In re D.F. CA5

CourtListener 10114557Calctapp11.09.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/11/24 In re D.F. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re D.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.

KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN F087415
SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. No. JD144100-00)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. OPINION
K.F. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Christie Canales
Norris, Judge.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant K.F.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez and Giselle Marie Achecar, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant M.F.
Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, Judith M. Denny, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellants K.F. (mother) and M.F. (father) are the parents of the one-year-old
child, D.F. (the child), who is the subject of this dependency case. Mother challenges the
juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested Welfare and Institutions Code1 section
366.26 hearing that resulted in mother and father’s parental rights being terminated.
Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it declined to apply the beneficial parent-
child relationship exception. Mother also argues that the juvenile court deprived her of
due process by excluding relevant and favorable evidence. Father joins in mother’s
arguments.2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2022, the Kern County Department of Human Services (department)
initiated the present dependency proceedings after receiving a referral alleging the child,
at two-months of age, was at risk of severe physical harm in the custody of father and
mother due to severe physical abuse of the child’s sibling, L.F. There was concern the
child was at risk based on his older sibling’s suffering of skull fractures, subdural
hematomas, retinal hemorrhages, clavicle fractures, rib fractures, femur fractures, and
chronic bruising to the face as an infant.
The Sibling’s Case
The sibling’s case came to the attention of the Arizona Department of Child Safety
(DCS) on June 16, 2021, when then four-month-old L.F. was transported to the hospital
by ambulance after he started having seizures and became unresponsive. Law
enforcement responded to the hospital after receiving a report that L.F. had a life
threatening brain bleed and skull fractures, which appeared to be the result of abuse. X-
rays at the hospital revealed three skull fractures, a brain bleed, five rib fractures, bilateral

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Father asserts that if mother’s challenge is successful, his parental rights must
also be reinstated. (See California Rules of Court, rule 5.725(a)(1).)

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clavicle fractures in different stages of healing, a “bucket handle” fracture of the right and
left femur, fractured metatarsals in the right foot, and swelling in the spine.
Mother and father were interviewed by law enforcement during their investigation
of suspected child abuse. The family recently moved to Arizona from another state
because father was transferred by his employment. L.F. started going to daycare on
Thursday, June 10, 2021, and he threw up at the daycare on Friday, June 11, 2021. On
Saturday night, L.F. was up screaming all night due to constipation.
Mother picked L.F. up from the daycare on Monday, June 14, 2021, because he
was vomiting. On that same date, daycare workers made reports of child abuse after
observing bruising on L.F.’s face and bottom. Law enforcement and DCS did not observe
any noticeable bruising when investigating on that date. Mother acknowledged that L.F.
had a bruise and scratch on his bottom, but she did not know how they happened. Mother
took L.F. to urgent care on Tuesday morning for his fever. Later in the afternoon, L.F.
continued to have a fever and mother took him to the hospital. L.F. was sent home from
the urgent care and the hospital with instructions to be given Tylenol.
On the afternoon of Wednesday, June 16, 2021, L.F. was feeling better and playing
with his toys. The family went out for food that evening, and L.F. began to cry while
they stood in line. Father took L.F. to their truck to change his diaper, and he noticed L.F.
did not seem responsive as he laid him down. As father came back into the restaurant, he
told mother that “something was not right with [L.F.].” Mother described L.F.’s breathing
as labored and wheezing, and his eyes and head rolled back when father handed him to
her. The parents called 911 and an ambulance transported L.F. to the hospital.
Mother suspected that L.F. was injured during his first day at the daycare. When
informed that L.F. had older injuries, mother explained how she heard “popping sounds”
while they held him under the armpits on a trip to Bakersfield in March of 2021. She
also believed L.F. had brittle bones because she could not explain his fractures. Both

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parents also recalled an incident where L.F. bumped his face on father’s cheek, which
caused a bruise the week before he started daycare. Father claimed L.F. fell out of his
hands while he was showering a week earlier, but he caught L.F. with his hands. He also
believed L.F. hit his head on a door jamb, but he could not recall the exact date.
Neither parent could recall any incidents that could have caused L.F.’s fractures.
However, mother had numerous photographs on her cell phone of bruises, bumps, and
broken skin on various places of L.F.’s body and face on 11 dates from February 14,
2021, to June 2, 2021. The injuries included: bruises and scratches to the face and
abdomen, bruising on the jugular notch, a bump, bruise and abrasion on his forehead at
the hairline, minimal bruising under his eye, a blood spot under his tongue, a torn
frenulum, and visible abrasions to his upper gums.
Law enforcement and DCS consulted with one of the doctors from L.F.’s “Child
At Risk Evaluation” team. Dr. Woolridge was unable to date L.F.’s skull fracture, but the
brain bleeds that were likely associated with the skull fracture were described as acute.
One of L.F.’s clavicle fractures were older and the other was acute. L.F.’s rib fractures
were noted as “the only clearly older fractures.” L.F.’s right femur fracture was acute,
and his foot fracture was “age indeterminate.”
Dr. Woolridge had concerns that L.F.’s trauma was nonaccidental in nature. He
concluded that L.F.’s head trauma likely occurred during the diaper change in the truck at
the restaurant because he would have been symptomatic almost immediately after
suffering the injury. Dr. Woolridge also suggested that the skull fracture to the back of
L.F.’s head was caused by his head being hit against something with padding on it
because there was no obvious external bruising on the back of his head.
Mother was arrested for failing to protect L.F. due to the past injuries and trying to
dissuade the investigation by accusing daycare staff. On June 25, 2021, DCS filed a
petition regarding L.F., and he was placed into protective custody on June 29, 2021. DCS

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alleged that mother and father knew or reasonably should have known that another
person caused L.F. to suffer a serious physical injury, and the Arizona court found that the
allegations of the petitions were true.
On July 23, 2021, L.F. was placed with his maternal aunt and uncle in Bakersfield.
Both parents entered a no contest plea, and L.F. was adjudicated as a dependent of the
Arizona Superior Court in September 2021. In January 2022, DCS recommended that a
plan of adoption be established for L.F. Both parents contested the adoption and
requested a permanent plan of legal guardianship.
The Child’s Removal
On December 1, 2022, the department received a referral indicating father and
mother had an open dependency case due to substantiated severe physical abuse of L.F. in
Arizona. Mother moved to Kern County in September of 2022 and gave birth to the child
in September 2022. Father continued to live in Arizona, but he traveled to Bakersfield
regularly to visit L.F. Mother refused to answer the door when a social worker from the
department made a visit to her home, and she declined to speak with the social worker.
The department social worker spoke to the investigating detective in Arizona and a
DCS social worker regarding the circumstances surrounding L.F.’s injuries. The
detective summarized their investigation of the June 2021 incident for the department
social worker. The detective also reported that there was a previous incident in 2009,
where the four-month-old child of a female friend sustained a skull fracture and brain
bleed while in father’s care. After the initial investigation of the four-month-old child’s
injuries, father apologized for lying to law enforcement in a letter. He claimed the other
child hit his head on the headboard while his female friend was showering, and the
female friend then found the child unresponsive. On December 7, 2022, the child was
taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant.

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The department filed an original petition alleging the child was described by
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (j). The petition alleged the child was at substantial risk
of suffering serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by mother and father based
upon the previous injuries to the child’s sibling and the parents’ inability to provide a
reasonable explanation for the injuries.
The Arizona Superior Court declined jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) on December 14, 2022. At the
conclusion of a contested detention hearing, the court ordered the child detained and set a
combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing for February 1, 2023. Supervised
visitation was ordered to occur twice per week for two hours between the parents and
child.
The department’s jurisdiction report recommended that the allegations in the
original petition be found true. A contested jurisdiction hearing took place on March 27,
2023, after multiple continuances, and both mother and father testified. The juvenile
court found all of the allegations of the petition true and continued the disposition hearing
to April 11, 2023.
The department’s disposition report recommended that both parents be denied
services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) and the setting of a section 366.26
hearing. The child was placed with a nonrelative extended family member in
Bakersfield. He was developmentally on target for his age with no medical issues noted.
Mother was living with her parents in Bakersfield, and father recently moved to
Bakersfield.
Mother did not understand why the child was removed from her care, and both
parents claimed inaccurate information was provided by DCS in Arizona. Father
reported completion of two anger management classes, two parenting classes, and a
psychological evaluation for L.F.’s case. Mother was participating in nurturing parenting

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and child neglect, physical abuse as a perpetrator, and learning to protect classes. Mother
and father were participating in supervised visits, and they interacted appropriately and
affectionately with the child. Mother fed him formula from a bottle and walked him
around the visitation room in her arms. She often shared hugs and kisses with the child
during visitation.
L.F.’s social worker from DCS reported that neither parent had taken responsibility
for L.F.’s injuries, but mother recently accepted that the injuries could have happened
while he was in their care. According to the DCS social worker, four medical doctors
testified during L.F.’s case indicating that L.F.’s injuries were consistent with
nonaccidental trauma. The parents had no experts testify as to other potential causes
during L.F.’s case. Both parents still believed L.F.’s injuries were caused by the daycare
or mishandling by doctors at the hospital.
The department did not recommend reunification services for either parent
because they had not taken responsibility for the severe physical abuse of L.F. or
provided a plausible explanation for L.F.’s injuries. The report acknowledged that both
parents established a bond with the child, but the department continued to believe that the
parents’ inability to explain the child’s injuries placed the child at a continued risk of
nonaccidental harm by the parents.
The contested disposition hearing began on May 11, 2023, with both mother and
father present. The child’s care provider testified that the child lived in her home since
late December 2022. She also testified that the child recognized mother’s voice during
phone calls every day and appeared excited to visit with mother. The child was observed
crying on occasion when mother placed him into the car seat after a visit. Both mother
and the care provider were referred to as “mama” by the child. Mother provided
supplies, clothes, and breast milk for the child as needed.

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The aide responsible for supervising the parents’ weekly visits testified that mother
comforted the child appropriately and she did not have to intervene in mother’s visits.
Mother brought toys, books, and food to her visits. The child was responsive to mother’s
voice, and mother comforted him throughout the visitation. The aide believed one could
tell that the child was happy and wanted to be around mother.
Mother testified that the child lived with her for the first two and a half months of
his life prior to removal. She had participated in classes to improve her parenting in both
Arizona and California. Her requests to progress her visitation beyond a visitation center
were denied by the department.
Mother and father were currently living together, and father was around the child on
occasion for the first two months of his life.
Mother testified about the topics she was learning in her courses, and she applied
the skills during her visitation. Mother’s counsel asked her how she demonstrated what
she learned to the department. Mother responded that, “at the beginning of this process, I
provided visit notes from [L.F.], and they were disregarded. So that’s why I’m still
confused at how the Department would know how my parenting skills are, if they don’t
consider visitation reports.”
On cross-examination, mother acknowledged photographing injuries on L.F. on
several dates prior to his hospitalization. Mother had reviewed the various records from
the sibling’s case, and she was aware of a report of injuries to another child who was in
father’s care in 2009. She testified that neither her or father ever intentionally harmed
L.F. Mother also testified that she “[had] not witnessed any reason to believe” that father
injured L.F., and she had “only witnessed him as a safe person.” Seeking further
clarification, the juvenile court asked if it was possible that father could have been
inappropriate with L.F. Mother responded, “I believe anything is possible.”

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On May 24, 2023, the juvenile court allowed counsel to present argument before
its ruling on the contested disposition. Mother’s counsel requested that the juvenile court
observe a visit between the child and mother prior to making its ruling. The juvenile
court denied mother’s request. After hearing argument from counsel, the juvenile court
ordered the child removed from the parents’ custody and denied family reunification
services to both parents pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).3 A section 366.26
hearing was set for September 21, 2023, and mother’s visitation remained supervised at
twice per week for two hours.
Selection and Implementation Hearing
The section 366.26 report, dated September 11, 2023, recommended that mother
and father’s parental rights be terminated and a plan of adoption be ordered. The child, at
11 months old, had no noted health concerns and appeared to be developing appropriately
for his age. He was recently placed in the home of his maternal aunt and L.F. on June 11,
2023. The maternal aunt was interested in adopting the child and L.F.
The report noted that mother continued to visit regularly with the child. She was
appropriate and attentive during the visits, and she provided snacks and activities for the
child. Mother showed affection for the child with hugs and kisses. The child slept in
mother’s arms, and he was comforted by mother when he cried. At the conclusion of
visits mother kissed and passed the child to the care provider with no distress noted.
The social worker acknowledged that mother had consistently visited with the
child. However, it was determined that the child likely viewed her as a friendly visitor
due to the length of time that he had been out of her care. The department considered the
parental relationship to be minimal, and it concluded that it would not be detrimental to
terminate parental rights. The current relative care providers were observed to meet the

3 Mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ relief challenging the juvenile
court’s order, which we denied. (K.F. v. Superior Court, (Aug. 17, 2023, F086322
[nonpub. opn.].)

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child’s daily needs, and they expressed a full commitment to providing a permanent home
for the child through adoption. The child looked to the relative care providers to meet his
physical and emotional needs, and he was fully integrated into their family. The social
worker noted that the child appeared to be calm, happy, and easily comforted by the
relative care providers. He willingly went to them and smiled while he was in their arms.
A contested section 366.26 hearing was held on November 9, 2023. Mother and
father were both present for the hearing. Mother’s counsel requested that the court accept
her offer of proof regarding her excuses for missed visits. The aide responsible for
supervising six of mother’s visits since August 2023 testified about her observations. The
child appeared to be comfortable and happy with mother. There were no issues when the
child was separated from mother or father at the end of visits.
Mother’s counsel argued that severing mother’s parental relationship would be
harmful to the child, and she requested that the court refuse to terminate parental rights.
Father’s counsel also argued that his parental rights should not be terminated based upon
the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. Counsel for the department and
the child argued that the parents had not proven that an exception to adoption was
applicable.
After hearing argument from all counsel, the juvenile court proceeded to its ruling
on the beneficial relationship exception by acknowledging that mother visited
consistently. The court described mother’s visits as positive, and it explained that, “the
parents obviously love their child very much, and the child enjoys the visits.” However,
it concluded that there was no evidence to show that there was a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment between the child and either parent.
The court continued to examine the third prong of the parent-child relationship
exception in the event that there was a substantial, positive, emotional attachment. The
court acknowledged that it was not comparing the parents’ attributes to the care provider

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or determining whether the parent could provide a home for the child. It concluded its
analysis regarding the detriment of severing the parental relationship against the benefits
of an adoptive home as follows:

“I have no evidence regarding the detriment that [the child] would … have if the
parental rights were terminated. The evidence indicates to me at this point that
he’s been in out-of-home care for 11 months; that the benefits of being in an
adoptive permanent home outweigh any detriment. [¶] And again, I think at best
[the child] would suffer minimal detriment if parental rights were severed, but it
appears that the caregiver, the maternal aunt, is open to post-adoption contact; so
at this time I do not believe that the parents meet either the second or the third
prong and will follow the recommendations in the report.”

The court proceeded to follow the department’s recommendation and terminated
the parental rights of mother and father and selected a plan of adoption for the child.
Both parents filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
Mother contends that the juvenile court erred when it did not apply the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception to adoption. Mother argues that she met her burden to
prove all three of the elements of the exception and the juvenile court relied on an
improper factor.
A. Legal Principles
At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and
order the child be placed for adoption unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) One of the statutory exceptions is the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining
that termination would be detrimental to the child” where “[t]he parents have maintained

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regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
A parent claiming an exception to adoption has the burden of proof to establish by
a preponderance of evidence that the exception applies. (In re Melvin A. (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.) Thus, the parent must prove three elements in order to prevail
under the beneficial relationship exception: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a
relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.).)
The first element of the beneficial relationship determination asks the
“straightforward” question of whether the parent visited consistently, considering the
extent permitted by court orders. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The focus is
on the best interest of the child as opposed to punishing or rewarding parents for good
behavior in maintaining contact. (Ibid.)
The second element of the exception asks whether the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The parent-child
relationship “may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect
of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The juvenile court’s focus
should again be on the child, and it “must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child
relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern.” (Caden C., at p. 632.)
When considering the third element, courts must determine “how the child would
be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 633.) Potential negative effects from severance of the relationship might

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include “emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in
school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.” (Ibid.) An adoptive home might provide a
new source of stability that alleviates emotional instability and preoccupation leading to
those problems, making the loss “not, at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.) Under
this element, the court is again guided by the child’s best interest, but in a “specific way:
it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the
sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Ibid.)
In Caden C., the court held “that because the parent continued to struggle with
substance abuse and mental health issues and because of the risks of foster care and
benefits of the potential adoptive home, no reasonable court could find the child’s
relationship with his parent outweighed the benefits of adoption.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 625–626.) Rejecting that conclusion, our Supreme Court found “[t]he
Court of Appeal did not explain how the parent’s struggles related to the specific
elements of the statutory exception: the importance of the child’s relationship with the
parent or the detriment of losing that relationship.” (Id. at p. 626.) A parent’s struggles
with issues that led to dependency were determined to be relevant only to the extent they
inform whether the child would “benefit from continuing the relationship and be harmed,
on balance, by losing it.” (Id. at p. 638.)
B. Standard of Review
Appellate courts review a juvenile court’s ruling on the application of the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception using a “hybrid” standard. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) The substantial evidence standard applies to the first
two elements of regular visitation and existence of a beneficial relationship. (Id. at
pp. 639–640.) The juvenile court’s decision as to the third element—whether termination
of parental rights would be detrimental to the child—is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) “Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused

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not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses its
discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
The standard of review of a court’s determination that a parent did not meet his or
her burden to prove an exception to termination of parental rights is “whether the
evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In re I.W.
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of
O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) Specifically, the question is “whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.)
C. Analysis
In the present case, the juvenile court determined that mother did not meet her
burden of proof as to the application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.
Mother contends that evidence was presented that would support a finding of the
existence of a beneficial relationship between the child and mother that would outweigh
the benefits of adoption. In support of her contention, mother cites to evidence that she
had positive and affectionate interactions with the child during visits. While mother
consistently visited the child, satisfying the first prong of the exception, she failed to
identify any evidence which would compel a finding that termination of her parental
rights would cause the child great harm.
The evidence before the court established that the child appeared to enjoy the
supervised visits that occurred with mother twice per week from two months of age to
thirteen months of age. However, evidence that the child had pleasant visits with mother
is not enough to preserve parental rights. (See In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823,
827 [“The parent must do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’

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[citation] an emotional bond with the child, or that parent and child find their visits
pleasant”].) Mother also cites to evidence that the child sometimes appeared upset at the
conclusion of visits during the beginning of the case.
Mother’s visitation with the child never progressed beyond supervised, and the
testimony regarding more recent visitation indicated that the child had no difficulty
separating from mother at the end of visits. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the
child was suffering any type of emotional harm as a result of the limited interaction with
mother over the past year in out-of-home placement. In fact, the department’s report
indicated that the child had been fully integrated into the relative care providers’ family
and appeared calm and happy with them. He was easily comforted, willingly went to
them, and smiled while he was in their arms.
At such a young age, the child needed permanency and stability, which the relative
care providers were willing and able to provide. The limited relationship mother was
able to maintain through supervised visits in the several months that the child transitioned
from a newborn to toddler in out-of-home care is not that extraordinary case where
preservation of parental rights outweighs the preference for adoption. (In re G.B. (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1166 [“ ‘ “it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of
the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive
placement” ’ ”].) Based on the present record, we cannot find that the court erred in
declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.
Mother also cites to the case of In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155 (M.V.), in
support of her contention that the juvenile court improperly relied on the relative care
providers’ willingness to allow post-adoption contact when it declined to apply the
exception to adoption. In M.V., the juvenile court acknowledged that the child wanted to
remain in contact with her parents and live with both her parents and her relative care
providers, and that she would be sad if she could not see her parents again. (Id. at p.

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1184.) The court then moved on to the third, detriment element, before it “caught itself”
and stated that there was clearly a bond with the child and parents. (Id. at pp. 1184–
1185.) There was no further discussion about the beneficial relationship element of the
analysis, which caused the appellate court to describe the analysis as “cursory,” and state,
“The court does not appear to have evaluated the quality of the parent-child relationships
or to have considered factors such as M.V.’s age, how much of her life she spent in her
parents’ custody, the positive or negative effects of interaction with the parents, and
M.V.’s particular needs. [Citation.] This was error.” (Id. at p. 1185.)
In addition, the appellate court determined that the juvenile court improperly relied
upon a bonding evaluator’s opinion that adoption by relative care providers would keep
the child’s relationship with her parents intact because the relatives were willing to have
an open adoption. (M.V., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1173–1174, 1178.) The appellate
court further explained that the bonding evaluator’s “preference for adoption over
guardianship rested on the legally untenable and factually questionable idea that adoption
would leave M.V.’s relationship with her parents unchanged because the grandparents
would permit continued contact with the parents. This is entirely the opposite of the legal
effect of adoption.” (Id. at p. 1181.) The appellate court held that “to the extent the court
relied on the expectation of continued contact between M.V. and the parents after
adoption, this was an impermissible consideration.” (Id. at pp. 1185–1186.)
A similar claim was also considered in the case of In re C.B. (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 102 (C.B.), which involved 9-, 10-, and 17-year-old children “ ‘of an age
where they are intellectually and emotionally aware of whom their parents are.’ ” The
juvenile court had implicitly found the existence of a “substantial, positive emotional
parent-child attachment despite the lack of day-to-day contact.” (Id. at p. 126.)
However, it stated “ ‘[t]here is no evidence that that [loving] connection [between mother
and the children] would be severed if the Court were to terminate parental rights. The

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Court cannot see that terminating parental rights would “greatly harm” the children .…’ ”
(Id. at p. 127.) Based in part on this belief, the juvenile court ultimately proceeded to
terminate parental rights. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal found that the juvenile court erred by injecting an improper
factor into the weighing process and concluded as follows,

“[I]f a juvenile court determines that a parent has ‘maintained regular
visitation and contact’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)), that there is a
‘substantial, positive emotional attachment’ between child and parent
benefitting the child [citation], and that the benefit from continuing that
parent-child relationship in a tenuous placement ‘promotes the well-being
of the child to such a degree as to outweigh’ the benefit that child would
gain from the stability and permanency of adoption [citation], then the
parent-child relationship exception is established. In those circumstances,
the court cannot nevertheless terminate parental rights based upon an
unenforceable expectation that the prospective adoptive parents will
voluntarily permit future contact between the child and a biological parent,
even if substantial evidence supports that expectation.” (C.B., supra, 190
Cal.App.4th p. 128.)
Here, unlike the cases of M.V. and C.B., we do not believe that the juvenile court
ordered termination of parental rights on the expectation that there would be ongoing
contact between the mother and the child. The juvenile court never found that there was
a substantial, positive relationship between mother and the child. Furthermore, it made
no express statement that there would be no severance of the parent-child relationship
based on an agreement for postadoption contact. Nothing about the juvenile court’s
ruling indicated it had found sufficient evidence to support the existence of a beneficial
relationship and then declined to apply the exception based on an unenforceable promise
of future visitation.
The juvenile court made its comment regarding possible future contact after it had
already concluded that the benefits of being in an adoptive permanent home outweighed
any detriment. We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile court’s order
(In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 250–251), and a reasonable inference from

17.
the record is that the juvenile court was merely commending the child’s relative care
provider as a digression during its weighty decision to terminate mother’s parental rights.
The court appeared to be expressing a positive note that mother might still be allowed to
maintain contact in order to soften the blow of its forthcoming orders. The totality of the
juvenile court’s statements at the hearing makes clear that it decided to terminate
mother’s parental rights because she failed to meet her burden of proving the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception.
In sum, the evidence in the record weighed in favor of the preferred permanency
option of adoption. Given the fact that the child was only one year old, showed no
distress when separating from mother, and was already comfortable with her relative care
providers, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.4 Under these
circumstances, the juvenile court’s ruling is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and
remand is unwarranted. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) Therefore, the juvenile
court did not err in declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception,
and its orders terminating mother and father’s parental rights were proper.
II. Due Process and Fair Hearing
Mother also asserts that the juvenile “precluded [her] from presenting the
necessary facts to defend her parental rights.” She contends that she was deprived of a
fair hearing because the department only provided excerpts of visitation notes, she was
not permitted to provide her own visitation notes, and the court did not observe a visit
between her and the child.
A. Legal Principles

4 We acknowledge that mother loves her son very much. It is clear that she made
an effort to maintain her bond with him through the visitation that she was permitted to
have during these proceedings. However, her ability to develop the type of relationship
that could establish the exception was hindered once reunification services were denied
and a section 366.26 hearing was set.

18.
Due process requires “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.” (Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S.
306, 314.) The juvenile court “is accorded broad general authority to control its
proceedings.” (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 758.) The
juvenile court’s discretion to control proceedings must be exercised consistent with due
process. (Lois R. v. Superior Court (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 895, 902 [parent has “right to
the custody of her child,” which “could not be deprived without an essential ingredient of
due process, to wit, a fair hearing”].) A parent’s due process right to present evidence in a
dependency proceeding is limited to relevant evidence of significant probative value to
the contested issues. (Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1147.)
B. Standard of Review
The trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of
evidence. (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 911.) We review juvenile court
orders regarding the control of dependency proceedings and exclusion of evidence for
abuse of discretion. (See Ingrid E., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 753; see In re Stephanie
M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 [court abuses discretion by “ ‘ “making an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd determination” ' ”].)
C. Analysis
Mother argues the juvenile court denied her a meaningful opportunity to be heard
by limiting the evidence regarding her visitation with the child to excerpts of notes
contained in the department’s reports. We conclude she had ample opportunity to present
her case, and she does not establish any abuse of discretion or due process violation.
First, the juvenile court did not prevent mother from introducing her own notes
from visitation with the child. Mother testified at the disposition phase of the
proceedings that she provided the department notes from her visits with the child’s

19.
sibling, L.F., to demonstrate her parenting skills. At the section 366.26 hearing, mother
was permitted to provide an offer of proof regarding her excuses for missing certain visits
with the child over the course of the proceedings. However, she did not attempt to
introduce any additional evidence or notes from her visits with the child. Her argument
to the contrary is without merit.
Next, mother argues that the department only presented excerpts of visitation notes
that were favorable to the department, which deprived her of a fair hearing. As mother
did not object below to the adequacy of the adoption assessment, she cannot make these
challenges on appeal. (In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [waiver of issue
of adequacy of adoption assessment].) Such a contention also fails on the merits because
the excerpts of mother’s visits did in fact provide favorable characterizations of mother’s
interactions with the child. The descriptions of mother’s visits were primarily positive,
and the juvenile court considered live testimony from one of the department’s aides
providing supervision of the visits. Mother was permitted to cross-examine the aide, and
she did not seek to introduce any additional documentation from her visits. Thus, the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the department’s summaries of
visitation between mother and the child.
Finally, we also reject mother’s claim that the juvenile court erred when it denied
her request to observe a visit between herself and the child. Mother made this request
during closing argument for the contested disposition hearing. Her counsel requested that
the juvenile court delay its decision on disposition to allow the court to personally
observe a visit between mother and the child. The juvenile court denied the request
because the evidentiary portion of the disposition hearing was closed, and the department
had documented many visits between mother and the child. Similar to the section 366.26
hearing, there was also testimony regarding the positive nature of mother’s visits with the

20.
child. Mother did not raise the denial of her request for observation in her previous writ
petition, or at the section 366.26 hearing.
The forfeiture rule (often called the waiver rule), which precludes raising on
appeal a challenge to any order entered in a prior hearing, as to which the time to appeal
has expired, applies in all dependency cases “unless due process forbids it.” (In re Janee
J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 208 (Janee J.).) The rule, embodied in section 395 and in
section 366.26, subd. (l), promotes the “dominant concerns of finality and reasonable
expedition” in dependency matters. (Janee J., at p. 207.) With respect to “setting
order[s],” i.e., orders setting a section 366.26 hearing, the rule also promotes the
predominant interest of the child, at the late stages of the dependency, “preventing a
sabotage of the process and preserving the legislative scheme of restricting appeals of
final-stage termination orders.” (Ibid.) Section 366.26, subd. (l) precludes review of any
issues decided at the setting hearing by any means other than a timely petition for
extraordinary writ relief. (§ 366.26(l)(1), (l)(2).)
In general, the forfeiture rule should be waived if two conditions are met. First,
there must be “some defect that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme so that
the parent would have been kept from availing himself or herself of the protections
afforded by the scheme as a whole.” (Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 208.) Lack of
notice of writ review rights is one example of such a defect. (Id. at pp. 208–209, citing In
re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722–724.) Second, the defects “must go
beyond mere errors that might have been held reversible had they been properly and
timely reviewed.” (Janee J., at p. 209.)
Here, the issue mother raises does not amount to a defect going beyond an
ordinary error that could have been addressed in a timely writ petition. Nor is it a defect
that prevented mother from availing herself of the protections afforded by the
dependency scheme as a whole. The juvenile court clearly explained its reasons for

21.
denying her request for court observation of a visit prior to ruling on disposition. Mother
provided no rational explanation for her failure to timely challenge the juvenile court’s
prior ruling. Accordingly, there is no justification for waiving that requirement. (Janee
J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 208–209; see also In re Dakota H. (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 212, 221–222 [failure to raise due process claim in lower court results in
forfeiture].)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
or violate mother’s right to due process by excluding any relevant evidence at the section
366.26 hearing.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

SMITH, J.
WE CONCUR:

POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

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