People v. Rocha CA2/8

CourtListener 10123136Calctapp20.09.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/20/24 P. v. Rocha CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B327631

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA056510)
v.

MELINDA ROSE ROCHA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.

Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas Webster and Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

**********
Defendant and appellant Melinda Rose Rocha appeals from
the denial of her petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95).
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In March 2002, defendant drove a known gang member (Jorge
Rivera), who was the brother of her roommate and a member of the
same gang as her boyfriend (The Townsmen), to a residential
neighborhood in rival gang territory. She slowed down in front of a
home where several rival gang members were standing, and Rivera
fired multiple shots, one of which struck a four-year-old child
playing outside with his younger brother. Defendant then sped off
and dropped Rivera back at a house controlled by The Townsmen
gang. Defendant, who was on probation at the time for drug
offenses, had her car painted a different color after the shooting.
Defendant was charged with four counts of premeditated
attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 1-4),
shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; count 5) and shooting at
an unoccupied vehicle (§ 247, subd. (b); count 6). Principal firearm
use allegations were alleged as to counts 1 through 4 (§ 12022.53)
and a gang allegation was alleged as to all counts (§ 186.22).
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree premeditated
attempted murder (count 3), attempted murder (count 1) and
shooting at an inhabited dwelling (count 5). The allegations that a
principal used and discharged a firearm in the commission of the
offenses were found true as to counts 1 and 3. In addition, the
allegation that a principal used a firearm causing great bodily
injury was found true as to count 1 (the four-year-old victim). The
gang allegation was found true as to all three counts. The jury
acquitted defendant on counts 4 and 6. Count 2 was dismissed by
the court before the start of the jury’s deliberations.

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The court sentenced defendant to a life term for first degree
attempted murder on count 3, plus a consecutive 20-year term for
the firearm use allegation. The court imposed a concurrent term of
seven years to life plus 25 years on count 1. The court imposed and
stayed a middle term sentence on count 5.
In defendant’s direct appeal, this court modified defendant’s
custody credits and affirmed her conviction in all other respects
(People v. Rocha (Oct. 29, 2003, B162152) [nonpub. opn.]).
After defendant’s conviction became final, the Legislature
passed two pieces of legislation amending the law regarding
liability for murder and attempted murder: Senate Bill 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) which became effective January 1, 2019
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4) and Senate Bill 775 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) which became effective January 1, 2022 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551,
§ 2).
As relevant here, the new legislation amended Penal Code
section 188, eliminating the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as it relates to murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) It also
enacted section 1172.6 which provides a procedural mechanism for
defendants convicted under the prior law to seek retroactive
sentencing relief. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Senate Bill 775
extended the sentencing relief available to those convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
On January 18, 2022, defendant filed in propria persona a
form petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6. Defendant checked the boxes indicating she had
been convicted of attempted murder under a natural and probable
consequences theory and could no longer be convicted under current
law. She requested the appointment of counsel. The court
appointed defendant counsel, and the People filed an opposition.

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On January 26, 2023, the trial court denied defendant’s
petition finding, as a matter of law, she was not entitled to
sentencing relief. The court said the jury instructions
demonstrated that defendant was convicted on a direct aiding and
abetting theory and the jury was not instructed with the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.
This appeal followed. We grant the People’s request to take
judicial notice of the reporter’s transcripts that were included in the
appellate record in defendant’s direct appeal (People v. Rocha,
supra, B162152).
DISCUSSION
We independently review the denial of a Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Ervin
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.) We agree with the trial court that
defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
Sentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 for those
convicted of attempted murder is limited to those individuals
convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(Id., subd. (a) [a “person convicted of . . . attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, . . . may file a
petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the
petitioner’s . . . attempted murder . . . conviction vacated and to be
resentenced”].)
The record of conviction here unequivocally establishes that
defendant was prosecuted and convicted of attempted murder and
attempted premeditated murder as a direct aider and abettor who
acted with the intent to kill, and not under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. Defendant concedes the jury was
not instructed with the natural and probable consequence doctrine.
Defendant argues however that the prosecutor’s argument
and discussion of the jury instructions could have misled the jury

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into finding her guilty on a theory akin to a natural and probable
consequences theory. She argues, citing to People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433 (Curiel), that because of the prosecutor’s misleading
argument, the record does not conclusively demonstrate ineligibility
as a matter of law and remand for an evidentiary hearing is
therefore appropriate. We do not agree.
Unlike here, the jury in Curiel was instructed with the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 468.) Curiel explained that “[b]ecause the jury was
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the
jury was required to find only that Curiel knew that Hernandez
intended to commit one of the underlying target offenses and that
Curiel intended to aid him in that offense, not murder. Nor was the
jury required to find that the underlying target offenses,
themselves, were dangerous to human life. While the jury
separately found Curiel intended to kill, such an intent standing
alone is insufficient to establish the requisite mens rea for aiding
and abetting murder.” (Ibid.)
Curiel also noted the narrowness of its holding. “We hold only
that under the jury instructions here, the findings the jury must
have made are insufficient to conclusively establish that Curiel is
liable for murder under current law.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 471, italics added.)
Unlike the jury in Curiel, defendant’s jury was instructed
that in order for a person to be guilty of attempted murder, the
person must act with the “specific intent to kill unlawfully” another
human being. (CALJIC No. 8.66.) CALJIC No. 3.01 told the jury
that a person aids and abets a direct perpetrator of attempted
murder if the person acts “[w]ith knowledge of the unlawful purpose
of the perpetrator” and “[w]ith the intent or purpose” of aiding the
direct perpetrator’s criminal act. Collectively, the instructions

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therefore accurately informed the jury that defendant could be
liable for aiding and abetting attempted murder only if she acted
with knowledge that the shooter (Rivera) specifically intended to
kill his intended victims and she acted with the intent to aid him in
committing those crimes.
Moreover, nothing in the prosecutor’s arguments would have
misled a reasonable jury. The prosecutor did not mischaracterize
any of the instructions and admonished the jurors to follow the
court’s instructions on the law in the event the prosecutor or
defense counsel inadvertently paraphrased the instructions. The
court’s instructions to the jury, as explained above, accurately
stated the law regarding direct aiding and abetting liability for
attempted murder. The prosecutor also told the jury that if they
believed defendant had no knowledge of Rivera’s intent to kill,
“then you will have to acquit her.”
Defendant did not establish her eligibility for resentencing,
and her petition was therefore properly denied. (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 [“If the petition and record in the case
establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the
trial court may dismiss the petition.”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant and appellant Melinda Rose
Rocha’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:
WILEY, J. VIRAMONTES, J.

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