People v. Williams CA2/6

CourtListener 10046373Calctapp20.08.2024

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Filed 8/20/24 P. v. Williams CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B331744
(Super. Ct. No. TA148615)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

DERRICK DEON WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Derrick Deon Williams appeals from a judgment following
a trial at which the jury found him guilty of second degree
murder (Pen. Code1, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and possession of a
firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2). The jury also
found true three allegations regarding personal use of a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)-(d).) The court sentenced appellant to 35
years to life: 15 years to life for the murder in count 1, plus 20
years for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53,

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
subdivision (c). The court stayed the punishment for the count 2
possession of a firearm by a felon.
Appellants contends (1) the prosecutor’s cross-examination
of him violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination under Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 [49
L.Ed.2d 91] (Doyle); and (2) the court abused its discretion in
allowing impeachment based on his 1992 robbery conviction. We
will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution’s Case-in-Chief
At around midnight on February 20, 2019, Los Angeles
County Sheriff deputies responded to a shooting at V Live LA, a
strip club at which appellant worked as head of security. Upon
arrival, deputies saw Leland Mathews lying on his back in the
parking lot. Mathews had suffered a gunshot wound to the leg.
He was transported to a hospital, where he was pronounced dead.
In conducting a protective sweep of the club, a deputy
noticed streaks of blood on the floor. The floor seemed to have
been recently mopped, and mop buckets appeared to have blood
in the water. An expended bullet was found on a hallway floor.
Law enforcement also recovered a bullet casing that had been
thrown away.
Deputy Hector Panduro interviewed appellant in the club’s
parking lot. Appellant stated he was in the staff restroom in the
club’s rear at the time of the incident. He heard people
“scattering.” He left the restroom and noticed a blood trail, which
he followed to the club’s front door. He saw the victim on the
ground of the parking lot, along with several people apparently
trying to help him. Appellant went back inside and told the

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deejay to shut down the club. He cleared people from the club
and waited outside until the police arrived.
Deputy Rayman Bailes also briefly interviewed appellant
on scene. Appellant stated he was coming out of the back office
at the time of the incident. Appellant heard a shot but saw
nothing. He declined Bailes’s invitation to add anything else.
Gary Honore testified he was a security guard who worked
with others to pat down customers entering the club. Honore
could not recall who patted Mathews down, but Honore was
present and would have been informed if a weapon had been
found. Later, Honore entered a back hallway through double
doors marked for employees. He saw Mathews and appellant
talking. Their demeanor was normal. Honore heard appellant
say something like, “You can’t be touching the bitches.”
Appellant and Mathews were face to face, so Honore asked them
if everything was okay. Both said yes.
Honore then heard appellant say “what” and saw the two
men looking at each other. Honore heard a gunshot. Honore saw
appellant holding a semi-automatic handgun pointed down.
Appellant and another manager told Honore and others to clean
up. They did. Appellant said, “Gangsters don’t snitch. If you got
a problem, you gonna need that.” Honore took it as a threat and
felt scared. At trial, Honore was sure appellant shot Mathews.
Honore had given law enforcement statements inconsistent
with his trial testimony. Honore testified he did so out of fear
and for his safety. Honore was originally charged as an accessory
based on the cleanup at the club. The charge was dismissed
following a proffer agreement.
Surveillance video showed a member of Mathews’s group
slapping the buttocks area of a dancer. The dancer spoke to

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appellant. The video showed appellant and Mathews conversing
in the club’s main area. The two appeared to have a heated
discussion in which they were standing almost face to face.
Appellant reached for Mathews’s right hand or arm, but Mathews
spun to break away. The two then went through double doors to
a hallway. A detective testified an upside-down, L-shaped object
in appellant’s pants was consistent with a firearm.
The cameras did not capture the shooting itself, but they
did capture Honore and other employees in the hallway. The
video showed Honore and another employee flinch or otherwise
react. Then, a bleeding Mathews headed out of the club, followed
by appellant and other employees. The cameras later captured
appellant apparently washing his hands. The video also showed
him giving his jacket to another person, who took it to a vehicle
in the parking lot.
Appellant gave a third interview on the morning after the
shooting. Part of that interview occurred after he was advised of
and waived his Miranda2 rights. Appellant claimed he had never
seen or “said two words” to Mathews. He indicated his jacket
should still be in the club. Appellant broached the subject of
gunshot residue (GSR) testing. He denied washing his hands
since “this shit started.”
A GSR kit obtained from appellant contained one particle
characteristic of GSR. Handwashing has been shown to remove
“most, if not all,” GSR present on hands.
Law enforcement arrested appellant in May 2019, over two
months after the shooting.

2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694]

(Miranda).

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The deputy medical examiner testified the cause of death
was a gunshot wound of the leg, and the manner of death was
homicide. The bullet entered through the right thigh and exited
through the right knee; the bullet then reentered on the left knee
and exited from the left leg. There was also a small laceration of
the right ring finger. A bullet likely caused the laceration.
Mathews had a femoral blood alcohol level of .23. The examiner
could not exclude the possibility of an accident based on the
autopsy itself. He recalled an accidental gunshot to the leg in one
case out of roughly 1200.
The parties stipulated appellant was convicted of robbery
(§ 211) in 1992.
Defense Evidence
According to appellant, Mathews said somebody who
worked in the back, Trill, owed him money. Appellant indicated
he would check in the back and told Mathews not to go through
the double doors. Nonetheless, Mathews followed appellant.
Eventually, appellant walked toward Mathews and asked him to
go back into the club. Appellant heard a pop and saw a flash.
Mathews immediately turned around and walked away.
Appellant realized Mathews had shot himself and wanted to “get
him out of there.” Once appellant was outside, appellant told the
deejay to shut down the club. Appellant denied asking employees
to clean up blood but acknowledged they did. He never saw a gun
in Mathews’s hand.
Appellant found ketchup on his jacket sleeve. The jacket
was expensive, so he gave it to someone to put in his girlfriend’s
car. Appellant’s girlfriend testified she was sleeping in her car in
the club parking lot when a man placed appellant’s jacket in the
car.

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Appellant admitted he lied to law enforcement about his
whereabouts at the time of the shooting. He did so because he
had not yet spoken with club ownership and did not know what
he should do. He did not want to bring negative attention to the
club and was primarily concerned with losing his job.
During appellant’s cross-examination, the prosecutor
repeatedly asked why appellant waited to say that Mathews
accidentally shot himself. The prosecutor’s questions covered the
entire period from the shooting until appellant testified at trial.
That period included a pretrial interval in which appellant
represented himself.
Rebuttal Evidence
The lead detective never became aware of a “Trill” during
his investigation. Nor did his investigation substantiate the
theory that Mathews shot himself.
DISCUSSION
Asserted Fifth Amendment Error
Appellant argues multiple questions posed on his cross-
examination violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination under Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. 610. The People
concede certain questions violated Doyle because they
“encompassed a time period that included statements to law
enforcement before receiving Miranda warnings, after waiving
his Miranda rights and giving a statement, and post-Miranda
silence following appellant’s arrest . . . .” However, the People
maintain any error was harmless. We agree any Doyle error was
harmless.
In Doyle, the Supreme Court held that due process and
fundamental fairness prevent use of a defendant’s post-arrest
silence following Miranda warnings to impeach that defendant’s

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trial testimony. (Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 617-618.)
“However, Doyle does not apply when a defendant presents
exculpatory testimony at trial inconsistent with a voluntary post-
Miranda statement.” (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175,
203.) Inquiry into prior inconsistent statements does not make
unfair use of silence because “[a]s to the subject matter of [those]
statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all.”
(Anderson v. Charles (1980) 447 U.S. 404, 408 [65 L.Ed.2d 222].)
The prosecutor properly questioned appellant’s failure to
disclose the claimed accidental shooting during his three pre-
arrest interviews with law enforcement. Doyle does not apply to
the first two interviews because they occurred prior to Miranda
warnings. (Fletcher v. Weir (1982) 455 U.S. 603, 605 [71 L.Ed.2d
490].) Regarding the third interview, the prosecutor’s questions
simply highlighted the inconsistency between appellant’s
statements during that interview and his trial testimony. As to
questions probing appellant’s silence after his arrest, even
assuming a Doyle violation, any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24
[17 L.Ed.2d 705].)
Appellant’s concededly and, by virtue of the video
surveillance, demonstrably false statements to law enforcement
impeached his trial testimony far more than any impermissible
inference drawn from silence. (See People v. Hinton (2006) 37
Cal.4th 839, 868; People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 857-858.)
Moreover, sufficient evidence establishes appellant’s guilt.
Honore saw Mathews and appellant speaking in proximity just
before hearing a gunshot. Honore then saw appellant holding a
semi-automatic handgun pointed down. He was sure appellant
shot Mathews. While appellant attacked Honore’s credibility,

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appellant’s threat against Honore explains his initial dishonesty
with police. The surveillance video also corroborates much of
Honore’s account, as does the existence of gunshot residue on
appellant’s hand despite evidence he had washed his hands.
By contrast, the evidence refutes appellant’s claim that
Mathews shot himself. Honore’s testimony indicated Mathews
was unarmed when he entered the club. Law enforcement did
not recover a firearm from Mathews, and appellant never saw a
gun in Mathews’ hand. A small laceration to Mathews’ right ring
finger was likely caused by a bullet, which would be inconsistent
with Mathews shooting himself while holding the gun in his right
hand. Given the compelling evidence against appellant and his
prior false statements, “it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the
[Doyle] error.” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831.)
1992 Robbery Conviction
Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing use of his 1992 robbery conviction to impeach his
credibility. We disagree.
“‘Past criminal conduct involving moral turpitude that has
some logical bearing on the veracity of a witness in a criminal
proceeding is admissible to impeach, subject to the court’s
discretion under Evidence Code section 352.’” (People v. Smith
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 512.) Robbery is a crime of moral
turpitude relevant to credibility. (People v. Gray (2007) 158
Cal.App.4th 635, 641.) We review admission of impeachment
evidence for abuse of discretion to be upheld “unless the trial
court ‘exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage
of justice.’” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 705.)

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Appellant claims his 1992 robbery conviction is too remote.
“However, convictions remote in time are not automatically
inadmissible for impeachment purposes. Even a fairly remote
prior conviction is admissible if the defendant has not led a
legally blameless life since the time of the remote prior.” (People
v. Mendoza (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 925-926.) Appellant has
not led a legally blameless life since the 1992 conviction.
Appellant was convicted of bringing contraband into jail in 1999
and firearm possession by a felon in 2008. He was also convicted
of possessing marijuana for sale in 2018, which the trial court
excluded. Appellant’s convictions dating back to 1992 formed a
pattern bearing on credibility.
Appellant, who was 17 years old when convicted of robbery
in 1992, argues his juvenile status at the time of the offense
“breaks the chain of relevance between [that] prior conviction and
the present day . . . .” However, even conduct subject to a
juvenile adjudication can be admissible for impeachment
purposes. (People v. Lee (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1740.)
Appellant’s youth did not render the court’s impeachment ruling
an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. YEGAN, J.

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Laura R. Walton, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________

Ralph H. Goldsen, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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