CourtListener 10099810•People v. Singer CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/30/24 P. v. Singer CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B328766
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA073169)
v.
HENRY ARNOLD SINGER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Roberta Simon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Stephanie A. Miyoshi and
David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
**********
Defendant and appellant Henry Arnold Singer was one of
three individuals charged with the first degree murder of a
college student who was kidnapped, robbed and left for dead in
the San Gabriel mountains in August 2001. Defendant pled
guilty to first degree murder in exchange for a dismissal of the
special circumstance allegations and agreed to testify against his
codefendants. In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant
was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.
In February 2019, defendant filed in propria persona a
form petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95). At the October 29, 2019
evidentiary hearing, the court denied defendant’s petition,
finding the evidence demonstrated defendant could still be
convicted under the amended murder statutes. In an
unpublished decision, we affirmed. (People v. Singer (Sept. 30,
2020, B302163) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2022, defendant filed two
more, largely identical, form petitions for resentencing. The trial
court summarily denied both based on the fact the court had
already denied the relief defendant sought after conducting an
evidentiary hearing.
Defendant appeals from the summary denial of his third
resentencing petition in January 2023. He contends the trial
court erred in denying his third petition as procedurally barred
because, at the hearing on his first petition in 2019, the court did
not consider his age as a factor in assessing his culpability for
felony murder. Defendant says the law now requires youth to be
considered and that a remand for a new evidentiary hearing is
therefore warranted.
We affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In April 2006, defendant and codefendant Markeisha Dixon
were charged with the first degree murder of college student
Christina Burmeister. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Robbery-
murder and kidnapping-murder special circumstances were also
alleged. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) In a separate information,
James Dixon was also charged with the Burmeister murder.
Because of the common surname, we refer to Markeisha Dixon as
Markeisha and James Dixon as Dixon for clarity.
In November 2007, defendant pled guilty to first degree
murder. As part of the plea agreement, the prosecution agreed to
dismiss the special circumstance allegations and defendant
agreed to testify against Dixon and Markeisha. Defendant’s
sentencing was deferred until after he testified at Dixon’s trial.
Markeisha pled guilty to first degree murder the day after
defendant’s plea.
On April 4, 2008, in accordance with the terms of the plea
agreement, defendant was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life.
The special circumstance allegations and the allegation
defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction in 2002 for
robbery were dismissed. Defendant was awarded 834 actual days
of presentence custody credits.
1. The First Petition and Appeal
After the passage of Senate Bill 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.), defendant filed, in propria persona, his first form petition
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court appointed
defendant counsel, the parties submitted briefs and the court
issued an order to show cause.
The evidentiary hearing on defendant’s petition was held
on October 29, 2019. The court said it had considered the record
3
of conviction, including the abstract of judgment, the information,
and the transcript of the preliminary hearing, and had also read
the transcript of defendant’s testimony in the Dixon case, which
had been submitted as an exhibit to defendant’s brief. Defendant
agreed that was the relevant evidence to be considered by the
court and that there was no new evidence to present. The
prosecutor also did not offer any new evidence but objected to the
consideration of defendant’s testimony. The court overruled the
objection.
Our summary of the evidence considered by the court at the
evidentiary hearing is taken from our prior opinion in People v.
Singer, supra, B302163. The evidence included the preliminary
hearing testimony of Sergeant Joseph Purcell of the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department, who investigated the Burmeister
murder, and Chanson Tyrone, a witness to the crimes, as well as
defendant’s testimony from the trial of codefendant Dixon.
On August 18, 2001, Ms. Burmeister’s body was discovered
in the front passenger seat of her truck on a gravel turnout on
Highway 39 in Azusa Canyon. Her throat had been cut. An
autopsy later determined the cause of death to be a knife wound
to the throat, causing the victim to have “drowned on her own
blood.” DNA testing performed on a cigar butt discovered on the
floorboard beneath the driver’s seat of the victim’s truck matched
the DNA profile for Dixon. The investigation also revealed that
three ATM withdrawals, totaling $400, were made from
Ms. Burmeister’s account at Washington Mutual bank within the
span of 90 seconds on the evening of August 17, 2001. Security
footage from the bank showed a person making the withdrawals
holding the hood of their sweatshirt down to obscure their face.
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Mr. Tyrone testified he was with defendant on the night of
August 17, 2001, in San Bernardino when they ran into Dixon
and Markeisha. Mr. Tyrone knew Markeisha because she lived
in his apartment building. Markeisha asked if they wanted to go
get some “cheese,” a slang term for money.
The four drove to Pomona. Markeisha was driving and
stopped the car on a residential street where some sort of party
was going on. Mr. Tyrone noticed Dixon had a handgun in his
lap. Markeisha and Dixon got out of the car and walked off.
Mr. Tyrone and defendant stayed by the car, talking and smoking
cigarettes.
After a few minutes, Dixon returned with Ms. Burmeister,
whom Mr. Tyrone did not know. Ms. Burmeister was walking
next to Dixon and holding her hands up. They walked toward a
blue truck and both Dixon and Ms. Burmeister got in the
passenger side of the truck. Markeisha said “come on” and then
got in the driver’s seat of the truck and drove off.
Defendant and Mr. Tyrone, in the car they had come in,
followed the truck, eventually arriving at a Washington Mutual
bank in Montclair. Markeisha, who was wearing a black hooded
shirt, got out of the truck and walked toward the ATM machine.
She never said what she was going to do, but it was “pretty easy
to figure out.” When she was walking back from the ATM, she
had money in her hands and was counting it.
Markeisha walked over to defendant and Mr. Tyrone and
told them she was having difficulty driving the truck because it
was a manual transmission. Defendant, who knew how to drive a
manual transmission, got into the truck and drove out of the
parking lot, followed by Markeisha and Mr. Tyrone. They drove
to “a secluded little dark area” up in the mountains. Markeisha
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parked the car a little bit away from where defendant parked the
truck. Defendant got out of the victim’s truck, walked over to the
car and got in with Markeisha and Mr. Tyrone. Mr. Tyrone could
see that Dixon was still in the truck with Ms. Burmeister. After
a few moments, he saw Ms. Burmeister appear to grab at her
neck “like she was gasping for air or something.” Dixon got out of
the truck and came back to the car. Mr. Tyrone did not see any
weapon in his hands. Markeisha then drove them all back to San
Bernardino.
Defendant’s testimony at Dixon’s trial differed from
Mr. Tyrone’s preliminary hearing testimony in several respects
but otherwise substantially corroborated the evidence of
defendant’s role in committing the crimes.
Defendant said he and Mr. Tyrone were driving around
that evening when they saw Markeisha and Dixon and stopped to
talk to them. Dixon asked for a ride to Pomona. Defendant said
he did not have enough gas to drive there and Dixon offered to
pay. During the drive to Pomona, Dixon suggested they make
some money by selling drugs once they arrived. All four of them
shared a blunt (a cigar with marijuana rolled inside). Once in
Pomona, defendant followed Dixon’s directions to a residential
location and parked the car.
Markeisha and Dixon got out of the car, said they would be
right back and walked away. Defendant and Mr. Tyrone stayed
by the car and finished smoking the blunt. Five to 10 minutes
later, Markeisha and Dixon returned, driving a blue truck. They
pulled up next to defendant and told him to follow them.
Defendant followed the truck to a bank in Montclair. Defendant
parked his car a few spaces away from the truck. Defendant saw
Markeisha, who was wearing a hooded sweatshirt, walk over
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toward the bank. Shortly thereafter, Markeisha came over to the
car. Mr. Tyrone pointed out that a police car was driving through
the parking lot. They all walked a short distance away and
watched the police car. Markeisha said they needed to get the
truck out of the parking lot.
After the police car left, they walked back to the truck and
Markeisha said she was having trouble driving it because it had
a manual transmission. She asked defendant to drive it and he
agreed. Markeisha told him there was a “white girl” in the truck
or words to that effect.
Before getting into the truck, defendant got a pair of socks
from the trunk of his car and put them on his hands because he
did not want to leave fingerprints in the truck. When defendant
got into the truck, he noticed that Dixon was not inside and that
there was a white female (Ms. Burmeister) lying face down on the
floor of the back cab area, with her shirt pulled up over her head
and her hands tied behind her back with red lace fabric,
apparently her underwear. She was “gasping,” “moan[ing] in
discomfort” and “struggling” to move. Defendant did not ask if
she was alright or do anything to help her.
Defendant, driving Ms. Burmeister’s truck, followed the car
now driven by Mr. Tyrone with Markeisha as a passenger, out of
the parking lot. Defendant saw Dixon standing on the side of the
road and stopped to pick him up. Before getting in, Dixon pulled
Ms. Burmeister from the backseat and put her in the front
passenger seat and then climbed into the back behind her.
Defendant asked Dixon what was going on and he pulled out a
handgun and told him not to worry about it. Ms. Burmeister told
them to take what they wanted and leave her alone or words to
that effect.
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When asked why he did not drive away from the others
before picking up Dixon, knowing Ms. Burmeister was tied up
and in need of assistance, defendant said “foul judgment” and
because he was “stoned.” Defendant also said he feared Dixon
might use the gun, but conceded Dixon did not point the gun at
him or threaten him with it.
Defendant followed Dixon’s directions to drive up into the
mountains of Azusa Canyon. Eventually, Dixon pointed out a
dark turnout area and told defendant to pull over. Defendant
parked the truck and got out, leaving Dixon in the truck with
Ms. Burmeister. Defendant walked over to the car and joined
Markeisha and Mr. Tyrone. Defendant saw Dixon get out of the
truck and then lean back into it, before closing the door. As he
walked toward defendant’s car, Dixon appeared to throw
something. Dixon told defendant to leave and gave him
directions back to the freeway. Dixon told Mr. Tyrone to throw
Ms. Burmeister’s cell phone out the window, and he did so.
After entertaining argument from the parties, the court
denied defendant’s petition, finding the evidence supported the
conclusion that, whether analyzed as express malice, implied
malice or reckless indifference, defendant would be found guilty
under current law and therefore was ineligible for resentencing.
Defendant appealed. In affirming the trial court’s denial of
relief, we concluded the record “amply support[ed] defendant’s
guilt of first degree felony murder on a theory he was a ‘major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Singer, supra, B302163.)
2. The Second and Third Petitions
In June 2022, defendant filed, in propria persona, a second
form petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6, largely
8
identical to his first petition. The court summarily denied the
petition as a duplicative, successive petition. Defendant did not
appeal. Shortly after defendant’s second petition was denied, the
court accepted receipt of a packet of materials on behalf of
defendant in accordance with Penal Code section 3051. The court
ordered the original to be transmitted to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation for use in future parole hearings,
including a youthful offender hearing pursuant to People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.
In December 2022, defendant filed his third form petition
in propria persona. Defendant did not cite any change in the law
regarding youthful adult offenders or cite any new evidence
regarding his age or the age of his accomplices that he contended
the court should consider. On January 26, 2023, the trial court
summarily denied the petition “with prejudice,” stating that
“defendant previously sought relief and the petition was
previously reviewed and denied” and “the defendant is not
entitled to an additional hearing.”
Defendant filed this appeal from the denial of his third
petition. We grant defendant’s request to take judicial notice of
our opinion affirming the denial of his first petition. (People v.
Singer, supra, B302163.)
DISCUSSION
1. Procedural Issues
Defendant does not cite any authority that the Legislature,
in enacting Penal Code section 1172.6, intended for defendants to
be entitled to multiple evidentiary hearings in perpetuity.
However, some courts recently have held there are circumstances
that permit a defendant to file more than one petition for
resentencing.
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In People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942 (Farfan), the
court held that the defendant’s second petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6, filed after a summary
denial at the prima facie stage, was not procedurally barred,
explaining that “[n]either the express language of section [1172.6]
nor the stated purpose of the legislation supports limiting access
to relief . . . where, as here, the subsequent petition rested on
new legal authority which challenged the basis for the superior
court’s summary denial of the previous petition.” (Farfan, at
pp. 946-947.)
After briefing in this appeal was completed, defendant sent
a letter citing People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994
(Jimenez) which reversed the denial of a second petition for
resentencing. The defendant’s first petition was denied after an
evidentiary hearing and that denial was affirmed on appeal.
After the passage of Senate Bill 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.),
Jimenez filed a second resentencing petition which the trial court
denied at the prima facie stage, finding there was no legal
authority entitling Jimenez to a second resentencing petition and
the changes in the law did not apply to Jimenez as a direct aider
and abettor. (Jimenez, at p. 1000.) Jimenez remanded for a new
evidentiary hearing, concluding there had been a substantive
change in the law regarding youthful adult offenders and that
neither collateral estoppel nor the doctrine of law of the case
barred proceedings on a second petition. (Id. at pp. 997-998,
1004-1005, 1006.)
Defendant, relying on Farfan and Jimenez, contends his
third petition was likewise not procedurally barred and should
have been considered on the merits because of the substantive
change in the law regarding youthful offenders after the court
10
resolved his first petition in 2019. Defendant argues that courts
have only recently begun to consider an offender’s age as a
relevant factor in assessing the reckless indifference standard for
murder liability, and that he is entitled to a new evidentiary
hearing at which the court considers his age at the time of the
crimes in assessing his culpability.
The People contend the doctrines of issue preclusion and
law of the case support the trial court’s ruling that defendant’s
third petition was procedurally barred. The People concede that
both doctrines will generally not be applied where there has been
a substantive change in the law, but they say there has been no
such change here. The People contend that state and federal
courts have long recognized the relative emotional and mental
immaturity of youthful offenders in assessing culpability and
imposing punishment, citing to cases such as Graham v. Florida
(2010) 560 U.S. 48 and People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1354. While not actually arguing forfeiture, the People also point
out that defendant’s third form petition, filed in December 2022,
did not cite any change in the law as a basis for consideration.
The People are correct that defendant did not cite any
change in the law as a basis for considering his third petition.
Defendant first asserted he should be entitled to a new
evidentiary hearing due to his age at the time of the murder—
23—in this appeal. As for the People’s first point, Jimenez
appears to be the first published decision discussing the doctrines
of issue preclusion and law of the case in this context.
We express no opinion on Jimenez and decline to resolve
today whether defendant is entitled to a second evidentiary
hearing due to a subsequent change in the law (even though he
did not ask or give the trial court the opportunity to consider the
11
asserted change in the law). We conclude that even assuming the
trial court erred in denying the third petition as procedurally
barred, the error was harmless because defendant has not shown
any prejudice.
2. Defendant Has Not Established Prejudice
Where, as here, an error is purely one of state law, we
apply the harmless error test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836. (People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29; accord, People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973-974 [failure of court to
appoint counsel at prima facie stage of Pen. Code, § 1172.6
petition is judged under Watson standard for state law error];
People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1239
[applying Watson test in context of § 1172.6 proceeding]; People v.
Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 489, fn. 8 (Oliver) [same];
People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 706 [same].)
Defendant must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability
that in the absence of the error, he would have obtained a more
favorable result. (Watson, at p. 836.) Defendant has not done so.
Defendant argues there is no evidence of two of the factors
identified in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803 as
relevant to assessing whether a defendant has acted “with
reckless indifference to human life” within the meaning of Penal
Code section 190.2, subdivision (d). He claims there is no
evidence he planned the crimes or knew that Dixon, in addition
to the handgun, also had a knife which was the weapon
ultimately used to kill Ms. Burmeister. But in clarifying the
evidentiary contours of the reckless indifference analysis, Banks
made clear that none of the nonexhaustive list of factors is
required to be present or is dispositive of the ultimate question of
guilt. (Banks, at p. 803.) More importantly, defendant does not
12
explain the relevance of age to these factors in the specific factual
context of this case.
The only other argument defendant makes is his claim that
“youthful impulsivity and peer pressure were paramount factors”
in the case, but he cites to no evidence supporting a finding of
either. Defendant was not a juvenile at the time of the crimes in
August 2001. He was a 23-year-old adult, on the high end of the
definition of youthful offender acknowledged by most courts and
used in Penal Code section 3051 as the cutoff for youthful
offender parole hearings (25 years old and under). We agree with
Oliver that “[p]resumably, the presumption of immaturity
weakens as a defendant approaches 26.” (Oliver, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489.)
The Jimenez court found denial of a second evidentiary
hearing to consider the defendant’s age was prejudicial because
Jimenez was 19, the actual shooter was Jimenez’s girlfriend and
she was only 20, and there was evidence suggesting defendant
acted under peer pressure or could have been swept up in
circumstances beyond his control. (Jimenez, supra,
103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1007-1008.)
In contrast, no evidence in this case suggests defendant
acted out of impulsivity or peer pressure. The evidence of
defendant’s guilt, much of which came from defendant’s own
testimony, was that, when Markeisha told defendant after the
robbery that she was having trouble driving the truck because of
the manual transmission, defendant agreed to drive it from the
bank parking lot to a remote area at night. Before getting into
the truck, defendant got a pair of socks from the trunk of his car
and put them on his hands because he did not want to leave
fingerprints in the truck. When defendant got into the truck, he
13
saw the victim was bound, face down, on the floor of the truck’s
back cab and was “gasping,” “moan[ing]” and “struggling” to
move. Defendant did not protest in any way or back out of his
agreement to drive the vehicle.
Defendant was alone with the victim as he drove out of the
parking lot and he could have driven off, leaving the others
behind and taking the victim to a place of safety. He chose not to
do so. Instead, defendant stopped and picked up Dixon and drove
a significant distance to a secluded mountain location. Once up
in the mountains, he left the victim alone in the truck with
Dixon, knowing Dixon had a handgun. After Dixon slit the
victim’s throat, defendant drove all the accomplices from the
scene of the crime. Once back home, defendant did nothing to
summon aid for the victim.
Defendant blamed being “stoned” for his poor judgment
that evening, not that he felt coerced or threatened or that he
succumbed to peer pressure. Defendant also did not identify any
new evidence that could be presented demonstrating that his age
at the time of the crimes impacted his participation that night.
Defendant has not shown there is a reasonable probability of a
more favorable outcome. He has not shown prejudice from the
court’s denial.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant and appellant’s Henry Arnold
Singer’s third petition for resentencing is affirmed.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J. WILEY, J.
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