People v. Bogdanoff CA3

CourtListener 10045320Calctapp19.08.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/19/24 P. v. Bogdanoff CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
----

THE PEOPLE, C097381

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 62184332)

v.

ZUBIN DIMITRI BOGDANOFF,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Zubin Dimitri Bogdanoff rammed his Jeep multiple times into two
smaller cars. He was convicted of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and two
counts of misdemeanor hit and run. After finding true that Bogdanoff had prior strikes
under the Three Strikes law and prior serious felonies, the trial court sentenced him to 50
years to life in state prison.
On appeal, Bogdanoff contends that the trial court erred in allowing him to
continue representing himself when he was not mentally competent to do so. He also
argues that one of his convictions for assault with a deadly weapon was not supported by

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substantial evidence. He further claims that the trial court was required to dismiss his
prior strikes under the Legislature’s recent amendments to Penal Code section 1385,
subdivision (c) or under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.1 We
reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
A second amended information charged Bogdanoff with two counts of assault with
a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)) and two counts of misdemeanor hit and run (Veh.
Code, § 20002, subd. (a)). It further alleged that he had suffered prior strikes (§§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had prior serious or violent felony convictions
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
At a bench trial, witnesses testified about two instances in October 2021 in which
Bogdanoff rammed his Jeep into another car. The first victim, A.A., was driving 15 to 20
miles per hour near a park where children were playing when a red Jeep hit her car from
behind three to four times in quick succession. A.A.’s head and neck were thrown
forward each time the Jeep hit her car. A.A. pulled over to let the Jeep pass. She felt
dizzy for an hour. The rear bumper of her car was scratched.
A.A. followed the Jeep and took a picture of its license plate at an intersection.
She eventually lost sight of the Jeep and drove home. She told her husband about the
incident, and he called 911. A.A. had difficulty talking to the 911 operator because she
was upset and crying.
The second victim, M.M., was merging off Interstate 80 approaching the Pagel
Pass off-ramp on her way home after work when a red Jeep came flying up and hit the
rear of her car. M.M. was traveling at a speed of under 20 miles per hour while merging.
The Jeep hit her car repeatedly as she tried to get out of its way. M.M. could not move

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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due to the close proximity of other cars. She tried to brake, but the Jeep was pushing her
car. The Jeep kept hitting her, eventually pushing her into the center turning lane.
After hitting M.M. eight to 10 times, the Jeep drove around and got in front of her.
M.M. followed the Jeep, and it cut off other vehicles and drove in the center lane and on
the opposite side of the road in an effort to evade her. M.M. followed the Jeep into a
parking lot and pulled alongside it. She asked the driver—whom she identified in court
as Bogdanoff—for his insurance information. He refused to provide it. M.M. started to
get out of her car, but got back in when Bogdanoff approached her aggressively.
Bogdanoff told M.M. that he was going to ram her car if she did not leave him alone.
Repairs to the back of M.M.’s car cost about $20,000. M.M. suffered neck and
back pain for weeks.
J.K. witnessed the incident involving M.M. He was driving past Pagel Pass when
he saw a Jeep strike another vehicle three or four times. The first hit appeared to be the
hardest. Pieces of plastic came off the cars. The driver in the car appeared to be trying to
get away. J.K. testified that “the vehicle in the front looked like it was definitely getting
hit pretty good.” The woman driving had trouble maintaining control of her car after it
was hit. To J.K., it looked more like a road-rage incident than an accident. He called 911
and reported a red SUV slamming into the back of another vehicle multiple times. Soon
thereafter, Bogdanoff himself called 911 and reported that he was being followed.
Roseville Police Officer Samantha Summers approached the scene and saw
M.M.’s sedan and Bogdanoff’s red Jeep parked alongside each other, pointing in opposite
directions. By the time she arrived at the location, M.M. had left. Bogdanoff identified
himself as the driver of the Jeep. Summers noticed minor damage to the front of the
Jeep. When Summers asked about the car following him, Bogdanoff appeared agitated.
He said he had not been involved in any collision that day. He admitted he had been in
the area of both collisions but denied being involved in either one.

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Roseville Patrol Officer Nathan Bonner also arrived at the scene and spoke to
Bogdanoff. Bogdanoff appeared angry and confrontational. Bogdanoff denied having
been in a collision. Bonner did not believe that Bogdanoff was under the influence of any
substance or that he was exhibiting any medical issues.
Based on the timing of the 911 calls, Bonner determined that the incident
involving A.A. happened before the one involving M.M. Another officer investigating
the two collisions concluded that they occurred five to eight minutes apart and about one
and one-half to two miles away from each other.
Roseville Police Officer Daniel Timoney testified as an accident investigation
expert. He opined that various outcomes may occur when one car rear-ends another. The
driver of the hit car could lose control and hit another vehicle. The rear-ended car might
go off the road and hit cyclists and/or pedestrians. The rear-ended car could also stop in
the middle of the road and be struck by another vehicle.
Timoney further testified that the harm can be significant even when a car is rear-
ended at a slow speed. The risk of injury also increases when a car is rear-ended multiple
times in a short period of time. Cars are generally designed for a single crash so that
seatbelts lock or airbags deploy.
Timoney also stated that a rear-end collision on the street where the incident
involving A.A. occurred could endanger more people due to the higher number of
pedestrians and cyclists in the area. Where the incident involving M.M. occurred, Pagel
Pass, a vehicle could be pushed into the cement barriers, which do not absorb energy like
a guardrail. All the energy would be transferred to the car.
Timoney additionally testified that a Jeep like Bogdanoff’s model is heavier than
an average sedan. The weight of the vehicle and its speed are two of the main factors in
determining its kinetic energy. The greater the kinetic energy, the greater the force
applied in a collision. The larger the vehicle, the greater the force applied. The force
cannot be determined solely by the appearance of damage. Significant damage may

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occur with little force and the other way around. In a hypothetical incident based on the
facts of each collision in this case, Timoney testified that he would be concerned that
serious injury requiring medical care could result for people in a smaller vehicle.
Bogdanoff did not testify at trial but did not object to the admission of his
testimony at the preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing, he testified, “I didn’t do
the accident. I didn’t do anything. That’s – that’s basically my whole testimony right
there.” He agreed that his Jeep was red. He could not remember the exact license plate
number, but confirmed that the number recited by the prosecutor was correct. He said
that he lived in the Roseville area and drove his car every day. He stated that he was not
using drugs or alcohol at the time of the collisions. Bogdanoff recalled being pulled over
in his Jeep by police and receiving paperwork informing him that his license was
suspended.
The trial court found Bogdanoff guilty on all counts. It also found multiple
aggravating circumstances true: the crimes involved great violence or threat of great
bodily harm (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)), Bogdanoff was armed with or used a
weapon (rule 4.421(a)(2)), the victims were particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)),
Bogdanoff engaged in violent conduct that indicates he is a serious danger to the
community (rule 4.421(b)(1)), his prior convictions were numerous or of increasing
seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)), he served a prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)), he was on
supervision when the crime was committed (rule 4.421(b)(4)), and his performance on
supervision was unsatisfactory (rule 4.421(b)(5)).
The trial court also found true that Bogdanoff suffered three prior serious or
violent felony convictions. Those convictions occurred in 2014 when Bogdanoff pleaded
no contest to inflicting injury on an elderly adult (§ 368, subd. (b)), first degree burglary
(§ 459), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).
The trial court denied Bogdanoff’s request to dismiss his prior strikes under both
section 1385, subdivision (c) and Romero. It struck the prior serious felony

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enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c)(3). The court sentenced Bogdanoff to
25 years to life on each of the assault with a deadly weapon charges, with the sentences to
run consecutively. The court also imposed sentences of six months, concurrent, on each
of the two hit-and-run convictions. The aggregate sentence was 50 years to life.
Bogdanoff filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
Bogdanoff contends that the trial court violated his right to due process by failing
to revoke his self-representation after his conduct at trial demonstrated that he was not
competent to represent himself.
A.
In March 2022, soon after he was originally charged, Bogdanoff asked to represent
himself. The trial court engaged in an extended colloquy with him, advising him of his
rights and the disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. Bogdanoff expressed his
understanding of the court’s admonitions, and the court accepted his waiver of counsel.
In May 2022, the prosecutor informed the trial court that the district attorney’s file
on a prior criminal case indicated that doubts about Bogdanoff’s competency had been
raised in that case and that a competency evaluation had been performed. The court
proposed to appoint a psychologist to evaluate Bogdanoff’s competency to represent
himself. Bogdanoff agreed to the court’s proposal.
Dr. Eugene Roeder evaluated Bogdanoff on June 23, 2022, and concluded that he
was competent to represent himself. Dr. Roeder’s report explained that Bogdanoff has a
long history of diagnosis and treatment for bipolar disorder with psychotic features,
including psychiatric hospitalizations. It noted that Bogdanoff had been evaluated for
competency to stand trial on numerous occasions between 2012 and 2014. On each
occasion, the evaluator opined that, while Bogdanoff suffered from the symptoms of
severe mental illness, he was competent to stand trial if and when he took prescribed

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medication. Psychological testing performed in 2012 also suggested that Bogdanoff has
a narcissistic personality and “grandiose and at times unrealistic perceptions and beliefs
about his own abilities.”
With respect to Bogdanoff’s ability to represent himself, the report concluded that
he was able to carry out the basic tasks needed to present a defense without help from
counsel. Dr. Roeder cautioned, however, that his opinion was “tentative” and would
change if Bogdanoff experienced an exacerbation of his psychiatric symptoms, which
could occur even if he remained on his medication. The report further stated that if
Bogdanoff continued to take his prescribed medication and the medication remained
effective, a decompensation leading him to become out of touch with reality “is not
necessarily imminent,” but “the prognosis for this to occur at some point within the next
several months is in the range between possible and probable.”
On June 29, 2022, after reviewing the psychologist’s report, the trial court engaged
Bogdanoff in another detailed colloquy concerning his rights and the drawbacks of
proceeding without counsel. Bogdanoff maintained his desire to represent himself. The
court found that Bogdanoff made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right
to counsel and granted his request for self-representation.
Trial began two days later, on July 1, 2022, and concluded on July 8, 2022.
Bogdanoff represented himself throughout trial. The trial court appointed counsel to
represent him for sentencing.
B.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives criminal defendants
the right to represent themselves. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.) A
defendant’s waiver of his or her right to counsel must be knowing and voluntary. (People
v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 205.)
In limited circumstances, a defendant’s right to self-representation may give way
to countervailing considerations. (People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 206.) In

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Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, the United States Supreme Court held that the
federal Constitution does not bar states from “insist[ing] upon representation by counsel
for those competent enough to stand trial . . . but who still suffer from severe mental
illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by
themselves.” (Id. at p. 178.) The court described competence for self-representation as
the ability “to carry out the basic tasks needed to present [one’s] own defense without the
help of counsel.” (Id. at pp. 175-176.)
After Edwards, our state high court ruled in People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th
519, 528 (Johnson) that California courts have the discretion to deny self-representation
in those cases where Edwards would permit it. “Under Edwards, a trial court may
exercise its discretion to deny self-representation where a defendant suffers from a severe
mental illness such that he or she is unable to perform the basic tasks necessary to present
a defense.” (People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th 181 at p. 208.)
“Trial courts must apply this standard cautiously.” (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 531.) “Self-representation by defendants who wish it and validly waive counsel
remains the norm and may not be denied lightly.” (Ibid.) In addition, a trial court “need
not routinely inquire into the mental competence of a defendant seeking self-
representation. It needs to do so only if it is considering denying self-representation due
to doubts about the defendant’s mental competence.” (Id. at p. 530.)
On review of a trial court’s competency assessment, we “defer largely to the trial
court’s discretion.” (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531.) A trial court’s determination
will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.) An appellate court’s
deference to a trial court’s judgment is “especially appropriate” when the same trial judge
has observed the defendant on multiple occasions. (Ibid.)
C.
Bogdanoff does not challenge the trial court’s initial decision to accept his Faretta
waiver. He argues instead that the trial court violated his federal due process rights by

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not rescinding his self-representation after his behavior at trial demonstrated that he was
not mentally competent to conduct his own defense. That argument is foreclosed by
controlling precedent. In People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, our state supreme court
concluded that “ ‘Edwards did not alter the principle that the federal [C]onstitution is not
violated when a trial court permits a mentally ill defendant to represent himself at trial,
even if he lacks the mental capacity to conduct the trial proceedings himself,’ ” provided
that he is “ ‘competent to stand trial and his waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing and
intelligent.’ ” (Id. at p. 878.) Bogdanoff does not argue here that he was incompetent to
stand trial or that his Faretta waiver was not knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, his
federal constitutional rights were not violated when he was permitted to represent himself
throughout the duration of his trial. (Ibid.; People v. Miranda (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
978, 988.)
Bogdanoff also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
revoke his self-representation when his behavior at trial suggested that his mental
competence had deteriorated. As noted above, our state high court held in Johnson that
California courts are permitted to exercise the discretion recognized in Edwards to deny
self-representation when a defendant is suffering from a serious mental illness that
prevents him or her from carrying out basic defense tasks. (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
pp. 528-530.) On the record before us, however, we do not perceive an abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s failure to sua sponte terminate Bogdanoff’s self-
representation.
As an initial matter, it is clear that the trial court understood that it had the
authority to inquire into Bogdanoff’s mental competence in deciding whether to allow
him to represent himself. That distinguishes this case from People v. Shiga (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 22, on which Bogdanoff places significant reliance. In Shiga, the trial
court erroneously believed that it lacked the authority to inquire into whether the
defendant was mentally incapable of representing himself. (Shiga, at pp. 40-42.) Here,

9
when a question about Bogdanoff’s competency surfaced, the court obtained an expert
evaluation, and only after reviewing it, allowed Bogdanoff to proceed to trial without
counsel.
We also do not believe that the trial court was required to suspend proceedings and
initiate a second competency inquiry once trial was underway. Trial started and ended
within 15 days of Dr. Roeder’s evaluation. During that period, no evidence emerged that
Bogdanoff had stopped taking his medication. And while Dr. Roeder opined that it was
between “possible and probable” that Bogdanoff’s mental condition would severely
deteriorate even if he remained medication-compliant, Dr. Roeder said that such
decompensation was “not necessarily imminent,” noting only that it could occur “at some
point within the next several months.”
Bogdanoff’s behavior also did not indicate that he was no longer able to perform
the basic tasks necessary to his defense. The record demonstrates that he remained
respectful throughout trial. He asked some relevant questions and made on-point
objections to the People’s evidence. For example, he questioned A.A. on the extent of
her injuries and damage to her car. He also challenged the prosecution’s presentation of
expert testimony concerning hypothetical accidents when no facts then in evidence
demonstrated the relevance of the scenarios being posited.
It is true, as Bogdanoff argues, that his conduct at trial evinced a lack of legal
knowledge and that he engaged in ill-advised defense tactics. For example, he
misunderstood the law governing mental health diversion, failed to cross-examine most
of the prosecution’s witnesses, declined to deliver a closing argument, and demonstrated
frustration and a lack of understanding about the procedure for proving prior convictions.
But for better or for worse, a criminal defendant’s unfamiliarity with legal concepts and
poor performance at trial alone do not authorize a trial court to deny his or her
constitutionally guaranteed right of self-representation. (See, e.g., People v. Taylor,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 866; People v. Best (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 747, 758 [defendant’s

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lack of “knowledge of criminal law and courtroom procedure . . . is not a basis to deny
the right of self-representation”].) Nor may a court deny self-representation “merely
because it believes the matter could be tried more efficiently, or even more fairly, with
attorneys on both sides. Rather, it may deny self-representation only in those situations
where Edwards permits it.” (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531.) On the record before
us, we see no convincing demonstration that, during the short period between
Dr. Roeder’s evaluation and the end of trial, Bogdanoff’s condition deteriorated to the
point that he was unable to conduct his defense. There was thus no abuse of discretion
when the trial court failed to terminate Bogdanoff’s self-representation.
II.
Bogdanoff next contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction
of assault with a deadly weapon as to victim A.A. In particular, he asserts that his Jeep
does not qualify as a deadly weapon with respect to A.A. because it struck her car at a
low speed and caused only minimal damage. We find sufficient evidence supports his
conviction on this count.
A.
Section 245, subdivision (a)(1) provides that “[a]ny person who commits an
assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a
firearm shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four
years, or in a county jail for not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding ten
thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment.” A “ ‘deadly
weapon’ ” under this provision is “ ‘ “any object, instrument, or weapon [that] is used in
such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily
injury.” ’ ” (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065.) A few objects, such as dirks
and blackjacks, are deadly weapons as a matter of law because “ ‘the ordinary use for
which they are designed establishes their character as such.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘Other objects,

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while not deadly per se, may be used, under certain circumstances, in a manner likely to
produce death or great bodily injury.’ ” (Ibid.)
In evaluating whether an object that is not inherently deadly or dangerous is used
in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury, the trier of fact may consider
“ ‘the nature of the object, the manner in which it is used, and all other facts relevant to
the issue.’ ” (In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528, 533.) “[F]or an object to qualify as a
deadly weapon based on how it was used, the defendant must have used the object in a
manner not only capable of producing but also likely to produce death or great bodily
injury.” (Id. at p. 530.) “The use of an object in a manner ‘likely to produce’ death or
great bodily injury [citation] requires more than a mere possibility that serious injury
could have resulted from the way the object was used.” (Id. at p. 534.)
“In deciding claims of insufficient evidence, we review the entire record in the
light most favorable to the prosecution ‘to determine whether it contains evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Aznavoleh (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1186.) We do not resolve credibility issues or evidentiary
conflicts; we presume every fact supporting the judgment that the trier of fact could
deduce from the evidence. (Ibid.) Reversal for insufficient evidence is not warranted
unless there is no hypothesis that would support the decision. (Ibid.)
B.
Construed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the record supports
Bogdanoff’s conviction. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Bogdanoff
came “out of no where [sic]” and hit A.A.’s car “[p]retty hard.” He drove his Jeep into
A.A.’s back bumper three or four times. A.A. lurched forward into the seat belt; her head
and neck were thrown forward each time Bogdanoff hit her. A.A. was dizzy for an hour
because of the “backlash movement.” We conclude this is sufficient evidence to support

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the conclusion that Bogdanoff’s use of his vehicle was likely to produce great bodily
injury.
Bogdanoff emphasizes that A.A. suffered only minor injuries and that the damage
to the two cars was minimal. He is correct that “the extent of actual injury or lack of
injury” is a relevant consideration. (In re B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 535.) But on this
record, the fact that A.A. did not suffer more extensive injuries does not establish that
“the nature of the object or the way it was used was not capable of producing or likely to
produce death or serious harm.” (Ibid.) While A.A. was not, for example, hospitalized
after the incident, her car was hit with sufficient force that she was thrown forward each
time Bogdanoff’s Jeep struck her car, causing a whiplash effect to her neck. The
“evidence may show that serious injury was likely, even if it did not come to pass.”
(Ibid.)
Bogdanoff notes as well that he was driving at a slow speed, but the accident
investigation expert testified that the weight of a vehicle is as much a factor in the amount
of force generated in a collision as the speed. Bogdanoff’s argument also overlooks that
he rammed A.A.’s car three or four times, which itself increased the risk of injury.
Finally, we are unpersuaded by Bogdanoff’s effort to contrast this case with those
in which courts found sufficient evidence that a vehicle was used in a way likely to
produce great bodily injury. (See, e.g., People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 107,
116 [defendant attempted to run over a pedestrian]; People v. Aznavoleh, supra,
210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1183-1184 [street racing at 60 miles per hour]). Section 245,
subdivision (a)(1) is not limited to only facts like these.
III.
Bogdanoff additionally argues that the trial court should have dismissed his prior
strike convictions under section 1385, subdivision (c). We reject that contention.
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, the
court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if

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dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” This court recently
held in People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237 that section 1385, subdivision (c) does
not apply to prior strikes. Burke explained that section 1385, subdivision (c) “expressly
applies to the dismissal of an ‘enhancement,’ ” and “the Three Strikes law is not an
enhancement.” (Burke, at pp. 243-244.) Rather, it “is an alternative sentencing scheme
for the current offense.” (Id. at p. 243.)
Bogdanoff acknowledges Burke but argues that it misinterpreted the statute. We
have reviewed his arguments based on the statutory text, legislative history, and canons of
construction, but none persuades us that Burke reached the wrong conclusion. Moreover,
since Burke was decided, other appellate opinions have agreed that section 1385,
subdivision (c) does not apply to the Three Strikes law. (People v. Olay (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 60, 69; People v. Dain (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 399, 410-411, review
granted May 29, 2024, S283924.) Consistent with the holdings in these decisions, we see
no error in the trial court’s decision not to apply section 1385, subdivision (c) to
Bogdanoff’s prior strikes.
IV.
We also conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to
dismiss Bogdanoff’s prior strikes under Romero and section 1385, subdivision (a).
A.
After his conviction, Bogdanoff filed a motion under Romero asking the trial court
to exercise its discretion to treat his three prior strikes as one and dismiss two of them.
The court rejected the request.
The trial court examined the facts of the offenses as well as Bogdanoff’s prior
convictions and background. With respect to the current offenses, the court reasoned that
Bogdanoff’s acts were dangerous, endangered pedestrians and other drivers, and caused
significant trauma to the victims.

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With respect to the prior convictions, Bogdanoff was driving behind an elderly
man whom he thought was going too slow. Bogdanoff followed the man home, entered
his garage, and beat him. Bogdanoff then attacked a neighbor who tried to help. When
Bogdanoff drove off, people had to jump out of the way to avoid being hit. The elderly
victim suffered traumatic brain injury and lifelong speech impairment.
The trial court did not find these prior strike convictions from 2014 “remote in the
least.” Bogdanoff received a nine-year sentence and was on parole at the time of the
current offenses. Describing his criminal history overall, the court observed that
Bogdanoff’s “level of violence is significant. It is not decreasing by any measure and has
not abated and is continuing.”
The trial court also considered aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The
court observed that it had found numerous aggravating circumstances true. It explained:
“Balancing that out with any mitigation which may perhaps be the fact that there are
some mental health issues that Mr. Bogdanoff has, I’ve considered that, but clearly in this
[c]ourt’s view, the factors in aggravation outweigh the factors in mitigation.” The court
further noted Bogdanoff’s age, the childhood abuse he suffered, and his bipolar disorder.
It said “those mental health issues not necessarily are mitigating,” because “[t]hey show a
person who has some narcissistic qualities” and “no ability to self-reflect and understand
his behavior or the wrongness of it.”
The trial court also expressed doubt about Bogdanoff’s ability to comply with
supervision. Bogdanoff committed the current offenses when on parole, and his history
demonstrated that he was unable to control his anger. Considering all these
circumstances as well as the length of the proposed sentence, the trial court declined to
strike any of Bogdanoff’s prior strike convictions.
B.
Section 1385, subdivision (a) authorizes trial courts to dismiss prior strikes “in
furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (a); People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148,

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161.) In Romero, our state supreme court held that a trial court may strike a prior
conviction under the Three Strikes law under this provision. (Williams, at p. 158.) In
ruling on a Romero motion, the court considers “whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions,
and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as
though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.” (Id. at p. 161.)
A trial court’s decision not to strike a prior conviction is reviewed under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
374.) A court abuses its discretion when it is not aware of its discretion to dismiss,
considers impermissible factors, or where the sentencing norm under the Three Strikes
law leads, as a matter of law, to a result that is arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd,
given the circumstances of the individual case. (Id. at p. 378.) It is not enough to show
that reasonable people might disagree. (Ibid.) “[A] trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could
agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.)
We are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
strike Bogdanoff’s prior strike convictions. Bogdanoff emphasizes his mental illness and
the great length of his sentence. We agree these are relevant factors weighing in favor of
striking his prior convictions. (People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161
[defendant’s background is a factor]; People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 500
[defendant’s sentence is “a relevant consideration”].) But on the record before us, we
cannot say that the trial court acted arbitrarily or irrationally when it declined to take that
step. As the trial court reasoned, Bogdanoff’s criminal history is extensive and includes
crimes of serious violence. His current offenses risked significant harm to not only the
direct victims whose cars he struck but also other motorists and pedestrians in the area.

16
Bogdanoff was on parole for another road-rage-inspired crime when he committed the
current offenses. Under these circumstances, the trial court acted within its discretion in
concluding that Bogdanoff’s commitment offenses, criminal history, and personal
background did not take him outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

/s/
RENNER, J.

17

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