People v. Wardlow-Smith CA1/2

CourtListener 10104751Calctapp04.09.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/4/24 P. v. Wardlow-Smith CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169532
v.
CAMILLE AUTUMN WARDLOW- (Del Norte County Super. Ct. No.
SMITH, CRF-22-9408)
Defendant and Appellant.

In August 2022, defendant Camille Autumn Wardlow-Smith pleaded
guilty to carjacking and misdemeanor burglary and was placed on three years
formal probation. In February 2023, the probation department petitioned to
revoke her probation, alleging that she had failed to check in with the
probation department or report for mental health and drug abuse
assessments, and had three times been arrested and subsequently violated
written promises to appear in court. The trial court sustained the
allegations, revoked Wardlow-Smith’s probation, and sentenced her to three
years in state prison. Wardlow-Smith argues that the trial court erred in
failing to hold a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118
(Marsden) after she stated at a hearing, “I think I need a new lawyer.” We
agree, and we conditionally reverse and remand for a Marsden hearing.

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BACKGROUND
On July 29, 2022, the Del Norte County District Attorney filed an
amended felony complaint charging Wardlow-Smith with carjacking (Pen.
Code1, § 215, subd. (a)) (count 1); vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a))
(count 2); and second degree robbery (§ 211) (count 3).2 On August 15,
Wardlow-Smith pleaded guilty to felony carjacking (count 1) and
misdemeanor burglary in an unrelated case (count 1 in No. CRF229432). On
September 22, the trial court sentenced Wardlow-Smith to 120 days in county
jail and placed her on three years of formal probation.
On February 6, 2023, the probation department petitioned to revoke
Wardlow-Smith’s probation, alleging that she had failed to: (1) check in with
the probation department within one day of her release from custody on
November 15, 2022; (2) check in with probation in December 2022; (3) check
in with probation in January 2023; (4) report for a mental health assessment
within two business days of her release from custody; and (5) report to the
alcohol and other drugs program within two business days of her release from
custody.
On March 7, the district attorney filed a petition to revoke probation
containing six allegations that on February 21 and 22, Wardlow-Smith had
trespassed into Safeway, took food and alcohol without paying, and had
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on her person.
On August 1, the district attorney again petitioned to revoke Wardlow-
Smith’s probation, alleging that she had been arrested on February 17, April

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 We omit any discussion of the facts underlying the charged offenses as

they are not relevant to the single issue on appeal.

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9, and May 17, and then willfully violated written promises to appear at
corresponding court dates on March 17, May 9, and June 16, in violation of
section 853.7.
At a hearing the next day, the prosecution moved to dismiss the March
7 petition without prejudice. Defense counsel indicated that she did not have
the February 6 petition, and stated, “[A]t the time that I talked to [Wardlow-
Smith], I didn’t have the one that was filed yesterday. So she has no idea
what those two petitions contain.” The prosecutor requested that a hearing
be set for August 8, noting, “[t]hese will be extremely quick allegations to
prove. She didn’t come into court and hasn’t been checking in or doing
anything she was supposed to do.” Wardlow-Smith then interjected: “Can I
just agree to that, and then we can go from there that I want to clean up my
life?” Defense counsel explained that “[s]he’s indicating right now that she
wants to admit and just go forward. But I don’t—I don’t want her to admit
until she knows exactly what she’s admitting to and gone over the petitions.”
The trial court set a hearing for August 7 and added, “If she wants to admit,
we can deal with it then.”
On August 7, the following exchange took place:
“THE COURT: And this is on for setting of the probation violation.
Looks like there’s an arraignment, which is scheduled for tomorrow. Let’s see
if we can take care of that.
“MS. OLSON [defense counsel]: I believe she’s been arraigned on all
the petitions that were filed. In fact, the D.A.’s office had dismissed the first
petition. And the only one we would go forward on for a hearing at this point
is the August 1st, 2023, petition.
“THE COURT: All right. I apologize. It looks like that was vacated on
the last court appearance.

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“MS. OLSON: Okay. Thank you.
“THE COURT: I’ll figure out how to read the minutes.
“MS. OLSON: I was hoping that—my client is not prepared to admit
the allegations in the August 1st petition. So I was hoping that we could just
set it for a hearing.
“THE DEFENDANT: That’s not true. I think I need a new lawyer.
“THE BAILIFF: Please don’t interrupt. Don’t disrespect the court.
“THE DEFENDANT: We just sat here and talked about it.
“THE BAILIFF: Do not interrupt. Listen.
“THE COURT: Let’s go ahead and set it for a hearing. What will
happen is they’ll talk to you about it if you do want to admit or something.
“THE DEFENDANT: Admit what?
“THE COURT: Or if it doesn’t go to a hearing, then we can accomplish
that. Okay. All right.
“Go ahead and set it for probation revocation hearing.”
After defense counsel requested a hearing date of August 29, defendant
said:
“THE DEFENDANT: All this for having a dope pipe? [¶] . . . Like,
seriously. All this for carrying meth paraphernalia with nothing in it? That’s
a placebo effect. Like, seriously.” She was then escorted from the courtroom,
and the court set a revocation hearing for August 29.
On August 28, at a brief readiness conference, defense counsel
indicated that she “was prepared to confirm [the probation violation] hearing
as I went and saw my client, and she does not appear that she would be
willing to admit the violations that are alleged in the two petitions.” The
court confirmed the hearing for the next day.

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At the hearing on August 29, Noah Chankin, a probation officer with
the Del Norte County Probation Department, testified briefly that Wardlow-
Smith had never checked in with the probation department after her release
from custody and that she had never reported for a mental health or alcohol
and drug abuse assessment. At the prosecution’s request, the court took
judicial notice of the terms of Wardlow-Smith’s probation, her signed, written
promises to appear in court on March 17, May 9, and June 16, and the
minutes from each of those court dates showing that Wardlow did not appear.
The trial court found the allegations of the February 6 and August 1 petitions
true by a preponderance of the evidence.
Defense counsel then made the following statement: “I was going to
ask if we could put this out for sentencing. In talking with my client and
going back through and rereading the police reports and the previous
sentencing report, I think there’s some mental health issues. I don’t think at
this point they rise to, like, a [section] 1368 level, but I would like to have her
evaluated while she’s in custody and hopefully use any information that’s
gleaned from a psychological evaluation in mitigation at sentencing.” The
court set a September 19 hearing for setting of sentencing.
On September 19, defense counsel indicated she had still not “received
a report back from Dr. Limon,” and the court set a further hearing for
October 19.
On October 19, defense counsel had still not received the report from
Dr. Limon. Wardlow-Smith addressed the court: “I just want to say, can we
just go forward with sentencing. I don’t need to see Limon. If it’s going to be
nine years, let’s do the nine years. Three years, four, five, whatever it is.
Can we just go forward with sentencing so I can get to where I’m going?”
Defense counsel explained, “I still think trying to argue for the mitigated

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term of three years is what’s best for my client, despite what she’s saying,”
and that “with Dr. Limon’s report I can argue for three years, as opposed to
five,” after which Wardlow-Smith interjected, “Like I said, I don’t mind the
time.” She then stated, “I have read and reviewed nothing from my
attorney,” and “Your Honor, don’t you think I should have reports or mail
from my attorney or something stating the reason I’m in jail?” The court
explained that defense counsel was “waiting on Dr. Limon to get a report
done” and “right now in your case there’s nothing going on,” and set a
sentencing hearing for November 2.
At sentencing on November 2, defense counsel still had not received Dr.
Limon’s report. However, defense counsel indicated that the prosecutor told
her that he would argue in favor of the lower term sentence, and that
therefore the report from Dr. Limon would not be necessary because “the
reason I wanted her to do it is so I would have . . . what was needed to argue
for the mitigated term.” She continued, “And I know her family is here, and
they were concerned about her competency. But I did talk to her very briefly
about that as well. And, clearly, she understands the court proceedings. [¶]
And she’s asking me not to make a [section] 1368 Motion. I think, based on
her reasoning, I don’t—I don’t have what’s necessary to overrule that and
make the motion at this time.”
The prosecution then argued in favor of the lower term sentence of
three years on the carjacking count based on Wardlow-Smith’s lack of
criminal convictions and “current mental health issues.” Defense counsel
noted that her client “just wants to be sentenced and go forward,” that the
prosecution’s recommendation was “the lowest consequence she could get at
this point in time,” and submitted on the prosecution’s recommendation. The

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trial court then terminated probation and sentenced Wardlow-Smith to the
lower term of three years. And then:
“THE DEFENDANT: I would like to appeal. So how do I get that
paperwork?
“MS. OLSON: I can file a notice of appeal for you. And then the
appellate jurisdiction will⎯
“THE DEFENDANT: I’d like to change my attorney as well.
“THE COURT: What?
“THE DEFENDANT: I would like to change my attorney as well.
“MS. OLSON: They’ll appoint an appellate attorney.
“THE COURT: They’ll appoint an appellate attorney.
“THE DEFENDANT: All right. Thank you.”
Wardlow-Smith filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Wardlow-Smith argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error
in failing to hold a Marsden hearing after she stated at the August 7 hearing
that, “I think I need a new lawyer.” We agree.
“When a defendant seeks new counsel on the basis that his appointed
counsel is providing inadequate representation—i.e., makes what is
commonly called a Marsden motion [Marsden, supra,] 2 Cal.3d 118—the trial
court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to
relate specific instances of inadequate performance. A defendant is entitled
to relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not
providing adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have
become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective
representation is likely to result.” (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581,
604.)

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The trial court’s duty to hold a Marsden hearing does not “require a
proper and formal legal motion, but at least some clear indication by
defendant that he wants a substitute attorney.” (People v. Lucky (1988) 45
Cal.3d 259, 281, fn. 8; see People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 89–90.)
Although the decision whether to permit a defendant to discharge his
appointed counsel and substitute another attorney is within the discretion of
the trial court, the court “cannot thoughtfully exercise its discretion . . .
without listening to [defendant’s] reasons for requesting a change of
attorneys. A trial judge is unable to intelligently deal with a defendant’s
request for substitution of attorneys unless he is cognizant of the grounds
which prompted the request. The defendant may have knowledge of conduct
and events relevant to the diligence and competence of his attorney which are
not apparent to the trial judge from observations within the four corners of
the courtroom. Indeed, ‘[w]hen inadequate representation is alleged, the
critical factual inquiry ordinarily relates to matters outside the trial record:
whether the defendant had a defense which was not presented; whether trial
counsel consulted sufficiently with the accused, and adequately investigated
the facts and the law; whether the omissions charged to trial counsel resulted
from inadequate preparation rather than from unwise choice of trial tactics
and strategy.’ [Citation.] Thus, a judge who denies a motion for substitution
of attorneys solely on the basis of his courtroom observations, despite a
defendant’s offer to relate specific instances of misconduct, abuses the
exercise of his discretion to determine the competency of the attorney. A
judicial decision made without giving a party an opportunity to present
argument or evidence in support of his contention ‘is lacking in all the
attributes of a judicial determination.’ ” (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp.
123–124; see People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 346 [“[A] refusal by the

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trial court to afford a defendant an opportunity to set forth the reasons
underlying his request for the substitution of appointed counsel constitutes
an abuse of discretion by the court”].)
The Attorney General first argues that Wardlow-Smith’s statement—
“That’s not true. I think I need a new lawyer”—was not a clear indication of
a desire for substitute counsel sufficient to trigger the trial court’s Marsden
obligations. We cannot agree. Other than the prefatory “I think,” Wardlow-
Smith could hardly have been more clear that she wanted substitute counsel.
(See Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 124 [“The semantics employed by a lay
person in asserting a constitutional right should not be given undue weight in
determining the protection to be accorded that right”].)
The Attorney General next argues that Wardlow-Smith’s statement at
best reflected a difference of opinion between her and her attorney over trial
tactics, i.e., whether to admit the allegations of the August 1 petition without
having reviewed them. (See People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 281 [“The
mere fact that there appears to be a difference of opinion between a
defendant and his attorney over trial tactics does not place a court under a
duty to hold a Marsden hearing”].) But Wardlow-Smith disagreed that she
was prepared to admit those allegations (“That’s not true”) separately from
her request for substitute counsel (“I think I need a new lawyer”). And the
balance of the record does not clearly support the Attorney General’s
contention. For example, it shows that Wardlow-Smith disagreed with her
attorney about whether sentencing should be delayed for a mental health
evaluation to support an argument for a lower term sentence and whether
counsel should declare a doubt as to her competency. She also told the court,
“I have read and reviewed nothing from my attorney,” and at the very
conclusion of the proceedings—almost three months after her initial request

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for a Marsden hearing—again asked for substitute counsel, suggesting that
her dissatisfaction with her attorney may have extended well beyond any
specific disagreement about whether to admit the allegations of the August 1
petition. In any event, the Attorney General does not cite any authority for
the proposition that we may make assumptions about a defendant’s reasons
for requesting new counsel and on that basis excuse the trial court’s failure to
hold a Marsden hearing to develop the record on precisely that question. (See
People v. Armijo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1183 [“we ‘cannot speculate
upon the basis of a silent record that the trial court, after listening to
defendant’s reasons, would decide the appointment of new counsel was
unnecessary’ ”].)
Having concluded that the trial court erred in failing to hold a Marsden
hearing, we turn to the question of prejudice. Reversal is required unless the
record shows that the failure to hold a hearing was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 126, citing Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18; People v. Reed (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1137,
1148; People v. Chavez, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 348–349.) That demanding
standard is not met here.
The Attorney General again contends that Wardlow-Smith’s
dissatisfaction with her attorney had only to do with the statement that she
was not prepared to admit the allegations in the August 1 petition, and that
because she “was permitted her desired outcome—to be found in violation of
the terms of her probation,” any error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. As already discussed, we cannot agree that Wardlow-Smith’s
disagreement with her counsel was so limited, and we decline to speculate as
to what would have happened had she been permitted to explain the basis for

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her request for substitute counsel. (See People v. Armijo, supra, 10
Cal.App.5th at p. 1183.)
In addition, the record does not show that failure to hold a Marsden
hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Wardlow-Smith’s
disagreement with her counsel appears to have extended to the question of
whether to declare a doubt as to her competency. (See People v. Solorzano
(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1071 [Marsden error not harmless where it may
have affected outcome of competency proceedings].) At the August 7 hearing,
Wardlow-Smith expressed her belief that the proceedings were “[a]ll . . . for
having a dope pipe,” despite the petition making those particular allegations
having been dismissed five days earlier. On August 29, defense counsel
stated, “In talking with my client and going back through and rereading the
police reports and the previous sentencing report, I think there’s some mental
health issues,” but concluded, “I don’t think at this point they rise to, like, a
[section] 1368 level.”3 Over six weeks later, on October 19, Wardlow-Smith
suggested in court that she still did not understand the “reason I’m in jail.”
And at sentencing on November 2, counsel indicated that Wardlow-Smith’s
family was “concerned about her competency,” but that she was “asking me
not to make a [section] 1368 Motion . . . based on her reasoning, I don’t . . .
have what’s necessary to overrule that and make the motion at this time.”
Ultimately, defense counsel never declared a doubt as to Wardlow-Smith’s
competency under section 1368 and elected to proceed with sentencing

3 Indeed, the presentence investigation report for the offenses

underlying Wardlow-Smith’s grant of probation noted that she had
“untreated systemic mental health issues,” “untreated poly substance abuse,”
was “not stabilized on medication,” “states that she sees and talks to ‘dead
people,’ ” and “said that she does not have a grasp on reality and feels like
she is in a video game.”

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without the mental health evaluation requested from Dr. Limon. On this
record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s failure to hold a Marsden
hearing at the outset of the proceedings on August 7 was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (See People v. Solorzano, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p.
1071; People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 971 [counsel may move for
evaluation of defendant’s competency over defendant’s objection].)
Because we cannot conclude that the trial court’s failure to hold a
Marsden hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a conditional
reversal with directions to hold such a hearing on remand is the “proper
disposition.” (People v. Sanchez, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 92; see People v.
Armijo, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1183–1184.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the case is remanded with
directions to the trial court to conduct a Marsden hearing. If defendant’s
request for substitute counsel is granted, the trial court is directed to appoint
new counsel to assist defendant and to entertain such motions as newly
appointed counsel may file. The court shall reinstate the judgment if, after a
hearing: (1) defendant’s request is denied; (2) the request is granted but
substitute counsel declines to file any further motions; or (3) the trial court
denies any such motion filed.

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_________________________
RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
MILLER, J.

________________________
DESAUTELS, J.

The People v. Wardlow-Smith (A169532)

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