CourtListener 10045048•People v. Finkelstein CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/16/24 P. v. Finkelstein CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B330151
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA102284)
v.
PATRICK MARTIN FINKELSTEIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Manuel Almada, Judge. Affirmed.
George L. Schraer for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and
Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Patrick Martin Finkelstein of vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated pursuant to Penal Code
section 191.5, subdivision (b), and found he fled the scene of the
accident in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001. Finkelstein
contends the trial court erred when it imposed the five-year
enhancement under subdivision (c) of Vehicle Code section 20001
(section 20001(c)) for fleeing the scene of the accident rather than
the shorter term specified under subdivision (b)(1) of
section 20001 (section 20001(b)(1)) for the same conduct. We
conclude the trial court did not err, and we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Finkelstein Hits Patricia O’Donnell with His Car
At approximately 1:15 a.m. on February 13, 2020,
Finkelstein hit and killed Patricia O’Donnell with his Audi A5 as
she was riding her skateboard on Pershing Drive in Playa del
Rey. Finkelstein slowed, but did not stop, after the collision. He
then drove away.
Eric Holm witnessed the accident. Holm testified at trial
he heard the roar of the engine as the Audi turned the corner
onto Pershing Drive and accelerated down the street. Holm saw
Finkelstein’s car hit O’Donnell. Holm estimated she flew 20 feet
in the air and landed on the curb. At trial, the prosecution
played surveillance video from the nearby businesses that
supported Holm’s testimony.
2
When Holm realized O’Donnell had died and there was
nothing he could do for her, he pursued Finkelstein in his car,
calling 911 during the chase. When he caught up with
Finkelstein, they both pulled over. Holm observed Finkelstein
had his window rolled down halfway. Holm screamed, “[G]o
back. You have to go back.” Finkelstein did not exit his car and
drove away after approximately 20 seconds. Holm identified
Finkelstein and his car to police officers after Finkelstein was
arrested. Finkelstein was taken into custody at 3:59 a.m.
B. The Information and the Trial
An information charged Finkelstein with gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated (count 1; Pen. Code, § 191.5,
subd. (a)); driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury
(count 2; Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)); driving with a blood
alcohol level of 0.08 percent causing injury (count 3; Veh. Code,
§ 23153, subd. (b)); and hit and run driving resulting in death
(count 4; Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2)). The information
further alleged Finkelstein fled the scene after the commission of
count 1 in violation of section 20001(c), inflicted great bodily
injury during the commission of counts 2 and 3, in violation of
Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and refused to
submit to a chemical test after the commission of counts 2 and 3,
in violation of Vehicle Code section 23577.
At trial, the prosecution presented Holm’s testimony and
surveillance video evidence as described above. The prosecution
also presented forensic evidence from Finkelstein’s Audi: three
swab samples were taken from the vehicle’s exterior, and DNA
analysis revealed the sample from the right rear window
matched O’Donnell’s DNA.
3
After his arrest, a police officer conducted a truncated field
sobriety test on Finkelstein. The officer testified he smelled
alcohol on Finkelstein at 5:30 a.m. and Finkelstein’s gaze failed
to smoothly track the officer’s finger. Finkelstein refused to
provide a blood or breath sample to test for alcohol. His blood
was drawn pursuant to a warrant at 8:30 a.m. Testing revealed a
0.07 percent blood alcohol level. A criminalist estimated
Finkelstein’s blood alcohol level at the time of the accident to be
0.14, 0.20, or 0.29 percent, assuming Finkelstein did not consume
any alcohol between the time of the incident and when the blood
was drawn. The criminalist explained people metabolize alcohol
at different rates and the three estimates were based on
metabolic rates for the average person and those who
metabolized alcohol at faster and slower rates than the average.
The defense attempted to discredit the prosecution’s
evidence, contending there was insufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt Finkelstein was the driver of the
Audi, acted with gross negligence, or was driving under the
influence at the time of the accident. Finkelstein did not testify.
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony that
Holm had smoked marijuana prior to the accident. The defense
also attempted to discredit the criminalist’s estimation of
Finkelstein’s blood alcohol level at the time of the incident by
highlighting evidence that Finkelstein may have had a drink
after he arrived home. Officers observed he had a bottle of vodka
on his kitchen counter when they took him into custody.
The defense further presented testimony from an accident
reconstructionist and a forensic engineer. The forensic engineer
testified to Finkelstein’s reaction time given the circumstances
surrounding the collision. The engineer explained the collision
4
took place in a bright spot of light and, if O’Donnell’s back was
toward Finkelstein, he was unlikely to see her in time to stop.
After viewing the videos of the accident, the accident
reconstructionist calculated Finkelstein’s speed to range from
24 to 43.5 miles per hour. He also estimated O’Donnell’s speed to
be four and a half to five miles per hour. According to the
defense, these facts showed Finkelstein did not act with gross
negligence.
C. Verdict and Sentence
The jury found Finkelstein guilty of vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated in violation of Penal Code
section 191.5, subdivision (b), a lesser-included offense of gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated under subdivision (a)
of that section. It also found true Finkelstein fled the scene of the
offense in violation of section 20001(c). The jury found
Finkelstein guilty as charged as to counts 2 and 4, and not guilty
as to count 3.
The trial court sentenced Finkelstein to a total of six years
and four months in state prison, comprised of the low term of
16 months on count 1, plus five years for the section 20001(c)
enhancement. The trial court dismissed count 2 pursuant to
Penal Code section 1385 because it was a lesser-included offense
of count 1. It imposed and stayed a two-year term for count 4
pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
Finkelstein timely appealed.
5
DISCUSSION
Finkelstein’s sole challenge is to the five-year sentence
enhancement imposed pursuant to section 20001(c). He contends
he should be resentenced under section 20001(b)(1), which
provides a sentencing triad for felony hit and run offenses of
16 months or two or three years, rather than the mandatory
five-year enhancement under section 20001(c).1 He contends the
disparate punishment for identical conduct is contrary to the
legislative intent underlying Vehicle Code section 20001, and also
violates equal protection and due process principles.2
1 Section 20001(b)(1) requires punishment by “imprisonment
in the state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year,
or by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor
more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that
imprisonment and fine.” Section 20001(b)(1) is a wobbler offense.
“Wobblers” are crimes that “are chargeable or, in the discretion of
the court, punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor; that
is, they are punishable either by a term in state prison or by
imprisonment in county jail and/or by a fine.” (People v. Park
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 789.) When a statute, such as section
20001(b)(1), makes an offense punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison but does not state a sentence range, then the
determinate sentence range is 16 months, two years, or three
years. (See Pen. Code, § 18; People v. Torres (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1138.)
2 Finkelstein also suggests he challenges the proportionality
of his sentence under the Eighth Amendment: “The sentence
that appellant is serving for leaving the scene of the accident is
more than three times as long as the sentence appellant is
serving for causing Ms. O’Connell’s [sic] death.” He concedes,
however, that “these provisions are generally reserved for
6
A. The Trial Court Properly Sentenced Finkelstein Under
Section 20001(c)
1. Standard of Review
We review questions of statutory construction de novo.
(See California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources
Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041.) “‘When we interpret a
statute, “[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first
examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and
commonsense meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must
generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation
would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not
intend. If the statutory language permits more than one
reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such
as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”
[Citation.] “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the
context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it
is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and
part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.”’” (City of
egregious cases of disproportionality and unfairness and not for a
case like appellant’s.” Given Finkelstein’s concession and his
failure to develop or provide any legal authority for this
argument, we conclude he has forfeited the issue. (See Golden
Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th
733, 786 [issues not addressed as error in a party’s brief with
legal analysis and citation to authority are forfeited]; Lee v. Kim
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721 [“our review is limited to those
issues that have been adequately raised and supported in the
appellant’s brief”].)
7
San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616-617 (City of
San Jose).)
2. Vehicle Code Section 20001
“Section 20001 addresses two types of penalties for leaving
the scene of a vehicular accident; one is a substantive offense and
the other is an enhancement for vehicular manslaughter.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 20001 proscribe a substantive
offense often referred to as felony hit and run.” (People v.
Nordberg (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236-1237 (Nordberg).)
Subdivision (a) of Vehicle Code section 20001
(section 20001(a)) provides: “The driver of a vehicle involved in
an accident resulting in injury to a person, other than himself or
herself, or in the death of a person shall immediately stop the
vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall fulfill the
requirements of Sections 20003 and 20004.” Vehicle Code
section 20003 requires a driver of a vehicle involved in an
accident resulting in injury or death to provide identifying
information and render aid to any of the injured. Vehicle Code
section 20004 requires a driver to report an accident resulting in
death to authorities.
Subdivision (b) of Vehicle Code section 20001 sets out the
potential determinate sentences for a violation of
section 20001(a). As stated, Section 20001(b)(1) provides for
“imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail for not more
than one year, or by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars
($1,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both
that imprisonment and fine.” And the sentence range for this
wobbler as a felony is not otherwise specified, so it is 16 months,
two or three years. (See Pen. Code, § 18.) If the accident results
8
in death or permanent, serious injury, Vehicle Code
section 20001, subdivision (b)(2), specifies a sentence of
“imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, or
in a county jail for not less than 90 days nor more than one year,
or by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor
more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that
imprisonment and fine. However, the court, in the interests of
justice and for reasons stated in the record, may reduce or
eliminate the minimum imprisonment required by this
paragraph.”
By contrast, section 20001(c) is “conceptually related” but is
a “sentence enhancement.” (Nordberg, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1237.) Section 20001(c) mandates a consecutive five-year
sentence enhancement for “[a] person who flees the scene of the
crime after committing” vehicular manslaughter in violation of
Penal Code sections 191.5 or 192, subdivision (c)(1). “This
additional term shall not be imposed unless the allegation is
charged in the accusatory pleading and . . . found to be true by
the trier of fact. The court shall not strike a finding that brings a
person within the provisions of this subdivision or an allegation
made pursuant to this subdivision.” (§ 20001(c).) There is no
requirement that the driver render aid, or provide identification,
as required in section 20001(a). (See People v. Vela (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 942, 950 (Vela).)
The legislative history of section 20001(c) reveals it was
“enacted in memory of 15-year-old Courtney Cheney, killed by a
recidivist drunk driver who fled the scene. (Stats. 1996, ch. 654,
§ 1; Sen. Com. on Crim. Proc., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1985
(1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 1, 1996, pp. 3-4.) The
Senate committee report pointed out that the enhancement was
9
necessary ‘because when a person who is DUI flees the scene of
an accident where a death has occurred and they are not caught
immediately, it is hard if not impossible to later prove that they
were DUI. This [enhancement] will create an added deterrence
to keep people from fleeing accidents where a death may have
occurred.’ (Sen. Com. on Crim. Proc., Analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 1985, supra, at p. 6.).” (People v. Calhoun (2007) 40 Cal.4th
398, 404 (Calhoun).)
“[U]nlike the substantive crime in subdivisions (a) and (b)
of Vehicle Code section 20001, the purpose and gravamen of the
enhancement” in subdivision (c) “is not to compel motorists to
stop, provide identification information and render assistance; it
is to preserve evidence of a DUI and to act as a deterrent.” (Vela,
supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 950.)
3. Analysis
Finkelstein does not dispute the plain language of
section 20001(c) mandates imposition of a five-year enhancement
because the information charged him with a violation of that
subdivision, he was convicted of the predicate offense—vehicular
manslaughter under Penal Code section 195.1—and the jury
found true that he fled the scene. The language of
section 20001(c) is clear, and we “must generally follow its plain
meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd
consequences the Legislature did not intend.” (City of San Jose,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 616.)
Finkelstein argues applying section 20001(c) in his case
leads to consequences the Legislature did not intend. Relying on
People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 1102, Finkelstein
contends the conduct the Legislature sought to punish when it
10
enacted Vehicle Code section 20001, commonly known as the hit
and run statute, “is not the hitting but the running.” Finkelstein
argues, “Section 20001 as currently written violates this
fundamental purpose of punishing the act of leaving and not
punishing the offense that causes the collision. In its current
form, section 20001 violates this principle by punishing
defendants whose act of leaving the scene is identical, but whose
underlying crimes differ in severity.” This contention is
unpersuasive.
Applying section 20001(c) to Finkelstein’s case complies
with the Legislature’s intent in enacting this subdivision.
Indeed, this case underscores the Legislature’s concerns about
DUI evidence. Finkelstein was arrested approximately three
hours after the accident. He refused toxicology tests and his
blood was not drawn until 8:30 a.m., approximately seven hours
after the accident and after the police obtained a search warrant.
Given this length of time, the criminalist could only estimate his
blood alcohol level at the time of the accident ranged from 0.14
percent to 0.29 percent, a two-fold difference. Finkelstein “could
have escaped detection and remained in hiding until [his] level of
intoxication could no longer reliably be determined. This
potential loss of evidence is precisely what the statute is intended
to deter.” (Vela, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 951.)
B. Vehicle Code Section 20001 Does Not Violate Equal
Protection Principles
1. Equal Protection and the Standard of Review
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides that no state may
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
11
the laws.” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) The California
Constitution likewise guarantees equal protection of the law.
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) “At core, the requirement of
equal protection ensures that the government does not treat a
group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v.
Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 (Chatman).)
“The degree of justification required to satisfy equal
protection depends on the type of unequal treatment at issue.
Courts apply heightened scrutiny when a challenged statute or
other regulation involves a suspect classification such as race, or
a fundamental right such as the right to vote, and accordingly
will demand greater justification for the differential treatment.
[Citations.] But when a statute involves neither a suspect
classification nor a fundamental right, the ‘general rule is that
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.’ [Citations.] A court applying this
standard finds ‘a denial of equal protection only if there is no
rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some
legitimate government purpose.’” (People v. Hardin (2024)
15 Cal.5th 834, 847 (Hardin).)
In Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pages 850 to 851, the high
court held that when “plaintiffs challenge laws drawing
distinctions between identifiable groups or classes of persons, on
the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal
protection, courts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether
the two groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law in
question. The only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged
difference in treatment is adequately justified under the
applicable standard of review.”
12
Here, the parties agree the rational basis standard of
review applies. We agree; there is no contention Vehicle Code
section 20001 involves a suspect classification or a fundamental
right. Indeed, a defendant “‘does not have a fundamental interest
in a specific term of imprisonment or in the designation a
particular crime receives.’” (People v. Wilkinson (2004)
33 Cal.4th 821, 838 (Wilkinson).)
“Rational basis review ‘sets a high bar’ for litigants
challenging legislative enactments.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 852.) “Under this deferential standard, we presume that a
given statutory classification is valid ‘until the challenger shows
that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably
conceivable.’ The underlying rationale for a statutory
classification need not have been ‘ever actually articulated’ by
lawmakers, nor ‘be empirically substantiated.’ Evaluating
potential justifications for disparate treatment, a court reviewing
a statute under this standard must ‘treat the statute’s potential
logic and assumptions far more permissively than with other
standards of constitutional or regulatory review.’ ‘If a plausible
basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guess its
“‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’”’ ‘[T]he logic behind a potential
justification need [not] be persuasive or sensible—rather than
simply rational.’” (Ibid., citations omitted.)
We review equal protection claims de novo. (See California
Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 208;
In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, 463.)
2. Analysis
Finkelstein argues the longer sentence for a violation of
section 20001(c) has no rational basis because it is inconsistent
13
with “the exclusive and single purpose of section 20001 of
discouraging and punishing fleeing.” Finkelstein presumes the
disparity in punishment between Vehicle Code section 20001,
subdivisions (a) and (b), on the one hand, and subdivision (c), on
the other, rests on the different underlying offenses—the
“hitting”—connected to the hit and run statute. In his view:
“Section 20001 violates equal protection because it provides for
three different possible punishments based on differences in the
nature of the hitting and not based on any differences in the
nature of the running.”
Even if Finkelstein’s presumption were true, he has
presented no authority precluding the Legislature from treating
the different predicate offenses differently.3 Finkelstein’s
argument is undermined by the Supreme Court’s recognition that
“[i]t is both the prerogative and the duty of the Legislature to
define degrees of culpability and punishment, and to distinguish
between crimes in this regard. [Citation.] Courts routinely
decline to intrude upon the ‘broad discretion’ such policy
judgments entail. [Citation.] Equal protection analysis does not
entitle the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom, fairness, or logic
of the law.” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74; accord,
Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 853.)
3 We observe the plain language of Vehicle Code
section 20001 belies Finkelstein’s assumption that the
subdivisions punish identical conduct differently.
Section 20001(a) requires a driver to stop, provide identifying
information, and render aid. Section 20001(c), on the other hand,
prohibits a driver from fleeing the scene of an accident involving
death or serious permanent injury but does not require he or she
provide aid or information.
14
In any event, the legislative history for Vehicle Code
section 20001 does not support Finkelstein’s assertion that the
sole purpose of section 20001 is to deter flight from the scene of
the crime. The Supreme Court has long recognized that
“[l]egislation is frequently the ‘“product of multiple and
somewhat inconsistent purposes that led to certain
compromises.”’” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 854, quoting
Hernandez v. City of Hanford (2007) 41 Cal.4th 279, 300.)
While “the state has a valid interest in requiring that
principals in the commission of serious vehicular crimes remain
at the scene,” that is not the only purpose for Vehicle Code
section 20001’s enactment. (Calhoun, supra, 40 Cal.4th at
p. 405.) The Legislature additionally recognized, by enacting
section 20001(c), the need for preservation of DUI evidence
“‘“because when a person who is DUI flees the scene of an
accident where a death has occurred and they are not caught
immediately, it is hard if not impossible to later prove that they
were DUI.”’” (Vela, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 950.)
Preservation of DUI evidence provides a rational basis for the
disparate sentences set out in subdivisions (b) and (c) of
section 20001.
C. Vehicle Code Section 20001 Does Not Violate Due Process
Principles
Nor are we persuaded that Vehicle Code section 20001
violates due process principles. Finkelstein argues the disparate
sentences specified in section 20001 allow for arbitrary
enforcement of identical conduct.
We reject Finkelstein’s contention that his due process
rights were violated because Vehicle Code section 20001 allows
15
the prosecutor to arbitrarily charge him with an enhancement
that carries a longer sentence when an identical offense carries a
shorter sentence. As we have observed, sections 20001(a) and
20001(c) do not address identical conduct.
In any event, the United States Supreme Court and the
California Supreme Court have held that the existence of two
identical criminal statutes prescribing different levels of
punishments and the exercise of a prosecutor’s discretion in
charging under one such statute and not the other, does not
violate equal protection or due process principles absent a
showing the prosecution’s exercise of discretion had been “‘based
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification.’” (United States v. Batchelder (1979)
442 U.S. 114, 125, fn. 9; accord, Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 838.) Finkelstein does not argue, much less demonstrate, any
such arbitrary classification underlying Vehicle Code
section 20001. As stated, the Legislature had a rational basis in
distinguishing between a hit and run offense and a hit and run
sentencing enhancement and in proscribing different sentences
for each.
Moreover, the cases cited by Finkelstein for his due process
argument—Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 544, and
Gilbert v. Homar (1997) 520 U.S. 924, 930—are distinguishable.
Both Wolff and Gilbert address the notice and hearing procedures
required to satisfy due process concerns in the deprivation of
certain private interests. (Wolff, at p. 544 [inmate faced loss of
good-time custody credits without notice, hearing, or written
statement of findings]; Gilbert, at p. 935 [employee faced a
temporary, unpaid suspension without a hearing].) Neither Wolff
16
nor Gilbert help Finkelstein because he does not identify any
similar deficiencies in the proceedings against him.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
STONE, J.
17
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