guilty of murdering Alex Ruiz, Jr., a rival gang member, in
a drive-by shooting. The jury also found Martinez guilty of being a convicted
felon in possession of a firearm. In the second phase of the trial, the jury
found true a gang-murder special circumstance allegation.
Martinez claims the trial court erred by allowing a gang expert to
testify in the guilt phase of the trial that Martinez had pleaded guilty to a
prior gang crime. Martinez also claims the trial prosecutor committed
misconduct during the closing argument. But Martinez’s claims have been
forfeited on appeal because he did not object at trial. Alternatively, Martinez
has not established ineffective assistance by his trial counsel for failing to
object. We also find no prosecutorial misconduct or cumulative prejudice.
Thus, we affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 15, 2022, Ruiz was walking with his friend Andre P.
(Andre) on Spurgeon Street in Santa Ana. This area was within the territory
of the Logan Street criminal street gang. Ruiz and Andre were both members
of Logan Street.
At about 3:17 p.m., a light blue Chevy Equinox pulled up next to
Ruiz and Andre. Martinez was driving and was alone in the car. Martinez
was a member of the Lopers gang, which is a rival of Logan Street gang.
Martinez asked, “Where are you guys from?” Ruiz said he was from Logan
Street. Martinez then fired one shot from a handgun through the passenger
window and drove away. Ruiz was hit in the chest and died.
2
Police Investigation
Later that day, officers spoke to Andre at the police station in a
recorded interview. Andre was generally cooperative and described what
happened during the shooting. Andre said the shooter was in his 30s and was
wearing a grey shirt; however, he said the shooter was wearing a ski-type
mask, which obscured his face.
Police obtained video from a surveillance camera near the
shooting. The video captured the shooting as Andre had described it. The
shooter was wearing a grey shirt, but police could not make out his identity.
Police were able to identify three license plate numbers from the light blue
Chevy Equinox, which they determined was registered to Martinez’s sister,
whom they interviewed in her home, where she lived with Martinez and
other family members.
Martinez’s sister said that on the day of the shooting Martinez
had borrowed her car to go to the gym at a mall, which was located about
three miles away from the shooting. Martinez had returned home about 4:19
p.m., wearing a grey shirt. Police obtained various surveillance videos and
still photos that showed the Chevy Equinox passing by Ruiz and Andre just
prior to the shooting. The videos also later showed Martinez leaving the gym
in a grey T-shirt, and then him leaving the mall parking lot in his sister’s car,
at about 4:15 p.m.
Martinez was eventually arrested at his home. Police found an
operable .22-caliber rifle in his bedroom closet.
Court Proceedings
The People filed an information charging Martinez with murder
and possession of a firearm by a felon. The People further alleged firearm and
3
out-on-bail enhancements, a gang-murder special circumstance, a shooting
from a vehicle special circumstance, and two prior strikes.
During a pretrial hearing, the court agreed to bifurcate the trial
on the gang-murder special circumstance. During the first (guilt) phase, the
1
People called several witnesses, including Andre and a gang expert.
At trial, Andre testified that he did not recall the details of the
shooting. Andre further said that he did not recall making statements to the
police. The video and a transcript of Andre’s police interview were introduced
into evidence.
After the guilt phase of the trial, the jury found Martinez guilty
of first degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon (Martinez
stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction). The jury also found true the
firearm allegation, and found true the special circumstance of discharging a
firearm from a vehicle.
During the second phase of the trial, the People recalled the gang
expert to testify. The jury found the gang-murder special circumstance to be
true. The trial court later found the alleged prior strikes to be true. The court
imposed a determinate term of nine years, a consecutive indeterminate term
of life without the possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life.
II.
DISCUSSION
Martinez claims: A) the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting evidence about a prior gang crime during the guilt phase of the
trial; B) the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the burden of
1
The pretrial proceedings and the gang expert’s trial testimony
will be covered in greater detail in the discussion section of this opinion.
4
proof during closing argument; and C) there is cumulative prejudice.
A. Evidentiary Error Claim
Martinez claims the trial court erred in the guilt phase of the
trial by allowing a gang expert to testify that Martinez had previously
pleaded guilty to a gang-related crime. We disagree.
A challenge to the admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion: “The trial court has broad discretion to determine the relevance
of evidence [citation], and we will not disturb the court’s exercise of that
discretion unless it acted in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
manner.” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 947.)
In this part of the discussion, we shall: 1) state the relevant
principles of law; 2) summarize the trial court proceedings; and 3) analyze
the law as applied to the facts.
1. Principles of Law
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is
admissible.” (Evid. Code, § 351.) “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence . . .
having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.)
California law provides that when “requested by the defense,” the
court shall generally bifurcate gang enhancements from the underlying
charges. (Pen. Code, § 1109, subd. (a).)2 The court shall then try the matter
“in separate phases” by first adjudicating the question of defendant’s guilt of
2
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
5
the underlying offenses; if the defendant is found guilty, the court shall then
hold “further proceedings to the trier of fact on the question of the truth of
the [gang] enhancement.” (§ 1109, subd. (a)(1)-(2).)
However, under section 1109, gang evidence may still be
admissible in the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial when the evidence is
relevant to prove the underlying charges. (See People v. Ramos (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 1116, 1132; see also People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31
[“The People are generally entitled to introduce evidence of a defendant’s
gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the charged offense”].)
That is, “evidence of gang membership is often relevant to, and
admissible regarding, the charged offense. Evidence of the defendant’s gang
affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s territory, membership, signs,
symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—
can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of
applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.”
(People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049.)
In order to raise an error on appeal, the issue must first be raised
in the trial court, otherwise the issue is forfeited. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1287, 1293 & fn. 2 (S.B.).) In a criminal trial, “a ‘contrary rule would deprive
the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would “permit the
defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that
a conviction would be reversed on appeal.’”” (People v. Partida (2005) 37
Cal.4th 428, 434.)
2. Trial Court Proceedings
The People filed a pretrial brief summarizing the anticipated
evidence and addressing several motions in limine. The People stated:
6
“During informal discussions . . . , the People anticipate [Martinez] will
request to bifurcate the gang special circumstance.” The People stated they
would not object to the bifurcation of the trial.
The People specified in their trial brief that they would still seek
to introduce limited gang evidence through the testimony of their gang
expert, Detective George Bodnar, in the guilt phase of the trial. “In this case,
the gang backgrounds for both Lopers and Logan are highly probative when a
documented Lopers gang member, Edgar Martinez, drives into Logan
territory and shoots at a documented Logan gang member, [Ruiz], after
hitting Mr. Ruiz up yelling out ‘Where you from?’”
The People indicated in the brief that during informal pretrial
discussions with Martinez, they had reached an agreement as to the
“parameters for Det. Bodnar’s gang testimony during the ‘guilt phase.’” The
parties had agreed Bodnar’s testimony would include “general background
information like history, signs or symbols, number of members, and what
type of criminal activity Lopers members engage in.”
The agreed upon gang evidence also included: “Edgar Martinez is
a documented and self-admitted Lopers . . . gang member . . . based on: [¶] a.
His prior contacts with law enforcement in gang territory with Lopers gang
members. [¶] b. His prior contact with law enforcement in rival (Walnut)
gang territory with other armed Lopers gang members in an admitted
conspiracy to commit an assault on rivals with the firearms (15CF2497
conviction). [¶] c. His prior admission . . . that he has claimed Lopers since he
was 11, grew up in Lopers territory, and [has] family in Lopers.”
The parties further agreed Bodnar’s testimony would include
evidence about the Logan gang, the membership of Ruiz and Andre in that
gang, and the rivalry between the two gangs. The agreed upon evidence also
7
included: “The significance of a ‘hit up’ or one gang member asking another
suspected or actual member ‘where you from?’”
At a pretrial hearing, the trial court addressed the People’s
motion to introduce gang evidence in the guilt phase. The court asked
Martinez’s counsel, “What is your position on that?” Counsel responded,
“Your Honor, I believe the case law does allow some limited evidence to come
in for motive purposes. So provided that the foundation is properly laid and
it’s limited to what the People have talked about, I submit to the Court on
their request.”
The trial court ruled that it would allow gang evidence to be
admitted during the guilt phase. The court said, “I think most people on the
street if you said ‘where you from,’ you know, if someone asked me that, I
would say the East Coast. But in the gang world ‘where you from’ . . . could be
viewed as a challenge, a hit-up, and it has some very distinct meaning other
than a specific geographical location. So it would be very probative for the
jury to hear this.”
The trial court said, “The jury doesn’t have to accept it. They can
reject it. But certainly under [section] 352 of the Evidence Code this is highly
probative. It gives meaning and flavor to the case. So I would definitely allow
the D.A. to put on the evidence that she indicated.” The court found the
evidence was not remote, it would not cause an undue consumption of time,
and it would not cause undue prejudice. The court said the jury “will already
know about the murder charge. It’s not like we are letting in another
uncharged murder or a charged murder or other violent acts.” The court
further stated it would give the jury an instruction as to the limited purposes
of the gang evidence.
During the guilt phase, Detective Bodnar testified that the area
8
of the shooting was within the territory of the Lopers gang. Bodnar testified
one of Lopers’ rival gangs is Logan Street. Bodnar said if gang members
sought to perpetuate this rivalry, they would go into rival territory and
commit violence. Bodnar testified that in a gang hit-up, “a gang member will
ask another person about their gang affiliation.”
Detective Bodnar testified that in order for him to opine as to
whether a person is an active gang member, he considers factors such as the
person’s gang admissions, and their participation in gang crimes. The
prosecutor asked Bodnar about a prior investigation from 2015:
“[Prosecutor:] In your review of that investigation did you learn
those detectives contacted Edgar Martinez the Defendant in Walnut [rival]
gang territory with three other admitted Lopers gang members?
“[Bodnar:] Yes.
“[Prosecutor]: In your review did you learn that the detectives
recovered weapons either on or near where those four individuals were seen
in Walnut territory?
“[Bodnar:] Yes.
“[Prosecutor:] Were charges filed in that case?
“[Bodnar:] Yes, they were.
“[Prosecutor:] And did the Defendant admit or plead guilty to
committing a crime with other Lopers members while being an active
participant in Lopers based off of the conduct of that investigation?
“[Bodnar:] Yes, he did.
“[Prosecutor:] Does that inform your opinion about whether
Mr. Martinez is an active participant . . . of Lopers criminal street gang?
“[Bodnar:] Yes.”
Detective Bodnar later testified: “My opinion is that Mr.
9
Martinez is a member of the Lopers criminal street gang, as well as an active
participant . . . . And that is based on the background that I conducted which
references the police reports, all the contacts such as the field identification
cards, as well as the circumstances in the [instant] case involving the victims
which are well-known rivals.”
3. Application and Analysis
We find Bodnar’s general testimony about criminal street gangs,
his specific testimony regarding the rival Santa Ana gangs, and his testimony
about Martinez’s active participation in the Lopers gang, were all relevant to
the jury’s understanding of the case. That is, we find the gang evidence was
relevant to explain Martinez’s possible motive to shoot and kill Ruiz, a
member of the rival Logan Street gang.
We also find the court properly weighed the probative value of
the evidence against its possible prejudicial effect. (See Evid. Code, § 352.)
The court further instructed the jury on the permissible use of the gang
evidence (e.g., Martinez’s intent, purpose, knowledge, and motive). The court
also instructed the jury on the limitations on the use of the evidence: “You
may not consider this evidence for any other purpose. You may not conclude
from this evidence that the defendant is a person of bad character or that (he)
has a disposition to commit crime.” (CALCRIM No. 1403.)
In short, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it granted the People’s motion and admitted the gang evidence in the guilt
phase of the trial through the testimony of Detective Bodnar.
Martinez argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court
erred in admitting a portion of Bodnar’s testimony, specifically about how
Martinez “had previously pled guilty to committing a crime with other gang
10
members while being an active gang participant.”
But Martinez did not make this objection at trial, so the issue has
been forfeited for purposes of appeal. (See Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); see
also People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 434 [“a ‘contrary rule . . . would
“permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the
knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal’””].)
Anticipating this well-known rule of forfeiture, Martinez
alternatively argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object.
A defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 685–686 (Strickland).) To
establish a violation of this constitutional right, a defendant must show: 1)
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms; and 2) this resulted in prejudice to the
defendant. (Id. at pp. 687–688, 691–692.)
A reviewing “court need not determine whether counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of
an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that
course should be followed.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.) Under the
second prong, “the test for ‘prejudice’ is not solely one of outcome
determination. Instead, the pertinent inquiry is ‘whether counsel’s deficient
performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding
fundamentally unfair.’” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721–722.)
Here, as recommended by the Supreme Court, we can dispose of
Martinez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the basis that he has not
shown sufficient prejudice. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.) That
is, if we presume Martinez’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
11
to Bodnar’s testimony concerning his guilty plea to an unspecified gang
crime, we do not find that the admission of this evidence was prejudicial.
Detective Bodnar’s testimony concerning Martinez’s prior guilty
plea was brief and nonspecific. Bodner did not testify as to exactly what
“gang” offense Martinez had pleaded guilty to committing. The jury was not
told whether Martinez had pleaded guilty to a violent or a nonviolent offense
(the crime was apparently a conspiracy to commit an assault). Therefore, in
light of the serious and violent nature of the charged crime (the driveby
shooting of Ruiz resulting in his death), we do not find that the brief
testimony about Martinez’s guilty plea to an unspecified gang offense
rendered “‘the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.’” (See
In re Avena, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 721.) Moreover, by way of a stipulation,
the jury necessarily knew that Martinez had been convicted of at least one
prior felony, given the crime alleged in count two (a felon in possession of a
firearm).
The jury was also properly instructed on the limited use of the
gang evidence, thereby reducing any chance of possible prejudice. (See People
v. Washington (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 26 [“As a ‘general rule,’ courts
presume that juries can and will dutifully follow the instructions they are
given, including instructions that limit a jury’s consideration of evidence for
certain purposes”].) Additionally, there was overwhelming evidence of
Martinez’s guilt. Indeed, the shooting was captured on video. The car used by
Martinez in the shooting was later identified as his sister’s. Also, the sister’s
statements about Martinez’s whereabouts were consistent with the video and
other identification evidence from both the mall and the gym.
To reiterate and conclude, Martinez has forfeited his claim on
appeal regarding Detective Bodnar’s testimony because he did not object
12
during the trial. Further, even if we presume ineffective assistance by trial
counsel under the first prong of Strickland—for failing to object—we would
not find that the admitted evidence concerning Martinez’s prior unspecified
gang conviction was prejudicial. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [“If
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed”].)
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim
Martinez claims the prosecutor committed misconduct during
closing argument by misstating the burden of proof. We disagree.
“As a general matter, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s
ruling on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Alvarez
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 213.) In this part of the discussion, we will: 1) review
relevant legal principles regarding prosecutorial error; 2) summarize the trial
court proceedings; and 3) analyze the law as applied to the facts.
1. Relevant Legal Principles
“A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to
the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to
make the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that
does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial
misconduct under state law only if it involves the use of deceptive or
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the
jury.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.)
Generally, in order to raise an alleged error on appeal, the issue
must first be raised in the trial court. (S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293 & fn.
2.) Specifically, a defendant forfeits a prosecutorial misconduct claim on
13
appeal unless the defendant objected to the alleged misconduct when it
occurred, and further asked the court to admonish the jury. (See People v.
Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 806.)
“‘A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on
other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in
representing the interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the
state.’” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819-820.) However, “‘the term
prosecutorial “misconduct” is somewhat of a misnomer to the extent that it
suggests a prosecutor must act with a culpable state of mind. A more apt
description of the transgression is prosecutorial error.’” (People v. Centeno
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666–667 (Centeno).)
In reviewing a prosecutor’s comments to the jury, “we must view
the statements in the context of the argument as a whole.” (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1203 (Cole).) Generally, a prosecutor has “‘wide
latitude to discuss and draw inferences from the evidence at trial,’ and
whether ‘the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to
decide.’” (Ibid.) The relevant question is “‘whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of
remarks in an objectionable fashion.’” (Id. at pp. 1202–1203.)
2. Trial Court Proceedings
Prior to closing arguments, the trial court verbally instructed the
jury using standard CALCRIM instructions, in relevant part, as follows:
“You must follow the law as I explain it to you even if you
disagree with it. If you believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law
conflict with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.” (CALCRIM
No. 200.)
14
“A Defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This
presumption requires that the People prove a Defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I
mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . [¶] Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the
charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because
everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.
“In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the
evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the evidence
proves the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an
acquittal and you must find him not guilty.” (CALCRIM No. 220.)
After the court verbally instructed the jury, the prosecutor made
an initial closing argument. Four relevant portions are quoted below
(Martinez challenges the italicized words):
(1) “Mr. Martinez is a documented Lopers gang member and
admitted gang member. So of all of the people on this planet driving a silver
light blue Chevy Equinox that was identified by the defendant’s own sister as
being her vehicle it makes sense and is reasonable and the only reasonable
interpretation of that is that the Lopers gang member brother is the person
who was driving at the time.” (Italics added.)
(2) “The rifle that was found in the Defendant’s room in his
closet. That is what count 2 deals with. . . . It was in his property, in his
possession. He knew he possessed a firearm. It was in his closet with his
clothes unsecured, not in a safe, not in any secret compartment where he
would get his clothes from. [¶] A reasonable interpretation of that is he knew
the gun was there.” (Italics added.)
15
(3) “You’re about to deliberate. . . . Once you get all that evidence
in there and start talking about it, that image will be clear. That the
Defendant shot Mr. Ruiz on Spurgeon. Nobody else. He was the one behind
the wheel. He was the one holding the gun. And the only reasonable reliable
interpretation of the evidence is that the Defendant is guilty of Counts 1 and 2
and all of the allegations alleged.” (Italics added.)
(4) “My burden is beyond a reasonable doubt. We talked about
that in jury selection. You heard the instructions. It’s not beyond all possible
doubt or all scientific certainty or 100 percent. It’s beyond a reasonable doubt.
It hinges on what is reasonable.” (Italics added.)
3. Application and Analysis
Martinez claims on appeal that the prosecutor committed
misconduct during closing argument in four instances. But Martinez did not
object at any time during the closing argument, and he did not request the
court to admonish the jury, so these claims have been forfeited. (See People v.
Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 553.) Nevertheless, we shall exercise our
discretion and address Martinez’s prosecutorial misconduct claim on the
merits. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161–162, fn. 6 [an appellate
court has authority to reach a forfeited claim].)
Martinez argues “the prosecutor’s comments at issue misstated
the burden of proof, and thereby constituted misconduct under state law.
And since these comments involved the fundamental concept that the
prosecution had the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, these
comments also infected the entire trial with unfairness, so as to amount to a
violation of appellant’s federal due process rights.” We disagree.
We do not find it reasonably likely that the jurors interpreted the
16
prosecutor’s statements in the manner Martinez suggests. The prosecutor
appeared to be simply arguing that her interpretation of the evidence was
reasonable; the prosecutor did not appear to be misstate or contradict the
beyond the reasonable doubt burden of proof as explained by the court. (See
Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1202–1203 [the relevant question is “‘whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the
complained-of-remarks in an objectionable fashion’”].)
Martinez argues that the case of Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th 659,
compels a different result. We disagree.
In Centeno, the prosecution used a diagram depicting an outline
of the state of California, even though some of the descriptions of California
on the image were incomplete and inaccurate. (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at
pp. 665–666, fn. 4.) The prosecutor argued that, despite the incomplete and
even inaccurate descriptions, it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the
state depicted was California. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court concluded this
constituted prejudicial prosecutorial error and reversed. (Id. at pp. 674–678.)
“The use of an iconic image like the shape of California or the
Statue of Liberty, unrelated to the facts of the case, is a flawed way to
demonstrate the process of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. These
types of images necessarily draw on the jurors’ own knowledge rather than
evidence presented at trial. They are immediately recognizable and
irrefutable. Additionally, such demonstrations trivialize the deliberative
process, essentially turning it into a game that encourages the jurors to guess
or jump to a conclusion.” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 669, italics added.)
Here, unlike the prosecutor in Centeno, the prosecutor in this
case did not use a diagram, or any kind of image, that purported to visually
depict the prosecution’s burden “of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
17
(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 669.) Further, unlike Centeno, the
prosecutor focused on the “evidence presented at trial.” (Centeno, supra, 60
Cal.4th at p. 669.)
In the first challenged statement, the prosecutor discussed the
evidence concerning the sister’s Chevy Equinox car admitted during the trial
and argued: “[I]t makes sense and is reasonable and the only reasonable
interpretation of that is that the Lopers gang member brother is the person
who was driving at the time.” (Italics added.) In the second challenged
statement, the prosecutor similarly focused on the evidence—the gun found
in Martinez’s closet—and argued: “A reasonable interpretation of that is he
knew that the gun was in there.” (Italics added.) And in the third challenged
statement, the prosecutor focused on the totality of the evidence admitted
during the trial and argued: “He was the one behind the wheel. He was the
one holding the gun. And the only reasonable reliable interpretation of the
evidence is that the Defendant is guilty of Counts 1 and 2 and all of the
allegations alleged.” (Italics added.)
In the fourth challenged statement, the prosecutor said: “My
burden is beyond a reasonable doubt. We talked about that in jury selection.
You heard the instructions. It’s not beyond all possible doubt or all scientific
certainty or 100 percent. It’s beyond a reasonable doubt. It hinges on what is
reasonable.” (Italics added.)
We find this argument was essentially a reiteration of the
pattern jury instruction: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that
leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence
need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to
some possible or imaginary doubt.” (CALCRIM No. 220.)
Indeed, even if there arguably was a conflict between the
18
prosecutor’s argument and the court’s instruction, we generally must
presume the jury followed the court’s instruction. (See People v. Najera (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 212, 224 [“The trial court correctly instructed the jury to
follow the court’s instructions, not the attorneys’ description of the law, to the
extent there was a conflict. We presume the jury followed that instruction”].)
In sum, we find the case of Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th 659, to be
readily distinguishable and it does not alter our analysis.
To reiterate and conclude, we find that the four challenged
statements on appeal do not constitute prosecutorial misconduct (error). (See
Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p.1203 [a prosecutor has “‘wide latitude to discuss
and draw inferences from the evidence at trial,’ and whether ‘the inferences
the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide’”].)
C. Cumulative Prejudice Claim
Martinez claims the cumulative prejudice of the asserted errors
(an alleged evidentiary error and prosecutorial misconduct) requires a
reversal of his convictions. We disagree.
“In theory, the aggregate prejudice from several different errors
occurring at trial could require reversal even if no single error was prejudicial
by itself.” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 483, superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 728.) However,
the rejection of each of a defendant’s individual claims “cannot logically be
used to support a cumulative error claim [where] we have already found
there was no error to cumulate.” (In re Reno, at p. 483.)
In this case, we found Martinez’s claim of evidentiary error was
not prejudicial, and his claim of prosecutorial misconduct (error) was not
meritorious; therefore, there is no further prejudice to cumulate.
19
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, J.
GOODING, J.
20
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.