CourtListener 10122936•People v. Sanders CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 09/20/24 P. v. Sanders CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
THE PEOPLE, C098642
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CM015193)
v.
LARRY EDWARD SANDERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2001, defendant Larry Edward Sanders was sentenced to 34 years to life in
prison for attempted murder and assault. His sentence included an upper term for the
assault, two firearm enhancements, and a prior prison term enhancement. The court also
imposed two $10,000 restitution fines.
In 2022, defendant filed a petition to strike the enhancements based on changes in
law and asked for reduction of the restitution fines. In the resentencing brief, defense
counsel wrote, “[d]efendant waives his right to be personally present.” At the
resentencing hearing, the trial court stated, “[Defendant], as I understand it, has waived
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his personal appearance for resentencing; is that correct, [defense counsel]?” Defense
counsel responded, “Yes. That’s correct, Your Honor,” and then the court proceeded with
the hearing in defendant’s absence. The court struck the prior prison term enhancement
and reduced the restitution fines to $200 but otherwise imposed the previous sentence.
On appeal, defendant contends the waiver presented by his attorney was invalid
and the resentencing court prejudicially erred in holding the hearing in defendant’s
absence. Defendant also contends the resentencing court erred by reimposing the upper
term for the assault and by including $10,000 restitution fines in the abstract of judgment
inconsistent with the judge’s oral pronouncement. We agree with defendant regarding his
absence from the hearing and remand for resentencing. Because we remand, defendant’s
other contentions are moot. Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2001, a jury found defendant guilty of assault with a firearm and attempted
murder after he hit his ex-wife (ex-wife) in the head with a firearm and shot her
boyfriend. Defendant was sentenced to 34 years to life in state prison composed of a 4-
year upper term for the assault (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), 4- and 25-year enhancements for the
firearm use (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d)), and a 1-year prior prison term
enhancement on the assault count (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court also imposed a $10,000
restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and a suspended $10,000 parole revocation fine
(§ 1202.45).
In March 2022, defendant in pro per filed a petition for resentencing citing former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6) (the first petition). (See People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 984.) On May 5, 2022, the court appointed counsel for defendant as to
the first petition.
On May 23, 2022, defendant still in pro per filed a second petition for resentencing
(the second petition), again citing section 1172.6. The court treated the second petition as
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one for resentencing under sections 1171 and 1171.1 (now sections 1172.7 and 1172.75),
finding that defendant was convicted of an enhancement described in those sections.
(See People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 324-325.) The court appointed different
defense counsel who filed a brief in support of the second petition. The brief:
(1) requested dismissal of the prior prison term enhancement, citing section 1172.75;
(2) requested dismissal of the firearm enhancements, citing sections 1385, subdivision (c)
and 12022.53, subdivision (h); (3) requested that “all fines and fees be reduced to the
statutory minimum” because they were imposed without a determination of defendant’s
ability to pay; and (4) stated, “[d]efendant waives his right to be personally present.”
The court held a hearing on the first petition over two days in February and March
2023. The court denied the petition because the prosecution had proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant was the actual perpetrator acting with express malice.
The court held a hearing on the second petition in May 2023. At the outset of the
hearing, the court stated its understanding that defendant had waived his personal
appearance for resentencing and asked defendant’s counsel if that was correct. Defense
counsel confirmed the court’s understanding. Boyfriend then testified against dismissing
the firearm enhancements. While he acknowledged that over 20 years had passed since
defendant’s crime, he could not tell the court that defendant deserved a second chance at
a decent life. He testified that defendant’s act was “premeditated double attempted
homicide,” that defendant committed to killing both ex-wife and boyfriend “[i]f it’s the
last thing [he] ever [did],” and that defendant would enjoy taking ex-wife away from her
grandchildren if he ever got another chance.
The court struck the one-year prior prison enhancement as legally invalid. As to
the firearm enhancements, the court found two mitigating factors under section 1385,
subdivision (c): (1) there are multiple enhancements alleged and (2) application of an
enhancement could result in a sentence over 20 years. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B) & (C).)
Because one victim was shot, the other was struck in the head with the gun, and the
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firearm was operable and loaded, the court “decline[d] to strike the enhancements, as to
do so would endanger public safety.” As to fines and fees, the court reduced the
restitution fines to $200. The abstract of judgment retained the original $10,000
restitution fines.
Defendant timely appealed from the order on the second petition.
We granted the People’s request to augment the record to include any document
filed or lodged demonstrating that the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant as a person serving a term for a judgment
that includes an enhancement described in section 1172.75. The superior court then filed
a letter stating that no such documents were filed or lodged in defendant’s case.
DISCUSSION
I
Jurisdiction
As a threshold issue, the People contend we cannot reach defendant’s claims
because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the second petition under section
1172.75. We disagree.
Section 1172.75 invalidates sentence enhancements imposed1 for prior prison
terms unless the prior term was for a sexually violent offense. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) It
also prescribes the procedure for resentencing affected defendants. Specifically, by
July 1, 2022, CDCR must identify individuals serving terms that include no-longer-valid
enhancements and provide certain information about those individuals to the sentencing
1 There is a split of authority regarding whether a stayed prior prison term enhancement is
subject to resentencing under section 1172.75. (See, e.g., People v. Renteria (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1282-1283 [§ 1172.75 requires resentencing for stayed prior prison
term enhancement]; People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 48-49, review granted
Feb. 21, 2024, S283169 [§ 1172.75 does not authorize resentencing for stayed prior
prison term enhancements].) This issue is not before us because the prior prison term
enhancement that defendant challenged was not stayed.
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court that imposed the enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Upon receiving that
information, the court is required to verify that the current judgment includes an invalid
prior prison term enhancement, recall the sentence, and resentence the defendant.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) We agree that “section 1172.75 does not authorize a defendant to
seek resentencing on his or her own motion or petition. Rather the process is triggered by
[CDCR] identifying a defendant as a person serving a sentence that includes a prior
prison term enhancement.” (People v. Cota. supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 332.) But we
reject the People’s position that this process was not triggered in this case.
Defendant filed the second petition in May 2022. On August 16, 2022, over one
month after CDCR’s deadline to identify eligible individuals, the trial court verified from
its records that defendant was convicted of an illegal enhancement. In October 2022,
over three months after the CDCR deadline, defendant filed his brief in support of
resentencing. The court ruled on the petition in May 2023. On the records presented, we
presume that the department performed its duty and identified defendant as eligible
before the court ruled on the petition. (Evid. Code, § 664 [“It is presumed that official
duty has been regularly performed.”]) The trial court clerk’s statement that nothing was
filed or lodged in defendant’s case does not rebut that presumption because section
1172.75 does not require a filing or lodging in a defendant’s case to trigger the process. It
requires CDCR to send certain information regarding the eligible individuals to the
resentencing court, which is likely done by way of a list or spreadsheet of names with the
required information (see People v. Cota, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 326 [describing list
of individuals made available by CDCR through a secure portal]; People v. Coddington
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 567, fn. 4 [“CDCR has identified some eligible defendants in
‘at least one lengthy list of names, rather than in individual letters to the superior
court’ ”]), and then requires the trial court to verify eligibility, which the trial court did in
this case. We decline to find a lack of jurisdiction in this case. (See Cota, at p. 333
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[rejecting lack of jurisdiction argument based on defendant’s unauthorized motion for
resentencing under section 1172.75].)
II
Defendant’s Absence
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by proceeding with the
resentencing hearing in his absence without a proper waiver. We agree.
“ ‘A criminal defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is guaranteed under
the federal Constitution by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
344, 347.) “It is also required by section 15 of article I of the California Constitution and
by sections 977 and 1043.” (People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 81.) The right
extends to all “ ‘critical stages of the criminal prosecution’ ” including sentencing and
resentencing. (Cutting, at p. 347; see People v. Quan (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 524, 533
[“The defendant’s presence is required when the court must make fact-bound
determinations as it exercises its sentencing discretion”].)
Under the federal and state constitutions, the defendant “can waive his right to be
present, but the waiver must be ‘ “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” ’ ” (People v.
Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 57.) According to our Supreme Court, the
effectiveness of a defense’s counsel’s waiver of this right is “unsettled.” (People v.
Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 899.) But, “ ‘[a]t a minimum, there must be some
evidence that the defendant understood the right he was waiving and the consequences of
doing so.’ ” (Ibid.; see People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 532.) For example, a
defense counsel’s statement he had discussed the hearing with the defendant and the
defendant would waive his presence is insufficient to establish a knowing and intelligent
waiver without evidence that counsel informed the defendant of his right to attend or
evidence that the defendant understood he would be unable to contribute to the discussion
of certain evidence by absenting himself from the hearing. (Davis, at p. 532.)
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Here, defense counsel’s statement in his resentencing brief, and confirmation at
the resentencing hearing, that “[d]efendant waives his right to be personally present” did
not provide evidence that defendant understood the right he was waiving and the
consequences of doing so. (See People v. Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 535
[counsel’s representation at the outset of a resentencing hearing of having authority to
appear on the defendant’s behalf pursuant to section 977, subdivision (b) did not show
that defendant gave a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to be
present].) We agree with defendant that he was deprived of his constitutional right to be
present at the hearing. As a result, we must reverse if the error was prejudicial. (People
v. Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 902.)
“Under the federal Constitution, error pertaining to a defendant’s presence is
evaluated under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman
v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23.” (People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 532.)
“Under that standard, the error ‘may be deemed harmless only if we can conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not affect the outcome of the proceeding.’ ”
(People v. Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.) The burden falls on the People, not
the defendant, to demonstrate that the violation of the defendant’s federal constitutional
right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 349.)
Here, the People do not address prejudice, so they fail to meet their burden. Even
if defendant bore the burden of showing prejudice (see Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 536), we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s absence did not
affect the outcome of the proceeding. The court must dismiss an enhancement if it is in
furtherance of justice to do so. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) In making this “furtherance of
justice” calculation, the court must afford great weight to evidence offered to prove
certain mitigating circumstances and may consider other circumstances. (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2), (4) [“circumstances listed in paragraph (2) are not exclusive”].) The “furtherance
of justice” standard allows courts to consider the nature and circumstances of the crime
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and the defendant’s background, character, and prospects. (People v. Mazur (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 438, 446, review granted Feb. 14, 2024, S283229; see Nazir v. Superior
Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 497 [in determining whether to dismiss a firearm
enhancement, a court considers the sentencing factors listed in the California Rules of
Court, including any facts and circumstances relevant to the case].) Defendant might
have offered relevant testimony as to those factors if he was present at resentencing.
“While the trial court may or may not have chosen to believe what [defendant] might
have said, . . . , we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that his presence at the
hearing would not have affected the outcome.” (People v. Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th
at p. 350.) Thus, we reverse and remand for resentencing where defendant is present or
enters a valid waiver.
III
Other Moot Issues
Defendant contends imposition of the upper term for assault violated section
1172.75, subdivision (d)(4). Defendant also contends, and the People concede, that the
abstract of judgment includes a clerical error because it retains the original $10,000
restitution fines even though the resentencing court’s oral pronouncement reduced those
fines to $200. Because we are vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding for
resentencing, these issues are moot. At resentencing, defendant is free to question the
upper term on the assault and the trial court will necessarily create a new abstract of
judgment that should reflect the oral pronouncement of any fines. (See People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385
[“Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the
minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls”].)
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DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing. The trial
court is ordered to conduct a new resentencing hearing at which defendant is present
unless there is a valid waiver.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
MAURO, J.
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