CourtListener 10050969•In re H.H. CA2/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/21/24 In re H.H. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re H.H. et al., Persons B333897, B335057
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct.
No. 20CCJP03745B, C)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Tiana J. Murillo, Judge. Affirmed.
Lillian Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
M.G. (mother) has filed two appeals. First, she challenges
the denial of her request for a sibling bonding study. Second, she
challenges the denial of her petition to reinstate reunification
services and the finding she had not established a sibling
relationship exception to the termination of her parental rights.
Due to the intertwined issues involving the bonding study and
the sibling relationship exception, this opinion addresses both
appeals.
Finding no error in these orders, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
M.G. is the biological mother of H.H. (born December 2019)
and I.H. (born May 2021).1 The children also have an older half
sister, L.E.2
1 I.H. was born after the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) filed the petition
concerning H.H. H.H. and I.H. are children of Daniel H.
2 L.E. is not a party to this appeal. Throughout the pendency
of this matter, L.E. and H.H. were placed together. In March
2023 the court placed L.E. with her father, Ruben E.
2
Petition filed for H.H. and L.E.
The Department filed a petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 3003 on July 14, 2020, alleging mother’s
actions endangered the health and safety of the children, H.H.
and L.E. The petition alleged mother and Daniel H. engaged in
violent verbal and physical fights in the children’s presence, and
mother endangered the children through her substance abuse
and her possession of drug paraphernalia and a blow torch in the
home.
At the detention hearing a prima facie case that H.H. fell
within section 300 was made. H.H. was placed with a caregiver.
Later, mother submitted to the court’s jurisdiction, and the
petition was sustained on all counts. Monitored visitation was
ordered for both parents. Family reunification services were
ordered for mother.
Petition filed for I.H.
On January 14, 2022, the Department filed a petition
alleging I.H.’s health was endangered by the violent conduct
between mother and Daniel H. (father) and by mother’s failure to
enforce a criminal protective order against father. The
Department also alleged mother failed to protect I.H. from harm
based on mother’s substance abuse, including positive tests for
marijuana during her pregnancy with I.H. The petition included
allegations that I.H.’s siblings, H.H. and L.E, were already
dependents of the juvenile court due to the violent conduct and
substance abuse of the parents.
3 All further unattributed statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
3
During the hearing the court determined that sufficient
evidence was presented to establish a prima facie case under
section 300, leading to I.H.’s placement with a caregiver. At the
jurisdictional hearing the court declared I.H. a dependent and
placed him in the Department’s custody, with directions to make
best efforts to place all three siblings together. Visitation and
reunification services were ordered for mother.
H.H. and I.H. were placed in the home of Bessie H., along
with half sister L.E. In March 2023, L.E. and was reunified with
her father.
Struggles with substance abuse and termination of
reunification services
Mother struggled with issues involving substance abuse
throughout the dependency proceedings. At the September 1,
2022 hearing on reunification services for H.H., the court noted
mother had relapsed and her substance abuse had not improved
after nearly two years of services.4 As a result, reunification
services were terminated for H.H.
At the April 25, 2023 status hearing on reunification
services for I.H., the court found mother had missed drug tests
and experienced another relapse. Following the hearings on
reunification efforts, the court found mother’s progress had been
“unsubstantial” and terminated family reunification services for
I.H.
In June 2023, mother again relapsed and ceased visitation
with the children for over six months. On December 18, 2023,
4 The court also found mother had concealed her continued
relationship with father, the relationship that was the basis for
the domestic abuse allegations in the section 300 petition.
4
mother entered a residential treatment program. She resumed
visitation with H.H. and I.H. in late December 2023.
Denial of mother’s request for bonding study
Mother filed a motion requesting a bonding study to
evaluate the sibling relationship among H.H., I.H., and L.E. She
argued the court lacked sufficient evidence to determine whether
the loss of the sibling relationship outweighed the benefits of
adoption. The Department opposed, asserting adequate
information about their relationship could be gleaned from
Department reports on the children. The juvenile court denied
mother’s motion both because a study would delay a permanent
resolution for the children and the evidence and arguments could
be made without a study.
Petition for reinstatement of reunification services
Mother filed two section 388 petitions seeking six
additional months of reunification services as to H.H. and I.H. In
support, mother provided evidence of her enrollment in the
treatment program, her renewed commitment to sobriety, and
her resumed visitation with the children. At the hearing mother
testified to her progress in treatment. The juvenile court denied
the petition, finding mother’s one month of sobriety did not
constitute changed circumstances, and additional services were
not in the children’s best interests given their need for
permanency.
Permanency planning hearing
At the permanency planning hearings on January 22, 2024,
and February 2, 2024, mother argued the parental benefit and
sibling relationship exceptions to termination of parental rights
should apply. The juvenile court found the parental benefit
exception did not apply because mother did not show consistent
5
visits, a beneficial relationship, or a detriment that would arise
from terminating her parental rights.
As to the sibling relationship exception, the court
acknowledged H.H., I.H., and L.E. shared a “very strong
connection,” but found H.H. and I.H. had remained with their
caregiver for nearly a year after L.E.’s departure “without any
major or apparent detrimental impact.” The court also noted the
caregiver had agreed to continue facilitating visits between the
siblings postadoption. Ultimately, the court found mother had not
met her burden of proving this exception applied and terminated
her parental rights.
Mother filed timely notices of appeal.5
DISCUSSION
Mother challenges (1) the denial of her sibling bonding
study request, (2) the finding the sibling relationship exception
did not apply, and (3) the denial of her section 388 petition to
reinstate reunification services.
I. There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of
mother’s motion for a sibling bonding study
A. Standard of review
While expert testimony can be useful to assess bonds
between family members (see In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
5 Mother has filed three appeals. The first, B329174, is
directed at the denial of her request for the children to be placed
with a relative. The denial was affirmed in In re H.H. (May 1,
2024, B329174) (nonpub. opn.).
Her other two appeals, B335057 and B333897, are the
subject of this opinion.
6
614, 633, fn. 4), the juvenile court has discretion to order a
bonding study under Evidence Code section 730. (Evid. Code,
§ 730; In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080.) There is no
requirement in statutory or case law for a juvenile court to obtain
a sibling bonding study as a condition precedent to a termination
order. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.)
Accordingly, we review the denial of a request for a bonding
study for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 1341.) “A court exceeds the
limits of legal discretion if its determination is arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd. The appropriate test is whether
the court exceeded the bounds of reason.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32
Cal.App.5th 840, 851.)
B. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
The juvenile court’s decision to deny mother’s request for a
bonding study was well within the bounds of reason. The court
properly considered two critical factors in reaching its decision:
(1) the potential delay in permanency for the children, and (2) the
sufficiency of existing evidence regarding the sibling relationship.
1. As reunification services had been terminated,
the focus was on the children’s needs for
permanency
The juvenile court expressed concern about further delay in
achieving permanency for H.H. and I.H. Reunification services
had been terminated for mother. “Once reunification services are
ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for
permanency and stability.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th
295, 309.) The court’s focus on the delay to the children’s needs
was entirely appropriate. H.H. and I.H. had been in foster care
for over three years and two years, respectively, when the study
was requested. The court reasonably concluded that ordering a
7
bonding study at this late stage would cause unwarranted delay
in securing permanency for the children. The decision was not
arbitrary or capricious, but rather a sound exercise of the court’s
discretion to focus on the children’s needs for permanency.
Mother argues her delay in seeking the bonding study was
necessitated by the Department’s repeated failures to provide
court-ordered information about the sibling relationship. While
the record reflects some deficiencies in reporting, the juvenile
court was aware of the issues and took steps to address them by
ordering additional information that was provided in reports filed
on November 13 and November 14, 2023, thus addressing the
deficiencies in the reporting and showing information about the
relationship was available without a bonding study.
We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of mother’s
request for a sibling bonding study.
2. Evidence of the sibling relationship could be
offered without the requested study
The juvenile court also found the evidence of the sibling
relationship could be offered without a bonding study. A review of
the record shows significant evidence of the sibling relationship:
(1) H.H. and I.H. were visiting consistently with L.E. since March
2023; (2) L.E. was having overnight visits with H.H. and I.H.
twice a month; (3) H.H. and L.E. were reported to be “well
bonded”; and (4) a postadoption contact agreement had been
signed, ensuring ongoing sibling visitation.
Furthermore, at the hearing mother’s counsel
acknowledged there was “evidence of a bond that would cause
harm to the children if that bond is severed” without a bonding
study. This admission further supports the court’s conclusion
8
that existing evidence was sufficient to evaluate the sibling
relationship exception.
II. Finding mother did not establish the sibling
relationship exception was not an abuse of
discretion
Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights,
arguing the juvenile court erred in finding the sibling
relationship exception did not apply.
A. Standard of review
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides for the
termination of parental rights if family reunification services
have been terminated and the juvenile court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted. Once
reunification services have been terminated, “‘[f]amily
preservation ceases to be of overriding concern . . . the focus shifts
from the parent’s interest in reunification to the child’s interest
in permanency and stability.’” (In re Richard C. (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 1191, 1195.) “Adoption, where possible, is the
permanent plan preferred by the Legislature.” (In re Autumn H.
(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.)
Although the statutory preference is in favor of adoption,
section 366.26 lists certain exceptions that may preclude
termination of parental rights, if the juvenile court finds “a
compelling reason for determining that termination would be
detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
One exception is the sibling relationship. When
determining whether terminating parental rights would
substantially interfere with a sibling relationship, the juvenile
court must first evaluate the nature and extent of that
relationship, “including, but not limited to, whether the child was
9
raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared
significant common experiences or has existing close and strong
bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s
best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest,
as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through
adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) This exception does not
apply often. (In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 174, quoting
In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014 [“‘application of
this exception will be rare, particularly when the proceedings
concern young children whose needs for a competent, caring and
stable parent are paramount’”].)
“If the court determines terminating parental rights would
substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is
then directed to weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that
sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by
the permanency of adoption.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
942, 952 (L.Y.L.).)
To show a substantial interference with a sibling
relationship, the person opposing the termination of parental
rights “must show the existence of a significant sibling
relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the
child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but
would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the
relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on
termination, there is no substantial interference with that
relationship.” (L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952,
fn. omitted.)
We apply the substantial evidence standard to the juvenile
court’s underlying factual determinations, and the abuse of
10
discretion standard to the court’s weighing of competing
interests. (In re D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 174.)
B. Substantial evidence supported the court’s
findings
Mother argues insufficient evidence supports the court’s
decision on the sibling relationship due to the court’s denial of
her request for a sibling bonding study. However, it was mother’s
burden to prove this exception applied. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 45, 61.) The court’s denial of her requested bonding study
did not preclude mother from presenting other evidence to meet
this burden.
Moreover, there was substantial evidence in the record
showing termination of parental rights would not substantially
interfere with the siblings’ relationship. The caregiver testified
she intended to continue facilitating visits among the siblings
postadoption. The caregiver maintained communication with
L.E.’s father to coordinate visits, received L.E. into her home for
overnight weekend visits, and intended on continuing the visits
among the siblings. The caregiver had also entered into a
postadoption contact agreement with L.E.’s father to preserve the
sibling relationship. Substantial evidence, therefore, supports the
court’s finding that termination of mother’s parental rights would
not substantially interfere with the sibling relationship.
The benefits of adoption outweigh any potential
interference with the sibling relationship. The children spent
years in foster care and the focus was on achieving a permanent
and stable home for them. Once they were in their placement
with the prospective adoptive parent, they thrived.
Given the evidence that sibling contact would continue and
the importance of providing H.H. and I.H. with a stable home,
11
the court did not abuse its discretion when weighing the
competing interests and concluding mother had not established
the sibling relationship exception.
III. There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of
mother’s section 388 petition to reinstate services
Mother also challenges the denial of her section 388
petition seeking additional reunification services for H.H. and
I.H. As mother’s single month of sobriety did not show a changed
circumstance nor that it was in the best interests of the children
to reinstate services, we disagree.
“Section 388 allows a parent to petition to change, modify,
or set aside any previous juvenile court order. [Citation.] ‘The
petitioner has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of
circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be in
the best interests of the child.’” (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
833, 845.) “We review a juvenile court’s denial of a section 388
petition for abuse of discretion, and review its factual findings for
substantial evidence. [Citation.] We may disturb the exercise of
the court’s discretion only when the court has made an
unreasonable or arbitrary determination.” (Id. at p. 846.)
The juvenile court found mother failed to meet her burden
on both prongs. Although mother entered a residential treatment
program, she had been sober for only one month at the time of
the hearing. Given mother’s history of relapse, the court could
reasonably conclude this short period of sobriety did not
constitute a significant change. (See, e.g., In re Cliffton B. (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423 [when there is a history of drug use and
relapses, 200 days of sobriety is not enough to show changed
circumstances].)
12
The court also found additional services were not in the
children’s best interests. “‘[T]o prevent children from spending
their lives in the uncertainty of foster care, there must be a
limitation on the length of time a child has to wait for a parent to
become adequate.’” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14
Cal.5th 609, 627.) Mother had received two years of services for
H.H. and over one year for I.H. The children had been in foster
care for most of their lives. The court properly prioritized the
children’s need for stability over mother’s interest in
reunification. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)
On this record, the juvenile court’s denial of mother’s
section 388 petition was not an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
________________________
LUI, P. J.
________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.
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