CourtListener 10115520•People v. Rios CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/12/24 P. v. Rios CA2/7
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B326828
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA091171)
v.
JUAN CARLOS RIOS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Andrew C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________
Juan Carlos Rios was convicted by a jury in February 2009
of special-circumstance first degree murder and other crimes
committed when he was 23 years old. Rios was sentenced on the
murder count to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
Rios appealed, and we affirmed. (People v. Rios (May 18, 2011,
B218445) [nonpub. opn.] (Rios I).)
On October 31, 2022 Rios, representing himself, filed a
motion seeking to develop a record of his youth-related mitigating
factors for an eventual youth offender parole hearing pursuant to
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and In re
Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Franklin proceeding). In his motion,
Rios argued Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (h),1 of the
youth offender parole hearing statute violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying the
right to a youth offender parole hearing to inmates sentenced to
LWOP for crimes committed when they were 18 to 25 years old,
while authorizing youth offender parole hearings for similarly
situated young adults who were sentenced to an indeterminate
term. The trial court summarily denied the motion on the basis
that Rios was statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole
hearing. We reversed, concluding that section 3051,
subdivision (h), violates the equal protection clause because there
is no rational basis for excluding 18-to 25-year-old offenders
sentenced to LWOP from the benefits of section 3051.
The Supreme Court granted review and transferred the
case to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider
Rios’s appeal in light of People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834
(Hardin), holding section 3051, subdivision (h), does not violate
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a
supplemental letter brief the Attorney General argues that based
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hardin, we should now affirm
the trial court’s order denying Rios’s motion for a Franklin
proceeding. Rios has not filed a supplemental brief in response.
We now affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Killing
Early on the morning of June 17, 2005, Alex Gutierrez
drove to a house on Clarkdale Avenue in Hawaiian Gardens,
where Lizbeth Figueroa and her sister Paola Figueroa lived with
their family.2 Gutierrez was a friend of Paola’s ex-boyfriend.
Paola reluctantly agreed to sell stereo speakers for Gutierrez.
Lizbeth and Paola drove to a house about five blocks away to try
to sell the speakers. One of Lizbeth’s friends, Carlos Gallardo,
was there with five or six other men. Gallardo was a member of
the Varrio Hawaiian Gardens gang, and the house was a regular
hangout for members of the gang. Rios, who was a member of the
same gang, approached the women and demanded to know who
gave Paola the speakers. Paola replied that it was “just some
friends.” Rios asked if they were “gangsters” and whether they
had guns, a nice car, and money. He also inquired whether they
looked like “Paisa[s],” meaning Mexican nationals. Paola told
Rios they were Paisas and had no money. Rios responded he
“was planning on jacking them.” Paola later drove Rios,
2 The summary of facts is taken from our prior opinion in
People v. Rios, supra, B218445.
3
Gallardo, and Omar Ramirez to Rios’s home, which was close to
where the Figueroa sisters lived.
At around 3:00 a.m. Gutierrez and David Quesada drove to
Lizbeth and Paola’s house for Gutierrez to pick up money for
what he described as a completed job. Rios, Gallardo, and
Ramirez were near the house when they saw Gutierrez’s car
make a U-turn and come to a stop on the street. Gallardo
thought the occupants of the car looked like Paisas. Rios,
wearing a hockey mask, approached the driver’s side of
Gutierrez’s car and asked Gutierrez for a cigarette. Gutierrez
said he did not have one. Rios whistled, and Gallardo and
Ramirez, whose faces were covered, ran to the passenger’s side of
the car from behind a nearby van. Rios drew a gun and told
Gutierrez to park the car and get out. Rios told Quesada in
Spanish that nothing would happen to him if he got out of the
car. Quesada started to get out of the car.
Rios argued with Gutierrez, who then began to drive away.
Rios fired several shots at the car. One of the bullets struck
Gutierrez, who lost control of the vehicle. The car hit a van that
was parked in front of the Figueroas’ house. Gutierrez later died
from a gunshot wound to his torso.
B. The Jury Conviction and Sentence
A jury convicted Rios of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)), attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246),
two counts of attempted carjacking (§§ 215, subd. (a), 664), and
two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021,
subd. (a)(1).) The jury also found the special circumstance
allegation true that the murder was committed while Rios was
4
engaged in the attempted carjacking and to further the activities
of a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17) & (22)), that he
and a principal personally used and discharged a firearm during
the commission of the murder, causing great bodily injury
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)), and that the crime was
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(C)). The trial court found true the allegation Rios
had one prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of
section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
The trial court sentenced Rios to LWOP for first degree
murder, a consecutive sentence of 30 years to life for the
attempted murder (15 years doubled under the three strikes law),
and a concurrent term of four years for possession of a firearm
(the middle term of two years doubled). The court also imposed
consecutive 25-years-to-life terms for the firearm use
enhancements on the murder and attempted murder counts, and
five years for the prior serious felony conviction. The court
stayed the sentences on the remaining counts and enhancements.
C. Rios’s Franklin Motion
On October 31, 2022 Rios, representing himself, filed a
motion seeking to develop a record for an eventual youth offender
parole hearing. In his motion Rios argued he was 23 years old at
the time of the offenses and section 3051, subdivision (h), violated
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
denying defendants sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed
when they were 18 to 25 years old the right to a youth offender
parole hearing while authorizing the hearings for similarly
situated individuals “who have been sentenced to the functional
equivalent to [LWOP].”
5
On November 8, 2022 the trial court summarily denied
Rios’s request for a Franklin proceeding. The court found that
Rios was statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing
“because (1) he was sentenced pursuant to sections 1170.12 and
667(b) through (i) for a prior serious ‘strike’ conviction and (2) he
received a life without the possibility of parole sentence for a
controlling offense (namely, first degree murder committed while
engaged in an attempted carjacking and to further the activities
of a criminal street gang), which he committed when he was
23 years old.” Rios timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Youth Offender Parole Hearings
In 2013, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill
No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.), which added section 3051 and
amended sections 3041, 3046, and 4801, effective January 1,
2014. Section 1 of the bill states, “The purpose of this act is to
establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person
serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a
juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has
shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity,
in accordance with the decision of the California Supreme Court
in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, and the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida (2010)
560 U.S. 48, and Miller v. Alabama (2012) [567 U.S. 460] . . . . It
is the intent of the Legislature to create a process by which
growth and maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a
6
meaningful opportunity for release established.”3 (Stats. 2013,
ch. 312, § 1; see In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 431
[“Youth offender parole hearings under section 3051 were
established by the Legislature in 2013, following a series of
United States and California Supreme Court cases addressing
the constitutionality of lengthy prison sentences for juvenile
offenders.”].)
Section 3051 initially applied to offenses committed before
the offender turned 18 years old and required the Board of Parole
Hearings, with limited exceptions, to conduct a youth offender
parole hearing no later than a juvenile offender’s 25th year of
incarceration (and at earlier points depending on the offender’s
“controlling offense”).4 (See People v. Ochoa (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.) Section 4801, subdivision (c), directed
the Board of Parole Hearings, when considering parole eligibility
3 In Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. 48, the United
States Supreme Court determined that LWOP sentences for
nonhomicide offenses committed by juvenile offenders violated
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. In Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. 460, the
Supreme Court extended the holding of Graham to include
juvenile homicide offenders given mandatory LWOP sentences.
In People v. Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th 262, the California
Supreme Court held, in the context of a 110-years-to-life sentence
imposed on a juvenile for nonhomicide offenses, that parole-
eligible sentences for juvenile offenders violated the Eighth
Amendment if the parole eligibility date falls beyond the
offender’s natural life expectancy.
4 “Controlling offense” refers to “the offense or enhancement
for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of
imprisonment.” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
7
for youth offenders, to “give great weight to the diminished
culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features
of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity.”
Section 3051 was subsequently amended to apply to
offenders who had committed the controlling offense before the
age of 23 (Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1), and later to offenders who
committed the controlling offense when 25 years old or younger
(Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5). In addition to raising the threshold
age to 25, the Legislature extended youth parole hearings in the
25th year of incarceration to juveniles sentenced to LWOP for a
controlling offense committed before the age of 18. (§ 3051,
subd. (b)(4), added by Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5; see People v.
Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 381.) Section 3051,
subdivision (h), expressly excludes from eligibility for a youth
offender parole hearing cases in which the sentence was imposed
pursuant to the three strikes law (§§ 667, 1170.12, subds. (b)-(i)),
the one strike law (§ 667.61), “or to cases in which an individual
was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.”
(Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.)
Following the enactment of section 3051, Franklin, supra,
63 Cal.4th 261, established a procedure by which an inmate at
the time of sentencing may make a record of youth-related
mitigating factors in anticipation of a future youth offender
parole hearing under section 3051.5 The Court in In re Cook,
5 As the Franklin court explained, “[S]ection 3051,
subdivision (f)(2) provides that ‘[f]amily members, friends, school
personnel, faith leaders, and representatives from community-
based organizations with knowledge about the individual before
the crime . . . may submit statements for review by the board.’
Assembling such statements ‘about the individual before the
crime’ is typically a task more easily done at or near the time of
8
supra, 7 Cal.5th at page 458 held that a juvenile offender with a
final judgment could move in a postjudgment proceeding under
section 1203.01 to present evidence of youth-related factors.
B. Section 3051, Subdivision (h), Does Not Violate Rios’s Right
to Equal Protection Under People v. Hardin
Rios contends section 3051, subdivision (h), violates the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
there is no rational basis for excluding 18-to 25-year-old offenders
sentenced to LWOP from the benefits of section 3051. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument in Hardin, supra,
15 Cal.5th at page 864.
In Hardin, Tony Hardin was sentenced to LWOP following
his conviction of first degree murder with a special circumstance
finding for an offense he committed when he was 25 years old.
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 840.) Hardin asserted
section 3051 violated his right to equal protection because “once
the Legislature decided to expand [youth offender parole]
opportunities to young adults, it could not rationally treat those
sentenced to life without parole differently from those convicted
the juvenile’s offense rather than decades later when memories
have faded, records may have been lost or destroyed, or family or
community members may have relocated or passed away. In
addition, section 3051, subdivision (f)(1) provides that any
‘psychological evaluations and risk assessment instruments’ used
by the Board in assessing growth and maturity ‘shall take into
consideration . . . any subsequent growth and increased maturity
of the individual.’ Consideration of ‘subsequent growth and
increased maturity’ implies the availability of information about
the offender when he was a juvenile.” (Franklin, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 283-284.)
9
of other serious crimes and serving lengthy parole-eligible
sentences.” (Hardin, at p. 846.) The Supreme Court clarified the
standard of review for an equal protection claim, explaining,
“[W]hen plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between
identifiable groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the
distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal protection, courts
no longer need to ask at the threshold whether the two groups
are similarly situated for purposes of the law in question. The
only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged difference in
treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard
of review. The burden is on the party challenging the law to
show that it is not.” (Id. at pp. 850-851.)
Under rational basis review, applicable here, a court
“presume[s] that a given statutory classification is valid ‘until the
challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment
is reasonably conceivable.’ [Citation.] The underlying rationale
for a statutory classification need not have been ‘ever actually
articulated’ by lawmakers, nor ‘be empirically substantiated.’”
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.) The court reviewed
section 3051’s legislative history and observed that “in designing
section 3051, the Legislature consciously drew lines that altered
the parole component of offenders’ sentences based not only on
the age of the offender (and thus the offender’s amenability to
rehabilitation) but also on the offense and sentence imposed. The
lines the Legislature drew necessarily reflect a set of legislative
judgments about the nature of punishment that is appropriate for
the crime.” (Hardin, at p. 855.) The court acknowledged that it
“may be true,” as Hardin had argued, that the crime-based
categories that affect at what age an offender is eligible for relief
may not be rationally related to the purpose of expanding
10
opportunities for early release based on the attributes of youth.
(Ibid.) But, the court continued, the Legislature was aware of
this point, and “nonetheless crafted a statutory scheme that
assigns significance to the nature of underlying offenses and
accompanying sentences.” (Ibid.) Therefore, the court reasoned,
“[t]he statutory framework indicates that the Legislature aimed
to increase opportunities for meaningful release for young adult
offenders, while taking into account the appropriate punishment
for the underlying crimes, depending on their severity.” (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court held Hardin could not establish that
“the Legislature’s decision to exclude offenders convicted of
special circumstance murder from the youth offender parole
system” is ‘so devoid of even minimal rationality that it is
unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection.’”6 (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 859.) The court explained that
section 190.2 adequately separates out the most egregious
murders (special circumstance murders), which are subject to the
most severe punishment—death or LWOP, from other murders
(Hardin, at p. 859), and therefore, “it is difficult to see how the
Legislature that enacted section 3051 could have acted
irrationally in singling out special circumstance murder as a
particularly culpable offense.” (Id. at p. 860.) Accordingly,
Hardin failed to show “that the exclusion of offenders who are
serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole
for a crime committed after the age of 18 from youth offender
parole eligibility is irrational.” (Id. at p. 864.) Similar to the
6 In Hardin, the defendant, like Rios, only raised an equal
protection challenge under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 847, fn. 2.)
11
defendant in Hardin, Rios has not shown his LWOP sentence for
conviction of special circumstance murder violates the equal
protection clause.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Rios’s motion for a Franklin proceeding
is affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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