In re Pedro S. CA4/1

CourtListener 10045059Calctapp16.08.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/16/24 In re Pedro S. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re PEDRO S., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D082537
THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J244358)

v.

PEDRO S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Richard R. Monroy, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winter, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Joshua Trinh, Deputy Attorneys
General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After finding that he committed first degree murder and other felonies,
the juvenile court committed Pedro S. to a secure youth treatment facility for
seven years. Pedro argues that the juvenile court made several errors in
exercising its discretion to select that term of confinement. But having failed
to raise each of these issues in the juvenile court, he has forfeited these
contentions on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In July 2023, Pedro was alleged to have committed first degree murder
(Pen. Code, § 187), robbery (id., § 211), two firearm-related offenses (id.,
§§ 29610, 25400), and possessing live ammunition (id., § 29650), stemming
from a dispute over some vape pens that Pedro wanted to buy from the
victim. The incident was captured on a surveillance video. Apparently
something went wrong during the transaction that caused the victim to grab
the vape pens and run away from Pedro. Pedro chased down the victim,
fatally shot him at close range in the back of the head while he was lying on
the ground, and retrieved the vape pens. At the time of the murder, Pedro
was 15 years old.
After finding that he committed the charged offenses, the juvenile court
held a disposition hearing to decide whether to commit Pedro to a secure

youth treatment facility (SYTF).1 The requirements for doing so in Pedro’s
case are provided for by Welfare and Institutions Code section 875 and

1 By the date of Pedro’s disposition hearing, a “juvenile justice
realignment” had transferred responsibility for wards of the court from the
State to the counties. (See generally In re Jose R. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
839, 845–846.) County-run SYTFs replaced the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation, Department of Juvenile Justice as the most restrictive
placement for severe juvenile offenders. (Ibid.) Juvenile courts are
authorized to confine to SYTFs minors found to have committed certain
felony offenses when they were at least 14 years old. (Id. at p. 846 & fn. 2.)
2
rule 5.806 of the California Rules of Court, the latter of which became

effective only a month before the disposition hearing.2 To commit a youth to
a SYTF, the juvenile court must first find that “a less restrictive, alternative
disposition for the ward is unsuitable.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3).) If the court
makes this finding, it must select the baseline term of confinement (baseline
term) “for the most serious recent offense for which the ward has been
adjudicated.” (Id., subds. (b)(1), (h).) Rule 5.806(d) assigns ranges of baseline
terms to various offenses, e.g., a range of four to seven years for murder.
When selecting a baseline term, the court must consider the four criteria

stated in the rule.3 (Rule 5.806(b).) It must also “state on the record its
reasons for selecting a particular term, referencing each of the criteria and
any factors the court deemed relevant.” (Ibid.)
During the disposition hearing, Pedro recognized that the juvenile
court was likely to confine him to a SYTF and agreed that the baseline term
would be between four and seven years. He requested a five year term.
Consistent with the People’s recommendation, the juvenile court decided that
Pedro should be confined to a SYTF for a baseline term of seven years.
Explaining its decision to the victim’s family, the court described the
“justice system” as “flawed and broken” and apologized for being unable to
offer them any solace for their loss. Turning its attention to Pedro, the court
remarked that he had already received a benefit by being tried as a juvenile

2 All further statutory and rules references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code and California Rules of Court, respectively.
3 These include: “(1) The circumstances and gravity of the commitment
offense”; “(2) The youth’s prior history in the juvenile justice system”; “(3) The
confinement time considered reasonable and necessary to achieve the
rehabilitation of the youth”; and “(4) The youth’s developmental history.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.806(b)(1)–(4).)
3
because an adult convicted of murder would have received a sentence of 50
years to life. The court referred to Pedro’s recent behavior in juvenile hall,
which included fighting with rival gang members, to conclude that a seven-
year baseline term was necessary to give him the best chance to be
rehabilitated. For her part, Pedro’s trial counsel neither raised any
objections nor asked any clarifying questions.

DISCUSSION

Pedro asserts that the juvenile court’s comments about the “broken”
justice system and the perceived benefit he had already received by being
tried for murder as a juvenile constitute prejudicial error. In Pedro’s view,
these comments evinced a “personal antipathy” for the juvenile justice system

that is not a valid consideration under the rule.4 He also maintains that the
only rule 5.806(b) criterion referred to on the record by the court was the
length of the confinement term needed to rehabilitate him due to his recent
behavioral issues in juvenile hall. According to Pedro, this single factor could
not support a seven year baseline term because it was outweighed by
significant mitigating evidence.
The People counter that Pedro forfeited these issues because he failed
to raise them during the disposition hearing. To the extent his contentions
have been preserved, the People maintain that the court considered the rule
5.806(b) criteria. We agree that Pedro forfeited his claims and affirm on that
basis.

4 Pedro does not contend in his opening brief that the juvenile court
erred by failing to state all four rule 5.806(b) criteria on the record; however,
he asserts in his reply brief that the juvenile court’s failure to do so was an
error. Absent good cause and unusual circumstances, we do not consider
arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. (People v. Peevy (1998) 17
Cal.4th 1184, 1206.)
4
The forfeiture rule (sometimes called the waiver doctrine) applies to
claims raised for the first time on appeal “involving the trial court’s failure to

properly make or articulate . . . discretionary sentencing choices.”5 (People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 (Scott).) Pedro’s claims fall squarely within
the categories of appellate challenges Scott says must first be objected to in
the trial court: the “stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular
case” or the court erred because it “misweighed the various factors” or “failed
to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.” (Ibid.)
So long as the juvenile court selected a baseline term that was “otherwise
permitted by law” and gave Pedro a “meaningful opportunity to object”
during the disposition hearing—neither of which he disputes—the forfeiture
rule bars us from addressing the merits of his claims. (Id. at pp. 354, 356.)
Here, Pedro’s appellate counsel chooses to interpret the juvenile court’s
comments to suggest that it was selecting the maximum baseline term
merely because prior law would have permitted Pedro to be tried as an adult
with a much longer maximum period of confinement. He believes these
statements expressed the judge’s personal antipathy to the Legislature’s
“current thinking” regarding juvenile justice. Of course, a judge’s personal
views on the wisdom of legislative policy choices are not a proper subject of
comment at a sentencing hearing. The judge is obligated to fairly apply the
law so as to effect and not frustrate the Legislature’s intent, regardless of his
or her personal opinions. (See People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298,
304.) We do not read the judge’s comments in the same way as Pedro does,

5 Even though “juvenile confinements are not ‘sentences’ ” (In re Jovan
B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 812), the principles discussed in Scott apply when
reviewing a juvenile court’s discretionary choices when imposing a term of
confinement (In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130–1131).
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but even if true, a specific objection would have clarified the judge’s intent
and understanding of the relevant factors.
Pedro goes on to argue that the juvenile court’s remaining reason for
selecting a seven-year baseline term—his recent behavioral issues at juvenile

hall—provided an insufficient basis to justify the court’s decision.6 He faults
the trial court for failing to discuss each of the factors listed in rule 5.806(b).
Again, however, a court’s asserted failure to provide “a sufficient number of
valid reasons” for a sentencing choice falls squarely within Scott’s objection
requirement. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353.) A timely objection would
have permitted the juvenile court to explain why it believed Pedro’s gang-
related fights in juvenile hall demonstrated the need for a longer period of
rehabilitation when considered with all the other relevant factors.
In finding that these arguments have been forfeited by trial counsel’s
failure to object, we decline Pedro’s invitation to excuse the lack of an
objection based on alleged futility. (People v. Welch, (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237
[excusing parties from making futile objections].) Pedro asserts that none of
the issues he raises on appeal would have necessarily resulted in a shorter
baseline term if they had been raised as objections, but that is not the
meaning of futility in this context. An objection does not merely allow the
trial court to change the result; it may, instead, permit the judge to explain
his or her reasoning in a manner that clarifies the existing decision and
facilitates appellate review. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 351.)

6 Pedro interprets the juvenile court’s comments about his behavioral
issues as having more to do with a future hearing to reduce his baseline term
than with the length of the term needed to rehabilitate him. While it is true
the court suggested that Pedro’s behavior would factor into a future decision
to reduce his baseline term, the main point was his behavior strongly
indicated that a seven-year term was necessary to give him the best chance to
be rehabilitated.
6
As a last resort, Pedro contends that if we conclude his appellate
arguments are forfeited, then he did not receive constitutionally mandated
effective assistance of trial counsel. But “[i]t is particularly difficult to
prevail on an appellate claim of ineffective assistance.” (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) This is so because “we begin with the presumption
that counsel’s actions fall within the broad range of reasonableness” (People
v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198), and the record on appeal frequently
“sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged” (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966 [internal quotation
marks omitted]). In such circumstances, “unless counsel was asked for an
explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation” for the challenged conduct, there is no alternative
but to affirm the judgment, relegating the defendant to a habeas petition that
can be used to remedy deficiencies in the appellate record. (Ibid. [internal
quotation marks omitted].) We will thus reverse a judgment or order “only if
there is affirmative evidence that counsel had ‘ “ ‘no rational tactical
purpose’ ” ’ for an action or omission.” (Mickel, at p. 198, quoting People v.
Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 437.)
The record contains no explanation why Pedro’s trial counsel chose not
to raise the issues his appellate counsel has identified. (See People v.
Sepulveda (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 291, 302.) Nor is this a situation where
there could be no conceivable tactical justification for his trial counsel’s
decision to remain silent during the disposition hearing. (Ibid.) Attorneys
are entitled to focus on the arguments that, in their professional judgment,
have the best chance of succeeding rather than raising “every colorable
issue.” (See Jones v. Barnes (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 753.) And they may do so
without fear of being deemed ineffective based on an appellate court’s second-

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guessing. (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 520.) Perhaps Pedro’s trial
counsel thought the best approach to convincing the juvenile court to adopt
her recommendation was to focus on what she believed were mitigating
factors. She might reasonably have thought that objecting to the court’s
comments Pedro’s appellate counsel takes issue with would have emphasized
a concededly aggravating factor and thereby undercut her strategy.
Whatever the case may be, because the record is silent on why trial counsel
did not object, we are unable to address and resolve Pedro’s ineffective
assistance claim on direct appeal.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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