People v. Hickman CA2/3

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Filed 9/9/24 P. v. Hickman CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B326553

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA054466)
v.

JOE DENNIS HICKMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Richard Lennon and Alice Newman, under appointments
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Idan Ivri and Jonathan J. Kline, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
In 2014, Joe Dennis Hickman pleaded no contest to one
count of voluntary manslaughter and five counts of felony child
abuse resulting in great bodily injury. He successfully petitioned
for resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95.1
Hickman now appeals from the trial court judgment entered after
he was resentenced. We conclude Hickman has not established
the trial court abused its discretion or committed reversible error.
However, we agree with the parties that the abstract of judgment
is inconsistent with the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence.
We therefore affirm with directions to amend the abstract of
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying proceedings
In March 2012, the People filed an information alleging
Hickman and Jennifer Zolorzano murdered Zolorzano’s son
Deshawn Z., assaulted Deshawn resulting in his death, and
committed child abuse likely to produce great bodily injury and
death.
In May 2014, Hickman accepted a plea offer. The People
amended the information to add allegations that Hickman
committed voluntary manslaughter on or about October 29, 2011
(§ 192, subd. (a); count 4) and five counts of felony child abuse
(§ 273, subd. (a); counts 5–9). The court suggested clarifying
separate date ranges for the five counts of child abuse, and the

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We refer to the law as section 1172.6 for the remainder of this
opinion.

2
parties agreed. Hickman pleaded no contest to the six new
counts, and the People dismissed the three initial charges against
him. Hickman also admitted allegations that each felony child
abuse count caused great bodily injury to a child under five
(§ 12022.7, subd. (d)).
In August 2014, the trial court sentenced Hickman to an
aggregate term of 26 years, consisting of 11 years for the
manslaughter conviction and five consecutive sentences of three
years for each felony child abuse conviction and their respective
enhancements.
In February 2021, the court held a Franklin2 hearing,
allowing Hickman to preserve youth-related evidence for future
parole hearings. According to the testimony of Hickman’s
relatives, Hickman was neglected, abused, and kicked out of his
home in his youth. His stepfather punished, beat, and spanked
him, and destroyed his clothes. Hickman’s mother prioritized his
stepfather such that Hickman “never really had the love from his
mother that a normal kid growing up would have.” Hickman’s
aunt and mother believed he was molested and sexually
assaulted by his stepsiblings in his youth. However, according to
his mother’s testimony at the Franklin hearing, despite his
traumatic childhood and lack of supportive parenting, Hickman
“never smoked [weed], never [drank] beer, whiskey, nothing . . . .
He never gangbang[ed],” and would not “hurt a fly.”

2 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).

3
Hickman’s petition for resentencing
In March 2022, Hickman filed a pro per petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6, alleging he could not
presently be convicted of manslaughter because of changes to
sections 188 and 189. The trial court concluded Hickman made a
prima facie case that he was eligible to be resentenced. It
appointed counsel for Hickman, scheduled a hearing on the
matter, and ordered the People to submit briefing on whether the
requested relief should be granted.
The People conceded Hickman was eligible for
resentencing. The court granted Hickman’s petition and vacated
his manslaughter sentence. It ordered the parties to submit
sentencing memoranda and scheduled a resentencing hearing.
In their sentencing memorandum, the People argued count
5, the first felony child abuse conviction, should be designated as
the principal term. The People asked the court to impose the
upper term of six years on that count plus six years for the
associated great bodily injury enhancement. The People also
asked the court to redesignate the manslaughter charge to its
target offense, which they argued was a separate uncharged
count of felony child abuse. The People requested that the court
sentence Hickman to 16 months on the redesignated target
offense. The People did not seek any change to the remainder of
Hickman’s sentence.
Hickman’s sentencing memorandum conceded he hit
Deshawn with his hand, a belt, a flip-flop, and a stick. However,
he argued Zolorzano was more culpable for Deshawn’s death.3

3 The trial court did not agree, finding, “I do think that he
was equally culpable for the death of this minor child. This baby

4
Hickman cited evidence that Deshawn was dehydrated,
malnourished, suffered from intravascular sickling, and was
severely underweight; and that dehydration alone may have
caused Deshawn’s death.4 Hickman contended these maladies
were Zolorzano’s fault because she was Deshawn’s legal and
biological mother, while Hickman was merely Zolorzano’s
cohabiting boyfriend. Hickman argued it would be unfair for
Zolorzano, who had been recently released after successfully
petitioning for resentencing, to be free while he remained
imprisoned. Hickman therefore asked the court to impose a low
term sentence for the redesignated target offense under section
1172.6, subdivision (e). He asked that all other counts and
allegations be dismissed pursuant to section 1385, served
concurrently, or stayed; or, alternatively, he requested probation
on the remaining counts.
At the October 2022 resentencing hearing, Hickman’s uncle
told the court he would have a loving family and support system
if released. Hickman told the court that he took “full
responsibility for what [he had] done.” He stated he was taking
anger management classes and was participating in Alcoholics
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. Hickman also reported
he was working toward taking his general equivalency
development test (an alternative to a high school diploma) but

did not deserve anything that happened to him, and they both
[sic] equally responsible.”

4 In support of these contentions, Hickman cited testimony
from a forensic pathologist at the preliminary hearing. The
transcript of that hearing is not part of the record on appeal.

5
had not completed the program in the 11 years he had been
incarcerated.5
In imposing its sentence, the court considered the probation
report, its own familiarity with the case, evidence presented at
the Franklin hearing, and the support system described by
Hickman’s uncle who testified during the resentencing hearing.
The court recognized it was unclear who was responsible for
Deshawn’s death but it believed Hickman and Zolorzano were
both culpable, particularly since they both admitted to physically
abusing Deshawn. The court specifically noted that Hickman
initially denied abusing Deshawn, but later conceded hitting the
child on the day he died. It also noted Hickman had admitted to
punching Deshawn and hitting the child with a stick and other
objects in the past. The court was particularly concerned that
Hickman admitted that he encouraged Deshawn’s sister to “sock”
the child, because “he act[ed] too much like a girl,” and Hickman
did not want Deshawn “to grow up to be gay.” The court believed
that Hickman acknowledged punching Deshawn in the face “so
he won’t be gay.” The court rejected Hickman’s counsel’s
argument that these statements may have been made in jest or

5 His lack of progress in this area concerned the court. As to
Zolorzano, the court found that “she has presented . . . the court a
tremendous amount of information as to what she’s done to
improve her life since she has been there.” The court referenced
Zolorzano’s more impressive self-improvement efforts while in
custody, in conjunction with her immediate acceptance of
responsibility, in rebutting Hickman’s claim that it was unfair for
Zolorzano to have been released after a successful resentencing
petition, while he remained in custody.

6
suggested by the interviewing detective. The court also found
that Hickman “now has a support system that he did not have”6
when he committed the crimes, and specifically referenced his
age at the time he committed the crimes: “[P]eople at 20 are not
the same people as they are at 30.”
The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 19 years four
months. The court selected count 5, the first felony child abuse
conviction, as the principal term. It imposed a sentence of 12
years, consisting of the upper term of six years on the base charge
plus the upper term of six years for the section 12022.7,
subdivision (d) enhancement. This sentence was based on the
court’s finding that Deshawn “was very vulnerable” because of
his young age, which the court concluded was an aggravating
circumstance justifying the upper term.7
The court redesignated Hickman’s manslaughter conviction
to an additional felony child abuse charge, and imposed a
consecutive sentence of 16 months, i.e., one-third the middle term
sentence. On counts 6 and 7, the court imposed consecutive
sentences of three years each, based on one-third the middle term

6 The court appeared to be invoking a comparison with
Hickman’s prior traumatic childhood as described in part by
Hickman’s aunt during the Franklin hearing as follows: “I think
if he would have had [his mother’s] love and support, he would
not be sitting here today.”
7 Hickman and the trial court both asserted Deshawn was 18
months old when he was killed. However, one page of the record
on appeal states Deshawn was two and a half years old when he
died. Regardless of the victim’s precise age, count 5, for which
the court imposed the upper term, covered the earliest time
period, when Deshawn would have been at his youngest.

7
sentence for each conviction and great bodily injury
enhancement. Finally, for counts 8 and 9, the court sentenced
Hickman to concurrent eight-year terms, based on the four-year
middle term on the charged offense and the four-year lower term
on each great bodily injury enhancement. The court explained
that it selected the middle term on the base term because the
convictions were based on multiple incidents over a long time
period, and the lower term on the great bodily injury
enhancements were appropriate because “some of the other
abuses did not, perhaps, rise to the higher level warranting a
higher term . . . .” Hickman did not object to any aspect of the
sentence.
Hickman timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder and limited the scope of the felony
murder rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708
(Strong); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843
(Gentile).) The bill amended section 188 by adding the
requirement that, except as stated in section 189, subdivision (e),
“to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with
malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3).)
As relevant here, Senate Bill No. 1437 created a procedure,
now codified at section 1172.6, in which a defendant who
accepted a plea deal in lieu of a trial on a murder charge may
seek resentencing if he or she could not presently be convicted of

8
murder under amended section 188. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th
at p. 847; see also Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 551, § 2) [further amending statutory procedures in
§ 1172.6].) A defendant commences the procedure by filing a
petition containing a declaration that, among other things, he or
she could not presently be convicted of murder under the current
law. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) If, after briefing and a
hearing, the court determines the petitioner made a prima facie
case for relief, the court must issue an order to show cause.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
Within 60 days after issuing an order to show cause, “ ‘the
court must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution
bears the burden of proving, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder” under state
law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437 . . . . [Citation.]’ ”
(People v. Njoku (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 27, 41; § 1172.6, subd.
(d)(1), (3).) Alternatively, the parties may waive the evidentiary
hearing and stipulate that the petitioner is eligible for
resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(2).)
If the petitioner is eligible for relief, the prior conviction
must be vacated and the defendant resentenced on all remaining
charges. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If the target offense underlying
the vacated conviction was not charged, the conviction “shall be
redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony for
resentencing purposes . . . .” (Id., subd. (e).)
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s sentencing decision for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847
(Sandoval), superseded by statute on another ground as stated in
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 756 (Lynch).) “The trial

9
court’s sentencing discretion must be exercised in a manner that
is not arbitrary and capricious, that is consistent with the letter
and spirit of the law, and that is based upon an ‘individualized
consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public
interest.’ ” (Sandoval, at p. 847.) “A court abuses its discretion
when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the
wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express
or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial
evidence.” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.)
However, “in light of the presumption on a silent record that the
trial court is aware of the applicable law, including statutory
discretion at sentencing, we cannot presume error where the
record does not establish on its face that the trial court
misunderstood the scope of that discretion. [Citations.]” (People
v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527 (Gutierrez).)
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Redesignating Hickman’s Manslaughter Conviction
Hickman argues the trial court abused its discretion8 by
redesignating his manslaughter conviction as an additional count
of felony child abuse. We find no abuse of discretion.9

8 Hickman contends the appropriate standard of review for
the “construction and interpretation of a statute” is de novo.
However, Hickman does not argue the court misconstrued section
1170, subdivision (e). Rather, he contends this subdivision did
not apply under the facts of this case.
9 The People argue Hickman forfeited this claim by failing to
raise it below. Hickman also appeared to invite any error by
asking the court to impose the lower term on the target offense
and citing section 1172.6, subdivision (e). (People v. Coffman and
Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49.) Hickman contends a claim

10
After the trial court vacates a conviction under section
1172.6, if the target offense underlying the conviction was not
charged, the court must redesignate that conviction as the target
offense. (§ 1172.6, subd. (e).) Although the statute does not
define “target offense,” that term refers to whatever underlying
offense “the natural and probable consequence of which was
murder.” (People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 470.) This
subdivision “invest[s] the superior court with considerable
discretion” in redesignating a vacated conviction as a target
offense. (People v. Silva (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 505, 532.)
Here, after vacating Hickman’s manslaughter conviction,
the trial court redesignated that offense as an additional count of
felony child abuse. Although the trial court did not expressly cite
section 1172.6, subdivision (e) in rendering its decision, no other
subdivision requires or permits a court to redesignate a vacated
conviction. “Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that
the trial court knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042 (Ramirez).) We therefore presume
the trial court redesignated Hickman’s manslaughter conviction
pursuant to and in compliance with section 1172.6, subdivision
(e). (Ramirez, at p. 1042.)
Hickman argues that the target offense for his
manslaughter conviction was separately charged. However,
Hickman fails to cite any part of the appellate record to support

could not be forfeited because the sentence was unauthorized,
citing People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354, but he fails to
explain how this aspect of his sentence was unauthorized rather
than merely an abuse of discretion. In any case, to the extent
Hickman arguably forfeited this argument, we exercise our
discretion to consider his claim.

11
this claim. Indeed, nothing in the record suggests the court or
any party determined or even considered whether one of
Hickman’s remaining child abuse convictions was intended to be
the target offense. Hickman contends the target offense was
charged as count 9 because the timeframe specified for that
count—March 3, 2011 through November 29, 2011—encompassed
October 29, 2011, the date of his now vacated manslaughter
conviction. Yet, the overlapping time frame does not establish
count 9 was based on the specific conduct that led to Deshawn’s
death. To the contrary: if count 9 was intended to serve as the
target offense, it would have been characterized as having
occurred on precisely the same date as count 4—October 29,
2011. That the two convictions were described as occurring over
different timeframes indicates count 9 was not the target offense
underlying Hickman’s manslaughter conviction.10
Hickman’s reliance on People v. Fouse (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 1131 is misplaced. In Fouse, the defendant was
convicted of “two counts of attempted murder of a peace officer,
three counts of first degree robbery, one count of assault likely to
cause great bodily injury, and one count of conspiracy to commit
first degree robbery.” (Id. at p. 1133.) After the defendant
successfully petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6, the
court vacated the attempted murder convictions and redesignated
them as assault. (Fouse, at p. 1133.) On appeal, the court found

10 Some criminal statutes proscribe “continuous” conduct and
therefore preclude convictions for both the continuous conduct
and any individual act thereof occurring within the same time
period. (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 244–245; §
288.5, subd. (c).) However, section 273a, subdivision (a) includes
no such restriction.

12
it was “undisputed” that the target offenses for the defendant’s
attempted murder convictions were robbery, which occurred on
the same day and during the same occurrence as the attempted
murder and for which the defendant was separately charged and
convicted. (Id. at pp. 1133–1139.) The court therefore concluded
the trial court was not permitted to redesignate the attempted
murder charges. (Id. at p. 1145.) In contrast, here, the People
dispute, and Hickman has not established, that the target offense
was separately charged. Fouse is therefore inapplicable.
IV. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sentencing Hickman
on Count 5
Hickman next contends the trial court erred and abused its
discretion in imposing the upper term on count 5 and the
associated great bodily harm enhancement. We disagree.
a. Any error in finding true the aggravating
circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt
Hickman argues the trial court erred by imposing the
upper term sentence on count 5, violating section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2). However, Hickman forfeited this claim by
failing to object during the resentencing hearing. (People v.
Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 242 [defendant’s failure to
object to upper term forfeited argument based on § 1170, subd.
(b)]; People v. Velasquez (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1511
[defendant’s failure to object forfeited claim that upper term was
improper].) Moreover, any error was harmless.
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731) amended section 1170,
subdivision (b). The amendments to subdivisions (b)(1) and (2)
“make the middle term the presumptive sentence for a term of

13
imprisonment; a court now must impose the middle term for any
offense that provides for a sentencing triad unless ‘there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.’ ” (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 464,
disapproved on another ground in Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p.
769.) Circumstances in aggravation include that “[t]he victim
was particularly vulnerable.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(3).)
The trial court resentenced Hickman in October 2022,
nearly a year after section 1170, subdivision (b) took effect. In
imposing its sentence, the court found Deshawn was “very
vulnerable” on account of “his very young age.” Based on this
single aggravating circumstance, the court sentenced Hickman to
the upper term for both the principal charge and the section
12022.7 enhancement. The facts underlying the aggravating
circumstances were not found true by a jury nor stipulated to by
Hickman. Yet, even assuming this aspect of the sentence
violated section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), any error was harmless
if we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a jury would
have found true, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Deshawn was
particularly vulnerable. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 768–
769.) We are satisfied that a jury would have done so here.
“ ‘ “Vulnerability means defenseless, unguarded,
unprotected, accessible, assailable, one who is susceptible to the
defendant’s criminal act.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v.
DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 154.) A victim is particularly

14
vulnerable “where the age or physical characteristics of the
victim, or the circumstances under which the crime is committed,
make the defendant’s act especially contemptible.” (People v.
Bloom (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 310, 321–322.) A “very young”
victim may qualify as “indisputably vulnerable” in the context of
aggravating circumstances. (Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p.
842.)
Here, Deshawn was either 18 months or two and a half
years old when he died.11 Based on his extremely young age,
coupled with his small size and weakened physical condition due
to dehydration and malnourishment, we find beyond a reasonable
doubt that a jury would find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Deshawn was particularly vulnerable. (Cf. Sandoval, supra, 41
Cal.4th at p. 842 [“very young” victim may qualify as
“indisputably vulnerable”]; People v. Garcia (1985) 166
Cal.App.3d 1056, 1070 [two-and-a-half-year-old victim’s “extreme
youth coupled with her close relationship to the defendant clearly
supports the court’s finding” that the victim was particularly
vulnerable].) Any error was therefore harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, and remand for resentencing is unnecessary.12

11 See ante footnote 7.
12 The People argue that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial does not apply during the section 1172.6
petition process. (People v. Howard (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 727,
740.) Therefore, the People argue that the requirement that an
aggravating circumstance be based on facts found true by a jury
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)) does not apply during resentencing.
Because we conclude any error was harmless, we need not reach
this issue.

15
b. Hickman failed to establish the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to impose the lower term
on count 5
Hickman contends the trial court also abused its discretion
by failing to impose the lower term on count 5 and the
accompanying enhancement, in violation of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)(A) and (B). We disagree.13
Senate Bill No. 567 also amended section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6). This subdivision of the new statute “creates a presumption
that the sentencing court ‘shall’ enter a lower term sentence”
when one or more mitigating circumstances contributed to the
offense. (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 419, citing
§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Mitigating circumstances include if the

13 Hickman did not cite section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) below,
nor did he object to the trial court’s sentence. Some courts have
concluded a defendant forfeits any claim based on the statute
under such circumstances. (People v. Tilley (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 772, 778 (Tilley).) Others have reasoned that the
statute creates a presumption that “does not apply if not
triggered by an initial showing, but it is not subject to forfeiture.”
(People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 994, fn. 8.)
Although Hickman’s counsel asked the court to consider
“during the [subsequent] sentencing” mitigating evidence which
had been presented at the Franklin hearing and though during
the sentencing Hickman referenced his youth at the time of the
crimes, his counsel neglected to draw a causal connection
between any mitigating factors and Hickman’s crimes.
Regardless of whether counsel’s failure to connect the dots
constitutes a forfeiture, as discussed post, the record does not
reflect the lack of a satisfactory rationale for such omission nor
has Hickman demonstrated a reasonable probability of a
different sentence had his counsel affirmatively made such a
connection.

16
defendant “has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma,” or was under 26 years old when the offense was
committed. (§§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A), (B), 1016.7, subd. (b).)
Hickman has not established the trial court abused its
discretion in declining to impose the lower term. Section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) does not apply unless the defendant establishes
one or more mitigating circumstances “was a contributing factor
in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
Even if such a causal link is established, the presumption can be
overcome if “the court finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.”
(Ibid.)
Although the court did not discuss section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), Hickman has not identified any evidence in the
record suggesting the court misunderstood the law or its
discretion. We presume the trial court knew and correctly
applied the law. (Gutierrez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.)
“ ‘ “In the absence of . . . a showing [that the court misunderstood
the law or its discretion], the trial court is presumed to have
acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will
not be set aside on review.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377 (Carmony).) The record reveals
that the court engaged in the balancing contemplated by section
1170, subdivision (b)(6).
In seeking resentencing, Hickman’s defense counsel
presented evidence of the mitigating circumstances which
Hickman now argues should have compelled the court to impose
the lower term on count 5. During a presentencing hearing,
Hickman’s counsel asked the court to consider the Franklin

17
hearing evidence—which centered on Hickman’s childhood
trauma—“as evidence as far as mitigation.” Moreover, during the
sentencing hearing, Hickman’s counsel reminded the court that
Hickman was “young at the time . . . .” At his counsel’s
invitation, Hickman addressed the court about his age and lack of
proper parenting skills. Hickman told the court he “didn’t have
the proper parenting skills that [he] needed to raise a child” at
the time of the offense, and “the kid, the child, the boy so to speak
that I was in 2011 is [sic] I am not today.”
The trial court acknowledged having considered the
Franklin hearing evidence; and it also knew how old Hickman
was when he committed the offenses. The record
reveals that these factors were considered by the court before
pronouncing sentence, when it recognized that Hickman was not
the same young person, with the same inadequate familial
support system, who committed the crimes years earlier. Despite
this acknowledgement, the court chose to impose the upper term.
Nothing in the record suggests the court found that
Hickman’s youth or traumatic childhood, on balance, compelled
the imposition of the lower term. Indeed, on the other side of the
scale, the court found Deshawn was particularly vulnerable on
account of his youth and cited this as an aggravating
circumstance supporting the upper term.14 The court also found
it “horrifying” that Hickman beat Deshawn, an 18-month-old
child, and/or directed Deshawn’s young sister to “sock” him, so he

14 The parties agree that the court relied on its conclusion
that the victim was particularly vulnerable as an aggravating
factor in imposing the upper term. They disagree as to whether
that conclusion, in the absence of a finding by a jury or a
stipulation by Hickman, constituted harmless error. As
discussed ante, we believe that it did.

18
would not “grow up to be gay.”15 The court’s emphasis on what it
concluded was the homophobic impetus behind Hickman’s crimes
was one of the “facts and circumstances”16 to which the court
devoted considerable time in determining the appropriate term
on count 5—the redesignated principal term. In short, the record
indicates the court found that the aggravating circumstances,
including the court’s “big concern” regarding the “horrifying”
evidence that Hickman abused “an 18-month-old child [who]
barely knows his name and already has health issues as it is”
“because [he] [didn’t] want him to grow up to be gay,” outweighed
those in mitigation. To the extent Hickman asks us to reweigh
the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation, we have no
authority to do so under the abuse of discretion standard.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 379.)
In the alternative, Hickman claims his counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue for the lower term presumption
under 1170, subdivision (b)(6). To establish this claim, Hickman

15 Hickman’s counsel disputed that his client admitted any
such homophobic motivation, arguing either that Hickman was
“joking” or, alternatively, that the detective who interviewed him
put words in his mouth. However, in contrast to section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), the court may rely on additional aggravating
circumstances not found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
in determining whether section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) applies.
(People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 204; People v.
Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 922, 929.)
16 According to the California Rules of Court, such “bigotry,”
as the court labeled it, could qualify as an additional aggravating
circumstance weighing against imposition of the lower term: that
the crime involved “a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).)

19
must show (1) his counsel’s representation fell below the
standard of reasonableness “under prevailing professional
norms,” and (2) that deficient performance caused him prejudice.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 (Strickland);
Tilley, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 778.) Moreover, “[i]f the record
‘sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the
manner challenged,’ an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel must be rejected ‘unless counsel was asked for an
explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ” (People v. Ledesma
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 746 (Ledesma), quoting People v.
Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426; see In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th
694, 721.)
Hickman has not met his burden of either: 1) establishing
that his counsel’s performance was deficient; or 2) that any such
deficient performance was prejudicial. Both parties acknowledge
that the court had been provided mitigating evidence prior to
pronouncing sentence. They also agree that Hickman’s counsel17
failed to draw a causal connection for the court between
Hickman’s age/traumatic childhood and the commission of his
crimes.
Hickman has not demonstrated the absence of any
“ ‘satisfactory explanation’ ” for counsel’s failure to make these
connections. (Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 746.) And the

17 In his Reply Brief, Hickman argues that, despite his
counsel’s failure to affirmatively link Hickman’s youth/childhood
trauma to his crimes, the court, by virtue of having considered
Hickman’s probation report and the evidence presented at the
Franklin hearing, was put “on notice” that these mitigating
factors contributed to Hickman’s crime.

20
record fails to “ ‘ “affirmatively disclose the lack of a rational
tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 403
(Majors).) Instead, the record reveals that Hickman’s counsel
may have had strategic reasons for not highlighting the section
1170, subdivision (b)(6) presumption in seeking the lower term on
the base count.
During the Franklin hearing, Hickman’s mother testified
that he did not “smoke” or “gangbang,” and would “not hurt a fly.”
Such testimony may have caused counsel to question the wisdom
of attempting to establish a causal link to his age or childhood
trauma in an effort to mitigate his culpability, especially given
that Hickman was seeking a similar sentence to that imposed
upon Zolorzano during her earlier resentencing.
In his brief in support of Hickman’s resentencing, defense
counsel sought a sentence which would result in Hickman’s
immediate release, just as Zolorzano had been released earlier by
the same court. Anything else, counsel implored, would be a
“miscarriage of justice” as counsel argued Hickman was less
culpable than Zolorzano.
However, at the start of Hickman’s resentencing hearing,
the court did not agree that Hickman was less culpable than
Zolorzano. The court reiterated Zolorzano had immediately
accepted responsibility. The court’s reference to Zolorzano’s
acceptance of responsibility might explain why Hickman opted
not to rely on mitigating factors in an effort to “excuse” his earlier
behavior, instead telling the court that he “[took] full
responsibility for my part . . . . I don’t point the finger or the
blame on anybody.” In short, Hickman’s counsel may have
determined the best tactical course of action was for Hickman to

21
accept responsibility, rather than blaming the crimes on his
youth or childhood trauma.
Even if an alternative conclusion could be drawn from the
record—that counsel’s approach in the resentencing fell below
applicable professional standards—Hickman has nonetheless
failed to establish prejudice. “It is not enough to establish
prejudice for defendant to propose that counsel’s performance had
some ‘conceivable effect’ on the outcome; rather, defendant must
show a reasonable probability of a different result but for
counsel’s errors. ([Strickland, supra, 466 U.S.] at pp. 693–694.)
Prejudice must be a demonstrable reality established based on
facts in the record, not simply speculation as to the effect of the
errors or omissions of counsel. [Citations.]” (Tilley, supra, 92
Cal.App.5th at p. 778.) Hickman argues only that the court
would have “likely” found his youth and childhood trauma
contributed to his offenses, and, in turn, “the court could decide if
the low term was in the interest of justice.” That the court
“could” change its decision is entirely speculative—Hickman does
not assert the court would have changed its decision, or even that
there was a reasonable probability of such a result. (Ibid.
[assertion that trial court “would have ‘reconsidered its
sentencing decision’ ” insufficient to establish prejudice].)
In any case, based on the totality of the record, there is no
reasonable probability the court would have concluded section
1170, subdivision (b)(6) required it to impose the lower term
sentence. As we have discussed, the record reveals the court was
aware of the mitigating circumstances on which Hickman relies
but found the aggravating circumstances far more compelling.
This indicates the court found the latter circumstances
outweighed the former. Thus, even if defense counsel had more

22
effectively argued that the presumption under section 1170,
subdivision (b) applied, we conclude there is no reasonable
probability that the court would have determined it was required
to impose the lower term.
The record does not “ ‘ “affirmatively disclose the lack of a
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission,”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Majors, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 403) and,
even it had, Hickman cannot establish prejudice. We therefore
reject Hickman’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding mitigating evidence was insufficient to
warrant dismissal of the enhancement on count 5
Hickman next argues the trial court abused its discretion
in declining to dismiss the great bodily injury enhancement
attached to count 5 based on section 1385, subdivision (c). We
find no abuse of discretion.18
Effective January 1, 2022, almost 10 months before
Hickman’s resentencing, our Legislature amended section 1385 to
provide trial courts guidance in exercising their discretion to

18 Hickman’s sentencing memorandum asked the court to
dismiss all counts and enhancements other than the principal
term, citing section 1385. However, his briefing failed to identify
any specific mitigating circumstances that could support such
dismissal. Hickman also failed to raise the issue during the
resentencing hearing. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 375–
376 [defendant’s failure to invite the court to dismiss under §
1385 forfeits the issue on appeal].) Even if Hickman arguably
forfeited this claim by failing to present argument based on
section 1385 during the hearing, we exercise our discretion to
consider his arguments.

23
dismiss sentencing enhancements. (People v. Coleman (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 709, 723–724 (Coleman); see also (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1).) Section 1385, subdivision
(c) now instructs the trial court to “dismiss an enhancement if it
is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” It further
requires the court to “consider and afford great weight” to
evidence that the crime “is connected to prior victimization or
childhood trauma” or that the defendant committed the offense
triggering the enhancement when he or she was a juvenile.
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(1), (2)(E) & (G).) Hickman argues the court
failed to “afford great weight” to evidence of his childhood trauma
and that he was a juvenile when he committed the offense, and
also failed to consider whether these circumstances in mitigation
justified dismissing the enhancement.
In contrast to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), only one
mitigating factor—evidence of childhood trauma—could have
triggered the court to consider exercising its discretion to dismiss
the enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c). As to age,
it is notable that the two statutes use different standards when
considering age as a mitigating factor. Section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6) establishes a presumption for the lower term if the
defendant was “a youth as defined under subdivision (b) of
Section 1016.7 at the time of the commission of the offense.”
Section 1016.7, in turn, defines youth as “any person under 26
years of age on the date the offense was committed.” In contrast,
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(G) compels the court, when
exercising its discretion to dismiss an enhancement, to consider
whether “the defendant was a juvenile when they committed the
current offense,” which other relevant statutes define as a person

24
under 18 years of age. (See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, § 101, subd.
(a).) There is no dispute that Hickman was at least 20 years of
age when the offenses to which he pled no contest occurred,
including the voluntary manslaughter charge for which he was
resentenced.
Again, Hickman has failed to establish the trial court
abused its discretion. (Coleman, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 724
[appellant’s burden is to “affirmatively demonstrate[]” trial court
misunderstood its sentencing discretion under § 1385].) As we
have discussed, during the resentencing hearing, the court stated
it considered evidence of Hickman’s childhood trauma (as well as
his age) when he committed the offenses. The court did not
indicate it afforded this factor “great weight,” but “we presume
that the trial court knew the law and followed it.” (Ramirez,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1042.)
Moreover, assuming the court afforded this factor great
weight, if the court also found “substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors,” such factors “ ‘may nonetheless neutralize
even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that
dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ”
(People v. Walker (Aug. 15, 2024, S278309) ___ Cal.5th ___ [2024
WL 3819098, p. *4], citing People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
1087, 1098.) Although the court never expressly found dismissal
was not in the furtherance of justice, we presume the court was
aware of and complied with section 1385, subdivision (c),
particularly since defense counsel cited section 1385 in his
sentencing memorandum. For example, the court may have
determined the potential aggravating factors described above—
the cruelty of Hickman’s abuse and Deshawn’s particular
vulnerability—neutralized any mitigating factors. Hickman’s

25
“citation to a silent record is insufficient to meet his burden to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Coleman,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 725.)
Hickman also contends we should remand so that the trial
court can reconsider whether to exercise its discretion to impose
the lower term sentence on the great bodily harm enhancement
to count 5. However, he fails to identify any legal authority that
would allow or compel such a result, and we therefore reject this
argument.
V. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Imposing Consecutive Sentences for Counts 4, 6, & 7
Hickman next argues the trial court abused its discretion
by imposing consecutive sentences for three of his convictions,
rather than concurrent sentences as Hickman requested in his
sentencing memorandum. We find no abuse of discretion.
When the defendant committed “separate acts of violence”
or the offenses “were committed at different times,” the court is
justified in imposing multiple sentences consecutively. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a)(2).) Here, the court found Hickman
committed multiple acts of child abuse over “a long period of
time.” Although the trial court did not expressly connect this
finding to its decision to impose consecutive sentences on counts
4, 6, and 7, we presume the court understood and complied with
the law. (Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1042.)
Hickman initially contends there was “no evidence” that he
“committed multiple acts of violence resulting in great bodily
injury.” This argument ignores evidence, cited by the court
during sentencing, that Hickman hit Deshawn on the day of his
death, admitted he hit Deshawn with a stick and other objects in
the past, and punched Deshawn “with closed fists” in the past so

26
he would not “grow up gay.” According to the probation report
which the court acknowledged reviewing prior to pronouncing the
revised sentence, “detectives discovered several bruises to the
victim’s skull, face and chin. He also had burn marks and
pattern marks on his stomach and a possible rope mark on his
ankle.” Deshawn appeared to be an “apparent victim of continual
physical abuse.” Moreover, Hickman pleaded no contest to five
counts of felony child abuse. A no contest plea, like a guilty plea,
“admits every element of the charged crime.” (People v. Miller
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1051, 1058; § 1016, subd. (3) [“a plea of
nolo contendere shall be considered the same as a plea of
guilty”].) He also admitted allegations that the five child abuse
counts caused great bodily injury. Hickman therefore cannot
dispute that he committed multiple acts of violence.
In his Reply, Hickman claims he “does not seek to raise the
issue of sufficiency of the evidence of the child abuse, as
respondent contends, but instead attempts to appeal to
fundamental issues of fairness” because the court did not
consider that his sentence is now greater than that of Zolorzano,
who he argues was more culpable for Deshawn’s death. However,
“[s]o long as appellant’s sentence was justified by appellant’s
crimes, individual culpability, and record, the sentence received
by an accomplice is not relevant.” (People v. Foster (1988) 201
Cal.App.3d 20, 27.) Moreover, the trial court did consider this
point. At the start of the resentencing hearing, the court
recognized that Hickman’s sentencing brief argued it was “not
fair” that he should receive a greater sentence than Zolorzano,
though the court disagreed with Hickman’s claim that he was
less culpable than Zolorzano. Moreover, the court later explained
it sentenced both Zolorzano and Hickman based on their

27
respective particular facts and circumstances, including what the
court believed to be Zolorzano’s early acceptance of responsibility.
Finally, Hickman contends the trial court erred because it
failed to state reasons for its decision to impose consecutive
sentences. (People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436, 449
[“The reasons for imposing consecutive terms must be expressly
stated”].) However, in Edwards, the appellate court remanded
because there was “nothing in the record to indicate that the
sentencing judge was cognizant” of any circumstances that could
justify imposing consecutive sentences. (Id. at p. 450.) In
contrast, as we have discussed, the court cited evidence that
Hickman committed multiple violent acts at different times, and
these circumstances would justify consecutive sentences.
Hickman has not identified any evidence suggesting the court
relied on any impermissible factor or evidence in rendering its
sentence. Because the record does not “affirmatively show[]
otherwise,” we presume the trial court properly exercised its
sentencing discretion. (People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th
1301, 1313, disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Cook
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 939.)
VI. The Abstract of Judgment Must Be Amended
Finally, the parties agree the abstract of judgment is
inconsistent with the trial court’s oral pronouncement of
sentence. In such cases, the oral pronouncement controls, and we
may order the court to correct the abstract of judgment
accordingly. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 188;
People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.) We direct the
trial court to amend the abstract of judgment as follows.
First, the abstract of judgment identifies count 4 as a
voluntary manslaughter conviction under section 192,

28
subdivision (a). In its oral pronouncement, the court vacated that
manslaughter conviction and redesignated it as an additional
count of felony child abuse resulting in great bodily injury or
death to a child, under section 273a, subdivision (a). We
therefore direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment
so that count 4 lists “273a(a)” and “GBI/Death to a child” under
the columns labeled “Section No.” and “Crime”, respectively.
Second, the abstract of judgment describes the
enhancement attached to count 5 as “PC 12022.7(a).” According
to the court’s oral pronouncement, the enhancement attached to
count 5 fell under subdivision (d) of that section. We direct the
trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to describe the
enhancement attached to count 5 as “PC 12022.7(d).”
Third, on counts 6 and 7, the trial court’s oral
pronouncement imposed identical sentences of one-third the
middle term sentence as the base term, or one year four months.
The abstract of judgment describes both sentences as three-year
lower term sentences. For counts 6 and 7, we direct the trial
court to amend the abstract of judgment to list “M” under the
“Term” column, add an “X” under the “1/3 Consecutive” column,
remove the existing “X” under the “Consecutive Full Term”
column, and change the entries under the “Principal or
Consecutive Time Imposed” column from three years zero
months, to one year four months.
Fourth, the abstract of judgment indicates, with
parentheses, that the trial court imposed concurrent sentences on
the enhancements attached to counts 6 and 7. However, the trial
court’s oral pronouncement imposed consecutive sentences on
those enhancements. We direct the trial court to remove the
parentheses surrounding the sentences for the enhancements

29
attached to counts 6 and 7 so those sentences are properly
reflected as running consecutively.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to
amend the November 7, 2022, abstract of judgment to (1) amend
count 4 to list “273a(a)” and “GBI/Death to a child” under the
columns labeled “Section No.” and “Crime”, respectively; (2)
describe the enhancement attached to count 5 as “PC 12022.7(d)”;
(3) in counts 6 and 7, list “M” under the “Term” column, add an
“X” under the “1/3 Consecutive” column, remove the existing “X”
under the “Consecutive Full Term” column, and change the
entries under the “Principal or Consecutive Time Imposed”
column from three years zero months, to one year four months;
and (4) remove the parentheses surrounding the sentences for the
enhancements to counts 6 and 7 so those sentences are properly
indicated to run consecutively. We further direct the trial court
to send certified copies of the amended abstract of judgment to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and to
appellate counsel.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BERSHON, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

30
We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

ADAMS, J.

31

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