CourtListener 10098739•People v. Johnson CA2/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/29/24 P. v. Johnson CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B331996
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA030918)
v.
LA’MIN JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND1
In 1999, a jury convicted defendant of numerous crimes,
including one count of first degree murder, and found true special
circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during
the commission of a burglary. Defendant was 23 years old at the
time of the murder. He was sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP), plus 19 years.
In April 2023, defendant filed a motion under Penal Code2
section 1203.1 for a proceeding under People v. Franklin (2016)
63 Cal.4th 261, seeking to make a record of mitigating evidence
for a future youth offender parole hearing under section 3051.
The trial court denied the motion, finding section 3051 excluded
individuals, such as defendant, serving LWOP sentences for
offenses committed after reaching 18 years of age.3 The court
also rejected defendant’s equal protection claim based on the
separate treatment of juvenile and non-juvenile, youthful
offenders sentenced to LWOP. The court did not address
defendant’s contention that section 3051, by rendering him
ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing, made his sentence
cruel or unusual punishment.
1 We grant defendant’s request to take judicial notice of portions
of our earlier nonpublished opinion in defendant’s case, People v.
La’Min Johnson (July 11, 2023, B320943). We draw the procedural
facts from that prior opinion.
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless
otherwise noted.
3 Section 3051, subdivision (h), provides, “This section shall not
apply to cases in which . . . an individual is sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was
committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.”
2
Defendant timely appealed. On appeal, defendant argues
section 3051 violates his constitutional rights to equal protection
and the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment under
the California Constitution. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 3051 Does Not Violate Defendant’s
Constitutional Rights to Equal Protection
When defendant filed his appeal and opening brief, most
appellate decisions rejected defendant’s equal protection
challenge. (See People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 125–
127; People v. Bolanos (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1079, review
granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278803; People v. Sands (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 193, 204–205 (Sands); In re Murray (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 456, 463–465; People v. Morales (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 326, 347–349 (Morales); People v. Jackson (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 189, 196–197, 199–200; People v. Acosta (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 769, 777–781 (Acosta).) Defendant argues these
cases were wrongly decided and requests we follow People v.
Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, review granted January 11,
2023, S277487. That case agreed with defendant’s contention
that no rational basis exists for section 3051’s disparate
treatment of young adults with a LWOP sentence and young
adults with lesser sentences. (Id. at pp. 286–288, 290.)
However, our Supreme Court recently disapproved of this
lone decision and agreed with the majority position of appellate
courts. (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin).)
Hardin held section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders
sentenced to LWOP from a youth offender parole hearing did not
violate equal protection. (Id. at pp. 838–839.) As stated by the
3
Supreme Court, “It was not irrational for the Legislature to
exclude from youth offender parole eligibility those young adults
who have committed special circumstance murder” because it is
“an offense deemed sufficiently culpable” to merit “society’s most
stringent sanctions.” (Id. at p. 864.)
Defendant does not dispute we are bound by Hardin. (Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
Nevertheless, he contends “Hardin does not foreclose relief” to
him “based on a finding that there is no rational basis to
distinguish between young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP
and juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP, because the
California Supreme Court . . . did not consider that issue.”
Hardin did not expressly address the separate treatment of
young adults and juveniles sentenced to LWOP because “Hardin
[did] not challenge the Court of Appeal’s conclusion on this
point.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 841.) The Supreme
Court noted, however, the appellate court rejected this argument
and “explained that the Legislature had a rational basis for
distinguishing between juvenile offenders and young adult
offenders, since a unique set of constitutional rules restricts
sentencing children to life without parole.” (Id. at pp. 840–841,
citing Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460.)
Defendant offers no argument addressing the Supreme
Court’s statement or the principles courts rely on to rationally
distinguish between children and adults subject to the same
sentence. (See, e.g., Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 347.)
We agree with the weight of authority finding a rational basis for
treating juveniles and adults differently. (Ibid.; accord, Sands,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 204; Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 779–780 [“The Legislature declined to include young adult
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LWOP offenders in this amendment, presumably because
Montgomery [v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190] did not compel
such treatment for young adults”].) Accordingly, we reject
defendant’s equal protection challenge.
B. Section 3051 Does Not Render Defendant’s LWOP
Sentence Cruel or Unusual Punishment
Defendant does not dispute his LWOP sentence was
constitutional when imposed, but he argues section 3051
rendered his sentence cruel or unusual in violation of the
California Constitution by making him ineligible for a youth
offender parole hearing. We disagree.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which applies to the states (People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th
262, 265, fn. 1), prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) Our state counterpart,
Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, prohibits
infliction of “[c]ruel or unusual” punishment. (Italics added.)
This distinction in wording makes no analytical difference.
(People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358, fn. 7 [“No
distinction need be attached this difference from an analytical
perspective”]; see also People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711,
733 (Baker) [“There is considerable overlap in the state and
federal approaches”].) The touchstone in each is whether a
defendant’s sentence “‘is grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S.
11, 21 (Ewing); accord, People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441,
479.)
“‘[O]utside the context of capital punishment, successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have
5
been exceedingly rare.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at
p. 21.) “There is no question that ‘the fixing of prison terms for
specific crimes involves a substantive penological judgment that,
as a general matter, is “properly within the province of
legislatures, not courts.”’ [Citation.] It is for this reason that
when faced with an allegation that a particular sentence amounts
to cruel and unusual punishment, ‘[r]eviewing courts . . . should
grant substantial deference to the broad authority that
legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and
limits of punishments for crimes . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Reyes (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 62, 83.) “‘Only in the rarest of
cases could a court declare that the length of a sentence
mandated by the Legislature is unconstitutionally excessive.’”
(Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.) The sentence must be
“so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it
shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human
dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424.) In assessing
whether this is the case, courts consider (1) the degree of danger
which the offense and offender present to society;
(2) punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for more
serious offenses; and (3) punishments imposed for the same
offense in other jurisdictions. (Id. at pp. 425–427.)
Here, defendant concedes his LWOP sentence “may not
meet the three-part test” for evaluating whether a particular
punishment is so disproportionate to the offense committed as to
constitute a cruel or unusual punishment. Indeed, defendant
does not address any of the factors.
Moreover, defendant states he is aware this court reached
“an arguably contrary conclusion” in People v. Argeta (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482. In Argeta, this court rejected the
6
contention that a defendant’s sentence constituted cruel or
unusual punishment where the defendant was 18 years and five
months old when he committed murder. Argeta reasoned,
“[W]hile ‘[d]rawing the line at 18 years of age is subject . . . to the
objections always raised against categorical rules . . . [, it] is the
point where society draws the line for many purposes between
childhood and adulthood.’” (Ibid., quoting Roper v. Simmons
(2005) 543 U.S. 551, 554.) Defendant contends Argeta is not
instructive because it was decided before section 3051 was
enacted. He asserts the line “has been redrawn, by the
Legislature, at 26 years of age.” However, after the enactment of
section 3051, our Supreme Court reaffirmed the age of 18 as the
line our society uses to separate childhood from adulthood for
many purposes, including the propriety of criminal punishments,
such as the death penalty. (See People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th
1169, 1234 [noting section 3051 did “‘not establish the “national
consensus” necessary to justify a categorical bar on the death
penalty for individuals between the ages of 18 and 21 at the time
of their offenses’”].)
Defendant does not otherwise explain why Argeta’s
reasoning is inapplicable to section 3051’s inclusion of juveniles
sentenced to LWOP and its exclusion of defendants sentenced to
the same term for committing a special circumstance murder
between the ages of 18 and 26. (See also Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 854 [“the structure and history of the expansion [of
section 3051] make clear that the Legislature sought to balance
[comparable opportunities to obtain release] with other,
sometimes competing, concerns, including concerns about
culpability and the appropriate level of punishment for certain
very serious crimes”].) Therefore, we reject defendant’s
7
contention section 3051 rendered his LWOP sentence cruel or
unusual punishment.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s motion is affirmed.
MORI, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P. J.
ZUKIN, J.
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