People v. Razon CA2/6

CourtListener 10119773Calctapp17.09.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/17/24 P. v. Razon CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B328166
(Super. Ct. No. MA077525)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

DWAYNE BERNARD RAZON,

Defendant and Appellant.

Dwayne Bernard Razon appeals his sentence after a jury
found him guilty of assault by a life prisoner by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 45001; count 1),
battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 2), and
assault by a prisoner by means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury (§ 4501, subd. (b); count 3). The jury also found true
allegations he personally inflicted great bodily injury on all
counts. Appellant admitted two prior convictions for purposes of

1 Unlabeled statutory cites are to the Penal Code.
the recidivist sentencing statute (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and the
Three Strikes Law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
The trial court granted appellant’s motion to strike one of the
prior strike convictions and declined to enhance his sentence on
counts 2 and 3. It sentenced him to a prison term of 21 years to
life on count 1, a determinate term of four years on count 2, and a
determinate term of six years on count 3. It stayed the sentences
on counts 2 and 3 pursuant to section 654.
Appellant argues four points. First, he contends the jury
should have received an unanimity instruction as to count 2 for
battery with serious bodily injury. Second, he contends we
should reverse his conviction on count 2 because substantial
evidence does not support the court’s finding that he seriously
injured the victim or caused great bodily harm. Third, he
contends we should strike the great bodily injury finding on the
same count because great bodily injury is an element of serious
bodily injury under section 243. Fourth, he requests we strike
his conviction on count 3 because section 4501 assault is a lesser-
included offense of section 4500 assault.
We will strike the enhancement on count 2 and reverse the
conviction on count 3 but otherwise affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A Riverside County jury convicted appellant of murder and
other counts in 1996. He remained incarcerated as a life prisoner
at California State Prison in Lancaster as of July 2018. He
shared a cell with Charles Wade, a 68-year-old wheelchair-bound
inmate who weighed about 100 pounds. Appellant was by then
52 years old and weighed over 300 pounds.
One morning after breakfast, guards in the prison yard saw
appellant straddling a supine Wade and punching him in the

2
face. Appellant ignored orders to stop. A guard in the control
booth shot him in the back with a non-lethal sponge round but he
still did not stop. The victim initially covered his face but his
arms fell to his sides as the beating continued. The incident
ended after a guard discharged an aerosol pepper grenade.
The guards and a nurse lifted Wade onto a gurney and
rolled him out of the yard. The nurse who evaluated Wade sent
him to the hospital because of his injuries.
DISCUSSION
Unanimity Instruction on Count 2 for Battery
with Serious Bodily Injury
Appellant contends the trial court violated his due process
rights by failing to give a unanimity instruction to the jury on
count 2 for battery with serious bodily injury. He argues the
instruction was required because jurors could have found
appellant seriously injured the victim in one or both of two ways:
(1) by beating him unconscious, and (2) by causing his facial
injuries. Appellant characterizes these as discrete crimes the
jury should have decided unanimously. (See People v. Russo
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [“when the evidence suggests more
than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among
the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the
same criminal act”].) We disagree.
The evidence at trial supported only one theory:
appellant’s prolonged beating of the victim caused discrete
injuries to his head and face. The crime falls within the
exception that applies when a series of acts are so closely
connected in time that they form part of one transaction. (See
People v. Robbins (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 261, 265-266.)
Appellant’s jury “perform[ed] a measuring function, deciding

3
whether the victim suffered that quantum of injury legally
defined as great bodily injury.” (Id. at p. 265.)
Substantial Evidence Supporting Conviction
On Count 2 for Battery with Serious Bodily Injury
Appellant contends substantial evidence does not show he
injured Wade seriously enough to convict him on count 2 for
battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)), or to find he
caused the victim harm sufficient to impose a great bodily injury
enhancement (§ 12022.7). We draw all reasonable inferences in
support of the judgment when reviewing the record for sufficiency
of the evidence for a conviction. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th
1199, 1206.)
Section 243, subdivision (f)(4) defines serious bodily injury
as “a serious impairment of physical condition, including, but not
limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; [or]
bone fracture . . . .” A reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant’s punches rendered Wade
unconscious. Four guards testified that Wade initially protected
his face. His arms then dropped to his sides as appellant
continued punching from above. One guard described Wade as
“unconscious” and “unresponsive” after the attack and remained
in that state while they rolled him from the yard on a gurney. He
was still on the ground when the nurse arrived in the yard to
evaluate him. The record also shows the punches caused one or
more bone fractures. A CT scan later revealed a nondisplaced
fracture near the right eye, a minimally displaced fracture in the
right maxillary sinus wall, and sinus hemorrhaging. This
evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that appellant
committed the felony offense of battery with serious bodily injury.

4
The evidence is also sufficient to support the jury’s true
finding on the special allegations that appellant caused great
bodily injury to Wade. “Some physical pain or damage, such as
‘[a]brasions, lacerations, and bruising can constitute great bodily
injury. [Citation.]’” (People v. Quinonez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
457, 464, quoting People v. Jung (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1036,
1042.) “[T]he injury need not be so grave as to cause the victim
‘“permanent,” “prolonged,” or “protracted”’ bodily damage.”
(People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 64, quoting People v.
Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750.) The nurse noted abrasions,
scratches, and swelling on his face after the attack. She
considered the injuries serious enough to call 911 and send him
to the hospital instead of the prison’s triage center. The fractures
and hemorrhaging revealed by the CT scan proved this decision
wise.
Imposing Great Bodily Injury Enhancement When
Serious Bodily Injury Is an Element of Battery
Appellant next contends we should strike the jury’s finding
of “great bodily injury” on count 2 because it is legally equivalent
to a finding of “serious bodily injury,” which is an element of
battery under section 243, subdivision (d). The great bodily
injury enhancement does not apply “if infliction of great bodily
injury is an element of the offense.” (§ 12022.7, subd. (g).) We
review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.2 (Reid v.
Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527.)

2 The People contend this issue is moot because the

abstract of judgment does not reflect a great bodily enhancement
on count 2. The trial court, however, does not appear to have
ruled on appellant’s motion to strike or otherwise disposed of the

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“[T]he Courts of Appeal have long construed Penal Code
section 12022.7, subdivision (g)’s bar on imposing the great bodily
injury enhancement when ‘infliction of great bodily injury is an
element of the offense’ to mean that the enhancement may not be
imposed where serious bodily injury is an element of the
underlying offense.” (In re Cabrera (2023) 14 Cal.5th 476, 490;
see People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375 [“‘serious
bodily injury’ and ‘great bodily injury’ have substantially the
same meaning [Citation] . . . [t]herefore, common sense dictates
that great bodily injury is indeed an element of battery under
section 243, subdivision (d)”]; accord, People v. Beltran (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 693, 696-697.) We conclude the same and will strike
the enhancement as to count 2. (§ 1260.)
Conviction for Assault Under Section 4501
The jury convicted appellant of assault under both section
4500 (count 1, assault by a life prisoner by means of force likely
to produce great bodily injury) and section 4501, subdivision (b)
(count 3, assault by a prisoner by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury). Appellant contends we should strike the
section 4501 conviction because it is a lesser-included offense of
the section 4500 conviction. (See People v. Delgado (2017) 2
Cal.5th 544, 570, quoting People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224,
1227 [“‘[I]f the statutory elements of the greater offense include
all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the latter is
necessarily included in the former’”].) The People concede we
should strike the section 4501 conviction—not because it is a
lesser included offense of section 4500, but because it expressly
excludes those serving a life sentence. We agree with the People.

enhancement. We decide the issue here as a pure question of
law.

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Section 4500 states in relevant part: “Every person while
undergoing a life sentence, who is sentenced to state prison
within this state, and who, with malice aforethought, commits an
assault upon the person of another . . . by any means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury is punishable with death or
life imprisonment without possibility of parole.” Section 4501,
subdivision (b) states: “Except as provided in Section 4500, every
person confined in the state prison of this state who commits an
assault upon the person of another by any means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury shall be guilty of a felony and shall be
imprisoned in the state prison for two, four, or six years to be
served consecutively.” (Italics added.)
Life prisoners who violate section 4500 cannot violate
section 4501 simultaneously because the latter applies only to
those prisoners serving less than a life term. (See People v. Noah
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 476 [“when an information or indictment
alleges a violation of section 4500, and by so doing alleges that
the defendant is serving a life term, section 4501 cannot be a
necessarily included offense in fact, since an offender who
violates section 4500 cannot violate section 4501”].) The
Legislature added the preface “except as provided in Section
4500” to both subdivisions of section 4501 when it amended the
statute in 2004. (Stats. 2004, ch. 405, § 17.) This phrase further
confirms that one cannot violate section 4501 if they are serving a
life sentence at the time of the charged offense. Appellant did not
dispute he was a life prisoner when he attacked the victim or
present evidence showing otherwise. The jury found the element
true when it found him guilty of section 4500 battery.

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DISPOSITION
The enhancement pursuant to section 12022.7 is stricken
as to count 2. The conviction on count 3 (violation of section
4501, subdivision (b)) is reversed. The judgment is affirmed in all
other respects. The trial court shall prepare an amended
abstract of judgment and send a certified copy to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Manuel A. Almada, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________

Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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