CourtListener 10103333•Loflin v. Creative Care CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/3/24 Loflin v. Creative Care CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
MARQUITA HAIRE LOFLIN et B325585
al.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Super. Ct. No. 22STCV21220)
v.
CREATIVE CARE, INC. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Virginia C. Keeny, Judge. Affirmed.
Citron & Citron, Thomas. H. Citron and Katherine A.
Tatikian for Defendants and Appellants Creative Care, Inc.,
Dr. Morteza Khaleghi and Dr. Karen Khaleghi.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Lann G. McIntyre,
Tracy D. Forbath, Raymond K. Wilson and Kathleen M. Walker
for Defendant and Appellant Farrah Khaleghi.
Brown, Neri, Smith & Khan LLP, Amjad M. Khan and
Jacquelynn K. M. Levien for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
__________________________
Creative Care, Inc., Morteza Khaleghi, Karen Khaleghi,
and Farrah Khaleghi (collectively, Creative Care defendants)
appeal from an order denying their motions to compel arbitration
of the causes of action asserted by Marquita Haire Loflin and
McKenzie Loflin (collectively, Loflin heirs) for wrongful death,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and the survival and elder abuse causes of
action asserted by the estate of Johnathon Loflin.1 The Creative
Care defendants contend all the causes of action are subject to
arbitration, including those brought by the nonsignatory Loflin
heirs, and the trial court erred in denying their motions. Farrah
Khaleghi (Khaleghi) also argues the court abused its discretion in
denying arbitration of the estate’s claims pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c),2 which provides
an exception to mandatory arbitration where a party to an
arbitration agreement and parties not bound by the agreement
assert claims in an action arising out of the same transaction. We
affirm.
1 Creative Care, Inc., Morteza Khaleghi, and Karen Khaleghi
filed one motion to compel arbitration; Farrah Khaleghi filed a
separate motion. We refer to the motions collectively as the
motions to compel arbitration and indicate where an argument is
asserted only by Farrah Khaleghi.
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Treatment at the Rehabilitation Facility and the Arbitration
Agreement
On October 18, 2019 Johnathon Loflin (Johnny)3 was
admitted into the Creative Care rehabilitation facility for
treatment of his mental health issues and substance abuse
disorder in a residential inpatient program. On the day of his
admission Johnny signed Creative Care’s Admissions Agreement
(admissions agreement). On December 20 Johnny signed a
second admission agreement. Both agreements contained the
following arbitration provision: “BINDING ARBITRATION: The
Client, any Guarantor of the Client’s payment and the facility
agree that Binding Arbitration is the sole and the exclusive
remedy against Creative Care and its staff. Any such Binding
Arbitration must be conducted in Los Angeles County and the
prevailing party, in addition to any other awards received, shall
be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”
On December 18, 2019, while Johnny was still at the
facility, Creative Care lost accreditation for its substance abuse
treatment services. Late at night on February 12, 2020, Creative
Care informed Johnny’s family that the facility was going to
transfer Johnny immediately to another facility, even though his
therapist advised against the transfer. Creative Care told
Johnny’s family the transfer would cost $5,000. Johnny’s sister
McKenzie objected to the transfer, but Creative Care’s senior
admissions coordinator told her that Johnny would be transferred
3 We refer to the Loflin parties by their first names to avoid
confusion. Our factual recitation is based on the allegations in
the complaint.
3
or he would be “out on the street” that night. After speaking with
one of Creative Care’s doctors and its founder, McKenzie agreed
to transfer Johnny to the other facility. Less than two months
after being transferred, Johnny was found unresponsive in a
bathroom after ingesting fentanyl, and he died soon after.
B. The Complaint
On June 29, 2022, the Loflin heirs and Johnny’s estate filed
an action against the Creative Care defendants. The Loflin heirs
alleged causes of action for wrongful death (§ 377.60 et seq.),
fraudulent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress; Johnny’s estate alleged causes of action for
survival (§ 377.30 et. seq.) and violations of the Elder Abuse and
Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 15600 et seq.).4 All claims were based on a common set of “facts
giving rise to all claims.” (Capitalization, boldface, and
underlining omitted.)
The wrongful death and survival causes of action alleged,
using almost identical language, that the Creative Care
defendants owed a duty of care to Johnny, and they breached
that duty by failing to provide medical care for his physical and
mental needs, ultimately causing his death. The elder abuse
cause of action alleged the Creative Care defendants “neglected
Johnny by failing to use the degree of care that a reasonable
person in the same situation [as his caretaker] would have used
4 The amended complaint separately alleged a cause of
action for “professional liability—negligence” against Cliffside
Malibu, Inc. Cliffside Malibu was later dismissed from the action
pursuant to a good faith settlement.
4
in providing for Johnny’s basic needs.” The fraudulent
misrepresentation cause of action alleged that Creative Care
made intentionally false representations to Johnny’s family
regarding his psychiatric care. The intentional infliction of
emotional distress cause of action alleged the Creative Care
defendants’ misrepresentations regarding psychiatric care and
threats to throw Johnny “‘out on the street’” were “outrageous,
i.e., so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in
a civilized community,” causing the Loflin heirs to suffer
emotional distress.
C. The Creative Care Defendants’ Motion To Compel
Arbitration
In August 2022 the Creative Care defendants filed their
motions to compel arbitration (styled as petitions to compel
arbitration). The Creative Care defendants argued the
arbitration provision in the admissions agreement bound the
Loflin heirs, even though only Johnny signed the agreement,
because the agreement reflected the parties’ intent that all claims
arising from the care and services rendered to Johnny during his
stay at Creative Care be arbitrated. Further, the Loflin heirs
were required to arbitrate their claims pursuant to section 1295,
which sets forth requirements for arbitration provisions in
contracts for medical services. They also highlighted California’s
strong public policy favoring arbitration.
In their oppositions, the Loflin plaintiffs argued the heirs
were not bound by the arbitration provision because it did not
purport to bind the heirs, successors, or family members.
Further, section 1295 did not apply because the arbitration
agreement did not comply with the statutory requirements. In
5
addition, given the possibility of conflicting rulings if the estate’s
claims were arbitrated and the Loflin heirs’ claims litigated in
court, the court should exercise its discretion under
section 1281.2, subdivision (c), to deny arbitration of the estate’s
claims.
In their reply briefs, the Creative Care defendants argued
section 1281.2, subdivision (c), did not apply because all the
parties were bound by the arbitration agreement, so there were
no third parties. Khaleghi also argued that, “[a]t a bare
minimum, the causes of action brought on behalf of the estate
should be ordered to arbitration . . . with any causes of action not
subject to arbitration (if any) remaining stayed pending the
completion of arbitration.”
D. The Trial Court’s Ruling
At the December 12, 2022, hearing on the motions, the
Creative Care defendants’ attorney asserted, among other
arguments, that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz v.
Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838 (Ruiz), nonsignatory heirs are
required to arbitrate professional negligence claims brought
against health care providers under section 1295. The Loflin
plaintiffs’ counsel argued Ruiz was inapplicable because, unlike
in Ruiz, the arbitration agreement did not reflect an intent to
bind the Loflin heirs. Following arguments from the attorneys,
the trial court took the matter under submission.
On December 15, 2022 the trial court issued an order
denying the motions to compel arbitration. The court found (1)
the arbitration agreement did not comply with the mandatory
provisions of section 1295; and (2) there was no evidence of an
intent to bind the nonsignatory Loflin heirs to the arbitration
6
agreement. The court exercised its discretion under
section 1281.2, subdivision (c), to deny arbitration of all claims
because the wrongful death and survivor claims were based on
the same facts, and there was a strong possibility of conflicting
rulings on common issues of law and fact if the estate’s claims
were arbitrated and the Loflin heirs’ claims were litigated in
court.5
The Creative Care defendants timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law on Arbitration Agreements and Standard of
Review
Section 1281.2 requires the trial court to order arbitration
of a controversy, subject to exceptions not applicable here, “‘[o]n
petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the
existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and
that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate such
controversy . . . if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate
the controversy exists.’” (Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1119-1120.) “Generally speaking,
one must be a party to an arbitration agreement to be bound by
it. ‘The strong public policy in favor of arbitration does not
extend to those who are not parties to an arbitration agreement,
and a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute that he
has not agreed to resolve by arbitration.’” (Monschke v. Timber
Ridge Assisted Living, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 583, 586-587;
5 For ease of reference, like the trial court, we refer to the
Loflin heirs’ claims collectively as their wrongful death claims
and the estate’s claims as the survivor claims.
7
accord, Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market
Development (U.S.), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 [“‘“a party
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he
[or she] has not agreed so to submit”’”].)
In Ruiz, supra, 50 Cal.4th at page 841, the Supreme Court
carved out an exception to the general rule that only parties to
arbitration agreements are bound, holding with respect to
medical malpractice claims that “all wrongful death claimants
are bound by arbitration agreements entered into pursuant to
section 1295, at least when . . . the language of the agreement
manifests an intent to bind these claimants.” The court in Ruiz
explained, “‘Section 1295 was enacted as part of the Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA). . . . The
purpose of section 1295 is to encourage and facilitate arbitration
of medical malpractice disputes. [Citations.] Accordingly, the
provisions of section 1295 are to be construed liberally.’ In other
words, the encouragement of arbitration ‘“as a speedy and
relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution”’ [citation]
furthers MICRA’s goal of reducing costs in the resolution of
malpractice claims and therefore malpractice insurance
premiums.” (Id. at pp. 843-844; accord, Holland v. Silverscreen
Healthcare, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1132 [“Ruiz
concluded ‘that section 1295, construed in light of its purpose, is
designed to permit patients who sign arbitration agreements to
bind their heirs in wrongful death actions.’”]; Daniels v. Sunrise
Senior Living, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 674, 682 (Daniels).)
The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence an agreement to
arbitrate a dispute exists, and the party opposing arbitration
bears the burden of proving unconscionability or other defenses.
8
(Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development
(U.S), LLC, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236; Rosenthal v. Great
Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)
“Absent conflicting evidence, we review de novo the trial court’s
interpretation of an arbitration agreement.” (Trinity v. Life Ins.
Co. of North America, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1120; accord,
Villareal v. LAD-T, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 446, 456 [“[W]e
independently review the order [to compel arbitration] if the trial
court’s denial rests solely on a question of law.”].)
B. The Loflin Heirs Are Not Bound by the Arbitration
Agreement
The Creative Care defendants contend that, as in Ruiz,
supra, 50 Cal.4th at pages 850 to 851, the Loflin heirs are bound
by the arbitration agreement even though they did not sign the
admissions agreement. There are two fatal flaws in the Creative
Care defendants’ argument: the arbitration agreement did not
purport to bind Johnny’s heirs, and the arbitration agreement did
not comply with section 1295.
The arbitration agreement in Ruiz provided “that this
agreement binds all parties whose claims may arise out of or
relate to treatment or service provided by the physician including
any spouse or heirs of the patient and any children, whether born
or unborn, at the time of the occurrence giving rise to the claim.”
(Ruiz, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 841-842, italics added.) By
contrast, the arbitration agreement here stated only that Johnny,
any guarantor, and the Creative Care facility agreed that
arbitration “is the sole and the exclusive remedy against Creative
Care and its staff.” The absence of language in the arbitration
agreement binding heirs, spouses, or family members shows a
9
lack of intent to bind anyone other than Johnny and Creative
Care (or a guarantor).6
This case also differs from Ruiz because the admissions
agreement failed to comply with MICRA’s requirements in
section 1295. Section 1295, subdivision (a), provides that the first
article of any contract requiring arbitration of medical
malpractice disputes “shall have” the following language: “‘It is
understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as
to whether any medical services rendered under this contract
were unnecessary or unauthorized or were improperly,
negligently or incompetently rendered, will be determined by
submission to arbitration as provided by California law, and not
by a lawsuit or resort to court process except as California law
provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings. Both
parties to this contract, by entering into it, are giving up their
constitutional right to have any such dispute decided in a court of
law before a jury, and instead are accepting the use of
arbitration.’”
6 Khaleghi contends that because Johnny’s sister McKenzie
was designated as his agent for purposes of obtaining care for
Johnny, as alleged in the complaint, she was bound by the
Agreement under Civil Code section 2337, which states a
principal may bind an agent “if such intent is plainly inferable
from the instrument itself.” But it is not “plainly inferable” from
the arbitration agreement that the parties intended to bind
anyone other than the signatories. Further, the fact McKenzie
was Johnny’s agent for the purpose of obtaining medical care for
him does not mean she intended to give up her right to a jury
trial on any claims she might have in her personal capacity.
10
The first article in the admissions agreement does not
contain the mandatory language prescribed by section 1295,
subdivision (a), providing only: “1. ADMISSION: The
undersigned hereby requests admission for the above-named
client to [Creative Care].” The arbitration provision is contained
in paragraph 16 on the second page of the admissions agreement.
Moreover, the admissions agreement does not comply with
MICRA’s notice requirement under section 1295, subdivision (b),
which provides, “Immediately before the signature line provided
for the individual contracting for the medical services must
appear the following in at least 10-point bold red type: [¶]
NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE
AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AND
YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT
TRIAL. SEE ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CONTRACT.” Here, the
admissions agreement contains no such notice provision above
the client signature line (or anywhere). Indeed, the arbitration
provision, placed in the middle of the agreement, does not state
that the parties are waiving their right to a jury, nor is it in red
bold type or capital letters.
Because the arbitration agreement failed to give the
required notice under MICRA, section 1295 cannot be relied on to
require the nonsignatory Loflin heirs to arbitrate their claims.
(Herbert v. Superior Court, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 727
[“Under section 1295, arbitration of wrongful death or other
professional negligence claims may not be compelled if the
requirements of that section are not met.”]; see Daniels, supra,
212 Cal.App.4th at p. 683 [explaining in affirming denial of
motion to compel arbitration of wrongful death claims, “we
11
disagree that Ruiz should be extended to arbitration agreements
not governed by section 1295”].)
Herbert v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 718, 720,
725, relied on by the Creative Care defendants, does not support
their position. There, Clarence Herbert’s estate filed claims for
medical negligence and fraud arising out of his death following
surgery, and his heirs filed claims for wrongful death and other
torts. (Id. at pp. 720-721.) It was undisputed that Herbert was
bound by an arbitration agreement in a health care service plan
that covered his wife and minor children, requiring arbitration
for “any claim asserted by a member or a member’s heir or
personal representative.” (Id. at p.720, italics added.) The Court
of Appeal concluded that Herbert’s wife and minor children were
bound by the arbitration agreement because the agreement
explicitly bound Herbert’s heirs; Herbert had the legal ability to
bind his wife and minor children; and the health care service plan
provided notice of the arbitration provision similar to that
required under section 1295. (Id. at pp. 726-727.) None of these
factors is present here.
Finally, the Creative Care defendants contend that
although the Loflin heirs did not sign the arbitration agreement,
they were bound as the “‘[g]uarantor[s] of the Client’s payment’”
because they “paid for [Johnny’s] treatment.” However, the term
“guarantor” is not defined anywhere in the agreement. Even
under paragraph 19, which is titled “Billing and Payments”
(capitalization omitted), there is no mention of a guarantor of
payments for Johnny. Paragraph 19 provides, “If you are paying
privately for treatment, you are expected to pay at the time of
admission,” suggesting only Johnny was responsible for payment.
Moreover, Civil Code section 2787 defines a “guarantor” as “one
12
who promises to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another, or hypothecates property as security therefor.” The
Creative Care defendants presented no evidence that the Loflin
heirs ever agreed to be guarantors of Johnny’s payments within
the meaning of Civil Code section 2787. McKenzie made one
payment of $5,000 for Johnny’s transfer to the new treatment
facility, but that did not make her the guarantor of Johnny’s
payments.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
the Motions To Compel Arbitration as to All Plaintiffs
1. Section 1281.2, subdivision (c)
“[S]ection 1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written
arbitration agreement unless one of three limited exceptions
applies. [Citation.] Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a
party waives the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for
revoking the arbitration agreement; and (3) pending litigation
with a third party creates the possibility of a conflicting ruling on
common factual or legal issues.” (Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real
Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 967; see Leenay v.
Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 553, 564 [§ 1281.2,
subd. (c), “addresses litigation with a third party that raises
‘common issue[s] of law and fact’”].)
Section 1281.2, subdivision (c), provides an exception to
mandatory arbitration where “[a] party to the arbitration
agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special
proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction
or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of
conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.” All three
requirements must be satisfied before section 1281.2,
13
subdivision (c), may be invoked to deny a motion to compel
arbitration. (Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc.
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835, 845 (Avila); Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton
Real Estate Group, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 968.) “For
purposes of the statute, a third party is one who is neither bound
by nor entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement.” (Daniels,
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 679.)
If the requirements of section 1281.2, subdivision (c), are
met, “the court (1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration
agreement and may order intervention or joinder of all parties in
a single action or special proceeding; (2) may order intervention
or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order
arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and
stay the pending court action or special proceeding pending the
outcome of the arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay arbitration
pending the outcome of the court action or special proceeding.”
(§ 1281.2, last para.; see Leenay v. Superior Court, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 564.) ‘‘‘[T]he ultimate determination
[pursuant to section 1281.2, subdivision (c),] whether to stay or
deny arbitration based on the possibility of conflicting rulings on
common questions of law or fact is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.’” (Nixon v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 934, 946-947; accord, Avila, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th
at p. 845; Daniels, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 680.)
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
arbitration of all claims under section 1281.2,
subdivision (c)
The Creative Care defendants contend the third-party
exception under 1281.2, subdivision (c), does not apply because
14
there were no “third parties” to the arbitration agreement,
relying on their argument that the Loflin heirs were bound by the
arbitration agreement. As discussed, the Loflin heirs were not
bound by the arbitration agreement; therefore, they are third
parties under subdivision (c). (Daniels, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at
p. 679.)
The holding in Laswell v. AG Seal Beach, LLC (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 1399, relied on by the Creative Care defendants,
is not to the contrary. In Laswell, a former patient in the
Country Villa healthcare facility filed a lawsuit (through her
daughter) against the facility operator, the owner, and the
management company for elder abuse and related claims. (Id. at
p. 1402.) The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to compel
arbitration on multiple grounds, including that although the
plaintiff had signed the arbitration agreement, some of the
defendants did not, and therefore, they were “third parties” under
section 1281.2, subdivision (c). (Laswell, at p. 1404.) The Court
of Appeal reversed, holding the exception to arbitration under
section 1281.2, subdivision (c), “does not apply when all
defendants, including a nonsignatory to the arbitration
agreement, have the right to enforce the arbitration provision
against a signatory plaintiff.” (Laswell, at p. 1405.) Because the
defendants were “related Country Villa entities,” they could all
enforce the arbitration agreement and were therefore bound by it.
(Id. at p. 1407.) Unlike in Laswell, the Loflin heirs were
nonsignatory plaintiffs, and there was no basis on which they
could enforce the arbitration agreement; therefore, they were not
bound by the agreement.
The other two requirements for application of
section 1281.2, subdivision (c), are also met. The Loflin heirs’
15
claims and the estate’s claims, as alleged, are all based on the
same “facts giving rise to all claims” (capitalization, boldface, and
underlining omitted), namely, that in February 2020 Johnny’s
family was forced to transfer Johnny to another facility even
though the transferee facility was not appropriate for Johnny’s
treatment, and due to the lack of proper treatment at the new
facility, Johnny died two months later after ingesting fentanyl.
Therefore, the claims arise out of the same transaction or series
of transactions. (See Avila, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 845 [the
survivor and wrongful death claims “involve the same set of
operative facts”]; Daniels, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 686 [the
survivor and wrongful death claims were all “based on the
allegation that [the decedent] received inadequate care at
Sunrise”].)
In addition, as the trial court found, because “the wrongful
death claim is based on the same facts as the survivor claims,
there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of
law and fact” if the estate’s claims were arbitrated and the Loflin
heirs’ claims were litigated in the trial court. (See Avila, supra,
20 Cal.App.5th at p. 845 [because the claims involved the same
operative facts, “[i]f the survivor claims were arbitrated while the
wrongful death claim was litigated, there is a strong possibility of
inconsistent rulings”]; Daniels, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 686
[because the claims were based on the same alleged inadequate
care, “if the survivor claims are ordered to arbitration but
Daniels’s wrongful death claim was not, there is a possibility of
inconsistent rulings on the claims”].)
As the Court of Appeal observed in Birl v. Heritage Care,
LLC (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1322, in which the decedent’s
family members sued a nursing home, hospital, and treating
16
doctors for wrongful death and survivor claims, if the trial court
only compelled the survivor claims to arbitration, “different triers
of fact could reach different conclusions as to which party was at
fault, the cause of any injuries, and the apportionment of
liability—unless all the parties are joined in one action.” Here, as
in Birl, different triers of fact could reach conflicting decisions
with respect to liability of Creative Care and the individual
doctors.
Once the trial court determined that all three requirements
for application of section 1281.2, subdivision (c), were met, it had
discretion to select one of the four options in the last paragraph of
section 1281.2. Khaleghi contends that even if section 1281.2,
subdivision (c), applied, the trial court abused its discretion by
selecting option (1) (refusing to enforce the arbitration
agreement) instead of option (3) (ordering arbitration of the
estate’s claims and staying litigation of the heirs’ claims). This
argument is unavailing.
Khaleghi failed to raise this argument in her motion to
compel arbitration in the trial court, forfeiting the challenge.
(Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 866 [“‘[A] reviewing
court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an
objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.’”].)
In addition, Khaleghi failed in her opening brief to provide any
legal or factual argument why the trial court abused its
discretion in selecting option (3) instead of option (1). (See Lee v.
Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721 [appellant’s “burden on
appeal ‘includes the obligation to present argument and legal
authority on each point raised.’”].) Even if Khaleghi did not
forfeit this argument, it was well within the court’s discretion to
select option (1) and refuse to compel the estate’s claims to
17
arbitration, which would delay relief for the Loflin heirs until the
arbitration had concluded. (See Fitzhugh v. Granada Healthcare
& Rehabilitation Center, LLC (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 469, 475
[rejecting argument that the trial court should have compelled
arbitration of the estate’s claims and stayed the heirs’ claims
because on appeal the court “will not disturb the court’s
discretionary ruling unless it exceeded the bounds of reason”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying the Creative Care defendants’ motions
to compel arbitration is affirmed. The Loflin plaintiffs are
entitled to recover their costs on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
18
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