CourtListener 10046371•Royal Palm Crest v. Groft CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/20/24 Royal Palm Crest v. Groft CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
ROYAL PALM CREST, INC., B331401
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. 22STRO06123)
SAMUEL GROFT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Timothy Martella, Judge. Affirmed.
Samuel Groft, in pro per., for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Samuel Groft appeals from a three-year workplace violence
restraining order (WVRO) obtained by Royal Palm Crest, Inc.,
(Royal Palm) under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8,1
1 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
protecting three Royal Palm employees. Groft contends the trial
court violated his due process rights by holding the WVRO
hearing in his absence, even though he told opposing counsel he
was running late and the attorney agreed to wait for him to
arrive. Because the record on appeal does not support Groft’s
contentions, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 21, 2022 Royal Palm filed a petition for a
WVRO against Groft protecting three Royal Palm employees:
Promise Okechukwu, Collenthmary Chukwu, and Eke Ukpai.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) the
following day. The TRO was reissued and the hearing on the
WVRO was continued multiple times. On February 23, 2023
Groft filed a request to continue the hearing, which was granted.
On May 25, 2023 Groft gave notice that the hearing had again
been continued to July 5, 2023.
On July 5, 2023 the trial court held a hearing on Royal
Palm’s request for a WVRO. According to the minute order, the
court called the matter for hearing at 1:40 p.m. Royal Palm’s
attorney, Ali Ziai, appeared for Royal Palm, and Okechukwu was
present. Groft did not appear by 1:40 p.m., nor did he call the
courtroom. Ziai confirmed that the facts in the petition for a
WVRO were correct and Royal Palm was still seeking a WVRO.
The trial court granted Royal Palm’s request and issued a
three-year WVRO protecting Okechukwu, Chukwu, and Ukpai.
According to the July 5 minute order, the court reviewed the case
2
file, moving papers, and supporting declarations.2 The WVRO
prohibited Groft from harassing, following, contacting, or taking
any action to obtain the addresses of the three employees. The
order also required Groft to stay 100 yards away from
Okechukwu, Chukwu, and Ukpai, as well as their homes, schools,
vehicles, and children’s schools and childcare. The order
prohibited Groft from owning any firearms or ammunition.
Groft timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
“Section 527.8 permits an employer to seek a restraining
order on behalf of an employee who has ‘suffered unlawful
violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that
can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been
carried out at the workplace.’ (§ 527.8, subd. (a).) A ‘credible
threat of violence’ includes a ‘course of conduct that would place a
reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his
or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.’
(§ 527.8, subd. (b)(2).)”3 (City of Los Angeles v. Herman (2020)
2 Groft did not designate for inclusion in the appellate record
Royal Palm’s initial request for a WVRO or the supporting
declarations.
3 Section 527.8, subdivision (a), provides, “[A]ny employer,
whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible
threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be
construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the
workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order
after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of
the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and,
3
54 Cal.App.5th 97, 102; accord, Technology Credit Union v. Rafat
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 314, 322.) Under section 527.8,
subdivision (j), “[i]f the judge finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent engaged in unlawful violence or
made a credible threat of violence, an order shall issue
prohibiting further unlawful violence or threats of violence.”
Groft’s sole contention on appeal is that his due process
rights were violated because the trial court held the hearing on
the WVRO without his presence even though he was only
10 minutes late and had informed opposing counsel that he was
running late.4 However, Groft has not supported his contention
with any evidence in the record showing that he appeared in
court 10 minutes late (or at all) or requested opposing counsel or
the court to delay the hearing until he arrived. To the contrary,
the minute order from the July 5 hearing states that Groft had
not contacted the court. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of
appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily
presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to
demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate
court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies
reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th
594, 608-609; accord, L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616,
619, 621 [affirming grant of WVRO where appellant failed to
if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the
employer.”
4 Groft also argues he was prejudiced by the order because
he has a pending criminal case. The appellate record does not
contain any information regarding a pending criminal case, nor
does Groft make any arguments as to how a pending criminal
case is relevant to his appeal.
4
address evidence in record supporting order].) “‘“Failure to
provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be
resolved against appellant.”’” (Mack v. All Counties Trustee
Services, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 935, 940; accord, Hotels
Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
336, 348; see Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141
[“‘[b]ecause [the appellant] failed to furnish an adequate record of
the attorney fee proceedings, [the appellant’s] claim must be
resolved against [him]’”].)5
5 At oral argument Groft again stated that he called opposing
counsel to say he would be running late and that opposing
counsel responded that he would ask the superior court to delay
the hearing. As discussed, however, the record does not show
that this call was made or how late Groft appeared in court. If
Groft believed the trial court should have set aside the WVRO as
a result of his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect, he could have sought relief in the trial court and
presented evidence that he spoke with opposing counsel or
showing the time he appeared in court. (See County of San
Bernardino v. Mancini (2022), 83 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1102
[“Section 473(b) authorizes the trial court to vacate a dismissal,
order, or judgment if it occurred because of the excusable
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect of a party or its
attorney.”].)
We acknowledge a self-represented litigant’s understanding
of the rules in the trial court or on appeal are, as a practical
matter, more limited than an experienced attorney’s. Whenever
possible, we do not strictly apply technical rules of procedure in a
manner that deprives litigants of a hearing. However, we are
required to apply the rules on appeal and substantive rules of law
to a self-represented litigant’s claims on appeal, just as we would
to those litigants who are represented by trained legal counsel.
(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)
5
Accordingly, on the record before us, there was no due
process violation. Groft had notice of the hearing but failed to
appear; the trial court reviewed Royal Palm’s moving papers and
supporting declarations; and Groft does not contend substantial
evidence does not support issuance of the WVRO.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
6
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