CourtListener 10045315•People v. Davis CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/19/24 P. v. Davis CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062515
v. (Super. Ct. No. 96CF1766)
JASON RUSSELL DAVIS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Robert A. Knox, Judge. Affirmed.
Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, Andrew Mestman and James Toohey, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jason Russell Davis appeals from the denial of his Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition, in which he sought the vacatur of his two 1998
1
attempted murder convictions. After issuing an order to show cause and
conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court found beyond a reasonable
doubt Davis aided and abetted the attempted murders and therefore was not
entitled to relief. Davis contends the court’s ruling was not supported by
substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1998, in a negotiated disposition, Davis pleaded guilty to two
counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)), a single count
of first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), and a single count of second
degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b)).2 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the
court imposed a 12-year prison sentence, dismissed the allegations the
attempted murders were deliberate and premeditated, and dismissed the
remaining charges. The factual basis for Davis’s plea, as relevant here,
stated: “On 6/16/96 in Orange County, I aided and abetted Manuel Martinez
in attempting to murder two human beings (L. Marco and R. Ward).”
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The burglaries Davis admitted committing were unrelated to
the attempted murder charges and occurred on dates prior to the attempted
murders.
2
In 2022, Davis filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
3
section 1172.6. After briefing by the parties, the court found Davis made a
prima facie showing of entitlement to relief and the court issued an order to
show cause.
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution submitted the
reporter’s transcript of the 1997 preliminary hearing, wherein both
attempted murder victims testified, and the prosecution requested the court
consider all admissible evidence, non-hearsay testimony, and stipulated facts
admitted at the preliminary hearing. The prosecution also requested the
court take judicial notice of and admit into evidence: (1) the register of
actions for the purpose of establishing the case’s procedural history, sentence,
and judgment; (2) the amended information; (3) Davis’s 1998 plea form,
which included the factual basis for his plea; and (4) the abstract of
judgment. Davis testified at the evidentiary hearing. The court denied the
petition, finding the evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt Davis
aided and abetted the two attempted murders. Davis timely appealed from
the court’s decision.
3
Davis’s petition references former section 1170.95, the
predecessor to section 1172.6. Former section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6 without substantive change in the text, effective June 30,
2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Citations in this opinion are to the current
version of the statute (§ 1172.6), unless otherwise noted.
When Davis filed his section 1172.6 petition, he had completed
his 12-year sentence, but he was serving a 25-year-to-life sentence in a
subsequent matter, in which his attempted murder convictions were used as
prior “strikes” under the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i) &
1170.12.)
3
FACTS
At the evidentiary hearing, the court considered the reporter’s
transcript of Davis’s 1997 preliminary hearing, at which Ward and Marco
testified, and heard Davis’s testimony.
I.
PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE
A. Introduction
In June 1996, Ward and his girlfriend Marco lived in a
condominium in the City of Orange. Ward had an exotic dancing business,
and Marco was a dancer.
Martinez, Davis’s codefendant, had known Ward for a few years.
Martinez and Ward went to clubs and parties together. Martinez had worked
as an independent contractor for Ward’s business and was paid to chauffeur
and protect the dancers, including Marco, at private shows. Ward and
Martinez once argued after Martinez stole money from a customer of Ward’s
business, but they later reconciled and Ward permitted Martinez to work for
him again. In early 1996, Ward was present when Martinez purchased a
chrome .380 caliber handgun. Marco saw Martinez at Ward’s office on
occasion, but she did not socialize with Martinez.
Neither Ward nor Marco had met Davis prior to June 16, 1996.
B. The Attempted Murders of Ward and Marco
On the night of June 16, 1996, Marco went to bed about 8:00 p.m.
and fell asleep soon thereafter. When she went to bed, Ward was the only
other person in the residence.
Around 9:15 that evening, a female friend of Ward’s visited him
at the residence. Ward and his friend were watching television when
Martinez arrived about 9:30 p.m. Martinez asked Ward to drive him and
4
Davis to a nearby location, where Martinez and Davis were going to pick up a
stolen car and drive it to Riverside. Ward was to drive Davis’s truck back to
Ward’s residence for them to retrieve later. Ward refused Martinez’s request.
Martinez had been talking to Ward for about 10 minutes when
Davis knocked on Ward’s door. Martinez answered the door and stepped
outside with Davis. Martinez reentered the residence a few minutes later.
Martinez offered to give Ward money or methamphetamine if Ward went
with him and Davis. Ward relented to Martinez’s repeated requests and said
he would do it for free.
Ward left the residence with Martinez. Ward’s female friend
departed in her own vehicle. Ward got into Davis’s truck, sitting between
Davis, who was driving, and Martinez. Davis drove to a dark street about a
mile away and parked the truck. Martinez got out and appeared to be
stretching, while Davis was looking around, checking their surroundings.
After a few minutes, Martinez said he did not want to go through with his
proposed plan because Ward was too nervous. On the drive back to Ward’s
condominium, Martinez tried to convince Ward to sell methamphetamine for
him.
Upon returning, all three men went into Ward’s residence. Davis
made a telephone call to his girlfriend. Martinez brought methamphetamine
and marijuana into Ward’s residence. Ward, who had $2,300 in his freezer,
was interested in buying some of Martinez’s marijuana.
Ward walked into the kitchen to get Martinez a soda. When
Ward grabbed the drink from the counter and turned around, Martinez
stabbed him in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Davis was standing next
to Martinez. Martinez did not say anything to Ward and did not answer
when Ward asked why he was doing this. Davis appeared angry but did not
5
say anything. Ward yelled for Marco, who was asleep in the bedroom.
Martinez ran to the bedroom. Davis prevented Ward from pursuing
Martinez. Davis punched Ward in the face, shoved him into the living room,
and pushed him to the floor.
In the bedroom, Martinez, who was wearing black gloves, stabbed
Marco while she was sleeping and tried to strangle her. In the living room,
Davis told Ward to “shut up.” With Ward face down on the floor, Davis sat on
top of him. Davis grabbed some wire and wrapped it around Ward’s neck.
He tightened the wire with one hand and used his other hand to pinch the
front of Ward’s neck. Ward did not see where Davis got the wire, and he did
not recognize it as something he had in his house. Unable to breathe, Ward
combatted Davis’s efforts to strangle him. During the struggle, Davis
released the wire and repeatedly struck Ward in the back of the head with a
closed fist. When Ward started to get up, Davis tried to push him down.
Managing to break free from Davis, Ward ran to the alarm system in the
hallway and hit the panic button. Davis called out to Martinez, who
reappeared from the bedroom. Ward did not see Davis after that.
Martinez pulled a handgun from his waistband and pointed it at
Ward. Martinez shot Ward in the face as he said, “‘Sorry, [Ward], I have to
kill you now.’” Shot in the left cheekbone, Ward ran toward Martinez. The
two men struggled for control of the gun; Ward prevailed. Ward chased
Martinez and tried to shoot him, but the gun jammed.
Ward ran to the bedroom with Martinez following close behind.
Ward tried to close the bedroom door but was unable to keep out Martinez.
Ward hit Martinez with the gun. When Martinez moved toward Marco, who
6
4
was on the telephone with 9-1-1, Ward grabbed him and the two men fought.
While Martinez and Ward were fighting, Marco fled the room. Martinez
started to pursue Marco. When Ward attempted to stop him, Martinez
stabbed Ward in the neck with the knife. Ward lost his grasp on Martinez,
and Martinez ran after Marco, with Ward following him.
Screaming for help, Marco ran through the condominium and
outside toward a neighbor’s residence. Before she reached the neighbor’s,
Martinez caught up to her, and grabbed her by the back of her shirt. He spun
her around and punched her in the face with his fist. He then let go of her
and ran away. She heard a gun discharge and a car drive away.
Ward collapsed outside. Ward and Marco were taken to the
hospital and treated for their injuries.
II.
DAVIS’S TESTIMONY
In June 1996, Davis and Martinez were friends. They had
committed burglaries together but not violent crimes. Prior to the night in
question, Davis had not seen Martinez do anything violent. Davis had met
Ward once before, when Davis was at a club with Martinez.
On June 16, 1996, Martinez called Davis and asked for a ride to
Ward’s. Martinez told Davis Ward said to come by and pick up some money
Ward owed Martinez. When they arrived at Ward’s condominium, Davis
4
Marco remembered the altercation between Martinez and Ward
in the bedroom differently. She testified that when Martinez was strangling
her, Ward came into the bedroom, pulled him off her, and both men left the
bedroom. While she was on the telephone to 9-1-1, Ward came back into the
bedroom and tried to close the door to keep out Martinez. Marco testified
Martinez had the handgun, reached in the doorway with it, and pointed it at
her while she was on the telephone. After Martinez broke into the bedroom,
Ward and Martinez struggled for control of the gun.
7
waited in his truck while Martinez went inside to talk to Ward. After waiting
20 minutes for Martinez to return, Davis knocked on the door to see if
Martinez was going to be ready to leave soon. Martinez came out and spoke
to Davis about a proposition Ward had to deliver some methamphetamine to
Riverside in a stolen car. Davis agreed to “‘check it out’” and the three men
left in Davis’s truck.
Martinez directed Davis where to go, and they stopped by a
vehicle in a residential area a few blocks away. Martinez got out of the truck.
Davis had a “weird vibe.” Davis got out of the truck and told Martinez he did
not want to be involved. Martinez said, “‘That’s fine,’” and the two men got
back in the truck. Martinez told Ward they were not going to help him move
the methamphetamine. Davis drove them back to Ward’s condominium.
When they returned, Davis asked to use Ward’s telephone to call
his girlfriend and explain to her he would see her soon. Davis sat on the
couch and called his girlfriend. After talking to her for a few minutes, Davis
asked Martinez if he was ready to leave. Martinez said he was but asked
Ward for a soda. Ward pointed to the dining area and said he left it there.
Martinez requested Davis get the soda for him. Ward offered to get it instead
and walked past Davis, into the kitchen. Martinez followed Ward into the
kitchen, while Davis remained in the living room. Davis could not see what
was happening in the kitchen but heard a scuffle. When he went to
investigate, he saw Martinez and Ward fighting. Davis grabbed Ward and
pulled him away from Martinez. Davis did not know Martinez had a knife
and did not see him stab Ward.
Davis threw Ward down onto the living room floor. Davis held
Ward there while trying to figure out what was going on. Ward fought
Davis’s efforts to restrain him. Davis grabbed speaker wire from a nearby
8
entertainment system and put it around Ward’s neck to control him and hold
him down. Davis did not know where Martinez was while he was wrestling
with Ward. While Davis and Ward were fighting, Davis saw blood on Ward’s
shirt and realized Ward was hurt. He released the wire that was around
Ward’s neck. Ward got up, walked over to an alarm system on the wall, and
activated it. Davis did not try to stop him. Davis yelled for Martinez and
said, “‘We gotta go.’” Martinez came from the hallway. Davis told him Ward
“‘hit the alarm,’” and Davis left the condominium.
Davis got into his truck and started driving out of the complex.
He heard someone yelling at him, so he slowed down and stopped. Someone
fired a gun at him. Martinez jumped into the truck, and Davis drove away.
Davis was unaware of any problems between Martinez and Ward.
He did not see Martinez shoot or stab Ward. When driving Martinez to
Ward’s residence, Davis did not know Martinez was carrying gloves, a
hunting knife, and a gun.
Davis denied he was trying to kill Ward when he put the wire
around Ward’s neck; he explained he only did it to hold Ward down while he
tried to figure out what was happening.
Davis did not know Marco. He did not know Marco was there
when they returned to the residence. He did not hear Ward call out to Marco
after Martinez stabbed Ward. He did not suspect Martinez would attack
Marco.
Davis was 19 years old when the incident occurred. Despite the
passage of time, he remembered what happened that evening because it had
a big impact on his life. He pleaded guilty to the two attempted murder
charges because his attorney at the time told him that under the natural and
9
probable consequences theory he could be held liable for anything Martinez
did.
DISCUSSION
Davis contends the court’s denial of his section 1172.6 petition
was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. We conclude the
court’s findings Davis aided and abetted Martinez in the attempted murders
of Ward and Marco are supported by substantial evidence.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The denial of a section 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary
hearing is reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14
Cal.5th 981, 988; People v. Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303, 313–314;
People v. Njoku (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 27, 43.) “Under this standard, we
review the record ‘“‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’” (People v.
Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.)
“Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in
deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant
evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to
credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to
support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People
v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) “‘“If the circumstances
reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the
judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also
10
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”’ [Citation.] It is well
settled that ‘“[a] reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it
appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support”’ the [trier of fact’s finding].”’” (People v. Sifuentes (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 217, 233.)
II.
SECTION 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015; Senate Bill 1437) amended the felony-murder
rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it
relates to murder. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) It did
this by amending section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, the
felony-murder statute. (Lewis, at p. 959; People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433, 448–449 (Curiel).) The Legislature also created a procedure in
what is now section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95) that allows those previously
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to obtain relief from their convictions if they could not
be convicted of murder under the amended law. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 449; accord, Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) Subsequently, the
Legislature extended relief to defendants convicted of attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551,
§ 2.) This legislation also codified aspects of the Lewis decision and clarified
the burden of proof and procedure at the evidentiary hearing stage of the
proceedings provided for in now section 1172.6. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1.)
The procedure begins when a defendant previously convicted of a
qualifying offense files a petition for relief in the superior court. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (a), (b)(1).) If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing for entitlement
11
to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause. (Id., subd. (c); People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) Unless the parties stipulate the
petitioner is eligible for relief under the statute, the court must hold a
hearing to determine whether the petitioner should be granted relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1), (2).)
At the hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted
murder under the amended law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Both parties may
present “new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (Ibid.)
“[T]he court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing
or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness testimony,
stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed.” (Ibid.) If the court finds
beyond a reasonable doubt the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted
murder under a theory that remains valid after the amendments to sections
188 and 189, the petition is denied. However, “[i]f the prosecution fails to
sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and
enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner
shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
III.
THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
In analyzing whether the court’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence, we focus on the elements of attempted murder and
direct aiding and abetting principles. “To prove the crime of attempted
murder, the prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the
commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended
killing.’” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602.) Direct aiding and
abetting is a valid theory of liability for attempted murder after Senate Bill
12
1437’s amendments to sections 188 and 189. (People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 548 [“Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of
attempted murder”]; cf. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 462 [direct aiding and
abetting is a valid theory for murder liability]; People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 848 [“Senate Bill 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and
abetting liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder
must possess malice aforethought”], superseded by statute on another ground
as stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.)
“‘[U]nder direct aiding and abetting principles, an accomplice is
guilty of an offense perpetrated by another [e.g., [attempted] murder][5] if the
accomplice aids the commission of that offense with “knowledge of the direct
perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in achieving those
unlawful ends.”’” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.) “‘Thus, proof of aider
and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct
perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the
aider and abettor’s mens rea’—which here includes knowledge that the direct
perpetrator intends to commit the crime . . . , ‘and (c) the aider and abettor’s
actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the
achievement of the crime.’” (Id. at p. 467.)
“[T]he mens rea required of a direct aider and abettor includes
knowledge of the perpetrator’s intent to commit an unlawful act constituting
the offense and the intent to aid the perpetrator in its commission.” (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 441.) “‘“When the offense charged is a specific intent
crime, the accomplice must ‘share the specific intent of the perpetrator’; this
5
Insertions added by this court are placed in brackets and
italicized to distinguish them from the bracketed insertion appearing in the
original material.
13
occurs when the accomplice ‘knows the full extent of the perpetrator’s
criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose
of facilitating the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.’”’” (In re Lopez
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 585.) When the charge is attempted murder, “‘the
aider and abettor must know and share the murderous intent of the actual
perpetrator.’” (Ibid.)
Here, the court’s findings Davis was guilty of the attempted
murders under a direct aiding and abetting theory are supported by
substantial evidence that Davis knew Martinez intended to kill Ward and
Marco, Davis intended to aid Martinez in committing those crimes, and
Davis’s conduct, in fact, aided Martinez’s commission of those crimes. (See
Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 467.)
Davis does not dispute the evidence proved Martinez attempted
to kill Ward and Marco. But he contends the evidence did not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt he intended to aid Martinez in trying to kill Ward or Marco.
We conclude otherwise.
A. There Is Substantial Evidence Davis Aided and Abetted the Attempted
Murder of Ward
Davis contends there was no evidence he knew Martinez planned
to kill Ward. His argument is not persuasive. To a large degree, Davis’s
argument is based on his own testimony at the evidentiary hearing: his
testimony he did not see Martinez stab Ward, and when he saw Ward
fighting with Martinez, he grabbed Ward to protect Martinez but not with the
intent of harming Ward. The court, however, found this portion of Davis’s
testimony not credible. We cannot lightly discount the court’s credibility
determination because “it is the exclusive province of the [trier of fact] to
determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts
14
upon which [such] a determination depends.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30
Cal.4th 342, 403.) Under the substantial evidence standard of review, “[w]e
resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for
substantial evidence.” (Ibid.)
It is not difficult to find substantial evidence Davis aided and
abetted Martinez in attempting to murder Ward. Ward testified Davis was
standing in the kitchen next to Martinez when Martinez stabbed Ward with a
hunting knife, and Davis had an angry expression on his face. When Ward
called out to Marco, Davis took over the attack on Ward while Martinez ran
to the bedroom and attempted to kill Marco. Davis punched Ward, shoved
him into the living room, and forced him to the floor. Davis’s actions after he
had Ward on the floor demonstrate his intention to kill Ward and he was not
simply pulling Ward away from a fight to protect Martinez, as he testified.
Davis attempted to strangle Ward, using a wire and his hand. Although
Davis let go of the wire at some point during the struggle, he continued the
attack on Ward by repeatedly hitting him in the head. When Ward tried to
get up, Davis pushed him back down. Davis’s conduct aided Martinez’s
attempt to kill Ward.
From Davis’s actions, we can readily infer he shared Martinez’s
intent to kill Ward. “Direct evidence of intent to kill is rare, and ordinarily
the intent to kill must be inferred from the statements and actions of the
defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime.” (People v.
Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 602.) Here, Davis’s actions are indicative of
an intent to aid Martinez’s efforts to kill Ward.
In his reply brief, Davis asserts the court found he did not intend
to kill Ward, but only intended to do serious harm, and therefore the court’s
conclusion he aided and abetted the attempted murder of Ward cannot stand.
15
Discussing its ruling, the court stated: “I don’t think the evidence is
sufficient for finding that there was a direct intent to kill Mr. Ward simply
because, as [the prosecutor] indicated, he changed his mind at some point.”
When viewed out of context, the court’s statement is difficult to reconcile with
its conclusion Davis aided and abetted Martinez in the attempted murder of
Ward. However, when read in context, it is less concerning. The court’s
comment came after the parties argued the relevance of Davis’s action of
letting go of the wire. Davis’s counsel argued it indicated Davis did not
intend to kill Ward, while the prosecutor argued the attempted murder was
complete by that point, even if Davis abandoned the plan by letting go of the
wire. The court noted Davis strangled Ward with the wire and tried to crush
or pinch the front of Davis’s throat. The court stated, those actions “indicate
an intent to do serious harm, if not to kill” and Davis would have understood
his actions would kill a person if “done for a sufficient period of time.” When
the court’s comments are reviewed in their entirety, it is clear the court found
Davis aided and abetted the attempted murder of Ward, and this finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
B. There Is Substantial Evidence Davis Aided and Abetted the Attempted
Murder of Marco
As to the attempted murder of Marco, the court found Davis
knew Martinez intended to kill Marco because Martinez left the kitchen
carrying the knife he had just used to stab Ward, as well as a handgun, and
went to the bedroom when he learned Marco was in the residence. The court
explained Davis’s actions of subduing Ward aided Martinez in the attempted
murder of Marco.
Davis contends the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s
finding he aided and abetted Martinez in attempting to kill Marco. His
16
argument focuses on the evidence he did not know Marco and did not see her
the night Martinez attempted to kill her, as well as his own testimony he
never heard Ward call out to Marco, he did not know she was in the
residence, and he did not know where Martinez was while he was subduing
Ward. He recognizes his actions “incidentally” (underline omitted) assisted
Martinez in his attempt to kill Marco, but he asserts this is insufficient to
prove he knew Martinez was going to try to kill Marco and that he engaged
with Ward with the specific intent to aid Martinez in trying to kill Marco.
The evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it support the court’s
finding Davis aided and abetted Martinez’s attempt to kill Marco.
It is reasonable to infer Davis knew Martinez planned to kill
Marco when Martinez ran to the bedroom with a hunting knife after realizing
she was in the residence. Davis had just witnessed Martinez use the knife to
stab Ward in the kitchen. Davis did not idly stand by while Martinez ran to
the bedroom to attack Marco. Davis instead tried to kill Ward while
Martinez went to the bedroom and tried to kill Marco. Davis knew of
Martinez’s unlawful purpose and Davis intended to facilitate that purpose by
preventing Ward from intervening in Martinez’s effort to kill Marco. Davis’s
actions prevented Ward from alerting or helping Marco and facilitated
Martinez’s attempt to kill Marco. Thus, there is substantial evidence Davis
knew Martinez intended to kill Marco when they learned she was in the
residence, Davis intended to aid Martinez in this crime, and his actions did
so.
The court’s conclusion Davis is guilty of the attempted murders of
Ward and Marco under a direct aiding and abetting theory is supported by
substantial evidence.
17
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Davis’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
MOTOIKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
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