Vanesyan v. Aperian CA2/5

CourtListener 10106557Calctapp06.09.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/6/24 Vanesyan v. Aperian CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

LARISA VANESYAN, B331463

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BD541888)
v.

MAXIM APERIAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jeffrey W. Korn, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Cynthia A. de Petris and Cynthia A. de
Petris for Defendant and Appellant.
Larisa Vanesyan, self-represented litigant, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

Maxim Aperian (Maxim) appeals from an order denying his
request for order (RFO)1 to modify or terminate a permanent
restraining order against him. We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Permanent Restraining Order

Maxim and petitioner Larisa Vanesyan (Larisa) were
married until their divorce in 2013. On May 19, 2011, Larisa
filed a petition for a domestic violence restraining order
protecting her from Maxim; and, on August 9, 2011, the trial
court granted the order, which was set to expire in two years.
Larisa subsequently requested that the restraining order be
made permanent. (Fam. Code2, § 6345, subd. (a).) On June 27,
2013, the trial court renewed the restraining order against
Maxim and ordered it be permanent. (See In re Marriage of L.A.
& M.A. (B289451, Apr. 15, 2020) [nonpub. opn.].) Among other
things, the restraining order required that Maxim stay at least
100 yards away from Larisa’s home, vehicle, job or workplace,
and their children’s school.

1 “In family law proceedings under the Family Code, the
term ‘request for order’ (RFO) ‘has the same meaning as the
terms “motion” or “notice of motion” when used in the Code of
Civil Procedure.’ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.92(a)(1)(A).)” (In re
Marriage of DeWolfe (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 906, 908, fn. 3.)

2 Further statutory references are to the Family Code unless
otherwise stated.

2
B. RFOs to Modify or Terminate Restraining Order

On September 30, 2021, Maxim filed an RFO to modify or
terminate the restraining order. On January 26, 2022, the trial
court denied the RFO. Maxim did not appeal from that order.
On March 14, 2023, Maxim filed another RFO to terminate
or modify the permanent restraining order. In his RFO, Maxim
claimed that he had never “intentionally or maliciously violated
the restraining order” but also admitted that he was found in
violation of the protective order in 2015, and pleaded guilty to a
misdemeanor. Maxim also claimed that he was “ordered to
complete all terms of probation, take 52 weeks of anger
management classes, [and] take parenting classes . . .”
Notwithstanding his admission of having been ordered to
complete these requirements, Maxim also claimed that he
completed the terms of probation “voluntarily.”
In his attached declaration, Maxim claimed that he was
pulled over and harassed by the police “all because of my
Restraining Order.” Maxim attached a copy of his Driver’s
License information in support of his assertion. That report,
however, does not make reference to the existence of a
restraining order. Maxim also claimed that the existence of the
restraining order prevented him from attending his brother’s
funeral, explaining that when he arrived at the airport to fly to
Armenia, “some type of alert” was triggered, which caused him to
be placed in a ”suspended terrorist line.” Because “there were 22
people ahead of [him,]” he missed his flight.
Maxim also described his feelings about his divorce and
Larisa. He claimed that he could not “function properly at [his]
work, due to the pressure and stress, given the process of divorce”

3
and was therefore laid off and ultimately became homeless. He
claimed that all of his “financial institutions were seized and
given to [Larisa].” He explained that he had a new girlfriend and
believed that “LARISA is . . . purposely trying to make [his] life
miserable, because [he] moved on.” He stated that when Larisa
advised the court that she had a “terminal illness,” Maxim sent
her a photograph of himself lighting a candle for her at a church,
along with a message that stated he did not “wish [her] a death”
and instead wished that she “would be happy and healthy.” She
responded, “Thank you so much! I’m so happy that you finally
feel happy! Picture was not necessary.” He also declared that he
had sent Larisa Mother’s Day greetings but that she did not
respond and “simply ignored [him].”
Finally, Maxim submitted a letter from Dr. Richard Ciasca,
dated February 27, 2023, who wrote that he had treated Maxim
since 2015 and “[Maxim] does not pose a threat to anyone
including the mother of his children.”
Larisa responded to the RFO, asserting among other things
that there was no material change of circumstances. She
submitted a declaration in support, which stated that in July
2014, the superior court issued two criminal restraining orders
against Maxim, protecting Larisa and the oldest child. And, in
2016, Maxim had been placed on a psychiatric hold after
reporting to his doctor that he intended to kill Larisa. Larisa also
reported that during court-ordered visits between Maxim and his
youngest child in 2019, Maxim was aggressive and hostile
towards Larisa, the child, and the monitor. Larisa submitted
visitation reports prepared by the visit monitors, including one
dated April 16, 2019, in which Maxim told the monitor, “[t]hat
bitch made all of this, she is the one that doesn’t want me to have

4
a relationship with [our daughter].” When the monitor requested
that Maxim not speak about mother, Maxim responded, “I don’t
care, you could write everything down, I don’t care. I will run her
to the ground financially, I don’t care if the fuck-en [sic] court
knows it. She made the soup now she has to stir it and eat it.”
Larisa also declared that Maxim constantly followed her and
knew when she and the children were far from home. He falsely
reported to the police that she was neglecting the children, which
resulted in investigations by the Department of Protective
Services, which determined that the claims were unfounded. As
a result, the police no longer responded to Maxim’s reports.
Finally, Larisa declared that on several occasions, Maxim
appeared near Larisa’s work. On those occasions, Larisa did not
contact the police because she did not wish to have her clients
involved in her personal matters. Instead, she had her friends
stay with her in order to ensure her safety.
Maxim replied to Larisa’s response, arguing that he never
intentionally or maliciously violated the restraining order in the
past 12 years and that he was no longer a “reasonable threat of
future harm toward [Larisa].”
On May 11, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
RFO. Both Larisa and Maxim testified. The record does not
include a reporter’s transcript of those proceedings, or a suitable
substitute, such as an agreed or settlement statement, of the
hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b).)3 The court denied
the RFO.

3 In his notice designating the record on appeal, Maxim
elected to proceed without a record of the oral proceedings.
Contrary to Maxim’s assertion, the court’s statement of decision
is not a suitable substitute for a reporter’s transcript. (See Foust

5
On July 5, 2023, the trial court issued a statement of
decision. The court stated that the conduct that initially gave
rise to the protective order was “severe and extended over time
and included surveillance of [Larisa]. The abuse in this case was
a course of conduct, not a single bad incident.” The court further
found that Larisa’s testimony about her fear of abuse was
credible and not objectively unreasonable. Maxim timely
appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

“A domestic violence restraining order is a type of
injunction, as it is an ‘order requiring a person to refrain from a
particular act.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 525 [defining an ‘injunction’].)
. . . Code of Civil Procedure section 533 sets forth the standards
for a trial court to apply when considering whether to dissolve an

v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181,
186.) Further, we reject Maxim’s request to stay proceedings so
that he can secure a settled statement. (See Ct. App., Second
Dist., Local Rules, rule 2(b) [“Appellant should file requests for
augmentation in one motion within 40 days of the filing of the
record or the appointment of counsel. . . . Thereafter, motions to
augment will not be granted except upon a showing of good cause
for the delay”]; Russi v. Bank of America National Trust &
Savings Assn. (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 100, 102 [“‘Even where the
matter sought to be added is proper, or the proposed correction is
warranted, neither augmentation nor correction is a matter of
right; they both may be denied for inexcusable neglect in
preparing the record, for delay in presenting the application, or
for other reasons’”].)

6
injunction. ‘In any action, the court may on notice modify or
dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a
showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon
which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted,
that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining
order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would
be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or
temporary restraining order.’ (Code. Civ. Proc., § 533; see also
Luckett v. Panos (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 77, 85 [Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 533 ‘articulates three independent bases on which a
modification [or termination] of an injunction may be
predicated—(1) change in the facts, (2) change in the law, or
(3) ends of justice[ ]’].)” (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 1495, 1503–1504 (Loeffler).)
“[W]here the party protected by a restraining order has
already made the required showing to obtain a renewal of the
order, and the restrained party later seeks to terminate the
restraining order, the burden is on the restrained party to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that one of the circumstances
set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 533 is present and
justifies a termination of the restraining order.” (Loeffler, supra,
174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.) “As in any review of an order
denying a motion to dissolve an injunction, we apply an abuse of
discretion standard of review.” (Id. at p. 1505.)

B. Analysis

Maxim contends that the trial court’s finding that Larisa
reasonably feared future abuse by Maxim is not supported by the
evidence, and was based entirely on her testimony that she was

7
still “‘afraid’” of Maxim. He also contends that the trial court was
required to grant the RFO based on a change of circumstances
because (1) Maxim was not represented by counsel at the hearing
in 2013, when the permanent restraining order was issued,
whereas he was represented by counsel for his RFO; (2) he did
not further violate the protective order; and (3) his psychiatrist
opined that Maxim did not pose a threat to Larisa. Finally, in
Maxim’s view, the trial court was required to grant the RFO
because there was no reasonable risk that acts of domestic
violence were likely to recur in the future.
Maxim cannot prevail on any of his arguments because he
has failed to provide an adequate record on appeal. “[T]he
absence of a court reporter at trial court proceedings and the
resulting lack of a verbatim record of such proceedings will
frequently be fatal to a litigant’s ability to have his or her claims
of trial court error resolved on the merits by an appellate court.
This is so because it is a fundamental principle of appellate
procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to
be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on
the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the
trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the
judgment. [Citations.] ‘This is not only a general principle of
appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine
of reversible error.’ [Citations.] ‘In the absence of a contrary
showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial
court’s action will be made by the appellate court. “[I]f any
matters could have been presented to the court below which
would have authorized the order complained of, it will be
presumed that such matters were presented.”’ [Citation.] ‘“A
necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate

8
for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of
the trial court should be affirmed.”’ [Citation.] ‘Consequently,
[the appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record.
[Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’
[Citation.]” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609, fn.
omitted.)
Here, we do not have a record of Maxim or Larisa’s
testimony. The trial court, however, found Larisa’s testimony
about her ongoing fear of Maxim to be both credible and
reasonable. We do not disturb this finding on appeal. (In re
Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1531.)
Moreover, we have no record of what, if any, other evidence was
admitted. Accordingly, although Maxim contends that his
psychiatrist’s letter required the granting of the RFO, we have no
record of whether the letter was admitted into evidence, excluded
as hearsay, or, if admitted, whether it was deemed either
probative or credible by the trial court. We therefore reject each
of Maxim’s arguments.

9
IV. DISPOSITION

The order denying the RFO to modify or terminate the
permanent restraining order is affirmed. Larisa is awarded costs
on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM, J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

DAVIS, J.

 Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

10

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.