CourtListener 10098163•Conservatorship of E.A. CA1/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/28/24 Conservatorship of E.A. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
Conservatorship of the Person of
E.A.
PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF CONTRA A169299
COSTA COUNTY, (Contra Costa County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. P20-00896)
v.
E.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Since October 2020, E.A. has been under conservatorship as a person
with a grave disability under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst.
Code,1 section 5000 et seq.; LPS Act). In this appeal, she challenges the trial
court’s failure to provide a timely jury trial on a petition for renewal of her
conservatorship filed in September 2022. It was never adjudicated.
A later petition for renewal was filed in September 2023, before any
trial was held on the 2022 petition. The September 2023 petition was heard
in November 2023, and E.A.’s conservatorship was extended. We are
dismayed by the trial court’s inability to hear the 2022 petition for over a
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
1
Institutions Code.
year, involving as it does “ ‘a massive curtailment of liberty’ ” for E.A.
(Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 354, 368 (Camacho).)
However, since E.A. is unable to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the
delay, we affirm. We direct the trial court to dismiss the September 2022
petition for conservatorship as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
A petition was filed in August 2020 seeking a conservatorship over E.A.
on the grounds that she was gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder
and unwilling to accept, or incapable of receiving, voluntary treatment. The
petition followed a long history of her interaction with county mental health
officials beginning in 2016, including 10 outpatient referrals and 8 acute
inpatient hospitalizations. Most recently, E.A. had been admitted to the
regional medical center in late July 2020, a day after she was discharged
from the hospital to a crisis residential program. She left the residential
program within hours of arriving and was later found wandering around a
BART2 station in her underwear. E.A. was diagnosed with schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar type, and was too disoriented and disorganized to accept
treatment voluntarily.
In October 2020, E.A. accepted the appointment of a conservator. A
petition for renewal of E.A.’s conservatorship was filed on September 24,
2021. At an October 19 hearing on the renewal petition, E.A. again accepted
appointment of a conservator.
Another petition for renewal, the one involved in this appeal, was filed
on September 13, 2022. It was set for hearing on October 7, 2022. On that
date, counsel for E.A. sought to continue the hearing on the petition for 30
days. The court continued the matter to November 18, when it was again
2 (Bay Area Rapid Transit.)
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continued at E.A.’s request to December 2. The reason for the continuance to
December was that E.A. had a visit scheduled with her family to take place
on November 19, the day after the trial was set to begin.
When the matter was called on December 2, E.A. objected to the
appointment of the conservator and requested a jury trial with no time
waiver. The case was set for a jury trial to begin on January 3, 2023. On
that date, however, there were no courtrooms available for trial, so the case
was reset for January 17. When the parties appeared on January 17, the
court announced it was unable to hear a jury trial that week, and the matter
was continued until January 30. On January 30, assigned counsel for the
petitioner was ill, and the deputy assigned to cover her appearances was not
ready to proceed. E.A.’s counsel objected to any continuance, but the court
found good cause to continue the matter to February 6.
On February 6, 2023, E.A. was ready to proceed to trial, but multiple
cases were set for the same day. The court queried the public defender
assigned to represent E.A. on whether the public defender’s office could
handle multiple trials on the same day. After observing that no courtrooms
had been made available for the public defenders’ cases that day, E.A.’s
counsel replied that her office would adjust to handle the cases that were
assigned. But counsel for the petitioner said she was not ready to proceed
because she had prepared for other cases that had priority over E.A.’s
petition.
Counsel for E.A. objected to any further continuance and moved to
dismiss the petition for the court’s failure to bring it to trial in a timely
manner. The court found the unavailability of courtrooms and the
petitioner’s unreadiness for trial to be good cause for a continuance. The
motion to dismiss was denied, and the case was continued to March 6.
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On March 6, counsel for E.A. was ready to proceed. Counsel for the
petitioner, however, stated she was not ready because she had just received
some records pursuant to subpoena and asked for a continuance. E.A.’s
counsel again objected to any continuance and moved to dismiss the petition.
The court denied the motion to dismiss and found good cause to continue the
case to April 10.
On April 11, the matter was continued to May 8, without objection, due
to the unavailability of the court and both counsel. On May 8, both counsel
appeared and stated they were ready for trial. But it appears other matters
were also set for trial that day. The following colloquy ensued. The court
asked counsel for the petitioner, “Can you represent that you have a second
deputy available [for trial] if you were engaged in another trial?” She
answered, “Yes.” The court then asked counsel for E.A. about her readiness
to proceed. She replied, “We’ve been requesting a time-not-waived jury trial
since December 2nd, 2022. [¶] I believe it’s a violation of due process that
County Counsel continues to get the benefit of the continuance of these trials
to request further records in these matters that aren’t being provided until
up to the date of trial. [¶] And I don’t believe that there would be any good
cause for continuance. So we’re ready.” The court asked counsel for E.A.,
“And can you make a representation concerning another attorney available
should you be engaged in another trial?” Counsel responded, “Should the
Court have an additional department available, we can provide additional
staffing.” Despite this assertion, the court replied, “[S]ince there’s no
representation about a second deputy available, I will find good cause to
continue.” The court denied another motion to dismiss and continued the
case to July 10, 2023.
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On July 10, there was an extended colloquy with the court about
whether both parties had a right to, and had been provided with, updated
clinical records pertaining to E.A. Since it did not appear that updated
records were properly subpoenaed, the court declined to make a good cause
finding for a continuance based on their absence. However, the court did find
good cause for a continuance based upon the court’s unavailability for trial
saying, “I’m going to be engaged in another court trial, and I’m the only
department available.” E.A.’s counsel objected and moved to dismiss.
Although the court recognized that her concerns were legitimate, it continued
the case to July 24. There was no express ruling on the motion to dismiss.
The case was next heard on August 28, 2023. Both parties were ready
to proceed at the morning calendar call, the jury trial was set to commence,
and the case was passed until later in the day. Later, however, counsel for
E.A. informed the court that she had commenced trial in another matter and
asked the court to trail E.A.’s case. The court declined to do so, finding good
cause to continue the matter to October 2, 2023.
Before the parties returned to court on October 2, a successive petition
for reappointment of the conservator was filed on September 7, 2023. This
most recent petition was set for hearing on October 4, 2023. Counsel for E.A.
filed a peremptory challenge on this new filing. The case was reassigned, and
the newly filed petition was set for a jury trial on October 2, 2023. On
October 2, no courtrooms were available for an LPS Act jury trial, so the
court trailed the case to Wednesday, October 4, over E.A.’s objection.
On October 4, the case was again continued over E.A.’s objection, this
time to October 9, due to the unavailability of a courtroom for an LPS Act
jury trial. The case trailed on the calendar until October 11 because E.A.’s
counsel was in trial on another matter. Both counsel were ready to proceed
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on October 11, but the expert for the petitioner was unavailable. Again, over
E.A.’s objection, the court determined there was good cause to continue the
case until October 16.
When the parties appeared on October 16, the court trailed the case to
October 18, over E.A.’s objection, because no courtroom was available for
trial. On October 18, the court again did not have a department available for
trial. The case was continued to November 6, without objection.
On November 6, 2023, counsel for E.A. requested a court trial on both
the 2022 and 2023 conservatorship petitions and objected to any further
continuances. On November 8, the matter was continued because E.A. was
ill and could not be transported to court. The case was set for November 13.
On November 13, the court was informed that E.A. was under quarantine
and could not be brought to court until at least November 22. The matter
was continued to November 27.
When the case was called on November 27, it was trailed for one day
because counsel for E.A. was ill. When the parties appeared on November 28,
E.A. accepted the conservatorship renewal alleged in the September 2023
petition with a less restrictive placement that would move her from a mental
health rehabilitation center to a board and care facility. The court ratified
the actions of the conservator over the previous year since the filing of the
2022 petition, and on November 30, 2023, ordered the less restrictive
placement. E.A. timely appealed.
On January 24, 2024, after reviewing the updated conservatorship
investigation report, the court issued its order reappointing the conservator,
ratified the actions of the conservator over the period of October 27, 2022 to
October 26, 2023, as related to the September 2022 petition for
reappointment, and designated a board and care facility as E.A.’s least
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restrictive and most appropriate placement. Pursuant to the updated report,
E.A. remained gravely disabled with little progress since her evaluation in
October 2021.
II. DISCUSSION
E.A. argues that the court erred and violated her statutory and
constitutional rights to a speedy trial when it ordered repeated continuances
that delayed her trial for almost a year.
This is not the first time our court has considered an appeal alleging
an unwarranted delay in bringing LPS Act cases to trial in Contra Costa
County in 2023. In Conservatorship of T.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1361,
1370–1373 (T.B.), our colleagues in Division Two considered a delay of 171
days following a demand for jury trial. Here, the delay was 362 days. We
agree with the thoughtful analysis and holding in T.B. and will apply it in
this case.
The LPS Act serves important public interests of ending improper and
indefinite confinement of the mentally ill, providing the mentally ill with
evaluation and treatment of serious disorders, and protecting public safety.
It protects the rights of involuntarily committed subjects through judicial
review, individualized treatment plans, and supervision and placement of
individuals through a conservatorship program. The LPS Act also protects
the mentally ill from criminal victimization and the suffering attendant to
their inability to care for themselves. (T.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1376.)
There is no doubt that the liberty interests at stake in an LPS Act
conservatorship are also significant. A person determined to be gravely
disabled under the LPS Act may be confined for a year, and have their
confinement renewed annually so long as they remain disabled. In addition
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to freedom from confinement, conservatees may also lose significant personal
rights, including driving privileges, voting rights, the ability to contract, and
the right to refuse or consent to medical treatment. (T.B., supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1376.)
In light of the significant private interests at stake in LPS Act
proceedings, several layers of important procedural safeguards are built into
the process. There are a series of temporary detentions for evaluation and
treatment that safeguard against the erroneous deprivation of liberty. (T.B.,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1376.) Only after those temporary detentions
have failed to ameliorate serious mental health issues may an individual be
subject to a petition for a year-long detention due to grave disability. (Id. at
p. 1377.)
Section 5350 provides that a court or jury trial to effectuate a year-long
commitment under the LPS Act shall commence within 10 days of a demand
for trial, subject to a possible continuance for 15 days if requested by counsel
for the proposed conservatee. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(2).) In 2022, the statute was
amended to add that failure to commence trial within the specified time is
grounds for dismissal of the petition. The amendment became effective
January 1, 2023. (Stats. 2022, ch. 960, § 5.)
But this 10-day deadline for commencement of trial mandated by
section 5350 has been held to be directory, not mandatory (Conservatorship of
James M. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 293, 299), and it remains directory even
after the 2022 amendment (T.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1382–1384).
Thus, the trial court retains the discretion to determine whether a delay in
bringing a case to trial may be excused, or whether the circumstances
warrant dismissal of the petition. (Id. at pp. 1382–1384.)
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The circumstances that may excuse delay in this context include
continuances supported by a finding of good cause. (T.B., supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1389.) But this does not mean that “good cause” for a
continuance is a mere shibboleth for the trial court to recite when it delays
the commencement of a trial. A finding of good cause requires the court to
consider the factors specified in rule 3.1332 of the California Rules of Court.3
Rule 3.1332(d) states that in considering a request for continuance,
“the court must consider all the facts and circumstances that are relevant to
the determination. These may include: [¶] (1) [t]he proximity of the trial
date; [¶] (2) [w]hether there was any previous continuance, extension of time,
or delay of trial due to any party; [¶] (3) [t]he length of the continuance
requested; [¶] (4) [t]he availability of alternative means to address the
problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; [¶]
(5) [t]he prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the
continuance; [¶] . . . [¶] (7) [t]he court’s calendar and the impact of granting a
continuance on other pending trials; (8) [w]hether trial counsel is engaged in
another trial; [¶] . . . [¶] (10) [w]hether the interests of justice are best served
by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the
continuance; and [¶] (11) [a]ny other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair
determination of the motion or application.”
Here, a trial on the September 2022 petition was never held while
E.A.’s case languished and her conservatorship continued for more than 362
days until November 28, 2023, when the court heard the September 2023
petition. The reason supporting good cause was most often the court’s
inability to provide a courtroom for an LPS Act jury trial. The minutes and
transcripts of the many hearings reflect barely more than this conclusory
3 References to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
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reason supporting delay, and do not expressly reflect consideration of the
factors specified in rule 3.1332(d). For example, none of the hearings reflect
the number of days the case had remained pending beyond the statutory
directive, or the number of continuances previously granted. Yet, by early
2023, “it should have been clear that the lack of sufficient courtrooms was a
recurring obstacle to commencing trial in this case. But there is no indication
that the court had looked into ‘[t]he availability of alternative means to
address [this] problem.’ (Rule 3.1332(d)(4).)” (T.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1392 [discussing the Contra Costa County Superior Court in early 2023].)
Just as in T.B., there is nothing in the record to suggest the court
viewed setting this case for trial with the level of urgency the statute and
circumstances require. There is reason to question the sufficiency of the good
cause showing under rule 3.1332 for many of the continuances granted in this
case. But the absence of significant analysis for the many continuances does
not compel us to reverse the order of commitment and remand for a new trial.
Rather, we must still consider whether E.A. suffered prejudice due to the
delay. (See T.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1392.)
Recently, in Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th 354, our Supreme Court
addressed the appropriate constitutional framework for evaluating the
timeliness of trials under the Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.).4 In that case, the SVP trial was delayed for more
than a decade. (Camacho, at p. 368.) In considering a due process challenge
to the failure to bring the case to trial in a timely manner, the Camacho
court—while it refined the prejudice analysis to fit the non-criminal context
4 The SVP Act is a scheme of civil commitment for the treatment of
sexual predators apart from any criminal sanctions they may receive.
(Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1143.)
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of the case as we discuss below—otherwise applied the test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514
(Barker) that is traditionally used to analyze pretrial delay in criminal cases.
“[T]he Barker court declined to adopt any bright-line rules for
determining when the right [to a speedy trial] has been violated. The court
instead identified four factors for courts to examine: the length of the pretrial
delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. [Citation.] The defendant
carries the ‘burden of demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker’s
multifactor test.’ [Citation.] Because none of these factors is dispositive,
‘courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process’ to
determine whether trial has been unconstitutionally delayed.” (Camacho,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 380.)
When applying the Barker framework in the SVP context, however, the
court expressly rejected the rule applicable to criminal speedy trial claims
that presumptive prejudice is part of the mix of relevant facts to be
considered and that its importance increases with the length of delay.
(Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 392.) As our high court explained: “There
is little reason . . . to apply a presumption of trial prejudice in the SVP
context. As previously noted, trial on a petition for commitment under the
SVP Act aims to establish whether a person meets the definition of an SVP at
the time of trial. This inquiry is categorically different from that of a criminal
trial, where the issue is whether the defendant’s past conduct constitutes
guilt of a particular offense. In the SVP context, then, time ordinarily will
not erase critical evidence for the defense, since the jury relies on recent
expert evaluations to evaluate whether the individual qualifies as an SVP at
the time of trial. . . . Severe prejudice to the alleged SVP’s defense is less
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likely to result purely as a function of the passage of time; as a result, no
presumption of prejudice applies in this context.” (Ibid.)
When further considering prejudice, the Camacho court also
distinguished pretrial incarceration at a state hospital from pretrial
detention at a jail, which has few rehabilitative resources. (Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 393.) Specifically, although it stressed “the oppressive
nature of involuntary detention awaiting an SVP trial,” the court
acknowledged that “[p]retrial treatment of the underlying mental disorder
that caused the state to seek commitment in the first place may ultimately
facilitate the individual’s release before trial.” (Ibid.)
In the end, the Camacho court concluded that, in the SVP context,
“[d]etermining how heavily to weigh the prejudice resulting from pretrial
custody . . . requires a sensitive inquiry into the circumstances of the case.
For individuals who have never received a favorable expert evaluation, delay
in holding trial will generally entail less prejudice than for individuals who
have a more substantial basis for arguing they do not satisfy the criteria for
SVP commitment. Where an individual makes such a showing, the amount
of prejudice may increase as the length of the delay increases. For example,
in the case of an individual who has expert reports recommending release, a
four-year delay in going to trial will generally be significantly more
prejudicial than a one-year delay.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 393.)
We find Camacho’s analysis in the analogous SVP context helpful and apply
it here.
In assessing the first of the Barker factors in this case, we will assume
without deciding that the delay of 362 days in bringing this case to trial
weighs in support of a due process violation. (Accord, T.B., supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1395; see also Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 383,
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390.) But the reasons for the delay do not entirely rest with the court or the
prosecution. The case was continued at the request of E.A.’s counsel from
October until December 2022, when counsel made the demand for a jury trial
and declined to waive time. There were also three later occasions when the
case was continued to accommodate E.A. or her counsel. Thus, the reasons
for delay are in some part attributable to E.A. In contrast, there is no
question that from December 3, 2022, E.A. was persistent in her request for a
jury trial and asserting her right to prompt adjudication. But the fourth
Barker factor of prejudice weighs against E.A.
In arguing that she was prejudiced, E.A. says that she “only” withdrew
her demand for trial and “acquiesced” to the conservatorship due to the
extended delay in getting her case to trial. She thus implies that her
agreement to extend her commitment was not voluntary. However, there is
nothing in this record to suggest that E.A.’s ability to prepare for trial or her
defense to the allegations was impaired by the delay. There is also no reason
on this record to question that E.A. remained gravely disabled when she
agreed to extend her conservatorship in November 2023. The investigator’s
report for this most recent commitment prepared in late 2023 plainly states
that her condition remained essentially unchanged since she was evaluated
in October 2021. Moreover, the agreed disposition of the September 2023
petition was announced when her trial was to begin, and she could have
proceeded to trial on that day. Finally, E.A.’s argument that the extended
nature of the delay alone in this case was presumptively prejudicial was
rejected by the Camacho court as discussed above.
In sum, E.A. has not shown that the delay in this case “had [an]
appreciable impact on [her] ability to present [her] defense.” (Camacho,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 393; accord, T.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1396.)
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After balancing the Barker factors, we conclude E.A. has not met her burden
to show her due process rights were violated.
Although we have concluded that E.A. has not demonstrated she was
prejudiced by the delay in this case, our holding should not be read to
minimize the responsibility courts have in ensuring timely trials under the
LPS Act. An adjudicated conservatee faces a loss of personal freedom and
fundamental rights, including the ability to refuse or consent to medical
treatment. (T.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1376.) As stated above,
“[i]nvoluntary civil commitment entails ‘a massive curtailment of liberty.’ ”
(Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 368.) “ ‘[I]t must be remembered that “ ‘the
primary burden’ to assure that cases are brought to trial is ‘on the courts and
the prosecutors.’ ” [(Citation, quoting Barker, [supra,] 407 U.S. at p. 529.)]
Furthermore, “society has a particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions,
and society’s representatives are the ones who should protect that interest.”
[(Barker, at p. 527.)] Thus, the trial court has an affirmative constitutional
obligation to bring the defendant to trial in a timely manner. [Citation.] And
to that end, it is entirely appropriate for the court to set deadlines and to hold
the parties strictly to those deadlines unless a continuance is justified by a
concrete showing of good cause for the delay.’ ” (People v. Williams (2013)
58 Cal.4th 197, 251.) “ ‘ “The trial judge is the captain of the ship; and it goes
without saying that the ship will go in circles if the crew is running around
the deck with no firm marching orders.” ’ ” (Camacho, at p. 389.) That is
exactly what happened here.
As a final matter, we note that an LPS Act conservatorship lasts only
one year as a matter of law. (Conservatorship of K.Y. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
985, 988.) The court’s ability to rule on the September 2022 petition that
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initiated this appeal expired on September 12, 2023. It remains unresolved
and is now moot. We will direct the superior court to dismiss it.
III. DISPOSITION
The January 24, 2024 order for conservatorship is affirmed. The case is
remanded with instructions for the trial court to dismiss the petition for
conservatorship filed in September 2022 as moot.
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SIGGINS, J.*
WE CONCUR:
HUMES, P. J.
BANKE, J.
A169299
Conservatorship of E.A.
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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