CourtListener 10046379•Loyd v. Imperial County Narcotics Task Force CA4/1
Loyd v. Imperial County Narcotics Task Force CA4/1
CourtListener 10046379Calctapp20.08.2024
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/20/24 Loyd v. Imperial County Narcotics Task Force CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MICHAEL LOYD, D081178
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super Ct. No. ECU001391)
THE IMPERIAL COUNTY
NARCOTICS TASK FORCE et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Imperial County,
L. Brooks Anderholt, Judge. Affirmed.
Artiano Shinoff, Jack M. Sleeth, Jr., and Paul V. Carelli IV for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Robert J. Solis for Defendant and Respondent the Imperial County
Narcotics Task Force.
Quarles & Brady and Jeff Michalowski for Defendant and Respondent
the County of Imperial.
Fisher & Phillips, Aaron F. Olsen, Megan E. Walker, and Lauren
Roseman for Defendant and Respondent Strategic Contracting Services, Inc.
Michael Loyd was terminated from his position as Commander of the
Imperial Valley Narcotics Task Force (Task Force). He sued the Task Force,
Imperial County (County), and Strategic Contracting Services (SCS;
collectively, Defendants) for retaliation under the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h)) and Labor Code section
1102.5, and for failure to prevent retaliation under FEHA (Gov. Code,
§ 12940, subd. (k)).1
Loyd alleged he was terminated for reporting that a male Task Force
board member engaged in gender harassment of a female staff assistant,
after the board member confronted her for declining to supply requested
documents, and she and another female staff member avoided the board
member. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial
court granted. The court ruled, inter alia, that Loyd could not establish he
engaged in protected activity, because he lacked any reasonable belief that
gender harassment occurred and did not report such conduct. The court
entered judgments for Defendants.
On appeal, Loyd argues there are triable issues of fact on these and
other matters. We reject his arguments regarding protected activity, do not
reach the other matters, and affirm the judgments.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Background on the Task Force and Loyd’s Position
The Task Force operates pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding
between several public agencies, including the Imperial County District
Attorney’s (DA) Office and other County offices; police departments including
1 Statutory references are to FEHA unless specified. We generally refer
to points made by at least one defendant as being by Defendants and
distinguish between them as warranted.
2
El Centro, the California Highway Patrol (CHP), and federal agencies. The
Task Force is intended to “ensure well-coordinated narcotic and gang
enforcement regionally” and to “increase the flow” of information between the
participating agencies.
The Task Force is governed by an Executive Board (Board), which
consists of an official from each agency. One official is elected by the others
as Chairman. During the relevant time, Imperial County DA Gilbert Otero
was Chairman.
The Board also appoints a Commander, who manages the Task Force
and reports to the Board through the Chairman. Loyd became Commander
in 2001, while employed by the California Department of Justice. After he
retired from that agency in June 2013, the Board wanted him to continue as
Commander, and he did so. In September 2013, the County entered an
“Employer of Record Service Agreement” with SCS on behalf of the Task
Force, under which SCS would be Loyd’s employer of record. The same
month, Loyd entered an “Agreement to Provide Law Enforcement Services”
with SCS and the County (through the County DA and Task Force
Chairman).
II. Underlying Events
A. The Board Renegotiates Loyd’s Contract in 2018
In 2018, the Board decided to renegotiate Loyd’s contract, and proposed
lowering his salary. Otero asked three Board members to conduct the
negotiations: CHP Captain Arturo Proctor, City of Imperial Police Chief
Leonard Barra, and Drug Enforcement Agent Frank Amavizca (Committee).
Loyd met with the Committee, including in November 2018. Loyd later
expressed concerns about the negotiations (see post). On December 3, Proctor
sent Loyd an email with the Board’s final offer, which included a $15,000
3
salary cut and work conditions (e.g., requiring him to work onsite, absent
justification). On December 11, Loyd sent an email stating, “I accept the
Board’s offer and await finalization of the agreement from the [County].”
B. Events in Late 2018 and Early 2019
Meanwhile, on or around December 4, 2018, Proctor sent Irma
Martinez an email request for Task Force documents. Martinez was an
employee of the El Centro Police Department, who was assigned to work as a
staff assistant for the Task Force. Otero emailed Martinez, asking her not to
respond to Proctor and telling her that, if he followed up, to say he had “to
contact [Otero] for such a request.” Otero subsequently emailed the Board,
stating the process to request documents was to “contact the
department/agency head”; a “request was made to a staff
member, . . . bypassing [the] Commander and/or the Chair”; and this was
“unprofessional, defies common sense, and just plain wrong.” He also stated,
in part, that it was not “right or fair to put one of our clerical staff members
in the middle of a situation that has been very contentious . . . .”
On December 6, 2018, Proctor went to the Task Force office and asked
Martinez for the documents. According to Martinez, she told Proctor that he
had to request the documents from Loyd or Otero; he asked her if she “felt
uncomfortable in the situation,” and she said yes; and he continued to request
the documents. She said that when she declined, he became “visibly
frustrated and irritated.” Two male probation officers were present during
the incident.
Loyd returned to the office shortly thereafter, and Martinez told him
about the incident. Loyd recalled she had “tears in her eyes” and he had not
“seen her so distraught” since he started working with her in 2005. He said
she told him, “[Proctor’s] in here, and he’s beating on stuff and telling me I
4
gotta give him this, and I gotta do that, and yelling at me in front of the
guys’ . . . .” Loyd spoke with Proctor, Proctor said he had a right to the files,
and Loyd stated, “No; no. You don’t get to feel that way. Coming in here and
talking to my staff assistant like that, what do you think you’re doing? How
dare you.” After Proctor left, Loyd talked with Martinez again. He stated
she said Proctor “kicked the chair, hit the table” and “scream[ed] at her in a
very aggressive manner”; he told her it was “up to [her]” if she wanted to file
a complaint; and she said, “I need to file a complaint. I can’t tolerate that.”
Martinez said she told Loyd that Proctor “became visibly frustrated and
irritated that I was not giving him the documents . . . he requested.” She
denied telling Loyd that she felt Proctor “engaged in gender or sexual
harassment, or took any action due to [her] gender.” Loyd acknowledged in
his deposition that Martinez did not say the incident related to gender or sex.
Both Loyd and Martinez told Otero about the incident, and neither told him
it had anything to do with gender or sex, either.
The following day, Martinez discussed the incident with her supervisor
at the El Centro Police Department, Commander Aaron Reel, and told him
she did not wish to take action. A few days later, Reel prepared a
memorandum, which said Martinez “did not believe the interaction to be
unprofessional or inappropriate,” and she only described Proctor as “being
visibly irritated at her responses to him to speak to Loyd or Otero” and felt
she “was in an awkward/uncomfortable position . . . .”
According to Loyd, Martinez told him she filed a complaint against
Proctor with the El Centro Police Department, but he did not specify its
contents. Otero also recalled she filed a complaint, but he did not believe it
had to do with gender or sex.
5
On February 8, 2019, Loyd sent Otero an email stating “FYI this is
what I’m contemplating,” with an attached document titled “Complaint.” The
document began, “Please consider this a formal complaint against [CHP]
Captain Art Proctor,” and focused on the contract negotiations. Loyd
expressed concerns about Proctor’s conduct and noted he told the Committee
they “were trying to lowball [him] into quitting and looking to replace [him]
with someone else” and “it was clear there w[ere] other agendas at play.” In
his deposition, he also said, in part, that he responded “[n]ot well” when told
about the pay cut and “raise[d] [his] voice” when Proctor said something
untrue.
Loyd’s February 2019 complaint also briefly described the Martinez
incident, stating in part that she was visibly upset, she said Proctor spoke to
her in a “rude and demeaning manner,” and she filed a complaint. It did not
say the incident related to gender or sex.
Proctor was out of state until April 2019. On April 10, 2019, Martinez
and another staff assistant, Yvette Tira, did not want to take notes at a
Board meeting attended by Proctor, and Loyd did not make them. Loyd said
Martinez “appeared very concerned” and did not want to be in the room with
Proctor because of the “prior incident” and her feeling “very uncomfortable”
near him; he could not recall if the “word she used” was “fearful or something
like that . . . .” Loyd said Tira also did not want to attend due to Proctor, but
he acknowledged he did not ask or find out why she did not want to be
around Proctor.
After the Board meeting, Loyd met with Otero. Loyd said Otero
“agreed . . . the hostile work situation could not continue and directed [him]
to meet with [Proctor’s] supervisor Kari Clark and advise her of the
complaint.” In his deposition, Otero testified Loyd wanted to go, and he said
6
to go. Otero agreed he also wanted Loyd to tell Clark he (Otero) “tried to
maintain the peace, but some people make it impossible” and “it’s only going
to get worse before it gets better,” stating Proctor “makes it impossible to
work with him.”
Loyd met with Clark the next day, April 11, 2019. On the first day of
Loyd’s deposition, he said he told Clark that Martinez had filed a complaint;
she and Tira did not want to be in the room with Proctor; and Martinez had
not heard back after three months. He said that after Clark indicated she did
not hear about the complaint, he stated, “Well, isn’t that policy when
somebody has got a sexual harassment complaint that it’s moved up the
flagpole, moved up the chain?” Clark said, “Absolutely” and she would pull
Proctor, meaning CHP, off the Task Force. When asked what he told Clark
about the substance of Martinez’s complaint, he said, “[b]asically what had
occurred . . . . With the tantrum, I guess you would say, that [Proctor] had
with Irma in the office.”
On the second day of his deposition, Loyd denied using the word
“sexual” when describing Martinez’s complaint to Clark, or in connection with
the incident prior to the lawsuit. He was asked if he told Clark the incident
“was because of [Martinez’s] gender or her sex,” and said, “No . . . I don’t
believe I said it like that,” but “may have described it as, ‘Hey, you have this
about four-foot-ten female and this guy that is just going off on her, and that
makes it incredibly wrong.’ ” When asked if he and Clark discussed anything
else, Loyd said Clark brought up his contract, calling it “bullshit” and asking
if he could change it, and he said, “No . . . . It’s over.” Loyd later stated in his
declaration that at the April 2019 meeting, he “advised [Clark] . . . of
Proctor’s gender . . . harassment.”
7
Clark’s recollection of the April 2019 meeting was that Loyd talked at
length about his contract negotiations and that, towards the end, he brought
up removing Proctor from the Task Force and mentioned the Martinez
complaint. She met with her supervisor afterwards, and they agreed CHP
would not withdraw from the Task Force. She also met with Proctor and told
him what Loyd told her.
On May 6, 2019, Loyd sent Clark a text asking her to confirm CHP
withdrew from the Task Force; she indicated they would be staying; and she
said, in part, “I know you have issues with [Proctor] and he assured me they
would be worked out.”
C. The Board Votes to Terminate Loyd in May 2019
On May 8, 2019, the Task Force Board met in a closed session.2
Proctor told them Loyd went to his chief (Clark) to discuss the contract
negotiations and mentioned to her that there was an agenda. A different
Board member similarly thought Loyd may have spoken to his mayor and
city manager about these topics, and one (who seemed to be El Centro Police
Chief Brian Johnson) said “go[ing] over our head” was “insubordination,” and
“unconscionable” unless there were facts showing something illegal,
unethical, or immoral. Other concerns were raised, including that Loyd
would not answer questions, was dismissive and disrespectful, “thumb[ed]
[his] nose” at the Board, and had a “little bit of attitude.” Johnson moved to
terminate Loyd, Proctor seconded the motion, and six other members voted to
terminate. Otero opposed the motion and voted no, another member voted
no, and one member abstained.
2 Otero recorded the meeting on his phone and a transcript is in the
record; some speakers are not identified.
8
In his deposition, Loyd said that after the meeting, Otero told him the
Board terminated him for insubordination, and when he asked why, Otero
said it was because he let Clark know about Martinez’s sexual harassment
complaint. Otero did not recall this, but said he would assume Loyd was
telling the truth.
The County subsequently notified SCS that it was terminating the
Employer of Record Service Agreement.
III. Litigation
Loyd filed suit against the Task Force, County, and SCS, plus other
agencies who are no longer in the litigation. His operative first amended
complaint included causes of action for (i) retaliation in violation of FEHA;
(ii) failure to prevent retaliation under FEHA; and (iii) retaliation in violation
of Labor Code section 1102.5.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. SCS argued, in part, that
Loyd could not show a link between any adverse employment action by SCS
and protected activity, essentially arguing it was not his employer. Both the
County and Task Force similarly argued they did not subject him to an
adverse employment action. They also argued Loyd did not engage in
protected activity; there was “no causal link between the alleged protected
activity (reporting gender harassment of [Martinez] to [Clark])” and his
termination; and the termination was for legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons.
The trial court granted summary judgment for SCS on the grounds that
Loyd could not show his termination by SCS was linked to protected activity
and, rather, that it was based on termination of SCS’s contract.
The trial court then granted summary judgment for the Task Force and
County, based on a lack of protected activity (and, for the County, the lack of
an adverse employment action).
9
First, the trial court ruled Loyd could not assert a reasonable belief
that Proctor’s conduct constituted gender-based harassment, as the “conduct
in question consisted of [Proctor] yelling about a refusal to provide documents
and hitting a table,” and Loyd asserted only that the “participants were of
opposite genders and . . . two women employees were reluctant to interact
with the male captain.” The court stated the “conduct here shows no
connection to the respective genders of the participants,” and a “dispute
between two people of opposite genders” does not “automatically implicate
gender-based harassment concerns.”
Second, the trial court ruled Loyd could not show that reporting the
conduct was a protected activity, “particularly as [he] [did] not dispute the
fact that he never used the words gender or sex when making his report to
Clark.” The court explained his report “did not contain any indication that
would put the employer on notice that he was reporting a suspected FEHA
violation.”
The trial court determined that because Loyd did not show he engaged
in protected activity, he did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation
under FEHA or the Labor Code, and it did not need to reach any remaining
issues. The court entered judgments for Defendants, and Loyd appealed.
DISCUSSION
Loyd contends there are triable issues of fact as to whether he engaged
in protected activity by disclosing to Clark what he reasonably believed to be
gender harassment by Proctor. He further contends there are triable issues
on causation, pretext, and whether Defendants are liable as joint employers.
We conclude the undisputed facts show Loyd did not engage in protected
activity, requiring affirmance of the judgments for all Defendants. We need
not and do not reach the other issues.
10
I. Standard of Review
“A trial court properly grants a motion for summary judgment where
‘all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)” (Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Swift Distribution, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277, 286 (Hartford).) Thus, a
defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion
that ‘one or more elements of’ the ‘cause of action’ in question ‘cannot be
established,’ or that ‘there is a complete defense’ thereto.” (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar); Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
We “ ‘take the facts from the record that was before the trial court
when it ruled on [the summary judgment] motion. [Citation.] “ ‘We review
the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the
moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made and
sustained.’ ” [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of that party.’ ” (Hartford, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 286.) The
opposing party’s evidence “remains subject to careful scrutiny.” (King v.
United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 433 [evidence must
“ ‘allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the
party opposing the motion’ ”].)
We “must affirm on any ground supported by the record.” (Jimenez v.
County of Los Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 140.)
11
II. Retaliation Under FEHA
A. Applicable Law
Under FEHA, it is unlawful “for an employer ‘to discharge, expel, or
otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed
any practices forbidden under this part . . . .’ ” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1035 (Yanowitz), quoting § 12940, subd. (h).)
We analyze Loyd’s FEHA retaliation claims under the McDonnell
Douglas test. Under this test, which was adopted from federal law as set
forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, the plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. (Yanowitz, supra,
36 Cal.4th at p. 1042.) To do so “a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged
in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an
adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the
protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Ibid.) “Once an employee
establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to offer a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. [Citation.] If the
employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action,
the presumption of retaliation ‘ “ ‘drops out of the picture,’ ” ’ and the burden
shifts back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation.” (Ibid.)
An employer moving for summary judgment “has the initial burden to
present admissible evidence showing either that one or more elements of
plaintiff’s prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse employment action
was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory [or nonretaliatory] factors.”
(Hicks v. KNTV Television, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 994, 1003.) If the
employer does so, it “ ‘ “will be entitled to summary judgment unless the
plaintiff produces admissible evidence which raises a triable issue of fact
12
material to the defendant’s showing.” ’ ” (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 327, 344 (Arteaga), italics omitted.)
B. Analysis
1. Whether Loyd Had a Reasonable Belief That Proctor
Engaged in Gender Harassment
Loyd contends he reasonably believed Martinez was “mistreated by
Proctor because of her gender.” This contention lacks merit.3
FEHA makes it unlawful “for an employer, ‘because of . . . sex, . . . to
harass an employee.’ (§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).) Under the statutory scheme,
‘ “harassment” because of sex’ includes sexual harassment and gender
harassment. (§ 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C).)” (Lyle v. Warner Brother Television
Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 277 (Lyle).) The “ ‘ “critical issue . . . is
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 279–280; cf. id. at p. 280 [“it is the disparate
treatment of an employee on the basis of sex . . . that is the essence of a
sexual harassment claim”].) Conduct supporting gender-based harassment
may include “sex-specific and derogatory terms” and “ ‘evidence about how
the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 281 &
fn. 6.)
An “employee is protected against retaliation if the employee
reasonably and in good faith believed that what he or she was opposing
constituted unlawful employer conduct such as sexual harassment or sexual
3 Although Loyd’s complaint cited harassment and discrimination, his
claims rest on one incident of alleged gender-based aggression and later
avoidance of the aggressor. We thus focus on harassment. The dispositive
issues (whether he reasonably believed unlawful gender-based conduct took
place and disclosed such conduct) would be the same regardless.
13
discrimination.” (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446,
474; see Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1043 [an “employee’s conduct may
constitute protected activity . . . , whether or not the challenged conduct is
ultimately found to violate the FEHA”].)4
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Loyd, we conclude he
cannot show a reasonable belief that Proctor engaged in gender harassment.
First, with respect to the underlying events, Loyd did not witness the
December 2018 incident, and the facts of both that incident and the
April 2019 incident were objectively gender-neutral. In December, Proctor
struck furniture and screamed at Martinez when she refused to supply
documents he requested at Otero’s direction. Martinez was very upset when
she told Loyd what happened, but she did not tell him or Otero that the
incident related to gender or sex. In April, Martinez and Tira did not want to
take notes at a Board meeting attended by Proctor. Loyd testified only that
Martinez said this was due to the prior incident and Proctor making her
uncomfortable, and he did not ask or find out why Tira wanted to avoid
Proctor.
The fact that Proctor is male, while Martinez and Tira are female, is
insufficient to support a reasonable belief that Proctor’s aggressive conduct
was because of gender. (See Guthrey v. State of California (1998)
63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1118 [“The mere fact that [plaintiff’s supervisor] is a
4 We need not resolve Loyd’s disagreement with Defendants’ view that
“reasonable” means “objectively reasonable.” (See Dinslage v. City and
County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 381–382 [citing federal
law for proposition that the “ ‘belief must . . . be objectively reasonable’ ”].) As
we explain shortly, Loyd failed to identify any facts that support an inference
of gender-based harassment, so his belief was not reasonable by any
standard.
14
female and plaintiff a male does not give rise to the inference that her alleged
aggressive conduct was motivated by a desire to discriminate on the basis of
gender”; it was “mere speculation” to infer conduct was based on gender]; id.
at p. 1124 [none of the “trivial and occasional acts” at issue were “alleged to
be sexual in nature and all . . . are objectively gender-neutral”]; Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 864 [“Speculation . . . is not evidence.”].)5
Loyd does not establish otherwise. In opposing summary judgment, he
cited Martinez being “in tears” and her and Tira “avoiding contact” with
Proctor as evidence of gender harassment. Being upset about offensive
conduct, or trying to avoid it, does not imply one was subject to unlawful
harassment. (Arteaga, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 344 [FEHA “ ‘is not a
shield against harsh treatment’ ”]; see Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 295
[FEHA is “ ‘not a “civility code” ’ ”]; cf., e.g., Kelley v. The Conco Companies
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 191, 207 [“[w]hile [plaintiff] was undoubtedly
subjected to grossly offensive comments and conduct,” he did not supply
evidence that it was “because of his gender”], superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014)
222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239, fn. 2.) And, again, Loyd admitted he did not find
out why Tira was avoiding Proctor.
Here, Loyd argues the “implication for [him]” of Martinez reporting
that Proctor yelled at her “in front of the guys” was that he “demean[ed] [her]
5 See also, e.g., Gregory v. Widnall (9th Cir. 1998) 153 F.3d 1071,
1074–1075 (“mere fact that plaintiff is male and most of his supervisors are
female” was “not sufficient to raise a jury question” for hostile work
environment claim under title VII); Alvarado-Santos v. Dept. of Health (1st
Cir. 2010) 619 F.3d 126, 134 (“beyond the mere fact that [plaintiff] is a
woman and [the supervisor] is a man,” there was “no evidence that any
difference in how she was treated was based on gender”).
15
because she was female . . . .” He also asserts “Martinez is small,” “Proctor is
much larger,” and he “believed the physical difference was part of the
intimidation factor.” The presence of coworkers and a size difference are
neutral facts. Even if they “impli[ed] for Loyd” that Proctor was motivated by
gender, the implication is unreasonable without more.
Loyd further argues he believed Martinez made a sexual harassment
complaint, as evidenced by him “specif[ying] to Clark . . . that [she] had
complained of ‘sexual harassment.’ ” This mischaracterizes the record (see
discussion post) and either way, would show only that his belief was in good
faith, not reasonable.6 The other evidence Loyd cites here (his February
2019 complaint about Proctor, and deposition testimony) reflects only that
Martinez said she made a complaint, not that it was about gender.
Second, the contemporaneous documentary evidence does not reflect
any link between Proctor’s conduct and gender. The December 2018 emails
support a gender-neutral explanation for why he confronted Martinez:
Proctor and Otero were in the midst of a document access dispute, and she
refused to give Proctor documents at Otero’s direction. Reel’s December 2018
memorandum said Martinez described Proctor as “visibly irritated,” not
inappropriate, and did not address gender or sex or any facts relating to
them. And Loyd’s February 2019 complaint about Proctor described the
Martinez incident only briefly, and did not mention gender or sex either.
Loyd argues the absence of these words in the February 2019 complaint
does “not mean that he didn’t have a reasonable and good faith belief that
6 For a similar reason, we reject Loyd’s reliance on his deposition
testimony that Otero said he was being terminated for reporting sexual
harassment (which Otero did not recall) and that he responded by saying,
“It’s not insubordination to report sexual harassment.” Assuming the
statements were made, they could support good faith belief at most.
16
Martinez was mistreated due to her gender.” But there would be no reason
for him not to mention gender-based treatment by Proctor, if he thought it
happened. Indeed, he mentioned sexual harassment by a different CHP
officer, elsewhere in the complaint (noting that in 2017, “a CHP officer whom
[Proctor] said he had handpicked” for the Task Force “was removed for sexual
harassment”).
Third, Loyd’s February 2019 complaint expressed concern about
Proctor’s conduct generally, including toward Loyd, further undermining any
inference of gender-based harassment. (Cf. Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 281
& fn. 6.) In the complaint, Loyd focused on his contract negotiations, and he
accused Proctor of, among other things, “falsely accusing [Loyd] of lying to
him” (which was “very unprofessional and unbecoming”) and “defam[ing]
[Loyd’s] integrity to the [Board].” Even in describing the Martinez incident,
Loyd’s complaint said he told Proctor it “was inappropriate to
demand . . . [Loyd’s] staff assistant to do anything,” and he later testified at
deposition that it was “disrespectful to [Loyd]” for Proctor to confront
Martinez. Otero similarly had concerns about Proctor’s workplace conduct,
including stating in his December 2018 email to the Board that Proctor’s
request to Martinez was “unprofessional” and in deposition that Proctor was
“impossible” to work with.
Loyd’s February 2019 complaint had also accused Proctor of
“slamm[ing] a sheet of paper on the table” in front of him. Loyd argues that
“arguably the single [paper] slam . . . would have been a lot worse . . . had
Martinez been sitting in front of Proctor,” because her “description . . . of
Proctor’s behavior was worse than the single slam Loyd witnessed.” But
Loyd does not deny Proctor acted aggressively toward him; he just speculates
Proctor would have been more aggressive toward Martinez. (See Crouse v.
17
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1524 [a “party
cannot avoid summary judgment based on mere speculation”].)
2. Whether Loyd Disclosed Gender Harassment
Loyd further argues he engaged in protected activity by disclosing what
he believed to be gender harassment to Clark. We reject this argument too.
An “employee’s unarticulated belief that an employer is engaging in
discrimination [or harassment] will not suffice to establish protected conduct
for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation, where there
is no evidence the employer knew that the employee’s opposition was based
upon a reasonable belief that the employer was engaging in discrimination
[or harassment].” (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1046.) “[C]omplaints
about personal grievances or vague or conclusory remarks that fail to put an
employer on notice as to what conduct it should investigate will not suffice to
establish protected conduct.” (Id. at p. 1047.) “Nonetheless . . . ‘an employee
is not required to use legal terms or buzzwords . . . .’ ” (Ibid.) The “ ‘relevant
question’ ” is “ ‘whether the employee’s communications to the employer
sufficiently convey the employee’s reasonable concerns that the employer has
acted or is acting in an unlawful discriminatory [or harassing] manner.’ ”
(Ibid.)
Although Loyd and Clark recalled certain details of their April 2019
meeting differently, the key facts are undisputed and foreclose any finding
that Loyd sufficiently notified Clark that he believed Proctor engaged in
gender harassment.
Loyd’s deposition testimony reflected, at most, that he told Clark
Proctor had a “tantrum” toward Martinez in December 2018, and she filed a
complaint; that it was “incredibly wrong” for a guy to go off on a “four-foot-ten
female”; and that she and Tira did not want to be in a meeting with Proctor.
18
He did testify he posed a question about the policy for a sexual harassment
complaint.7 But he also denied using the term “sexual” to describe
Martinez’s complaint (or the incident, prior to the lawsuit), and when asked if
he told Clark the incident “was because of . . . gender or sex,” he said, “No.”
He did also state in his declaration that he “advised [Clark] of . . . Proctor’s
gender . . . harassment,” but he could not “create a triable issue of fact by
providing a declaration that contradicts [his] prior deposition testimony.”
(Best Rest Motel, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 696, 708–709.)
Further, both Loyd and Clark recalled discussing his contract at the
April 2019 meeting (with him stating she said it was “bullshit”), as well as
removal of Proctor from the Task Force. And, in Clark’s later text message
advising Loyd that Proctor would be staying, she noted his “issues with”
Proctor.
We conclude Loyd’s statements to Clark constituted “complaints about
personal grievances or vague or conclusory remarks” that did not suffice to
alert her Loyd thought Proctor engaged in gender harassment. (Yanowitz,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1047; see Foster v. Humane Soc’y of Rochester &
Monroe County, Inc. (W.D.N.Y. 2010) 724 F. Supp. 2d 382, 395 (Foster) [“none
of what plaintiff complained about had anything to do with unlawful
discrimination”].) Loyd did not tell Clark that Proctor harassed Martinez
because of gender (much less Tira) and did not disclose any facts reflecting
gender-based harassment, such as gender-based language or differential
treatment based on gender. (Cf. Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 281, fn. 6.)
Loyd does not establish otherwise.
7 As described above, after Clark said she did not hear about Martinez’s
complaint, he said, “Well, isn’t that policy when somebody has got a sexual
harassment complaint that it’s moved up the flagpole . . . ?”
19
First, he seeks to rely on his inquiry about sexual harassment policy.
Assuming he made the remark, this hypothetical use of the term “sexual
harassment” was insufficient to alert Clark that Loyd believed Proctor
actually subjected Martinez to gender-based harassment. This insufficiency
is underscored by the fact that, in opposing summary judgment, Loyd
disclaimed his reliance on sexual conduct, stating the “issue is gender, not
‘sexual’ . . . .” (See Kodl v. Bd. of Educ. et al. (7th Cir. 2007) 490 F.3d 558,
563 [“Merely complaining in general terms of . . . harassment . . . is
insufficient.”]; Foster, supra, 724 F. Supp. 2d at p. 395 [“[T]he mere fact that
plaintiff used the term ‘hostile environment’ in her email to her supervisor is
not enough; the court must look at the substance of her complaint, not the
terminology that she used.”].)8
Second, Loyd contends the “entire reason” he went to Clark was
because “Martinez complained to [him] on April 10, 2019 that [she] was
fearful of Proctor, and did not want to be in the same room” as him. It is not
clear if he makes this point in support of reasonable belief, disclosure, or
both, but it lacks merit regardless. As noted, Loyd did not remember if
Martinez used the word “fearful,” and did not find out why Tira was avoiding
Proctor. Even if his stated motive were genuine, it establishes neither that
8 Loyd argues that, in ruling it was undisputed he did not use the words
gender or sex with Clark, the trial court overlooked this “sexual harassment”
testimony. But he conceded at deposition he did not say the incident related
to gender or sex, and he stated the fact of the “words . . . used” was
undisputed in responding to the statements of undisputed facts from the
County and Task Force. He suggests that stating the fact was undisputed
was partly in error, due to Defendants not citing the “sexual harassment”
testimony in their statements. This testimony does not change his
concession, or itself create a triable issue as to disclosure, as discussed
herein.
20
his belief in gender harassment was reasonable, nor anything about the
content of his meeting with Clark.
Third, Loyd argues in connection with pretext that Defendants claimed
he “spoke to Clark about his contract negotiation,” but this “theory makes no
sense” because he agreed to the contract in December 2018. But the contract
was not final; his acceptance email said he “await[s] finalization of the
agreement,” and Otero testified it was not finalized. Even if it were final,
that would not preclude discussion about it. Indeed, there is no dispute that
he and Clark discussed his contract; they just differ as to who brought it up
and what was said.
Finally, Loyd seeks to distinguish two cases cited by Defendants,
Carter v. Escondido Union High School District (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 922
(Carter) and Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School District (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 1378 (Patten), disapproved on other grounds by Lawson v.
PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 718, fn. 2 (Lawson).
He contends they are not FEHA cases and are factually distinguishable,
insofar as the Carter plaintiff did not take prompt action and the Patten
plaintiff had both nonprotected and protected disclosures.
Neither contention has merit. Both cases involved Labor Code section
1102.5, which also requires protected activity and under which Loyd also
brought a claim. (Carter, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 925, 933 [public
policy wrongful termination claim based in part on Lab. Code, § 1102.5];
Patten, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381 [Lab. Code, § 1102.5 claim].) And
factual differences aside, they underscore that a report like Loyd’s, which
involves “at its core, a disagreement between [coworkers],” is not protected
activity. (Carter, at p. 934; id. at pp. 933–934 [teacher’s disclosure that coach
recommended protein shake to student was not protected, where, inter alia,
21
“record [was] devoid of anything” to show belief in unlawful conduct was
reasonable; this “was not whistleblowing . . . , but rather a routine ‘internal
personnel disclosure’ ”]; Patten, at pp. 1382, 1384–1386 [principal’s
complaints about a male gym teacher looking into the girl’s locker room, and
off-color remark by a male science teacher to a female student, involved
personnel matters and did not support protected activity; disclosures
regarding program expenditures did present a triable issue].)9
We conclude Loyd cannot establish he engaged in protected activity and
thus cannot establish a FEHA retaliation claim. We affirm the judgments as
to this cause of action.
III. Failure to Prevent Under FEHA
Loyd acknowledges his FEHA “failure to prevent” claim under
Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k) is derivative of his FEHA
retaliation claim, and the judgments are affirmed for this claim as well.
(Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1021
[accepting concession that Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k) “ ‘cause of action
[could] survive only if a “[r]etaliation” cause of action survives’ ”]; see Trujillo
v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 289 [employers
“should not be held liable . . . for failure to take necessary steps” to prevent
conduct violating FEHA, “except where the actions took place and were not
prevented”].)
9 In his reply brief, Loyd contends he also engaged in protected activity
by confronting Proctor. We “generally do not consider arguments raised for
the first time in a reply brief” (Raceway Ford Cases (2016) 2 Cal.5th 161,
178), and it lacks merit anyway. Loyd argues that “although he didn’t use
the word woman or female with Proctor, that’s what was in his head.” An
“unarticulated belief” is insufficient to establish protected activity.
(Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1046.)
22
IV. Retaliation Under Labor Code Section 1102.5
Loyd argues that, like his FEHA retaliation claim, there are triable
issues for his Labor Code section 1102.5 claim as to protected activity, based
on both reasonable belief and disclosure. We rejected these arguments above,
and they fail here for similar reasons.
A. Applicable Law
Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part
that an employer “shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing
information” to an employee with authority to investigate it, if the employee
has “reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation” of
a law, rule, or regulation.
For retaliation claims under this section, Labor Code section 1102.6
“provides the governing framework.” (Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 718.)
A plaintiff must show “by a preponderance of the evidence, that retaliation
for an employee’s protected activities was a contributing factor in a contested
employment action.” (Ibid.) The burden then “shifts to the employer to
demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the
action in question for legitimate, independent reasons even had the plaintiff
not engaged in protected activity.” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
Loyd’s argument here consists mainly of a description of the legal
standards for a Labor Code section 1102.5 retaliation claim. We briefly
address two points, to explain why his argument does not support a different
result here than under FEHA.
First, Loyd asserts that under Labor Code section 1102.5, the question
is whether he “reasonably believed he was disclosing a violation” of law, and
this is a “fact-intensive inquiry.” But Loyd relies on a FEHA violation as the
23
basis for his Labor Code section 1102.5 claim, and we have concluded he did
not establish a reasonable belief that FEHA was violated. He identifies no
facts that warrant a different analysis of this issue under Labor Code
section 1102.5.
Second, Loyd asserts that although a disclosure identifying a statute
can support reasonable belief, such identification is unnecessary. There is no
dispute Loyd did not have to cite FEHA when he talked to Clark. Rather, our
conclusion that he did not disclose gender harassment to Clark was based on
his failure to alert her to gender harassment at all, through either specific
allegations or facts.
As with Loyd’s FEHA retaliation claim, his failure to establish
protected activity means he cannot establish a Labor Code section 1102.5
claim, and we affirm the judgments on this basis as well.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on
appeal.
O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
RUBIN, J.
24
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.