People v. Boyd CA2/5

CourtListener 10105516Calctapp05.09.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/5/24 P. v. Boyd CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B324316

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA067912)
v.

DERRICK DWIGHT BOYD,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Allen Joseph Webster, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant Derrick Dwight Boyd
(defendant) of the first degree murder of Joel Garcia (Garcia).
The jury also found true a robbery-murder special circumstance
allegation, a gang enhancement allegation, and “principal armed”
firearm allegations (Pen. Code,1 § 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)).2 The
trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for the murder, plus 25 years to life in prison
for the “principal armed” firearm enhancement. Years later, as a
result of changes in felony murder law, defendant petitioned for
resentencing under section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95). The
trial court granted the petition, vacated the murder conviction,
and substituted in its place a conviction for robbery. On that
conviction, the court then resentenced defendant to 30 years to
life: five years for the robbery plus 25 years to life for the same
“principal armed” firearm enhancement. Now on appeal from
that resentencing, the parties agree the sentencing enhancement
must be vacated because the evidence does not satisfy the
heightened requirements for proving a gang enhancement after
passage of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (AB
333), which took effect on January 1, 2022—before the
resentencing. We shall modify defendant’s sentence accordingly.

1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
Section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) provides that the
firearm enhancements in that section apply to a person who is “a
principal in the commission of an offense” (not just the actual
firearm user or shooter) if the person is also found to have
violated the gang enhancement statute (section 186.22) and an
accomplice was the actual firearm user or shooter.

2
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense Conduct, Trials, and Sentencing
On the evening of December 22, 2002, four members of the
10 Line Gangster Crips street gang (10 Line) were standing on
110th Street in Los Angeles. One of the gang members, Sabino
“Flip” Bahadur (Bahadur), was armed with a pistol, which he
brandished openly. Residents of the neighborhood who were
outdoors at the time either went inside or hurried home.
Garcia turned onto 110th Street in his automobile and
stopped to ask for directions. At that point, the four gang
members swarmed his vehicle. Bahadur and two other gang
members approached the vehicle from the driver’s side,
demanded money, and reached inside Garcia’s window. When
the gang member on the opposite side of the vehicle attempted to
open the passenger door, Garcia pressed down on the accelerator.
As the car moved forward, Bahadur shot Garcia and his vehicle
crashed into a tree. As the four gang members fled the scene, one
of the neighborhood’s residents who witnessed the shooting called
911 and later identified Bahadur to the police as the shooter.
Defendant was arrested after the police first arrested and
interviewed Bahadur and another gang member. Defendant
initially denied any involvement in Garcia’s death. After being
advised by the police that they had an eye witness and two other
people in custody, however, defendant admitted during a
recorded interview that he participated in the crime. He
explained that on the day of the shooting, he was with Bahadur
and two others, they had a gun, and they were looking to rob
someone. After Garcia stopped, asked them for directions, and
made a u-turn, defendant and the others decided to rob Garcia.
While the other three men confronted Garcia from the driver’s

3
side of the vehicle and yelled at him not to move or they would
kill him, defendant approached the car from the passenger’s side.
According to defendant, “something happened,” the vehicle
moved, and Bahadur shot Garcia in the head.3
The District Attorney charged defendant, Bahadur, and
two other men with Garcia’s murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The
information also alleged the murder was committed while the
defendants were engaged in a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), a
principal personally and intentionally used and discharged a
handgun that caused great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b)-(e)), and the murder was gang-related (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)).
Defendant, Badhur, and another co-defendant were tried
together. The jury found Bahadur guilty and found true the
robbery-murder special circumstance allegation, the gang
allegation, and the allegation that he personally used a handgun
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b)). The jury was unable to reach a verdict
on the charges against defendant and the co-defendant.
In the spring of 2004, defendant was retried alone. Officer
Scott Stevens, a gang enforcement officer assigned to the Los
Angeles Police Department’s Southeast Division, testified as an
expert on criminal street gangs.4 For almost three years, Officer
Stevens had been assigned to monitor 10 Line. He described for
the jury the gang’s history, size, and primary criminal activities,

3
Defendant related the same facts to his expert forensic
psychiatrist.
4
Both of the detectives that investigated Garcia’s shooting
testified at defendant’s second trial, but neither offered any
expert gang testimony.

4
which included “narcotics sales, street robberies, [and] gang
robberies which result in shootings, homicides.” In addition,
Officer Stevens, who had dozens of contacts with defendant,
identified him as a member of 10 Line and described him as a
“player,” i.e., a “very active” member of the gang who was known
by the moniker “Dirty D.”
To establish the predicate pattern of gang crimes that must
be proven under then-prevailing law, Officer Stevens testified
about four sets of crimes committed by other members of 10 Line:
a robbery and rape by force; a robbery, attempted robbery, and
rape by force; possession of a firearm and possession of a firearm
in school; and kidnapping and lewd acts with a child. In each
instance, when presented with a certified record of the
convictions, Officer Stevens identified the offender as a member
of the gang.
Toward the end of Officer Stevens’s direct examination, the
prosecution asked him to offer an opinion on whether several
hypothetical scenarios designed to track the facts of Garcia’s
murder would be gang-related. When asked if it would be
common for four members of 10 Line to approach a vehicle from
both sides and attempt to rob the driver at gunpoint, Officer
Stevens opined that such an event would be “one of the most
common activities” engaged in by the gang. He explained that
such a crime would benefit the gang by instilling fear in the
driver and in the surrounding community, including any local
rival gangs. He opined further that the reputational benefit to
the gang would be even greater under the hypothesized scenario
if one of the gang members shot the driver after he became
frightened and attempted to drive away; such an act would
establish the gang’s “dominance” by showing others that “it’s a

5
10th [Line] world. It’s our rules.” Finally, Officer Stevens opined
that 10 Line would expect all members present during such a
hypothetical street robbery-murder to participate in the crime.
The trial court did not instruct the jury on malice murder;
it instructed on felony murder only. In addition, the court
instructed the jury on the two essential elements of the alleged
gang-related crime enhancement as follows: “One, that the
crimes charged were for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with the criminal street gang. [¶] And two, that this
crime was committed with the specific intent to promote, further,
or assist any criminal conduct by gang members.”
During closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the
charged gang enhancement and argued defendant committed the
robbery-murder to benefit the gang: “10 Line Gangster Crips
robs people. They rob people in cars.” The prosecution argued
the crime was committed by the gang in front of people in the
neighborhood to “scare[ ] people off the street,” to “show them
something,” to “show[ ] who they are,” and to show “what this
gang can do.” Defendant participated in the robbery-murder, the
prosecution argued, because he was a member of the gang, “part
of the team,” and “the robbery involve[d] terrifying persons in a
car. [¶] You surround the car. You increase the fear.”
On June 7, 2004, the jury found defendant guilty of first
degree murder and found true all of the alleged sentencing
enhancements, including the gang-related allegation. Pursuant
to the true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance
finding, the court sentenced defendant to life without the
possibility of parole for Garcia’s murder. In addition, the court
imposed a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life in connection
with the jury’s finding that “a principal” personally and

6
intentionally discharged a handgun for the benefit of a criminal
street gang that caused great bodily injury and death to Garcia.
Punishment for the remaining gang-related, principal-armed
firearm findings and the gang finding itself was stayed pursuant
to section 654. The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal.

B. Defendant’s Petition for Resentencing
In June 2019, 15 years after he was convicted, defendant
petitioned for resentencing. Using a form petition, defendant
declared an information was filed against him that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, he was
convicted of murder following a trial, and he could not presently
be convicted of murder as a result of changes to murder law
taking effect in 2019. Defendant additionally declared he was not
the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, and was not a
major participant in the felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life during the course of the felony.
The trial court, without appointing counsel for defendant
(as he requested) or holding an evidentiary hearing, summarily
denied defendant’s petition. The court ruled defendant was not
eligible as a matter of law for resentencing because he
“manifested an intention to kill” and “displayed reckless
indifference to human life” by aiding and abetting his fellow gang
members and the actual killer.
On appeal, a different panel of this court, reversed the
denial of defendant’s petition and remanded for further
proceedings. The panel held defendant was entitled to
appointment of counsel and a hearing at which his attorney could
present evidence beyond the existing trial record.

7
The trial court appointed counsel for defendant on remand,
and the attorney filed a supplemental request for relief. Defense
counsel argued his client was entitled to resentencing because he
was not the actual killer and was not a major participant in
Garcia’s murder. As the defense argued it, defendant’s admission
to participating in the crime was limited to a concession that he
merely stood next to Garcia’s vehicle when the shooting occurred.
The District Attorney submitted a supplemental opposition,
which argued that while defendant was not the actual killer he
was nonetheless guilty of felony murder because he was a major
participant in the crime who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.
At a hearing held in April 2022, the trial court granted
defendant’s petition. The court found that, based on the totality
of the circumstances revealed by the record before it (the
transcripts of defendant’s criminal trial), there was insufficient
proof defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.
At a subsequent hearing in August 2022, the court vacated
defendant’s murder conviction and amended the criminal
information by interlineation to add a second degree robbery
charge (the felony underlying the felony murder theory). As so
amended, the robbery charge was accompanied by gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)) and firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)(1)) sentencing
allegations. The court then redesignated defendant’s conviction
as a conviction for robbery with an enhancement that a principal
personally and intentionally discharged a handgun for the benefit

8
of a street gang causing great bodily injury and death
(§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)).5
The court sentenced defendant to 30 years to life in prison:
the upper term of five years in prison for the robbery and 25
years to life in prison for the gang-related firearm enhancement.
The court stayed punishment for the gang and other “principal
armed” firearm enhancements.

II. DISCUSSION
Defendant presents several arguments for consideration,
but the only one we need address is his contention that there is
insufficient evidence to support sentencing enhancements
originally alleged and found true by the jury and imposed by the
trial court upon resentencing: the section 186.22, subdivision
(b)(1) gang enhancement and the section 12022.53, subdivision
(d) and (e)(1) “principal armed” firearm enhancement. Defendant
argues the evidence before the trial court does not meet the

5
The minute order from the hearing states that defendant
was convicted of first degree robbery. The reporter’s transcript of
the hearing and the subsequent abstract of judgment reflect the
trial court found defendant guilty of second degree robbery.
Where there is a discrepancy between a court’s oral
pronouncement and what is recorded in the minutes, the oral
pronouncement prevails. (People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th
224, 242.) Accordingly, we order the minute order corrected to
reflect the second degree robbery offense for which defendant was
found guilty. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
[reviewing courts have the inherent power on appeal to correct
clerical errors found in court records whether on the court’s own
motion or upon application of the parties].)

9
heightened requirements for proving a gang enhancement under
the amendments made by AB 333—which took effect months
before he was resentenced. Defendant further argues that, with
insufficient proof of the gang enhancement, the firearm
enhancement that depends on the validity of the gang
enhancement must fall too. This is all correct. Indeed, the
Attorney General concedes the trial evidence is insufficient to
support the gang and gang-related firearm enhancements the
trial court imposed after AB 333. Defendant, for his part,
concedes his remaining arguments are rendered moot by the
Attorney General’s concession of error. That too is correct. So we
shall affirm defendant’s redesignated robbery conviction and
order his sentence modified to strike all sentencing
enhancements.6

A. Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
“[A] successful petitioner [under section 1172.6] who was
charged with murder ‘generically, and the target offense was not
charged’ is entitled to have the murder conviction ‘redesignated’
as ‘the target offense’ of the natural and probable consequences

6
There is no reason to remand for resentencing because the
trial court imposed a high-term sentence for the robbery
conviction and our Supreme Court has recently held that
uncharged, unproven enhancements cannot be imposed at a
section 1172.6 resentencing. We also believe retrial of the
sentencing enhancements, which fail for insufficient evidence, is
not permitted in this case. (See Burks v. United States (1978) 437
U.S. 1, 16-17; People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 272; see also
In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 780 [reversing findings
without any opportunity for a redetermination on remand].)

10
theory—or the ‘underlying felony’ of the felony murder—and to be
resentenced accordingly. (Id., subd. (e).)” (People v. Arellano
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 464.) Arellano holds that when such a
redesignation occurs, a resentencing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (e), like a resentencing under subdivision (d)(3), “does
not contemplate the addition of an enhancement or an allegation
that was not previously found to be true.” (Id. at 470.)
We, of course, confront the opposite scenario in this appeal:
gang and firearm sentencing enhancements that were alleged
and were previously found true by the jury. Although the trial
court’s imposition of the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) and
(e)(1) enhancement in this case therefore does not run afoul of
Arellano’s holding, the enhancement imposed by the trial court
must still be supported by sufficient evidence. (See People v. Del
Rio (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 47, 50-51, 56 [redesignated robbery
conviction, following vacatur of a murder conviction, unsupported
by substantial evidence]; I.A., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 775
[“[f]ull and effective appellate review” requires that redesignated
offenses are “proven beyond a reasonable doubt” and “are
supported by substantial evidence on appeal”].) As we next
explain, that is what is lacking. There was insufficient evidence
introduced during the section 1172.6 proceedings, when AB 333’s
amendments had already taken effect, to justify imposition of the
gang and firearm enhancements alleged against defendant.

11
B. The Section 186.22 Gang Enhancement Lacks
Sufficient Evidentiary Support, As Does the
“Principal Armed” Firearm Enhancement That
Depends on the Gang Enhancement
At the time of defendant’s trial in 2004, section 186.22
defined “criminal street gang” as “any ongoing organization,
association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or
informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission
of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs (1)
to (25), inclusive, of subdivision (e), having a common name or
common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a
pattern of criminal gang activity.” (Former § 186.22, subd. (f).)
With regard to a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” the
prosecution at defendant’s second trial had to prove only that
those associated with 10 Line had committed at least two
offenses from a list of predicate crimes on separate occasions
within three years of one another. (Former § 186.22, subd. (e)
[defining “pattern of criminal activity” as “the commission of,
attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of,
sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of two or more of the
following offenses, provided at least one of these offenses occurred
after the effective date of this chapter and the last of those
offenses occurred within three years after a prior offense, and the
offenses were committed on separate occasions, or by two or more
persons”].)
As our Supreme Court has recently observed, the
Legislature “substantially amended the STEP Act in [AB 333].”
(People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 752.) “‘First, it narrowed
the definition of a “criminal street gang” to require that any gang

12
be an “ongoing, organized association or group of three or more
persons.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.) Second, whereas
section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s
members “individually or collectively engage in” a pattern of
criminal activity in order to constitute a “criminal street gang,”
[AB 333] requires that any such pattern have been “collectively
engage[d] in” by members of the gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics
added.) Third, [AB 333] also narrowed the definition of a
“pattern of criminal activity” by requiring that (1) the last offense
used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within
three years of the date that the currently charged offense is
alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed
by two or more gang “members,” as opposed to just “persons”; (3)
the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4)
the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones
other than the currently charged offense. (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1),
(2).) Fourth, [AB 333] narrowed what it means for an offense to
have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any
“common benefit” be ‘more than reputational.’ (§ 186.22, subd.
(g).)’ [Citation.]” (Id. at 752-753.) “Examples of a common benefit
that are more than reputational may include, but are not limited
to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived
or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential
current or previous witness or informant.” (§ 186.22, subd. (g).)
Our Supreme Court held in Clark that the Legislature’s
reference to collective engagement in a pattern of criminal
activity “calls for an inquiry not just into how the predicate
offenses benefited the gang, but also how the gang works together
as a gang. It calls for a showing of a connection, or nexus,
between an offense committed by one or more gang members and

13
the organization as a whole.” (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at 762.)
The Clark court went on to explain that this organizational nexus
“may be shown by evidence linking the predicate offenses to the
gang’s organizational structure, meaning its manner of
governance; its primary activities; or its common goals and
principles.”7 (Ibid.)
The record before the trial court during the section 1172.6
proceedings lacks sufficient evidence to support the section
186.22, subdivision (b)(1) (as amended by AB 333) gang
allegation. Officer Stevens, the prosecution’s gang expert,
testified about 10 Line’s history, size and primary criminal
activities. He did not (understandably, under then-prevailing
law) offer any testimony about the gang’s organizational
structure or how the gang’s members collectively engaged in
criminal activity generally or in specific connection with the four
predicate crimes. Officer Stevens opined that the gang benefited
from the hypothetical crime tracking the facts of Garcia’s murder
by enhancing its reputation for ruthlessness, but did not (again,
understandably) address any benefit to 10 Line provided by the
predicate criminal acts or establish the nature of any such

7
Clark offered a number of examples of how collective
engagement might be established: “[T]here might be evidence of
a direct order from the gang to commit specific crimes.
[Citations.] Alternatively, evidence might show a more general,
well-understood expectation that members must engage in
certain types of offenses. [Citation.] In other cases, collective
engagement might be shown by demonstrating that the offenses
are reflective of the primary activities of the gang, or else adhere
to a common goal or plan characteristic of the gang in question.
[Citations.]” (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at 762.)

14
benefit. Besides reputational gain, Officer Stevens did not
identify any other advantage that might have inured to 10 Line’s
benefit from the hypothesized murder-robbery.
Because there is no substantial evidence of 10 Line’s
organization, the organizational nexus between the gang and the
crimes committed by its members, and any nonreputational
benefit to the gang from the predicate crimes and Garcia’s
murder, vacatur of the true finding on the section 186.22 gang
allegation is required. Because the evidence is insufficient to
support the gang enhancement, the related firearm
enhancements are also infirm and must be vacated as well. (See,
e.g., People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 745-747 [reversing
section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) firearm enhancement that
was contingent on a true finding on the gang enhancement under
section 186.22].)

15
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s conviction for the redesignated offense of
robbery is affirmed. Defendant’s sentence is modified to strike all
sentencing enhancements, i.e., the section 186.22, subdivision
(b)(1) gang enhancement and all firearm enhancements under
section 12022.53, whether stayed or not. The trial court is to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting these
modifications and deliver the amended abstract to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM, J.

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