People v. Francis CA2/8

CourtListener 10104569Calctapp04.09.2024

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Filed 9/4/24 P. v. Francis CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B329384

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA454480
v.

TYREE FRANCIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Affirmed.
Sharon Fleming, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Stephanie Yee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Tyree Francis unsuccessfully tried to dismiss parts of his
criminal case before trial. He also unsuccessfully sought mental
health diversion. He ultimately agreed to a no contest plea and
19 years in prison. Then he appealed. His appellate counsel
found no arguable issues and filed a brief under People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We ordered briefing related to
mental health diversion and now affirm. Undesignated statutory
citations are to the Penal Code.
I
First we draw from the preliminary hearing transcript to
summarize the underlying incidents. Then we trace the relevant
procedural history of the case.
A
On a rainy day in February 2017, police spotted a white
Mercedes with dark tinted windows and paper plates at a gas
station on the corner of Slauson and Crenshaw. When one of the
officers walked to the car, the driver quickly reversed and sped
out of the lot into oncoming traffic. Police pursued the Mercedes,
which sped through red lights on wet roads going more than 100
miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour area. The police fell behind
and eventually lost sight of their target. They went back to the
gas station to get surveillance video of the incident.
The next afternoon, different officers who had been briefed
on the incident saw the same Mercedes get onto the 110 Freeway.
They pulled behind it. The driver (Francis) accelerated, cut
across the freeway lanes, and again topped 100 miles per hour as
he swerved through moderate to heavy traffic. The officers
trailed him with their siren on and lights flashing.
After the police briefly lost sight of the Mercedes, the chase
continued on surface streets in downtown Los Angeles. Francis

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pulled into a parking structure, crashing through the crossing
arm at the entrance and nearly hitting garage employees inside
the structure. One employee saw the driver throw a small black
object out of the car. The object was a gun.
Francis left the parking structure and pulled into an alley.
He rapidly accelerated his car towards the police who pursued
him on foot. One of these officers fired one shot at the Mercedes
as it sped towards him and got within a couple feet.
Francis sped out of the alley and continued evading police.
He drove on the wrong side of the road, in a turn lane, and
through at least one red light. The chase ended after the
Mercedes crashed into several cars, flipping one onto its side and
badly injuring the driver. This was in a residential area near a
school. Francis was going more than twice the speed limit.
Police recorded nearly all of this chase. They tied Francis
to the earlier chase using the gas station surveillance video.
B
A May 2018 information charged Francis with 11 counts
arising from the two car chases. The information included
various enhancements and asserted Francis had two or more
serious or violent felony convictions.
After various delays, Francis hired private counsel, who
moved to dismiss the allegations and enhancements based on
several special directives by the District Attorney. The trial court
denied the motion.
In July 2022, new private defense counsel filed an omnibus
motion for relief under various ameliorative laws. The motion
sought dismissal of enhancements and prior strike allegations
under amended section 1385 and the Racial Justice Act (section

3
745), requested mental health diversion (section 1001.36), and
alternatively asked for an indicated sentence.
Francis supported his motion with a psychosocial
evaluation by social worker Regina Robles and with a report by
trauma specialist Dr. Kevin E. Booker. The thrust of Robles’s
report was Francis’s actions in February 2017 were connected to
his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from having several
childhood friends die from police violence, his young age (24 at
the time of these offenses), and the childhood trauma he
experienced with a drug-addicted mother, no father, and
consistent police harassment. Booker diagnosed Francis with
moderate chronic PTSD, recurrent major depressive disorder, and
complicated bereavement.
The prosecution opposed Francis’s motion. It argued
Francis had a documented history of putting members of the
public at great risk of death in a consistent effort to avoid arrest
and responsibility, his conduct was not the result of a mental
disorder, and his early release would endanger public safety. The
opposition emphasized Francis’s earlier manslaughter conviction:
In 2013, shortly out of prison for another offense, Francis killed a
72-year-old man while speeding to pass a car and veering into
oncoming traffic. Francis fled the scene while the man lay dying
and while Francis’s two passengers were trapped in his car. He
was not arrested for this crime until after “yet another vehicle
pursuit with the police” later in 2013.
Before hearing Francis’s omnibus motion, the trial court
asked Francis to submit a viable treatment plan with an updated
expert report explaining whether Francis satisfied the
requirements of section 1001.36. Booker provided a two-page
supplemental report concluding Francis was a feasible candidate

4
for mental health diversion. Booker observed: “While there is no
absolute correlation between [Francis’s] actions and his chronic
mental illness, the exhibited behavior in this case is most
consistent with the hyperarousal we see in chronic PTSD.”
“Clinical data suggests that his Post-traumatic Stress Disorder is
clinically significant and it appears evident that this destabilized,
mental disorder played a role in the commission of the offense in
this case.” Booker noted that unless people like Francis “receive
targeted, therapeutic treatment, the chances of disinhibited,
asocial behaviors increases.” “Therefore, a Mental Health
Diversion referral would reduce his chances of re-offending
PROVIDED IT IS SPECIFIALLY [sic] TARGETED for Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder treatment. A Mental Health
referral in this instance would likely not pose a risk of Mr.
Francis committing a super-strikable offense if he remains
compliant in trauma-focused treatment.” The emphasis is
Booker’s.
Francis also provided a Conditional Letter of Acceptance to
a “residential recovery home for chemically dependent and/or
dual diagnosed clients.” The letter referred to Francis’s
“addiction” but said nothing about PTSD or PTSD treatment.
The trial court let both sides argue at the January 25, 2023
hearing. But first, the court “set the stage” for the motions before
it. The court recited the documents it had reviewed and key facts
about the two police chases at issue. It explained some of
Francis’s criminal history: Francis had three strikes for three
separate residential burglaries in early 2013—around the same
time as the vehicular manslaughter—and he had been on parole
for just five months at the time of the offenses here, in February

5
2017. The court found the facts of the manslaughter case
significant and observed no police were involved in that incident.
Regarding mental health diversion, the court acknowledged
Francis’s PTSD diagnosis but noted this was a “lower level
mental health issue” that would not qualify him “for a bed in the
lockdown even if one were available.” The judge discussed her
familiarity with mental health diversion—having been the Office
of Diversion and Reentry judge for five years. She mentioned her
efforts “to get as many people out of custody as possible and into
treatment.” She also acknowledged, multiple times, the law on
mental health diversion recently had changed, and there now
was a presumption favoring diversion.
The court ruled as follows:
“I do find the Defendant is charged with an eligible offense
and has been diagnosed with an eligible mental disorder.
“I find the analysis fails on factors two and six. Factor two
is now the presumption that the mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. In
other words, there has to be no clear and convincing evidence
that it was not a motivating factor, a causal factor, a contributing
factor to the Defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.
“I find that there is, in this case, is no clear and convincing
evidence that the disorder was a motivating factor, a causal
factor, or contributing factor to the Defendant’s involvement in
the charged offense in this case.
“I find it very significant that on February 7, he fled from the
police without there being any police contact and again on
February 8 of 2017 with a handgun in the vehicle. He again fled
from the police. [¶] . . . [¶]

6
“The sixth factor is the next factor that I find is not satisfied
and that is whether the defendant will pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to the public safety as defined in the 1170.1(a) which
allowed the People overlook the risk of committing a super strike,
and I believe that in this case he actually is.
“I do believe he [poses] an unreasonable risk of danger to the
public safety if treated in the community, and it would be a risk
of committing a super strike.
“He’s engaged in extremely dangerous driving on three
occasions, two of which were after an event that resulted in the
death of a 72-year-old man at the hands of the Defendant. That
was in the event that did not involve police contact whatsoever.
“The Defendant has shown a complete and total disregard
for the safety of others in the manner in which he has driven.
The events in the current case have resulted in very serious
injury to another human being yet again.
“Despite having been convicted for felon with a firearm and
vehicular manslaughter, he is alleged to once again be driving
with a handgun in the vehicle.
“And lastly, even if he could be safely treated in a lockdown
facility, those facilities do not exist in LA County. There’s a 120-
bed facility that is always full. Those are reserved for seriously
mentally ill defendants, not someone who suffers moderate
chronic PTSD. Therefore, that is an unrealistic option.
“For that reason, I find the defense has not made a prima
facie showing, prima facie showing that he is eligible and suitable
for diversion.”
Apart from mental health diversion, the court struck two
one-year prison priors. It otherwise denied relief. The court
observed many of the grounds were premature and, accordingly,

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made many of its rulings without prejudice to Francis raising the
issue again at sentencing, should a jury convict him. Defense
counsel acknowledged the court had given her leeway in hearing
the motions then rather than waiting until after trial.
Instead of going to trial, Francis reached a plea agreement
with the prosecution and pleaded no contest to four of the 11
counts. He admitted one strike, an allegation of great bodily
injury, and two aggravating factors. In line with the plea
agreement, the trial court dismissed the remaining counts, struck
one strike, and sentenced Francis to a total term of 19 years in
state prison. The court imposed no fines or fees.
C
Francis received a certificate of probable cause and
appealed the denial of his pretrial motions. We appointed
appellate counsel, who filed a Wende brief raising no issues.
After examining the entire record, we asked the parties to
brief the following issues:
1) Whether the grounds given for denying pretrial diversion
at the prima facie stage were proper under the version of
Penal Code section 1001.36 then in effect.
2) Whether any error in this ruling was harmless because it is
clear the court would have exercised its discretion to deny
diversion regardless.
3) The proper disposition here.
The parties briefed these issues, and we resolve the pretrial
diversion matter now.
II
The trial court supplied three grounds for its diversion
ruling: (1) Francis inadequately tied his disorder to his offenses;
(2) he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if

8
treated in the community; and (3) the proposed treatment plan
was unrealistic. Both sides acknowledge the court erred on the
first ground.
Below we explain the diversion statute and the error. Next
we show that this error was harmless, and that remand is
unnecessary because the second and third grounds are valid.
A
In 2018, the Legislature created a pretrial diversion
program for criminal defendants with diagnosed mental health
disorders. (Sarmiento v. Super. Ct. of San Diego County (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890 (Sarmiento).) In 2022, when Francis
filed his motion, the relevant statute listed six criteria defendants
needed to meet to be considered for diversion. (See id. at p. 891.)
Effective January 1, 2023, a few weeks before the ruling on
Francis’s motion, the Legislature amended the statute by
dividing the six criteria into two eligibility requirements and four
suitability requirements. (See Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 891–892.) “Defendants are eligible if they have been
diagnosed with a recognized mental disorder that was a
significant factor in the commission of the criminal offense with
which they are charged. ([§ 1001.36], subd. (b).) They are
suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert,
the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2)
the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the
defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4)
the defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety’ as defined in sections 1170.18 and 667, subdivision
(e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)” (Id. at p. 891.) The last factor
requires courts to consider whether a defendant likely will
commit a super strike offense. (Id. at pp. 890 & 897.)

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Under the amended statute, defendants generally are
eligible for diversion if they have been diagnosed with a
recognized mental disorder. (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th
at p. 891.) Unlike the 2022 version of the statute, “the amended
statute creates a presumption that the defendant's diagnosed
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
charged crime.” (Ibid.) Courts now must find a causal connection
unless there is clear and convincing evidence the disorder did not
motivate, cause, or contribute to the crime. (See ibid.)
The trial court acknowledged the new presumption
favoring diversion. But it incorrectly flipped the presumption in
concluding Francis had failed to mount clear and convincing
evidence tying his offenses to his disorder. This was error. But it
was harmless, and we need not determine whether the court
would have exercised its residual discretion to deny diversion
regardless, because the court provided other valid grounds for its
decision, as we explain next. (See People v. Watts (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 830, 837 (Watts).)
B
We uphold the denial of a request for diversion if there was
a valid ground for the decision. (Watts, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 832–833 & 837.) That is the case here, where the trial court
separately ruled Francis was unsuitable for diversion due to the
risk he posed to public safety. (See People v. Bunas (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 840, 860 (Bunas) [“a trial court may deny a motion
for diversion on the basis of either suitability or eligibility”].)
The trial court appropriately recognized that this factor
required it to determine whether Francis was likely to commit a
super strike offense—a narrow category of felonies encompassing
any homicide offense. (See Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at

10
pp. 890 & 892, fn. 4.) From the facts of Francis’s latest two car
chases, plus the fact of Francis’s earlier vehicular manslaughter,
the trial court reasonably could infer there was a significant risk
Francis would kill another person while driving recklessly. (See,
e.g., People v. Moore (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 937, 939 [upholding
implied malice murder conviction where the defendant raced
through city streets at excessive speeds, ran a red light, and
collided with a car that killed one victim and seriously injured
another]; see also § 1001.36, subd. (c)(4) [when ruling on this
factor, the court “may consider the opinions of the district
attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and
may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s
violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and
any other factors that the court deems appropriate”].)
Francis concedes the record “arguably” supports this ruling.
He also concedes implied malice murder was a potentially
applicable super strike offense.
Denying mental health diversion based on this suitability
factor fell within the trial court’s broad discretion. (See People v.
Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147 [appellate courts
review diversion rulings for abuse of discretion and related
factual findings for substantial evidence].)
Francis maintains People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
113 (Brown) shows this case should be remanded for a new
eligibility determination and for reconsideration of Francis’s
suitability for diversion. Brown is distinguishable. There, the
trial court ruled on mental health diversion before the 2023
change in the law, and the appellate court concluded this pre-
amendment ruling fell within the court’s discretion. (Id. at pp.
117–119, 121–124.) The appellate court went on to address the

11
retroactivity of the statutory changes and forfeiture arguments,
and it determined remand was required to analyze the
defendant’s diversion request under the amended statute. (Id. at
pp. 117 & 125–128.) In a final few sentences, the court rejected
the prosecution’s argument that remand was unnecessary
because there was a valid ground for upholding the diversion
decision, as the record did not clearly show the trial court would
reach the same conclusions about eligibility or suitability under
the new law. (See id. at p. 128.)
Here, the law had changed by the time the trial court ruled,
the court was aware of the change, but the court applied part of
amended law (the presumption) incorrectly. The court’s
treatment of Francis’s continued risk to society under the
amended law was sound. Redoing the eligibility and suitability
analyses is unnecessary. (See Bunas, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p.
860 [because a court may deny a diversion motion based
on either suitability or eligibility, “if the court determines that
the defendant or offense is not suitable, it makes no difference
whether the defendant is eligible”].)
C
Separately, the trial court’s denial of diversion based on the
proposed treatment plan was sound.
Not only must a defendant be both eligible and suitable for
mental health diversion, but the trial court also must be satisfied
the recommended mental health program will meet the
specialized needs of the defendant. (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i);
see also Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892 [this
subdivision contemplates “an ongoing assessment to assure that
defendants will receive appropriate treatment for their particular
conditions as part of the diversion program”].)

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Francis’s reply brief does not respond to the prosecution’s
arguments on this point.
Francis’s diversion motion noted his condition qualified him
for a particular long-term locked care facility in Los Angeles
County (Olive Vista Behavioral Health Center). The motion said
nothing about the center’s ability or inclination to accept Francis.
The court noted its experience with these facilities was that they
were always full and were reserved for those with significantly
more serious conditions. No one refuted this.
Instead, Francis’s supplemental diversion materials
pointed to a different residential facility that eventually would
have space for Francis. This letter said nothing about PTSD or
trauma-focused treatment. Accordingly, nothing assured the
court the facility could provide the intensive focused therapy
Booker maintained Francis needed to reduce his chances of
reoffending.
Denying mental health diversion under these
circumstances was not an abuse of discretion. (See Sarmiento,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 895 [under subdivision (f)(1) of the
diversion statute, “a court might reject diversion if it concluded
that the proposed treatment services did not target or could not
effectively address the defendant’s particular diagnosis”].)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s orders and the judgment.

WILEY, J.
We concur:

STRATTON, P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.

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