In re J.G. CA2/2

CourtListener 10098158Calctapp28.08.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/28/24 In re J.G. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re J.G., a Person Coming B332869, B333964
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
No. 20CCJP04967A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.A. et al.,

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant S.A.
Matthew I. Thue, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Leonard G.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******

Appellants S.A. (mother) and Leonard G. (father) appeal
from the juvenile court’s orders (1) denying mother’s Welfare and
Institutions Code section 3881 petition to reinstate reunification
services and (2) terminating parental rights to their son, J.G. We
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Referral and petition
On September 17, 2020, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (department)
received a referral alleging mother had severely neglected five-
year-old J.G. (born May 2015). Mother was arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol (DUI) after being observed driving
over 100 mph and weaving in and out of traffic at approximately
2:39 a.m. Mother’s blood alcohol level was 0.14 percent. During
the arrest, mother was uncooperative, yelling, screaming, and
expressing a desire to kill herself. J.G. was in the backseat,
unrestrained by a seatbelt or car seat.
Mother has a history of substance abuse and prior DUI
arrests. Her criminal history includes a January 1, 2016 DUI

1 All further unattributed statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

2
conviction, an August 24, 2019 DUI arrest, and a September 17,
2020 DUI arrest. Mother had previously received voluntary
family maintenance services in 2016 related to her alcohol use.
On September 21, 2020, the department filed a petition
alleging J.G. came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) based on Mother’s substance
abuse and the September 17 incident. The juvenile court detained
J.G. from parental custody on September 24, 2020.
The petition was amended to add allegations that father’s
untreated mental health issues and his failure to comply with
court orders endangered J.G. After mother tested positive for
cocaine, the petition again was amended to add claims of
mother’s substance abuse.
The juvenile court sustained the second amended petition
on December 11, 2020, finding true the allegations mother had
placed J.G. in a detrimental and endangering situation by driving
under the influence with the child in the car and mother had a
history of substance abuse and was a current abuser of alcohol
and cocaine. The court also found true the allegations that
father’s mental health issues and failure to comply with court
orders endangered J.G.
Reunification services for mother were ordered, including
substance abuse treatment, random drug testing, and parenting
education. The court did not order reunification services for
father.
Reunification services
Over the next two years, mother participated in court-
ordered services. She struggled to maintain consistent sobriety,
exhibiting behaviors associated with those struggling with
addiction, e.g., minimizing, blaming, not taking accountability,
and lacking a commitment to testing. On March 16, 2021, mother

3
was again arrested for DUI after causing a collision while driving
with a suspended license. Her blood alcohol levels were measured
to be 0.17 percent and 0.15 percent.
J.G. exhibited behavioral issues throughout the dependency
proceedings, including aggression, sexualized behaviors, and
regression. He was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder
and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. J.G.’s behaviors often
worsened during and after visits with mother. J.G. would call his
mother stupid and ugly and the caregiver had to end one virtual
visit to stop J.G. from hurting his face. After other visits with
mother, J.G. made comments about dying and having to smoke to
feel better. J.G.’s behavior was observed to be sexualized,
including telling stories about sexual behavior and engaging in
shaking his bottom with his hands. When asked where he had
seen this, he said “sometimes when he is sitting down on the
couch Mama sits on his lap and shakes her booty.”2
Mother’s visits with J.G. were initially monitored. In
October 2021, they were liberalized to unmonitored. However,
mother struggled to manage J.G.’s behaviors during visits and
often completed his homework for him rather than helping him
do the work. Mother promised J.G. he would return to her care,
and she asked him to conceal the fact she was violating
restrictions on her driving privilege. In April 2022, mother’s

2 The department’s report expressed a concern J.G. was
exposed to sexualized content while in his mother’s care. J.G.
described specific details of sexual behavior involving his mother
and her partners. In addition, video equipment, cameras, and
lighting were observed in mother’s bedroom along with red satin
sheets on her bed.

4
visits reverted to monitored after the department filed a section
388 petition based on these concerns.
At the July 25, 2022 18-month review hearing, the juvenile
court found mother had partially complied with her case plan but
had not gained sufficient insight to warrant returning J.G. to her
care. The court granted mother additional reunification services.
On August 12, 2022, J.G. was placed with Ms. F., who
expressed a desire to adopt him. J.G. thrived in Ms. F.’s care,
developing a strong bond with her and referring to her as “Nana.”
At the 24-month review hearing on October 27, 2022, the
juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a section
366.26 permanency hearing. The court found while mother was in
compliance with her case plan, it had not been completed. The
court noted mother’s history of relapse, additional DUI arrests,
positive drug tests, and failure to gain insight into her behavior.
Mother filed a section 388 petition seeking to regain
custody of J.G. or reinstate reunification services. Mother alleged
changed circumstances based on her completion of court-ordered
programs, participation in Alcoholics Anonymous, negative drug
tests, and employment. The juvenile court denied the petition on
October 26, 2023, finding mother had not demonstrated the
proposed change would be in J.G.’s best interests.
Permanency hearing
At the permanency hearing, mother testified she helped
J.G. with homework and played cards with him during visits. She
added he would smile, hug her, and call her mommy during the
visits. Mother also stated she does not attend his medical
appointments or therapy, explaining the department does not
allow her to attend. She could not identify the name of his school
or teacher and admitted she does not discipline J.G. Father did
not appear.

5
The juvenile court terminated parental rights, finding J.G.
adoptable and that no exception to adoption applied. The court
found mother and father failed to demonstrate a beneficial
parental relationship that outweighed the benefits of adoption.
Mother and father appealed the October 26, 2023, orders
denying the section 388 petition and terminating parental
rights.3

DISCUSSION
I. No abuse of discretion in denying mother’s section
388 petition
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her
section 388 petition to reinstate reunification services. We
disagree because, though mother made commendable changes to
address her substance abuse issues, she did not establish it was
in J.G.’s best interests to reinstate services for the purpose of
reunifying the family at some uncertain future date.
“Section 388 allows a parent to petition to change, modify,
or set aside any previous juvenile court order. [Citation.] ‘The
petitioner has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of
circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be in
the best interests of the child.’” (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
833, 845.) “We review a juvenile court’s denial of a section 388
petition for abuse of discretion, and review its factual findings for
substantial evidence. [Citation.] We may disturb the exercise of

3 Mother’s notice of appeal was assigned case No. B332869
and father’s was assigned No. B333964. On March 28, 2024, this
court granted a request to consolidate the appeals.

6
the court’s discretion only when the court has made an
unreasonable or arbitrary determination.” (Id. at p. 846.)
In her section 388 petition mother sought to reinstate
reunification services that were terminated after two years of
services having been provided to mother.
When considering her petition, the juvenile court found
mother demonstrated the existence of changed circumstances by
addressing the reasons for terminating services. This was based
on her completing an 18-month DUI program, her use of support
groups to assist with alcohol sobriety, and her negative drug test
results. However, mother was also required to show it was in
J.G.’s best interests to reinstate the reunification efforts.
“[A]fter reunification efforts have terminated, the court’s
focus shifts from family reunification toward promoting the
child’s needs for permanency and stability.” (In re J.C. (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 503, 527.) It is not in the best interests of the child to
further delay permanency and stability in favor of rewarding the
parent for hard work and efforts to reunify. (Ibid.) The parent’s
best interests “are simply no longer the focus.” (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that “to
promote the prompt resolution of the child’s custody status and
her permanent and stable placement, the law sets a presumptive
18-month limit on reunification services.” (Michael G. v. Superior
Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 627.)4 This time limit “reflects a
considered legislative choice: ‘[I]n order to prevent children from
spending their lives in the uncertainty of foster care, there must

4 Under some limited circumstances, services may be
extended for an additional six months. (Michael G. v. Superior
Court, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 628-629.)

7
be a limitation on the length of time a child has to wait for a
parent to become adequate.’” (Ibid.)
Here, mother had already received more than the
presumptive limit of reunification services and failed to show it
was in J.G.’s best interests to delay permanency and stability and
extend the uncertainty of foster care. Weighing strongly against
delaying permanency was mother’s prior years of substance
abuse. Mother began drinking alcohol when she was 14 years old
and had been arrested repeatedly for DUI’s, including the
September 2020 DUI that resulted in J.G.’s detention and
another DUI occurring during its pendency. Also during the
pendency of this case mother tested positive for cocaine. Even if
mother had made commendable progress in treating her
substance abuse in the year before her petition, this must be
considered in the context of the prior years of substance abuse.
Further, the record shows J.G. had been thriving in the
stability of the placement with his prospective adoptive mother,
to whom he was securely attached and with whom he desired to
stay. J.G.’s improvement occurred over the nearly three years
since he had been detained from mother’s care.
Delaying permanency to provide mother with further
reunification services “would deprive [J.G.] of a permanent,
stable home in exchange for an uncertain future.” (In re Ernesto
R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 225.) It was reasonable for the
juvenile court to find it was not in J.G.’s best interests to
reinstate family reunification services and deprive him of a
permanent, stable home.
Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in the juvenile
court’s order denying mother’s section 388 petition.

8
II. No error in finding the parental-benefit exception
inapplicable
Mother and father contend the juvenile court erred in
terminating their parental rights because the parental-benefit
exception applies. However, mother does not address the
substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding on the
parental-benefit exception. Father fails to show error in the
record and merely contends if we agree with mother, his parental
rights should be reinstated.
Under section 366.26, once the juvenile court terminates
reunification services and determines a dependent child is
adoptable, it must select adoption as the permanent plan and
terminate parental rights unless it finds doing so would be
detrimental to the child under one of several statutory
exceptions. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630-631
(Caden C.).) To establish the parental-benefit exception, a parent
must show: (1) regular visitation and contact with the child; (2)
the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the
parent; and (3) terminating that attachment would be
detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. (Id. at p. 636.) We
review the juvenile court’s factual findings regarding the
existence of a beneficial parental relationship for substantial
evidence and its determination that termination of parental
rights would not be detrimental to the child for abuse of
discretion. (Id. at pp. 639-640.)
A. Substantial evidence supports the finding that
the beneficial relationship exception was not
applicable
The department admits mother established the first
element by showing she maintained regular visitation and

9
contact with J.G. As to the second element, “courts assess
whether ‘the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The focus
is on the child, and factors that are considered are “‘[t]he age of
the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Ibid.)
Here, J.G. was detained from mother on September 17,
2020, when he was five years old. In the nearly four years since,
the record does not demonstrate mother consistently provided
emotional support or engaged in positive, nurturing interactions
with J.G. Instead, during visits, J.G. was rude to mother, called
her “stupid,” and was observed to act as if he were spitting or
urinating on mother during virtual visits.
There was no showing that mother actively participates in
J.G.’s learning and development by offering guidance, teaching
life skills, and encouraging his growth. On the contrary, mother
does not even know the name of the school J.G. attends or his
teacher. She admitted she does not attend his therapy, claiming
the department does not allow her to participate. She also
admitted she does not discipline J.G. On occasion she appeared
intoxicated during calls and encouraged J.G. to dance by singing
“there’s some hoes in this house.” When J.G. engaged in sexual
behavior inappropriate for his six years of age and was asked
where he learned the behavior, he explained, “sometimes when
he is sitting down on the couch Mama sits on his lap and shakes
her booty.”
Though mother testified she and J.G. have visits where she
helps him with his homework and they play cards,such routine
interactions fall short of demonstrating J.G. looks to mother for
reassurance and comfort or that she is attentive to his special

10
needs. Thus, substantial evidence supports the implicit finding
mother did not establish the second element, i.e., that she had a
substantial, positive bond with J.G.
As to the third element, the detriment J.G. will suffer from
terminating the parental relationship, mother offered no evidence
that outweighs the benefit of a stable, nurturing new home.
There is no evidence J.G. suffers significant distress or
depression when leaving mother. Instead, it shows J.G. “happily
trotting off back to [caregiver’s] vehicle without any upset from
leaving his mother.” There is no evidence J.G. has a connection
with mother or that she plays a key role in his sense of self such
that he will suffer a detriment at the loss of the parental
relationship. Moreover, the record shows J.G. thrives in his new
home. He is bonded with his caregiver and calls her “Nana,” has
a loving relationship with another child in the home, who he
refers to as sister, and encourages new foster children placed in
the home to share and listen to the caregiver.
The record supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that any
detriment from severing the attachment with mother was
outweighed by the benefits of adoption. Given a child’s need for
permanence and stability, the court did not abuse its discretion in
finding termination of mother’s parental rights would not be
detrimental to J.G.
B. Father fails to identify any error and did not
establish the beneficial relationship exception
Father joins mother’s arguments and offers no independent
basis to find error. Essentially it is his argument that, if the order
terminating mother’s parental rights is reversed, his rights
should be reinstated as well. Since mother did not demonstrate
error, father has no basis for reversal.

11
Further, the record contains no evidence of a significant,
positive relationship between father and J.G. Father did not
establish he had consistent visitation and contact throughout the
dependency proceedings. Mother reported father had not seen
J.G. since 2016 and that J.G. knew a different man as his father.
When father participated in an in-person visit, J.G. initially hid
behind the visitation supervisor and said, “that is not my dad.” In
a telephone visit, J.G. did not recognize father and eventually
asked to end the call. Father’s visits were inconsistent and there
is no evidence he had a positive, beneficial relationship with J.G.
or that terminating the relationship would cause detriment to
J.G.
Thus, the juvenile court’s finding that father failed to
establish the parental benefit exception was clearly supported by
substantial evidence.

DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

________________________
CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, J.

12

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.