CourtListener 10114456•Razavi v. Razavi CA2/7
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Filed 9/11/24 Razavi v. Razavi CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
MICHELLE RAZAVI, B324113
Petitioner and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21SMRO00136)
SEYED RAZAVI,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Los Angeles County Superior
Court, Joshua D. Wayser, Judge. Affirmed.
Michelle Razavi, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Lozoya & Lozoya and Robin J. Lozoya for Respondent.
_________________________________
Michelle Razavi appeals from an order denying her request
for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her father,
Seyed Razavi.1 Michelle contends the family court abused its
1 Where the parties have the same surname we refer to them
by their first names to avoid confusion.
discretion in denying the DVRO because she submitted substantial
evidence of abuse, the court applied an incorrect legal standard, and
it improperly excluded evidence showing Seyed’s past abuse.
Michelle also argues the court violated her due process rights by
displaying bias in favor of Seyed’s attorneys. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Michelle’s Request for a DVRO
On July 30, 2021 Michelle filed a request for a DVRO against
Seyed, seeking to protect Michelle, her mother (Farhad Rahimi),2
and her brother (Michael Razavi).3 In the request Michelle stated,
“[Seyed] has physically and verbally abused me throughout my
entire life. . . . He has sent me endless texts, emails, [and] openly
admitted to stalking me online to keep tabs on me. . . . He most
recently trespassed into the parking garage of my apartment
complex and left an intimidating note signed by him on my car . . .
.” The application listed the “date of most recent abuse” as July 29,
2021. The application attached one page of a police report listing
dates of occurrence as May 5, 2021 and July 29, 2021 and
describing the incident as “unk[nown] susp[ect](s) continued
sending multiple emails/text messages from different email
accounts and phone numbers to vict[im] after being advised that
they were unwelcomed.”
2 Rahimi and Seyed’s marriage was dissolved in 2001.
3 On our own motion we augment the record with Michelle’s
July 30, 2021 request for a DVRO, Michelle’s October 20, 2021
application for order for posting of summons, and the exhibits
Michelle filed in support of her March 25, 2022 declaration. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
2
The family court4 issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
restraining Seyed and protecting Michelle, Rahimi, and Michael,
and the court set a hearing on the DVRO for August 24, 2021. Over
the subsequent three months, however, Michelle had difficulty
serving Seyed with the TRO and notice of the DVRO hearing. On
October 20, 2021 Michelle filed an application for order for posting
of summons requesting alternative service pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 413.30. The application attached a form
declaration signed by Michelle on September 16, 2021 stating “see
attached declaration of Michelle Razavi” (capitalization omitted).
The form declaration attached an undated declaration signed by
Michelle (the September 16, 2021 declaration).
The September 16, 2021 declaration provided additional
information regarding Seyed’s conduct starting in 2004 when
Michelle was a teenager. Michelle declared that in 2005 Seyed
screamed profanities at Rahimi, in 2008 he ruined Michelle’s
birthday because Rahimi had to go to court to defend against
creditors as a result of Seyed’s alleged embezzlement, and while
Michelle was in high school Seyed made daily calls to the family
home “to check on [Rahimi] and see where she was.”
Regarding recent events, Michelle stated that on October 12,
2019 she received an anonymous call saying her mother would be
harmed or killed if Michelle appeared as a witness in her parents’
divorce proceeding. Then, in May 2021 Seyed sent her an email
wishing her happy birthday despite her request not to have contact
with him, and on July 26, 2021 Seyed drove by her as she left her
place of work. On July 29, 2021 Seyed placed a note from “Dad” on
4 Judge Susan Lopez-Giss issued the temporary restraining
order and presided over the case through the beginning of
January 2022.
3
the windshield of her car parked in her apartment complex’s gated
parking area, even though she had previously asked Seyed to stop
contacting her.
On October 20, 2021 the family court granted Michelle’s
request for alternative service under Family Code section 6340,
subdivision (a)(2)(A),5 authorizing Michelle to serve Seyed by mail
and post the summons in the Santa Monica courthouse for 28 days.
On December 20, 2021 Seyed appeared at the hearing, and the
court found good cause had not been shown to include Rahimi and
Michael as protected persons under the TRO.6 The court continued
the hearing on the DVRO.
On January 18, 2022 Seyed filed a response to Michelle’s
request for a DVRO in which he denied Michelle’s allegations. In
his supporting declaration, he acknowledged that he sent the May
5, 2021 email to Michelle wishing her a happy birthday. He
attached the email, which read: “Hope your birthday is as
extraordinary and special as you are, and may you forever sparkle
and shine like the star that you are and I wish you a birthday that
is as beautiful, incredible, and unique as you are. The last ten
years, I can only see you through social media . . . , however what I
see makes me proud of you for being happy, healthy, and successful
. . . . I wish I get a chance someday to tell you my side of the story .
. . . Being my favorite has not been easy on you, however we all
have been dealt a hand that we have to play no matter what. Be
happy, positive and continue to make me proud.” Michelle
5 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Family
Code.
6 After Seyed informed the family court that Rahimi and
Michael did not live in Los Angeles County, the court stated, “They
will be removed because they should not have been included.”
4
responded, “Don’t you ever fucking dare email me at my work ever
again. Such a violation of privacy to follow me on Instagram you
creep.” Seyed stated his email was intended to be a “positive loving
birthday email,” and Michelle’s response caused him pain.
Seyed stated he had not reached out to Michelle in the two
years prior to sending the email. Further, he had not contacted
Michelle since the May 5, 2021 email, he did not leave any notes on
her car, he did not show up at her work, and he did not ask anyone
else to contact her. He believed Michelle lived in San Francisco,
and he only learned that she had relocated to the Santa Monica
area after she requested a DVRO. Seyed denied that he had ever
been abusive to Michelle or Rahimi. Seyed and Rahimi were
married for 13 years.
Seyed also declared that although his relationship with
Michelle had been strained, in 2016 he gave a car to her as a gift.
They corresponded by email about the car, and after receiving the
gift, Michelle sent a photograph to Seyed of her standing in front of
the car.
On January 13, 2022 Seyed filed evidentiary objections to
Michelle’s September 16, 2021 declaration.7 Michelle filed a
response to Seyed’s objections, and at the January 19, 2022 hearing
7 There has been significant confusion on appeal regarding
which declaration Seyed objected to in January 2022, much of
which has been caused by Seyed’s counsel. Seyed’s objections stated
they were in response to a December 20, 2021 declaration.
However, Michelle has adamantly denied filing any declaration on
that date, and Seyed’s counsel has since acknowledged that date
was incorrect. It is clear from our comparison of Michelle’s
September 16, 2021 declaration and Seyed’s January 13, 2022
objections (which quote Michelle’s declaration) that Seyed objected
to Michelle’s September 16 declaration.
5
the family court8 stated it had ruled on Seyed’s evidentiary
objections “[a]fter considering the objections and the response.” In
its January 19 rulings, the court sustained many of Seyed’s
objections.9
B. The Hearing on the DVRO Request
On March 25, 2022, two weeks prior to the continued hearing
date, Michelle filed a 10-page declaration with 37 exhibits in
support of her request for a DVRO. The declaration contained
much of the same information as the September 16, 2021
declaration regarding allegations of abuse by Seyed dating back to
2005. Seyed filed evidentiary objections to the declaration.
At the outset of the pretrial hearing held on April 4, 2022, the
family court stated its view that evidence regarding Michelle’s
childhood and the parents’ divorce was not material to whether
Seyed disturbed Michelle’s peace because “people have a right to
say to other people, including their parents, I don’t want to see you.
And then the question becomes did the father take steps to disturb
the daughter’s peace.” Michelle’s attorney argued that he would
like to present evidence showing how Seyed’s relationship with the
family started to “sour” in 2005, Seyed failed to take financial
responsibility for Michelle, and when Michelle confronted him,
Seyed responded in an extreme and violent manner, causing
8 Judge Joshua D. Wayser signed the order and presided over
subsequent proceedings in the case.
9 Michelle does not specifically address the evidentiary rulings
on appeal, and she has therefore forfeited any challenge to the
family court’s rulings. (Villanueva v. City of Colton (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1197; Roe v. McDonald’s Corp. (2005)
129 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114.)
6
Michelle to flee the family home. The court declined to consider
evidence prior to 2009, emphasizing that it was Michelle’s right not
to have contact with Seyed, which the court took as a “given,” and
thus the question at the hearing was how Seyed in response
“proceeded and conducted himself and how [Michelle] responded to
that.”
The court admitted Michelle’s September 16, 2021 declaration
and Seyed’s declaration in response to the request for a TRO,
subject to the court’s prior evidentiary rulings. The court did not
admit Michelle’s March 25, 2022 declaration, finding it was
duplicative of her September 16, 2021 declaration, and the court
therefore did not “need it.”
The hearing on Michelle’s request for a DVRO took place over
four days between April 4 and August 17, 2022. Michelle, Seyed,
and the parties’ experts testified.
1. Michelle’s testimony
Michelle testified that “the past six months have been the
most horrific experience of my life.” She continued, “And all I am
here for today is just to be safe and to sleep at night and not to
worry about my safety.” She explained that she and Seyed had
been estranged since 2009, and she told him she did not want to
have any contact with him. In 2016 Seyed contacted Rahimi and
offered to purchase a car for Michelle. Michelle initially refused,
but she later agreed to accept the gift on the condition that Seyed
not contact her or expect a relationship with her. Michelle admitted
she sent a photograph of herself with the car to Seyed but claimed
she did so only after Rahimi directed her to thank him. Michelle
stated, “I sent him the photo, and I thanked him because that was
the polite thing to do, but I was very clear in that I did not want any
communication. I did not want a relationship.”
7
For several years, Michelle and Seyed had no further contact
until Seyed sent her a text message in 2018 regarding her parents’
divorce proceeding. Michelle responded by emailing Seyed, with the
intent to “clearly communicate to him that I don’t want any
communication with him.” Michelle asserted Seyed ignored her
request on October 12, 2019, when he called her from a blocked
number and threatened to hurt her and Rahimi if she testified in
the divorce proceeding. According to Michelle, Seyed identified
himself on the call, and she recognized his voice.
In May 5, 2021 Michelle received an email from Seyed
wishing her a happy birthday, which stated that Seyed could only
see her “through social media,” and what he could see “makes me
proud of you for being happy, healthy, and successful.” Seyed added
that he hoped to “get a chance someday to tell you my side of the
story.” Michelle testified the email made her feel violated, and she
felt Seyed was stalking her online and was “obsessed with” her.
She responded to the email with profanity to send Seyed a clear
message that she did not want him to contact her.
Michelle’s next contact with Seyed was when he “drove past
her” on July 26, 2021, while she was leaving her place of work at a
fitness center.10 Michelle explained she taught fitness classes, and
her schedule was posted online. Seyed made eye contact with her
from his car, then drove away. Michelle stated the incident made
her feel “[t]errified, violated, watched; [and] unsafe.”
10 Michelle also testified regarding telephone calls her business
partner and her business partner’s parents received in June 2021.
The calls were from a blocked number, but Michelle testified the
caller identified herself as Seyed’s sister and warned Michelle’s
business partner that Michelle had stolen money from Seyed. In
response to hearsay objections, the family court stated it was not
admitting the testimony for its truth.
8
On July 29, 2021 Michelle found a typewritten note on her
windshield that was “written in the same style as an email,” and
she believed it was signed by Seyed. The letter stated, “Welcome
back to LA my love! [¶] I’m so proud of you for what you have
achieved so far and I’m glad that you are enjoying the [car] I bought
for you. [¶] Life is too short my favorite one and we shouldn’t
waste any more time. [¶] Let me know when [you’re] available to
chat perhaps in a nice restaurant of your choice in [your] area. [¶]
Dad.” Michelle believed the only way Seyed could have known her
address was if he followed her home from work.
Michelle filed a police report and applied for a TRO the next
day. The following week Michelle received in the mail at her
business address a copy of the same note that had been left on her
windshield. Michelle testified, “I immediately felt terrified and
violated that someone had trespassed into my gated garage to leave
this note on my car letting me know they know where I live . . . .
That it was unwanted harassment and intimidation.”
2. Seyed’s testimony
Seyed testified that, prior to 2018, he had limited contact with
Michelle but believed there was an “open channel” between them.
He denied that Michelle conditioned her acceptance of the car in
2016 on Seyed having no further contact. Seyed also denied that
Michelle ever told him not to contact her prior to his sending the
May 5, 2021 email. But Seyed admitted that in 2020 his then-
girlfriend mailed Michelle a souvenir he had purchased from a trip,
and Michelle responded by asking him not to let his girlfriend send
her things.11
11 The record contains a copy of a December 2016 email message
sent to Seyed that states, “When my mom asked you to stop sending
9
Seyed admitted he emailed Michelle in May 2021. He stated
he had not been in contact with her for over a year and wanted to
wish her a happy birthday. But, consistent with his declaration,
Seyed denied contacting Michelle again after receiving her
response. With respect to the unsigned note Michelle testified was
left on her car on July 29, 2021, Seyed testified he never signed
communications to Michelle with “Dad,” instead signing them
“daddy,” “Hamid,” or his nickname “Mehran.”
3. Expert testimony
Michelle’s attorneys called Linda Mitchell, a forensic
document examiner, as a handwriting expert. Mitchell testified
Rahimi provided her with a bound journal, which Rahimi
represented had belonged to Sayed. Mitchell confirmed that she
had no other way of knowing that the journal was from Seyed.
Mitchell compared the handwriting in the journal to the
handwriting on the envelope Michelle received in August 2021
containing the note allegedly from Seyed. Mitchell concluded the
handwriting samples were “probably” from the same person because
they contained “significant similarities.” She added with respect to
handwriting samples from Seyed, Michelle, and Rahimi that
“[t]here are some similarities between the envelope and all three
writers. But those can be familial. They can be happenstance or
they can be not significant similarities . . . .”
Seyed’s attorneys called Beth Chrisman, also a forensic
document examiner, as a handwriting expert. Chrisman analyzed
me gifts, that doesn’t mean have Patricia send me things. That is
very inappropriate and she has no business sending me anything.
If you would like to send me anything, check with my mother first
since she has always been and always will be closest to me.”
10
the handwriting on the envelope Michelle received and compared it
to five samples of Seyed’s handwriting. She noted the samples of
Seyed’s handwriting all had a unique “A” formation, but the
envelope did not. Chrisman explained, “I found that the letter
spacing, the letter connections, the fluidity of the writing and the
letter formations as well as the habits between letters was
inconsistent with that of Mr. Razavi’s handwriting.” Chrisman
opined “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that Seyed
“did not write the address on the envelope in question.”
Chrisman also compared the envelope to the documents
Michelle filed in connection with her request for a TRO and that
Rahimi filed in Orange County in support of her request for a TRO.
Chrisman opined “there is a probability” that the person who wrote
the envelope filled out the information in the two requests for
TRO’s.
4. Closing arguments and the family court’s ruling
At the final hearing on August 17, 2022, the family court
stated prior to closing arguments that “regardless of what the
ruling is, [Michelle] is requesting no contact and that will be
respected on a go forward basis, because otherwise it’s to disturb
the peace.” Further, “no contact really means no contact, and so
regardless of what the ruling is, there will be no contact because I
think she’s entitled . . . .”
In her closing argument, Michelle’s attorney asserted that
Michelle had testified credibly to abuse by Seyed, including Seyed’s
emails to Michelle after she requested he not contact her. The
attorney concluded, “If your honor refuses or denies this request for
a restraining order, you’re giving this man license to continue
hounding my client, a person who wants to be done with him.” The
11
attorney for Seyed argued in response that there was no basis for
finding that Seyed had disturbed Michelle’s peace.
The court took the matter under submission, and later that
day the court issued a written ruling denying Michelle’s request for
a DVRO. The court explained, “The Court, after considering the
credibility of the parties and witnesses and the admissible evidence,
finds that [Michelle] has not met her evidentiary burden of showing
she is entitled to a ROAH.[12] The evidence does not establish that
[Seyed] disturbed the peace of [Michelle] or otherwise committed
recent acts that would warrant a ROAH. [Michelle’s] application is
therefore denied and the prior temporary restraining order
dissolved.”
Michelle timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA;
§ 6200 et seq.), a court may issue a protective order “‘to restrain any
person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic
violence and ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved’
upon ‘reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.’” (Nevarez v.
Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 782; accord, § 6300.)
The DVPA defines domestic violence, as relevant here, as
abuse perpetrated against a child of a party. (§ 6211, subd. (e).)
“Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or
assault.” (§ 6203, subd. (b).) Abuse includes “plac[ing] a person in
reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that
person or to another” or “engag[ing] in any behavior that has been
12 A ROAH is a “restraining order after hearing.”
12
or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.” (§ 6203,
subd. (a)(3), (4).) Conduct that may be enjoined under section 6320,
subdivision (a), includes “molesting, attacking, striking, stalking,
threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, . . . harassing,
telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying
telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal Code,
destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or
indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance
of, or disturbing the peace of the other party . . . .” (See Hogue v.
Hogue (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 833, 839.) “‘[D]isturbing the peace’” of
the other party “refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other
party.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).)
“The party seeking a restraining order bears the burden of
establishing the circumstances justifying the order.” (Jan F. v.
Natalie F. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583, 593; accord, Curcio v. Pels
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) The DVPA requires proof of past
abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. (Curcio, at p. 14; In re
Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.) We
review the grant or denial of a request for a DVRO for an abuse of
discretion. (Davila and Mejia, at p. 226; In re Marriage of G. (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780; In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1424.) We likewise review the family
court’s failure to consider evidence in issuing a DVRO for an abuse
of discretion. (See Nevarez v. Tonna, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at
p. 785 [family court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
consider text messages before issuing DVRO].)
Generally, “‘“[t]o the extent that we are called upon to review
the trial court’s factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence
standard of review.”’” (In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia, at
p. 226; accord, In re Marriage of G., 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 780.)
13
However, “‘[i]n a case where the trier of fact has determined that
the party with the burden of proof did not carry its burden and that
party appeals, “it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof
issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment [or
order].” [Citations.] Instead, “where the issue on appeal turns on a
failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes
whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as
a matter of law.” [Citation.] Specifically, we ask “whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and
(2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’”’
[Citation.] This is ‘an onerous standard’ [citation] and one that is
‘almost impossible’ for a losing [party] to meet, because unless the
trier of fact made specific factual findings in favor of the losing
[party], we presume the trier of fact concluded that ‘[the party’s]
evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden
of proof.’” (Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 651;
accord, Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 972,
979.)
B. The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
Michelle’s Request for a DVRO
1. The family court applied the correct legal standard
Michelle contends the family court applied the wrong legal
standard in finding she failed to meet her burden of proof for
issuance of a DVRO. Specifically, she argues the court in its August
17, 2022 minute order applied the standard for a restraining order
after hearing (ROAH), which requires proof of “threatening
behavior,” instead of the standard for a restraining order under the
DVPA, which requires only a showing of past abuse.
14
Michelle fails to cite to any authority for her assertion that a
restraining order after hearing requires a showing of threatening
conduct. The family court stated in its August 17 minute order that
Michelle did not meet “her evidentiary burden of showing she [was]
entitled to a ROAH. The evidence does not establish that [Seyed]
disturbed the peace of [Michelle] or otherwise committed recent acts
that would warrant a ROAH.” Given the court’s reference to the
lack of evidence that Seyed disturbed Michelle’s peace of mind or
committed recent abuse, it is clear the court was referring to the
standard for issuance of a DVRO. (See §§ 6218, subd. (a) [court may
enjoin acts of abuse], 6320, subd. (a) [abuse under DVPA includes
“disturbing the peace of the other party”].) Although we recognize
use of the term “ROAH” in the context of a DVRO may have created
some confusion, and we discourage courts from using an unfamiliar
acronym in the DVRO setting, we interpret the court’s use of the
term here to mean that its ruling in issuing a restraining order
under the DVPA was made after a hearing (and was not a
temporary restraining order).
2. Michelle’s evidence did not compel a finding of abuse as
a matter of law
Michelle, in arguing Seyed’s conduct constituted abuse, points
to Seyed’s purported violations of the TRO and that Seyed disturbed
her peace by leaving the note on her car on July 29, 2021. Michelle
has not met her burden to show this evidence compelled a finding of
abuse.
Michelle asserts Seyed violated the TRO on August 28, 2021
by contacting Rahimi and threatening to harm Michelle if she did
not withdraw her request for a DVRO. Michelle is correct that a
violation of a TRO may constitute abuse under the DVPA. (See
N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, 602 [“Section 6203,
subdivision (a)(4) specifically provides that engaging in behavior
15
that has been enjoined pursuant to section 6320 constitutes abuse
for purposes of the DVPA.”].) However, the court only has
jurisdiction over a person to be restrained after proper service.
(Caldwell v. Coppola (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 859, 863.) Therefore,
Seyed could not have violated the TRO in August 2021 because he
was not served with the TRO until November 30, 2021, three
months after the alleged threat by Seyed.
With respect to the handwritten note left on Michelle’s car on
July 29, 2021, the note was never produced at the hearing, but
Michelle produced a typewritten note that she testified had the
same text as the handwritten note. As discussed, this note, signed
by “Dad,” stated the author was proud of Michelle’s achievements
and added, “Life is too short my favorite one and we shouldn’t waste
any more time.” The note invited Michelle “to chat” in a nice
restaurant of her choosing. Even assuming from Michelle’s
testimony that the note disturbed her peace (based on her
testimony that she was terrified and felt violated that someone had
entered her gated garage to leave the note), there was conflicting
evidence as to whether Seyed sent the note. Seyed denied that he
left a note on her car, explaining he did not know Michelle’s address
and had never signed his communications with Michelle as “Dad,”
instead signing as “Hamid” (like the May 5, 2021 email), “daddy,” or
“Mehran.”
Further, the experts disagreed on whether Seyed addressed
the envelope with the August 2021 typewritten note. As the family
court explained in its written ruling, it considered the credibility of
the parties and witnesses, as well as the admissible evidence.
Mitchell’s testimony depended in part on whether Seyed had
written the journal Rahimi provided to Mitchell as a sample of
Seyed’s writing, and Mitchell opined only that the handwriting was
“probably” from the same person. By contrast, Chrisman compared
16
the handwriting on the envelope to five samples of Seyed’s
handwriting and concluded to a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty that the handwriting on the envelope did not match
Seyed’s handwriting. She also stated “there is a probability” that
the person who wrote the envelope filled out the information in
Michelle’s request for a DVRO and Rahimi’s request for a DVRO in
the Orange County dissolution proceeding. Given the court’s
finding that Michelle had not met her burden to show past abuse,
we imply a finding that the court found Seyed and Chrisman more
credible than Michelle and Mitchell. We defer to the family court’s
credibility findings and do not reweigh the evidence. (Herriott v.
Herriott (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 212, 223 [“It was for the trial court
to weigh the evidence and consider the demeanor and credibility of
the witness, as ‘credibility issues [are] routinely resolved by [the]
trier[ ] of fact.’”]; In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney, supra,
237 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426 [“the trial court was in the best position
to evaluate credibility and to resolve factual disputes”].)
Michelle’s testimony that she felt violated by Seyed’s May 5,
2021 email wishing her a happy birthday fares no better. Although
it was clear from Michelle’s profane response that she did not want
to have any future contact with Seyed, Seyed testified that this was
the first time Michelle told him that she did not want any contact,
pointing to his communications with Michelle in 2016 about his gift
of a car. Further, the family court assessed Michelle’s credibility,
and we imply a finding that the happy birthday email did not
disturb her peace. As discussed, we defer to the family court’s
credibility findings. It was likewise the court’s role to assess the
parties’ credibility with respect to whether on July 26, 2021 Seyed
drove by Michelle when she was leaving the fitness center:
Michelle stated Seyed drove by; Seyed testified he was not in Los
Angeles at the time.
17
Michelle also contends the family court abused its discretion
in refusing to consider her January 19 and March 25, 2022
declarations, which she asserts attached “hundreds of pages” of
evidence. However, the appellate record does not contain a January
19, 2022 declaration, and Michelle has failed to point to anything in
the March 25 declaration that was not included in Michelle’s
September 16, 2021 declaration, which the court admitted, or in
Michelle’s testimony at the hearing. Further, the exhibits to the
March 25 declaration were either duplicative of evidence already in
the record (such as Seyed’s May 2021 email to Michelle and the
letter Michelle received at her work address in August 2021) or
were not relevant to the proceeding (such as documents regarding
other legal proceedings involving Seyed, information regarding
Seyed’s business activities, and emails between Michelle and
Seyed’s counsel). On appeal, “‘“the appellant bears the burden of
providing an adequate record affirmatively proving error.”’” (Nellie
Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982,
996; accord, Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 959, 970.) Michelle has not pointed to anything in
the record that shows the court abused its discretion.
Moreover, the family court allowed Michelle to testify to each
alleged instance of abuse by Seyed in the prior 12 years (since
2009). Relying on Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th
816, 823, Michelle argues the court abused its discretion in
excluding testimony about conduct prior to 2009. In Rodriguez, the
Court of Appeal concluded the family court erred in finding abuse
that had occurred six months before the hearing was too remote in
time to be the basis for a restraining order. (Ibid.) Rodriguez does
not support the proposition that 12-year-old conduct is necessarily
relevant to current abuse. Moreover, as the court observed, the
evidence Michelle sought to present was offered to show what led
18
up to Michelle’s desire to avoid contact with Seyed, not the abuse
supporting the DVRO. Thus, exclusion of this testimony was not an
abuse of discretion.
Michelle also asserts that the family court abused its
discretion in excluding testimony from Rahimi and Michael. With
respect to Rahimi, Michelle’s attorney argued Rahimi would testify
about Seyed’s purchase of the car for Michelle in 2016, the
deterioration of the relationship between Michelle and Seyed, and
Seyed’s prior abuse (before the 2021 incidents). As the court found,
this testimony was cumulative and did not assist the court in
determining whether there was abuse. Michelle’s attorney also
asserted that Rahimi would testify it was Seyed’s handwriting on
the envelope, but this too was cumulative of the evidence from
Mitchell. As to Michael, Michelle’s attorney stated he was a
percipient witness to the relationship between Michelle and Seyed
and could testify about physical and verbal abuse by Seyed growing
up. He also would corroborate that Michelle asked Seyed not to
contact her. The court responded that Michelle had already
established these facts through her direct testimony. The attorney
did not object further, instead concluding, “If your honor believes
that it’s unnecessary, we can move on.” On these facts, there was
no abuse of discretion. (See Nevarez v. Tonna, supra,
227 Cal.App.4th at p. 785 [family court did not abuse its discretion
by refusing to consider text messages offered by petitioner because
they were cumulative of witness’s direct testimony].)
In light of the conflicting evidence that Seyed had disturbed
Michelle’s peace or “mental or emotional calm” (See § 6320, subd.
(c)), Michelle has not met her burden on appeal to show the
evidence compelled a finding of past abuse. Accordingly, the family
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the DVRO. (Estes v.
Eaton Corp., supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 651.)
19
C. The Family Court Did Not Violate Michelle’s Due Process
Rights by Showing Bias in Favor of Seyed’s Attorney
Michelle contends the family court violated her due process
rights by displaying bias in favor of Seyed and his attorney before
and during the DVRO hearing. She has not shown bias.
Michelle points to the fact that at the beginning of the DVRO
hearing, the family court greeted Seyed’s attorney, stating, “Good
morning, Ms. Lozoya . . . . Nice to see you.” Michelle also contends
the family court improperly made up its mind at the end of the
April 4, 2022 hearing by explaining that it planned to wait until
after Michelle’s birthday to file its final decision. The fact the court
politely greeted an attorney does not mean the court was biased
against the opposing party or attorney. With respect to Michelle’s
birthday, when the parties were discussing the scheduling of
Seyed’s testimony, Michelle raised that she preferred not to be in
court on her birthday. The court responded that it did not want to
require her to be present on her birthday, and it set the hearing for
the day before her birthday. In this context the court noted that it
would likely rule after Michelle’s birthday, adding, “I don’t know
which way the ruling is going to be.” In light of this record, it would
be pure speculation to conclude the court had already decided to
rule in Seyed’s favor (as opposed to accommodating Michelle’s
schedule).13
13 Michelle also argues in her opening brief that the family court
made clear it planned to rule in Seyed’s favor by stating, “I don’t
want any commotion when I’ll make my ruling today.” However,
this comment does not appear on the page cited by Michelle in her
opening brief, and she does not address it again in her reply. In any
event, nothing about the comment suggested that the court had
decided to rule in Seyed’s favor.
20
Michelle also contends the family court showed bias on
January 19, 2022 by sustaining many of Seyed’s evidentiary
objections, while declining to admit Michelle’s evidence. However,
as discussed, on April 4, 2022 the court made clear that it had
considered Michelle’s September 16, 2021 declaration, subject to
Seyed’s evidentiary objections.14 The fact the court made
evidentiary findings in favor of Seyed does not alone support a
finding of bias. (See People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1206
[rejecting bias claim where record did not show the trial court based
its decisions on “anything but the evidence properly presented at
trial”]; Blakemore v. Superior Ct. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36, 60
[trial court’s three erroneous rulings did not support bias claim
where plaintiffs “can point to nothing in the transcript of the
hearings or elsewhere reflecting comments or conduct by the trial
judge that suggests any bias in favor of [defendant] or against
the . . . plaintiffs”].)15 Moreover, the family court allowed Michelle
to testify about each act of alleged abuse by Seyed on which she
based her request for a DVRO, and to present expert testimony on
14 Recognizing the confusion in the record, the family court
explained in its minute order denying the DVRO that it was
considering the admissible portions of the “undated Declaration”
that Michelle “lodged in support of her application for . . . alternate
service. The Declaration consisted of 8 typed pages and 29 separate
paragraphs and provided a detailed history of [Michelle’s] issues
with her Father.” This description matches the September 16, 2021
declaration.
15 Michelle also argued the family court ruled on Seyed’s
evidentiary objections before considering Michelle’s response.
However, Michelle filed her response on January 19, 2022, and the
court made clear at the January 19 hearing that it had considered
her response before ruling on the evidentiary objections the same
day.
21
whether Seyed’s handwriting was on the envelope containing the
July 29, 2021 note she claimed Seyed left on her car.
Michelle’s contention that the family court showed bias by
refusing to file her January 27, 2022 motion for reconsideration is
not supported by the record. The only evidence of a motion for
reconsideration is a copy of a January 28, 2022 email Michelle sent
to the family court’s clerk and Seyed’s counsel stating Michelle
“hereby does move for an order” reconsidering the January 19, 2022
ruling and attaching a five-page motion for reconsideration.
However, Michelle has not pointed to any evidence that she
attempted to file the motion or obtain a hearing date or that the
judge had any role in refusing to allow the document to be filed.
We also note that at no time did Michelle or her attorney
raise a concern about the family court’s bias or file a motion to
disqualify the judge, making her challenge on appeal untimely.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(1) [a statement seeking a
judge’s disqualification “shall be presented at the earliest
practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the
ground for disqualification’”]; People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th
966, 978-979 [“‘Defendant may not go to trial before a judge and
gamble on a favorable result, and then assert for the first time on
appeal that the judge was biased.’”].)
22
DISPOSITION
The order denying Michelle’s request for a DVRO is affirmed.
Seyed is to recover his costs on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
STONE, J.
23
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