CourtListener 10099661•People v. Adams CA1/1
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Filed 8/30/24 P. v. Adams CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168688
v.
FREDERICK BERNARD ADAMS, (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CR2101465)
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Frederick Bernard Adams of six felonies
after he sexually abused his stepdaughter, C.C., and his daughter, Jane Doe.
He was sentenced to 50 years to life plus two years and eight months in
prison.
On appeal, Adams claims that (1) his conviction of lewd acts against
Doe in count two must be reversed because the crime was not proven to fall
outside the period for which he was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of
her in count one; (2) his conviction for lewd acts against Doe in count five
must be reversed because she was 16, not 15, years old when the crime was
committed; and (3) his sentences on three counts under the One Strike law,
Penal Code section 667.61, must be reversed because a multiple-victim
enhancement was not adequately pled or proven.1 We accept the Attorney
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
General’s concession that count five, on which Adams was sentenced to a
term of eight months, must be reversed. Otherwise, we affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
A. Background
C.C. was born in October 2001 to H.R. (mother) and another man. Two
years later, in early 2004, mother began dating Adams. They married later
that year and had two children together, Doe in March 2005 and a son in
September 2009 (brother).2
In the spring of 2013, while the family was living in Fortuna, mother
left Adams and moved to Lake County with C.C. About six months later,
mother and C.C. returned to Humboldt County. They lived separately from
Adams, Doe, and brother, who had recently moved to Scotia. Doe and brother
stayed with mother for half the week and Adams for the other half, and C.C.
stayed with Adams about once a week.
Adams, Doe, and brother moved twice more in the next few years: to
Rio Dell in September 2014 and to another house in Scotia in August 2015.
Mother and Adams eventually reconciled, and in February 2016, she and C.C.
moved into the Scotia house with him and the other children. The family
lived in Scotia until September 2019 and then moved back to Rio Dell.
Adams was the “primary disciplinarian” in the family. Mother testified
that he was “strict” with the children, and he often spanked them. Once, she
saw him spank C.C. and Doe with a belt. C.C. testified that from the time
she was 8 or 9 years old to the time she was 10 or 11, Adams would physically
discipline her by making her pull down her pants and underwear and
2 Mother had another daughter in the fall of 2014, whom we do not
discuss further because she played little role in the underlying events.
2
spanking her with a belt. Even after he stopped spanking her, he routinely
threatened to do so whenever he thought she had misbehaved. C.C. also saw
Adams spank Doe and beat brother. Doe testified that Adams routinely hit
her, C.C., and brother “upside the head” if they did something he did not like.
Mother testified that while C.C. and Doe were growing up, Adams
insisted that they kiss him on the lips. According to C.C., “[i]t had to be on
the lips and it had to be like if you were kissing a partner[.] . . . [I]f you
pecked him on the lips, he would get upset and tell you to kiss him right.”
Doe testified that if the girls did not kiss Adams for long enough, he would
“scold” them.
B. The Sexual Abuse of C.C.
Count six, the only charge involving C.C., stemmed from offenses that
occurred when she was 12 and 13 years old. C.C., who was 21 years old at
the time of trial, testified that Adams started touching her inappropriately
when she began puberty. Adams “would hug [her] from behind and try to
squish [her] boobs,” telling her that “he wanted to stop them from growing.”
He squeezed her chest “[r]eally hard” over her clothes. He would also “smack
[her] on the ass” when she walked by him. According to C.C., both types of
behavior happened “[a]lmost every day.” Later, when she was 14 or 15 years
old, Adams would routinely “stick his hand underneath [her] shirt” and
“unclip [her] bra.”
C.C. had weekly overnights with Adams before he and mother
reconciled, when she was 12 to 13 years old. While Doe and brother slept in
their own bedrooms, Adams required C.C. to sleep in his bed. Although C.C.
told him she did not want to, he told her she would get in trouble if she did
not. C.C. “would be l[]ying there with [her] back turned towards him and
then he would forcefully either scoot [her] closer to him or roll [her] over and
3
then stick his hand on top of [her] private.” A few times, C.C. forced herself
to throw up so that Adams thought she was sick and let her sleep on the
couch.
During the same time period, Adams got very angry with C.C. after she
wore a hole in a sweatshirt of his that she borrowed. While C.C. was still
upset from his yelling at her and was “crying [her] eyes out,” she told mother,
who had come to take her to school, “everything” about the sexual abuse.
Mother “called [C.C.] a liar” and got angry with her, asking her “if [she]
wanted [Adams] to go to jail.” C.C. was “frustrated” and sad that mother
would not believe her, and she never raised the issue with mother again.
Ultimately, Adams stopped sexually abusing C.C. when she was
15 years old, after she had an “inappropriate relationship” with an older man.
She left home in the fall of 2020, soon after graduating from high school,
because Adams and mother kicked her out.
C. The Sexual and Physical Abuse of Doe
Doe, who was 18 years old at the time of trial, testified about abuse
that began when she was 11. It continued until Adams was arrested in
May 2021, when she was 16.
1. Count one
Doe testified that when she was 11 years old, Adams began “coming
behind [her] and giving [her] bear hugs and putting his hands up [her] shirt
and squeezing [her] breasts and pinching [her] nipples, saying he was
stopping them from growing.” Adams squeezed her very hard, which hurt,
and she felt “[e]xtremely uncomfortable and helpless.” Doe estimated that
this happened “[a] hundred to two hundred” times while she was 11.
Although she told Adams several times that she was uncomfortable with this,
he said that “he wasn’t a pervert and that it was just a game.”
4
Around the same time, Adams also began routinely awakening Doe in
the morning “[b]y putting a hand up [her] shirt and either pinching [her]
nipples or grabbing [her] breast.” Doe began sleeping with a bra on to
discourage this behavior, but Adams would unsnap her bra before feeling her.
He told her that sleeping in a bra was “not good for [her] and would just be
visibly upset about [her] wearing a bra.” Doe testified that this behavior
persisted for years.
Adams initially squeezed Doe’s breasts in front of other members of the
family. Mother and C.C. recalled seeing Adams squeeze Doe’s chest “[a]lmost
every day.” Doe testified that at some point after Adams started touching
her, while she was still 11 years old, she told mother what was happening
and there was a family meeting about it. During the meeting, Adams
“explained to [Doe] with tears in his eyes that his intention was not to make
[her] uncomfortable and that it was just a game.” The groping “stopped for
about a month or two” after this meeting, but Adams then resumed the
behavior, which “got progressively worse” and “became more secretive.”
2. Count two
Wildwood Days was a three-day festival held in Rio Dell each year on
the first weekend in August. Doe testified that one year, Adams came home
from Wildwood Days “intoxicated.”3 As he was sitting in the living room, he
“had [Doe] sit on his lap and was asking [her], please, just this one time . . .
let me do it[,] and [she] repeatedly told him no and no until eventually [she]
felt extremely pressured and [she] gave in.” Adams then touched her breasts.
3 As discussed further in section II.A. below, there was conflicting
evidence about which year this offense occurred. Most of the evidence
suggested that it happened in either 2016, when Doe was 11 years old, or
2017, when she was 12.
5
3. Counts three and four
Doe also testified about sexual and physical abuse that occurred at
Adams’s automobile repair shop in Fortuna. Adams opened the shop in
June 2018, and Doe began working there the following summer, when she
was 14 years old and had just finished eighth grade. She worked full-time
without pay that whole summer, doing bookkeeping, cleaning, and other
tasks while Adams worked on vehicles. Because Doe’s “parents believed that
[she] was not trustworthy enough to be in school due to [her] going on social
media and talking to boys,” she was homeschooled during ninth grade
through a local high school’s independent study program. The program was
mostly self-directed, and Doe continued to work full-time in the shop that
academic year and the following summer.
Doe testified that during this period, if she asked for lunch, a ride, or
some other favor, Adams would ask her “ ‘what [she was] going to do for it’ or
‘what [she was] going to let him do to [her] for it’ in a sexual way.” Adams
would then abuse her at the shop, either in the back room or the main office
area if the shop was closed. Doe testified that in addition to continuing the
behavior of squeezing her breasts, Adams sometimes made her display
herself to him: “There [were] times I would have to drop my pants and
underwear down to my ankles and bend over in front of him for a minute to
two minutes at a time—he would set a timer on his phone most of the time or
he would count really slowly—or [I would be] standing there with my shirt
and bra up or even both at the same time . . . , the pants and the shirt.” Doe
agreed that this “negotiation process” happened “hundreds of times,” starting
when she was 14 years old.
6
Doe described a particular example of this type of abuse, which formed
the basis for count four, during a forensic interview.4 In late 2020, when Doe
had returned to some in-person schooling, she met and began dating a boy
(boyfriend) who attended her high school. Doe told the interviewer that once,
when she and boyfriend “were first hanging out,” she wanted to spend time
with him. In exchange for driving her, Adams required her “to bend over for
[25] seconds” with her pants and underwear pulled down to her ankles while
he “just looked.”
Doe also testified about an incident of physical abuse that occurred
when she was at the shop with Adams, which formed the basis for count
three. He asked her “to go to the back of the shop,” and Doe said she wanted
to go home. Adams then “backhanded [her] upside the head.” Upon noticing
that Doe had made a mistake doing inventory, he became even more angry.
Doe repeated that she wanted to go home, and Adams hit her again. Doe said
she “wanted [her] mom,” at which point Adams “put [Doe] in a chokehold and
[dragged her] to the oil room and started hitting [her] extremely hard.” Doe
testified that she “screamed and cried” as Adams hit her. The beating
resulted in handprints on her right hip and leg that lasted a few days.
4. Count five
Doe and boyfriend often played video games together remotely, during
which they talked to each other through headsets. On one occasion in
May 2021, Doe and boyfriend were playing video games together when she
briefly left her bedroom to ask her parents for a ride to school the next day.
Before she left the room, she hung the headset on her bed frame. Although
4 The forensic interview was conducted in May 2021, on the same day
that Adams was arrested. A video recording of the interview was played for
the jury.
7
she sometimes muted the headset’s microphone if she “thought there was
going to be an argument or any kind of loud noises,” this time it was still on.
Doe testified that she asked for a ride, and mother told her to talk to
Adams. When Doe looked over at him, “he gave [her] the well-what-are-you-
going-to-do-for it look.” She said, “Never mind,” and “stormed off to [her]
room.” Adams followed her there, at which point he told her, “I’ll take you to
school, but, come on, just do it. Like, just lift up your shirt.” Doe refused, but
Adams repeatedly asked her to lift her shirt. Since Adams “would never
leave until he got what he wanted,” Doe finally gave in and “just got it over
with so he would leave.”
Boyfriend testified that he overheard parts of Doe’s conversation with
Adams. According to boyfriend, after Doe asked for a ride, he heard Adams
say something about “a deal.” Boyfriend could hear “a lot of key stuff
mentions of, like, [o]ne more time, kind of begging. There [were] no specifics
about what the deal was but, obviously, it had some interest to [Adams],
something that he wanted, something that made [Doe] uncomfortable.”
Boyfriend heard Doe repeatedly say “that she wanted to go to sleep,” but she
kept “being pestered” by Adams.
When Doe put her headset back on and resumed talking to boyfriend,
she was “hysterical.” Boyfriend asked her what had just happened, but she
was too upset to talk. Eventually, however, Doe revealed to boyfriend
“everything that had been going on for the last five years at that point,”
including the “deals” Adams required. Boyfriend told her that they “were
going to fix this” and if she did not tell mother, he would.
After talking to boyfriend, Doe disclosed Adams’s sexual abuse to
mother. Mother took Doe to the Rio Dell police station to report Adams, and
he was arrested.
8
C. Other Prosecution Evidence
Other witnesses corroborated various aspects of C.C.’s and Doe’s
stories.5 Mother testified that she routinely saw Adams “come up behind
[C.C.] and . . . Doe and give them hugs . . . [and say] he was squishing their
breasts back in so they wouldn’t grow.” Mother also saw Adams unsnap the
girls’ bras “[q]uite often” and “laugh because he thought it was funny.”
Mother confirmed there was a family meeting at which Adams “cried and
said that he didn’t realize that this is how it was making the girls feel and
that he would stop,” but his inappropriate behavior continued.
A married couple who lived with the family for several years also
testified about Adams’s behavior toward the children. The husband testified
that he saw Adams “wrap his arms around [C.C.]” from behind and tell her,
while touching her breasts, “Suck your chichis in.” The husband also saw
Adams do the same thing to Doe, at least 10 times. Similarly, the wife saw
Adams give the girls bear hugs and touch their breasts, which he did
“[f]requently” to Doe. Both the husband and wife also saw Adams slap both
girls on the butt a few times.
Mother also provided testimony corroborating Doe’s reports of being
beaten at the shop and having to negotiate with Adams to get what she
wanted. Mother testified that Doe told her at the time about being beaten at
the shop, and mother saw “[b]ruising on [Doe’s] arms and . . . a bruise on her
leg.” Mother also testified that Adams sometimes made deals with her in
exchange for sex. Frequently, if mother was not interested in having sex but
5 These witnesses also described uncharged acts against Doe to which
she did not testify. One such incident was when Adams got mad at Doe for
using her cell phone, picked her up, and “body slammed her into” a couch,
breaking it.
9
he wanted to, “he would tell [her] in exchange for having sex, [she] could have
a special coffee, a special lunch, a special dinner, maybe a trip to Walmart.”
Dr. Anthony Urquiza, Ph.D., testified as an expert on child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome. Among other things, he testified that
children who are sexually abused often do not report the abuse because they
feel threatened or intimidated, particularly if the perpetrator also physically
abuses them. He also testified that children often delay reporting abuse for a
long time, making it more difficult to describe particular incidents or
remember exactly when they happened.
D. Adams’s Testimony and Other Defense Evidence
Adams testified in his own defense. He admitted that he slept in the
same bed once with C.C. when she came to visit him during the marital
separation because she asked him to, but he did not touch her. He also gave
Doe “bear[]hugs” during which he would squeeze her “more than a normal
hug,” and he admitted that he said a few times that if he “bearhugged her
hard enough, maybe it’d keep her [breasts] from growing.” He denied
touching her breasts, however, and he did not remember any family meeting
about his behavior. He also denied most of the other conduct C.C. and Doe
described, including giving C.C. bear hugs or smacking her butt, beating Doe
at the shop, or making Doe expose herself in exchange for favors.
Several of Adams’s family members and friends provided character
evidence. Generally, they testified that they did not notice anything odd
about Adams’s relationships with C.C. and Doe. Some witnesses also
testified that C.C. and Doe had reputations for not being honest.
E. Procedural History
The operative information charged Adams with six felonies, five
against Doe and one against C.C. As to C.C., Adams was charged with
10
continuous sexual abuse between January 1, 2014, and October 8, 2015
(count six). As to Doe, he was charged with continuous sexual abuse between
March 16, 2016, and March 16, 2017 (count one); lewd acts upon a child
under 14 years old between August 3 and August 5, 2018, based on the
Wildwood Days incident (count two); corporal injury to a child between
March 16, 2019, and March 15, 2020, based on the beating at the shop (count
three); lewd acts upon a 14- or 15-year-old child between January 1 and
January 31, 2021, based on the time Adams made Doe pull down her pants
and bend over for 25 seconds (count four); and lewd acts upon a 14- or 15-
year-old child around April 29, 2021, based on the incident boyfriend
overheard (count 5).6 The information also alleged that Adams committed
the offenses against more than one victim under 14 years of age.7
The jury found Adams guilty of all six counts as charged. In
August 2023, the trial court sentenced him to a total term of 50 years to life
plus two years and eight months in prison, composed of a term of 25 years to
life for count one, a consecutive term of 25 years to life for count six, a
concurrent term of 25 years to life for count two, and consecutive terms of 16
months for count three and eight months each for counts four and five.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Adams’s Claim that Count Two Must Be Reversed Lacks Merit.
Adams argues that his conviction of count two, lewd acts on Doe when
she was under 14 years old based on the Wildwood Days incident, must be
6 The charges were brought under sections 288.5, subdivision (a)
(counts one and six), 288, subdivisions (a) (count two) and (c)(1) (counts four
and five), and 273d, subdivision (a) (count three).
7 The multiple-victim circumstance was alleged under section 667.61,
subdivisions (e) and (j)(2).
11
reversed because the prosecution failed to prove that the incident occurred
“during the time period alleged in the complaint” or “outside of the time
period alleged” for count one, the continuous sexual abuse of Doe. We are not
persuaded.
1. Additional facts
Count one was alleged to have occurred “[o]n or about March 16, 2016,
through March 16, 2017,” between the day Doe turned 11 years old and the
day she turned 12. Count two was alleged to have occurred “[o]n or about
August 3, 2018, through August 5, 2018,” when Doe was 13. The jury was
instructed under CALCRIM No. 207 that the prosecution was “not required
to prove that the crimes took place exactly on” the dates alleged “but only
that [the crimes] happened reasonably close to those dates.”8
Doe reported during her forensic interview that Adams began
molesting her when she was 11 years old, and “that went on for about a year”
before she told mother and the behavior stopped. She indicated that the
Wildwood Days incident happened after this pause. At trial, Doe initially
testified that the Wildwood Days incident happened when she was 11 or 12
years old, which would have made it August 2016 or August 2017. She also
indicated that it occurred after the family meeting at which Adams promised
to stop touching her.
On cross-examination, Doe first said that the incident happened in
August 2014 or August 2015, but then stated, “No. It would have been 2016.
I don’t know. It was one of the teens.” She then affirmed that she was 11 or
12 years old at the time, agreeing that “it would have been at least 2016.”
8 The jurors were also instructed under CALCRIM No. 3502, a
unanimity instruction, that they must “all agree that the People have proved
specifically that the defendant committed that offense during Wildwood Days
in Rio Dell between August 3-5[,] 2018.”
12
Finally, on redirect, Doe agreed with the prosecutor that she was “sure” that
she “would have been under 14” at the time of the incident, meaning it was
August 2018 or earlier.
Doe also testified that she thought the Wildwood Days incident
happened when Adams “was in logging. He would have been living in
Scotia.” As noted above, the family lived in Scotia from August 2015 to
September 2019. Doe described Adams’s work schedule at this time as often
requiring him to be gone from the home. She testified that the work was
seasonal for the summer, and during this time he would “[co]me home every
other day, every other night[,] and then would go back into the hills.”
In fact, Adams was working on a marijuana grow, not logging. He
testified that after working at a hydroponics store from 2012 to April 2016, he
spent the summer of 2016 working on the grow. During the season, which
lasted from May to October, he spent six days a week living “in the hills” and
one day a week at home in Scotia. Adams testified that he also worked at the
grow on the same schedule the summer of 2017. Adams’s father agreed that
Adams worked at the grow for two summers. Mother, however, testified that
Adams worked there in 2017 only.
Adams testified that he did not attend Wildwood Days in 2016, 2017, or
2018. Although he attended in previous years because he worked at the
volunteer fire department, which was very involved in the festival, he had
quit the department by August 2016 because he was too busy working at the
marijuana grow. He claimed that as a result of that work, he did not attend
Wildwood Days in 2016 or 2017. By August 2018, he had opened the shop,
and he was too busy working to attend that summer either.
13
2. Analysis
Adams makes what is essentially a claim of insufficient evidence,
although he does not clearly describe it as such. The claim has two distinct
components, that the evidence failed to prove either that the Wildwood Days
incident occurred (1) outside the time period alleged for count one or
(2) within the time period alleged for count two.
In determining whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, “we
review the record ‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v.
Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 712.) “ ‘We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably infer
from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the
trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.’ ” (Id. at pp. 712–713) To the extent Adams’s claim raises
issues of statutory interpretation or other questions of law, our review is de
novo. (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 472, 496.)
Under section 288.5, a person who lives with a child and “who over a
period of time, not less than three months in duration, engages in . . . three or
more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct, as defined in Section 288, with a child
under the age of 14 years at the time of the commission of the offense is
guilty of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child.” (§ 288.5,
subd. (a).) To convict a defendant of this crime, the jury “need unanimously
agree only that the requisite number of acts occurred[,] not on which acts
constitute the requisite number.” (§ 288.5, subd. (b).) For any count of
14
continuous sexual abuse charged, however, “[n]o other act of . . . lewd and
lascivious acts, as defined in Section 288, involving the same victim may be
charged in the same proceeding with a charge under this section unless the
other charged offense occurred outside the time period charged under this
section or the other offense is charged in the alternative.” (§ 288.5, subd. (c).)
Thus, section 288.5 “punishes repetitive activity as a course of conduct,
defined as at least three acts over at least three months.” (People v. Cortes
(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 75, italics omitted.) The statute was enacted to
address “the due process and unanimity problems” that occurred when
victims of child molestation “gave generic testimony about the instances of
abuse” but “could not . . . link any instance with a particular date or
significant event.” (Id. at pp. 74–75; People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240,
242.) Though section 288.5 permits a conviction based on such generic
testimony, it also protects a defendant by limiting the prosecution to one
count of continuous sexual abuse per victim and “prevent[ing] multiple
convictions for both a course of conduct and the acts that comprised it.”
(Cortes, at pp. 76, 78; Johnson, at pp. 243–244.)
We conclude there was ample evidence that the Wildwood Days
incident happened in August 2017, outside the period of continuous sexual
abuse from March 16, 2016, to March 16, 2017. Doe made statements during
both her forensic interview and the trial permitting the conclusion that the
incident occurred in 2017, when she was 12 years old. In addition, Doe said
during the forensic interview that the incident happened when Adams was
working in the hills, and he and mother both testified that he did so in the
summer of 2017. Indeed, mother testified that 2017 was the only year he
worked at the grow. In short, the jury had substantial evidence from which it
15
could have reasonably concluded that the Wildwood Days incident happened
in August 2017.
Adams does not seriously argue otherwise, stating only that “[t]here
was some ambiguity in that Doe allowed that the count two offense could
have occurred when she was 12, and only one day of her 12th year was
included in the time period alleged as to count one.” But it was uncontested
that Wildwood Days happened every August, meaning that if the incident
occurred when Doe was 12 years old, it was in August 2017, not on her
birthday that year. Adams does not otherwise explain why there was
insufficient evidence that the Wildwood Days incident occurred after
March 16, 2017.
Adams’s main claim is that there was insufficient evidence that the
Wildwood Days incident occurred in August 2018, as alleged in the
information. Even if we assume there was insufficient evidence that the
incident occurred that month, Adams fails to cite any authority for the
proposition that the prosecution was required to prove that the incident
happened then. Thus, the argument is forfeited. (See People v. Holford
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 186 [points on appeal forfeited if appellant
“offers no reasoned argument or citation to authority”].)
In any event, Adams’s contention that proof of an August 2018 date
was required lacks merit. “The precise time at which [an] offense was
committed need not be stated in the accusatory pleading, but it may be
alleged to have been committed at any time before the finding or filing
thereof, except where the time is a material ingredient in the offense.”
(§ 955.) Although the fact that the Wildwood Days incident happened after
the continuous sexual abuse was a material ingredient of count two, we do
not see why whether the incident occurred in August 2018 instead of the
16
previous August would matter. The only time-based element of count two
was that it occurred when Doe was under 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a)),
which she undisputedly was in both 2017 and 2018. Nor do we perceive how
the variance between August 2017 and August 2018 could have prejudiced
Adams. (See People v. Meyer (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 618, 638.) He denied
attending Wildwood Days in 2016, 2017, or 2018, and there was no
suggestion that his defense might have changed had the prosecution charged
count two as occurring in August 2017. In short, he fails to show that
reversal of count two is required.
B. Count Five Must Be Reversed for Insufficient Evidence that Doe
Was the Required Age.
Adams also claims that his conviction on count five, the count of lewd
acts against a 14- or 15-year-old based on the incident that boyfriend
overheard, must be reversed because Doe was 16 years old at the time. We
accept the Attorney General’s concession that reversal is required.
Adams was convicted of count five under section 288, subdivision (c)(1),
which applies to “any lewd or lascivious act” committed against “a child of 14
or 15 years.” (§ 288, subds. (a), (c)(1).) As the Attorney General notes, there
was no dispute that the crime charged in count five occurred in late April or
early May 2021, which was at least a month after Doe turned 16 years old.
As a result, there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction.
C. The One Strike Sentences Were Properly Imposed.
Finally, Adams challenges his One Strike sentences of 25 years to life
on counts one (continuous sexual abuse against Doe), two (lewd acts on Doe
when she was under 14 years old based on the Wildwood Days incident), and
six (continuous sexual abuse against C.C.). He claims that these terms
cannot stand because they “violated [his] due process rights to notice and to
jury findings based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” We reject the claim.
17
1. Additional facts
The amended information filed shortly before trial contained a global
allegation under the One Strike law. That allegation read: “It is further
alleged, as to Count 1 through Count 6, within the meaning of Penal Code
sections 667.61(j)(2) and (e), that the victims in the above offenses were
children under 14 years of age, and that the following circumstance applies:
the defendant has committed offenses specified in Penal Code
section 667.61(c) against more than one victim in the present case.”
The trial court and the parties had an informal, off-the-record
discussion of jury instructions, after which the court memorialized the
discussion on the record. The court granted the People’s request not to give
CALCRIM No. 3181, the form instruction on the multiple-victim
circumstance under section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4). That instruction
provides that if the jury “find[s] the defendant guilty of two or more sex
offenses, . . . [it] must then decide whether the People have proved the
additional allegation that those crimes were committed against more than
one victim in this case.” (CALCRIM No. 3181.) The prosecutor contended
“that when a jury makes guilty findings as to relevant counts for separate
victims during the requisite age period, . . . [i]t’s not necessary to have a
separate special finding verdict form [about the multiple-victim
circumstance] because the jury’s finding would already be contained in the
guilty verdict.” Consistent with this discussion, the jury was not asked on
the verdict forms to make any findings under section 667.61.
At the same hearing, the trial court also clarified that the multiple-
victim circumstance applied only to counts one, two, and six, stating, “The
Court’s calendar as to the special allegations, 667.61(j)(2) alleges One
through Six. The Court’s calendar says only as to Six. I’ll just correct that
18
that the 667.61(j)(2) should be as to Counts One, Two[,] and Six.” The
hearing’s minute order states, “As to Special Allegations pursuant to
PC667.61(j)(2), the Court corrects the Court Calendar and the First Amended
Information filed June 9, 2023[,] to reflect said Special Allegation as to
Count 1, Count 2[,] and Count 6.”
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court made a further record about
its decision not to give CALCRIM No. 3181. After “not[ing] that the People
advocated that [the court] not give [the instruction] and that was acquiesced
[to] by the defense,” the court explained its view that the procedure used
complied with People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735 (Mancebo). First, the
multiple-victim circumstance was clearly pled, so Adams was on notice of
“the potential for a finding of multiple victims.” Second, the jurors effectively
found that there were multiple victims by returning the verdicts, and it
would have been “redundan[t]” to require them to decide separately that
“there [were] two victims in this case.” The court asked whether Adams’s
trial counsel wished to respond to its “comments in respect to the Mancebo
issue,” and counsel said he had “nothing to say” about it.
2. Analysis
The One Strike law “provides an alternative, more severe set of
penalties for certain sex offenses committed under certain enumerated
circumstances.” (People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 954.) Both crimes
at issue, continuous sexual abuse under section 288.5 and lewd acts upon a
child under 14 years old under section 288, subdivision (a), are qualifying
sexual offenses under the One Strike law. (§ 667.61, subd. (c)(8) & (9).) One
circumstance supporting an enhanced penalty is that “[t]he defendant has
been convicted in the present case . . . of committing an offense specified . . .
against more than one victim.” (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4).) If that circumstance
19
exists, then a defendant convicted of a qualifying offense “upon a victim who
is a child under 14 years of age . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for 25 years to life.” (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2).) To subject a
defendant to an enhanced penalty, a circumstance must be “alleged in the
accusatory pleading pursuant to this section, and . . . either admitted by the
defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.” (§ 667.61,
subd. (o).) Adams’s challenge to his sentence raises questions of law that we
review de novo. (See People v. Camp (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 461, 467.)
Adams first claims that because the information’s One Strike allegation
was made as to all counts, “including those to which it could not be applied,”
the allegation “was ambiguous and failed to give due process notice of exactly
what sentence the prosecution sought and as to which counts.” “A defendant
has a due process right to fair notice of any sentencing allegation that, if
proven, will increase the punishment for a crime. [Citations.] In the
sentencing enhancement context, the touchstone of fair notice is whether the
accusatory pleading enables the defense to predict the sentence the defendant
faces if convicted.” (In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 717.) A One Strike
allegation, like a sentencing enhancement allegation, “ ‘exposes a defendant
to greater punishment than would be authorized by a verdict on the offense
alone.’ ” (Id. at p. 718.) Thus, in Mancebo, the Supreme Court held that “the
prosecution must provide the defendant ‘fair notice of the qualifying statutory
circumstance or circumstances that are being pled, proved, and invoked in
support of One Strike sentencing.’ ” (Vaquera, at p. 718, quoting Mancebo,
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 754.)
Adams is correct that the One Strike allegation at issue was
inapplicable to counts three through five, the first of which was not a sex
offense and the latter two of which were not against victims under age 14.
20
(See § 667.61, subds. (c), (j)(2).) But he fails to recognize that the trial court
amended the information during trial to specify that the challenged
allegation applied only to counts one, two, and six. Thus, even if we were
willing to accept that Adams was somehow deprived of notice that the
prosecution sought One Strike terms on those three counts because it also
sought such terms on the remaining counts, the issue was addressed when
the information was amended. In short, we agree with the court that the One
Strike allegation was adequately pled.
Adams also claims that the jury failed to make a finding on the One
Strike allegation as statutorily required. Citing Mancebo, he argues that
“[t]he specific pleading and proof requirements of section 667.61 cannot be
satisfied by de facto findings under some other provision of law. [Citation.]
Therefore, any findings regarding the victim’s age under any other provision
of law without unambiguous notice of the prosecution’s intention to seek
sentencing on a specific count under . . . section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2),
would not give due process notice of the sentencing provision sought to be
applied.” He also mentions in passing that the court had “a sua sponte duty
to instruct” on the allegation. (Italics omitted.)
Adams’s argument appears to be premised on his claim that the One
Strike allegation was inadequately pled, which we have rejected. Moreover,
as the trial court explicitly found, his trial counsel agreed the jury need not
be instructed on the multiple-victim circumstance. Thus, Adams forfeited his
complaint about the jury’s failure to make a specific finding on that
circumstance.
The argument also fails if we consider it on its merits. Mancebo did not
involve the requirement that a One Strike enhancement be proven. The
Supreme Court did, however, distinguish a decision addressing that
21
requirement, People v. Jones (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693. (Mancebo, supra,
27 Cal.4th at p. 748.) In Jones, the defendant claimed the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury on the multiple-victim circumstances alleged,
resulting in the jury’s making no true finding on those circumstances. (Jones,
at pp. 709–710.) The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that by finding
that the offenses at issue were committed against different victims, the jury
clearly “intended to find each multiple[-]victim circumstance true.” (Id. at
p. 711.) Even if the jury had not done so, “or even if its findings did not
adequately track the language of the multiple[-]victim circumstance,” the
court concluded that “the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
because the jury necessarily resolved the factual question posed by the
omitted instruction[] adversely to [the] defendant under other, properly given
instructions.” (Id. at pp. 709, 711.)
Jones, which Adams does not mention, disposes of his argument. Here,
the jury necessarily found that Adams committed a qualifying offense
“against more than one victim” who was “a child under 14 years of age.”
(§ 667.61, subds. (e)(4), (j)(2).) The fact that the victim is under 14 is an
element of continuous sexual abuse (counts one and six) and lewd acts
against a child under 14 (count two), and C.C. and Doe were specified as the
victims on the verdict forms for their respective counts. Thus, by finding him
guilty of counts one, two, and six, the jury necessarily concluded that he
committed qualifying offenses against more than one victim under age 14.
Accordingly, any error in failing to require a separate finding on the One
Strike allegation was harmless. (See People v. Jones, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th
at p. 709.)
22
III.
DISPOSITION
Adams’s conviction on count five is reversed, and his sentence is
vacated. The matter is remanded for a full resentencing. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.
23
_________________________
Humes, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
_________________________
Siggins, J.*
*Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
People v. Adams A168688
24
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