CourtListener 10045022•In re N.J.
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/12/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re N.J., a Person Coming B326007 consolidated with
Under the Juvenile Court B331343
Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
21CCJP03756
21CCJP03756A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
C.J.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Judge Pro Tempore. Reversed
and remanded with instructions.
Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Amir Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
The California Legislature has expressed a strong
preference to place children who have been detained from their
parents with family members whenever possible. To that end,
there is a detailed statutory scheme setting forth the duties of the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) and the juvenile court, including requiring DCFS to
promptly, and diligently assess any interested family members
for placement when a child is removed from parental custody. If
a family member requests placement, the statutory placement
preference under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 361.31
requires DCFS and the court to place the relative at the head of
the line for placement and to place the child with the relative if
practicable. DCFS and the juvenile court utterly failed to
perform these duties in this case and, as a result, failed this
family.
Child N. was removed from mother C.J. immediately after
her birth in August 2021, due to mother’s substance abuse and
mental health issues. Shortly thereafter, DCFS placed her with a
foster caregiver (the caregiver) who, according to DCFS, was a
“trial attorney for the County Counsel’s office, Dependency
Division.” At the same time, maternal aunt (aunt) requested
assessment for N.’s placement. DCFS did not do this assessment
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
then, nor did it do so for the following year, despite repeated
requests by mother’s counsel, N.’s counsel, and aunt herself.
Instead, DCFS repeatedly reported to the court that it was
continuing to assess aunt, without further explanation; the court,
in turn, repeatedly ordered DCFS to assess aunt and to report on
the status, ignoring DCFS’s failure to do so and the pleas by
mother and others that there had been almost no visitation and
no movement toward placing N. with aunt. DCFS provided no
explanation for the delay, but nevertheless failed to place N. with
aunt on an emergency basis during the seven months aunt was
waiting for resource family approval, or during the seven months
between approval of aunt’s home and termination of mother’s
reunification services.
Meanwhile, almost no visitation occurred between N. and
her family members. DCFS deferred to the caregiver and allowed
her to dictate entirely when N. would visit with aunt. The
caregiver limited these visits to once per month, and would not
allow weekend visits because that was the caregiver’s “quality
time” with N. After aunt was finally approved for placement and
the caregiver was provided notice that N. would be moved, DCFS
deferred to the caregiver’s objection and did not move the child.
Ultimately, by the time DCFS and the court “considered” aunt for
placement, over a year had passed since N. was placed with the
caregiver. Although the record indicates that aunt took full
advantage of the visitation she was given, the unexplained and
unreasonable limitations on visitation imposed by the caregiver
and sanctioned by DCFS and the court left her without a
meaningful opportunity to establish a deep bond with N. As a
result, at the section 361.3 hearing in December 2022 (one year
and four months after aunt first requested placement), the court
3
found it was too late to apply the relative placement preference.
The court further found that even if it applied the preference, it
was not in N.’s best interest to move her due to her bond with the
caregiver and the passage of time.
In this consolidated appeal, mother challenges the court’s
order denying her request to place N. with aunt and the order
terminating her parental rights. She also argues that DCFS and
the court failed to properly serve aunt, mother’s appointed
conservator, with notice of all dependency proceedings, failed to
appoint either a guardian ad litem or aunt to speak for mother,
and failed to advise aunt and mother of mother’s right to file a
writ after the court terminated mother’s reunification services.
We conclude that DCFS’s inexplicable delays in fairly evaluating
aunt for placement and the lackluster response by DCFS and the
court to the pleas by mother, aunt, and N. (through counsel) to
provide supportive services to this family compels reversal. The
lengthy fallout of these failures is particularly egregious—the
longer DCFS and the court delayed in properly assessing aunt for
placement, the more N. became bonded to the caregiver and the
more disruptive any replacement would be for a young child who
had experienced disruption and trauma since her birth. Under
the circumstances here, DCFS cannot shut a family almost
completely out of the process for over a year and then point to the
passage of time and failure to form a bond as the reasons for
denial of placement.
We therefore conclude that the juvenile court erred by
failing to apply the relative placement preference under section
361.3, and that the error was prejudicial. We find that the
failures in providing proper notice to aunt and in providing
reasonable services to mother require reversal as well. We
4
reverse the order terminating mother’s reunification services, the
order denying mother’s section 361.3 motion, and the order
terminating her parental rights and remand for further
proceedings. On remand, we also direct DCFS and the court to
ensure compliance with the inquiry and notice requirements of
the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.) (ICWA).
BACKGROUND
I. Petition
N. was born on August 9, 2021 and is mother’s only child.
According to the DCFS detention report, mother was admitted to
the hospital several days before N.’s birth and placed on a
psychiatric hold as a danger to herself or others. She was violent
toward hospital staff and “acutely psychotic.” Mother tested
positive for methamphetamines at the hospital. N. tested
negative for drugs at birth. Mother told DCFS that she did not
know the identity of N.’s father.2
The court ordered N.’s detention on August 10, 2021. The
same day, aunt called the DCFS children’s social worker (CSW)
asking to be considered for placement. She told CSW that she
was available for a home assessment after 4:30 pm. No
assessment was done at this time. Maternal grandmother
(MGM) also asked to be considered and told DCFS that she and
aunt planned to be caregivers together as they both worked.
However, DCFS stated that MGM’s possible criminal history
precluded her from emergency placement. N. was placed with
the caregiver, who DCFS reported was a “trial attorney for the
County Counsel’s office, Dependency Division.” N. remained with
the caregiver throughout the proceedings.
2 Father, M.R., is not a party to this appeal.
5
DCFS filed a dependency petition on August 16, 2021 on
behalf of newborn N. under section 300, subdivision (b)(1).3 The
petition alleged that N. was at risk of harm due to mother’s
mental health problems and drug abuse, including her use of
drugs while pregnant with N. The petition further alleged that
mother had attempted suicide, was involuntarily hospitalized in
July and August 2021, and was diagnosed with schizophrenia
and “amphetamine induced psychotic disorder.” The August 16,
2021 detention report listed aunt as a relative to consider for
placement.
At the August 17 detention hearing, N.’s counsel asked
DCFS to assess all relatives for placement, including MGM and
aunt. The court ordered N. detained from mother and gave
DCFS discretion to place the child with any appropriate relative.
The court ordered DCFS to “continue to assess family members
for placement.” The court also ordered family reunification
services for mother, including visitation for a minimum of nine
hours per week with a written visitation schedule. Mother had
been accepted into a substance abuse program after she was
discharged from the hospital. The court further ordered DCFS to
assess whether mother’s facility would allow N. to live with her
and provide that information in the next report.
3 Section 300 states, in relevant part, “A child who comes
within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a
dependent child of the court. . . . [¶] (b)(1) The child has suffered,
or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm or illness, as a result of … (A) The failure or
inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or
protect the child.”
6
II. Adjudication and disposition
DCFS filed its jurisdiction/disposition report on September
29, 2021, reporting that mother remained in a mental health
facility with the goal of becoming sober and reunifying with N.
DCFS spoke with mother at the facility, but reported that she
had not “contacted the Department or caregiver in order to
initiate visits” with N. Father contacted DCFS and requested a
paternity test. DCFS reported that MGM could not be considered
for placement due to her criminal history, but did not include any
information regarding aunt. Mother filed a relative information
sheet on September 29 listing aunt as a potential caregiver and
providing her address.
At the next hearing on September 30, 2021, mother
remained in an inpatient facility but appeared by phone.
Mother’s counsel and N.’s counsel both requested that DCFS
assess aunt for placement. The court ordered aunt’s assessment
and again gave DCFS discretion to place N. with any appropriate
relative. The court again ordered visitation for mother if allowed
by her facility, and for DCFS to facilitate those visits, if not in
person, then at least by video. There was no information in the
record at this point that any visitation had occurred.
On October 12, DCFS reported in a last-minute information
that aunt was “currently in the process of being assessed by RFA
[resource family approval] as possible placement.” On October
14, mother submitted to the jurisdictional allegations. The court
sustained the allegations, found jurisdiction over N., and
continued disposition. Mother’s counsel requested a referral to a
dual diagnosis program for mother; the court ordered DCFS to
assess whether such a program would be appropriate. At
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mother’s counsel’s request, the court also ordered DCFS to
provide an update on the placement with aunt in the next report.
In November 2021, DCFS filed a first amended petition,
which it ultimately dismissed and refiled as a subsequent
petition under section 342. This petition added allegations that
father knew of mother’s substance abuse and failed to protect N.
That month, DCFS reported that placement with aunt “is
pending. The Department is in the process of obtaining LiveScan
results for maternal uncle who resides in the home.” Mother’s
psychiatric social worker told DCFS that mother would be
assessed to be placed in a dual diagnosis facility. The social
worker also reported that aunt was appointed as conservator for
mother.
On December 1, 2021, the court set disposition for February
24, 2022. The court also found father was N.’s biological father.
There was no update as to placement with aunt.
DCFS reported on February 10, 2022 that mother was
participating in an inpatient treatment program and was waiting
for placement in a long-term care and treatment facility. The
last-minute information provided no updates as to aunt or
visitation by mother or aunt.
At the disposition hearing on February 24, 2022, the court
sustained the section 342 petition as alleged as to father.
Regarding disposition on both petitions, counsel for mother
requested that DCFS actively assist mother with enrollment in
an inpatient or dual diagnosis program. The court found by clear
and convincing evidence that it was reasonable and necessary to
remove N. from parents. The court ordered mother to complete a
full drug and alcohol program with weekly random testing and
ordered DCFS to explore possible dual diagnosis programs. The
8
court also continued to order nine hours per week of monitored
visitation for mother as permitted by her facility, with DCFS to
provide a written visitation schedule to mother within four court
days. DCFS’s reports up to this point contain no indication that
mother had received any visitation with N., either in person or
virtual.
With respect to aunt, mother’s counsel again asked the
court for N. to be placed with aunt, noting, “I understand that the
department isn’t really looking into her for placement. She is
requesting that relatives’ preference placement should be [sic] at
this time.” She noted that mother had made this request
“throughout the case” and that aunt was currently being assessed
as a possible placement, with a possible issue being maternal
uncle who lived in the same home. Mother’s counsel requested
“more information in regards to the department’s efforts and
placement with maternal aunt.” For a third time in six months,
the court ordered DCFS to continue to assess relatives, including
aunt, for placement and to update the court at the next hearing.
Mother’s counsel asked the court to set a progress hearing
regarding relative placement. The court denied that request but
ordered DCFS to “continue to make efforts to place the child with
a relative and to give the court an update.”
III. Period of Review
Aunt’s home received resource family approval in March
2022. As recounted by DCFS in a later report, on March 29,
2022, the CSW called the caregiver to inform her that DCFS
intended to serve a 14-day notice to place N. with aunt.
Caregiver “expressed concerns regarding maternal aunt’s
protective capacity to ensure the mother would not have access to
the child.” The CSW explained that DCFS had reviewed with
9
aunt the terms and conditions of mother’s visitation plan for her
monitored visits with N. Caregiver stated that “she would take
the full 14 days and would be appealing.” On April 1, aunt told
DCFS that she had a caretaker action plan, including someone to
take care of N. while aunt was at work, and a “circle” of support.
aunt “expressed concerns” to the CSW that the caregiver “has
developed a strong bond with the minor, and is not in agreement
with having N[.] be placed under her care. [Aunt] raised these
concerns once the caregiver expressed her plan to file a grievance
to prevent a placement change.”
It does not appear from the record that DCFS ever issued
the 14-day notice or took any further steps in April toward
placing N. with aunt.
On May 17, 2022, the foster agency, DCFS, the caregiver,
and aunt participated in a child and family team (CFT) meeting
to discuss “the possibility” of having N. placed with aunt now that
her home was resource family approved. As later reported by
DCFS, “[o]ne of the areas discussed is [aunt] not having
consistent or sufficient face-to-face visits with the minor due to
her work schedule. The Department, the caregiver, and the
maternal aunt attempted to develop a consistent visitation
schedule; however, due to scheduling conflicts, a visitation
agreement could not be reached. Another matter discussed was
that minor had developed a very strong bond with the current
caregiver, and thus, a concern was raised as to whether it would
be in the minor’s best interest to remove her from the current
caregiver. It was recommended4 a bonding study be ordered prior
4 The report does not specify who made this
recommendation.
10
to any changes in placement to ensure minor’s best interest are
[sic] prioritized when making any placement recommendations.”
DCFS filed a status review report on August 10, 2022,
reporting that N. was doing well with the caregiver who was a
“strong advocate of the child’s needs.” DCFS also reported that
the caregiver “has also facilitated visits for the mother by
monitoring mother’s visit [sic] with the minor via zoom and as
well for the maternal aunt . . . in-person. [The caregiver] wants
to ensure the child remains connected with the family in order to
establish a good social-emotional relationship.” Mother was
currently in an inpatient behavioral health center and the CSW
was coordinating with her social worker to “resume virtual visits”
with N. once per week.
The caregiver reported that N. was scheduled for an intake
assessment at the regional center. She was not receiving mental
health services at that time. Regarding visitation, the caregiver
reported that mother had virtual visits through zoom, lasting 15
to 20 minutes. The caregiver stated that mother was appropriate
during visits. The caregiver also stated that she was only
available to facilitate virtual visits with mother from 1 to 2 p.m.
As for aunt, the caregiver reported that she monitored in-person
visits with aunt and MGM once per month. Aunt was
appropriate, loving, and attentive toward N. during visits. The
caregiver told DCFS that it would be detrimental to remove N.
from her home.
DCFS concluded that N. would be at high risk of harm if
returned to mother and recommended that N. remain with the
caregiver or aunt. DCFS reported that “[d]espite the caregiver[ ]
working remotely from home the maternal aunt is receiving 1x
visit with the minor a month,” due to the conflicting work
11
schedules of aunt and the caregiver. DCFS noted that although
aunt’s “home has been RFA approved, the minor remains placed
with the current caregiver. At this time, the minor appears to
have a very strong bond with the caregiver. The Department is
concerned the caregiver and maternal aunt’s conflicting schedule
is not conducive to the minor having consistent visits with the
aunt, thus not allowing her to develop a bond and healthy social
emotional attachment with her. If a bonding study is
recommended, the Department recommends that maternal aunt’s
home be considered as placement for the minor if it is deemed in
the minor’s best interest.”
At the next status hearing on September 1, 2022, N.’s
counsel asked to set the matter for contest because DCFS’s report
did not have a formal recommendation regarding whether to
order additional reunification services for either parent. The
court stated it would continue the matter to allow DCFS to clarify
its recommendations. The court also noted that aunt had been
approved and asked for input from counsel about placement. N.’s
counsel requested a formal assessment from DCFS in the next
report, stating “I don’t believe that this report gives enough
information regarding the maternal aunt, and I’m also requesting
a bonding study between [N.] and the current caregiver.” The
court stated that N.’s counsel’s office would have to pay for the
bonding study. Mother’s counsel stated that she thought there
was a bonding study already done but it was not attached to the
last report. The court also gave DCFS discretion to allow aunt
unmonitored visits with N.
In a September 29, 2022 last-minute information, DCFS
reported on mother’s progress at the behavioral health center,
where mother had recently moved. DCFS also reported that it
12
spoke with the caregiver regarding the bonding study, but the
caregiver stated “she did not feel a need to move forward with a
bonding study . . . as she feels it obvious [sic] the minor has
established a strong bond and has well-adjusted in her home and
care.” The caregiver also stated that recently N. had been
through “several invasive medical appointments and [she]
believes adding another psychologist appointment will
overwhelm” N. N. was a client of the regional center and was
receiving services once a week. The caregiver also stated that N.
“has been identified as at high risk for mental illness” by her
pediatrician “as it runs in [N.’s] family, therefore providing a
current stable and stimulating environments [sic] is in the best
interest for the minor as any changes could cause the minor
trauma.” According to the caregiver, mother had not seen N. in
person since N. was discharged from the hospital after she was
born. The caregiver stated that N. had referred to her as “mom”
since N. was 11 months old (approximately two months prior).
The CSW spoke with aunt regarding “establishing a
consistent visitation plan.” Aunt stated that she worked in the
afternoons and understood that the caregiver worked in the
morning. Aunt stated she was available for visits on weekends
and wanted to have visits more frequently than once per month.
Aunt reported that “she frequently communicates with the
caregiver to inquire a best day and time to meet with the minor
over the weekend, yet she is regularly informed that the
caregiver have [sic] already established planned weekends
between her and the minor only.” The CSW also spoke with the
caregiver, who stated she believed once per month visitation “is
feasible at this time.” The caregiver stated “she makes every
effort for the minor to connect” with relatives, including aunt, but
13
“also recognizes that she and the minor need ‘down time’ from
her work week schedule. The caregiver expressed she has in
place a planned schedule for her and the minor on the weekends
which allows them to spend quality time together.” The caregiver
agreed “to discuss further” having a consistent visitation plan for
aunt to “be in place moving forward in the next month.” In the
last-minute information, DCFS recommended that reunification
services for mother be terminated and that N. remain placed with
the caregiver, noting that although aunt was resource family
approved, N. “appears to have a very strong bond with the
caregiver.”
In October 2022, the caregiver filed a caregiver information
form, attaching a letter in which she stated that N. was “deeply
bonded” to her, had called her “mom” and “mama” since she was
11 months old, and “shows a strong preference for me over all
others.” She stated that a social worker approached her in May
2022 about doing a bonding study to assist DCFS in assessing
N.’s best interest, but the idea was “only briefly discussed.” She
stated that she “really wanted the bonding study in May,” but did
not believe it was necessary now that N. was 14 months old and
“undoubtedly even more deeply bonded to me . . . and no
reasonable psychologist would be likely to conclude otherwise.”
At the review hearing on October 7, 2022, mother’s counsel
told the court that mother was not in attendance but “her
conservator, maternal aunt” was present. Summarizing DCFS’s
position, the court stated that DCFS was recommending
terminating reunification services for mother because mother had
not addressed her substance abuse and mental health issues.
The court also noted that aunt was mother’s conservator and had
been resource family approved for placement, but that DCFS had
14
reported on N.’s strong bond with the caregiver. N.’s counsel
stated that mother had not shown any progress in her case plan.
She argued that it would not be in N.’s best interest to give
mother additional services. Mother’s counsel asked for more time
to allow mother to stabilize, stating that mother was in a facility
getting psychiatric help, but there had been difficulty getting her
into a dual enrollment program.
Mother’s counsel also requested a section 361.3 hearing to
apply the relative placement preference, noting that the court
ordered aunt to have unmonitored visits with N. at the last
hearing, but aunt “still has not been getting those visits. The
caregiver also does not want to make time for visits on the
weekends because she said that . . . she’s busy having bonding
time with N. Under 361.3, the preference is supposed to be to
relatives, your honor. The aunt has been approved since last
March.” Mother’s counsel also noted that no bonding study was
ever done, and that “the caregiver is now refusing to do the
bonding study.” She further reported that mother “has been
trying to have her virtual visits, but the caregiver also does not
show up at the link where the virtual visits are supposed to take
place. So I think the caregiver has been dragging her feet as far
as getting visits to both the mother and [aunt]. So I would ask
that a 361.3 hearing be ordered, and that maternal aunt’s
unmonitored visits begin immediately.”
Counsel for DCFS stated that the caregiver “is saying that
she does not see a need for a bonding study at this juncture.” As
for visits, DCFS counsel noted that there had been “a conflict as
to scheduling,” and that DCFS “will continue to work with the
family,” but that it “requires flexibility on everyone’s side.” The
court questioned whether the family was “entitled by law to a
15
361.3 hearing” and noted that in the last report DCFS had stated
that aunt was approved but that DCFS believed it was “in this
child’s best interest to remain with her current caregiver, given
their strong bond and the length of time the child has been with
the current caregiver.” However, the court concluded that it
would set the matter for a section 361.3 hearing “in an
abundance of caution.” The court asked N.’s counsel to weigh in,
and counsel noted that aunt was not RFA approved until N. was
six months old, at which time she had “created a very strong bond
to her current caretaker,” and that aunt had not been given
consistent visitation. The court ordered DCFS to work with aunt
and the caregiver in coordinating a written visitation schedule for
unmonitored visits with aunt, to be provided to aunt within one
week.
The court found that the required notice had been given,
that continued jurisdiction was necessary, and that mother’s
progress with her case plan had not been substantial. The court
found by clear and convincing evidence that DCFS “provided or
offered reasonable services that were designed to aid the parents
to overcome the problems that led to the initial removal and
continued custody of the child.” The court terminated mother’s
reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26
hearing.
IV. Section 361.3 Hearing
DCFS filed a report on November 3, 2022 for the section
361.3 hearing. Aunt told DCFS that she wanted to provide N.
with permanency through adoption and would ensure that N.’s
needs were met. DCFS reported that aunt’s home was safe and
she had a childcare plan in place. Aunt began unmonitored visits
on October 9, 2022, with a visitation plan providing for two-hour
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visits, twice per month. Despite never mentioning any concerns
before, DCFS reported that it “remains concerned” with aunt’s
“mental health issues” because she had depression and anxiety
and saw a therapist in 2013. Aunt stated that she takes
medication and manages her mental health. Aunt also reported
that she sought therapy for her daughter after the daughter
experienced social anxiety and was bullied. DCFS concluded that
it was in N.’s best interest to remain with the caregiver and that
it would be detrimental to N. to be removed from the caregiver
and placed with aunt.
On November 7, 2022, the caregiver filed a de facto parent
request. She attached a letter from a regional center provider
which had been providing developmental services to N. once per
week since July 29, 2022. The provider reported that N. had
made good progress in her development and demonstrated good
social-emotional skills.
DCFS filed a brief recommending that N. remain placed
with the caregiver. DCFS noted that mother “continues to be
under LPS conservatorship.” In the brief, DCFS focused on the
caregiver and her relationship with N.; it provided no additional
information regarding aunt. DCFS also attached a new caregiver
information form, with a new statement by the caregiver. The
caregiver stated that at the May 2022 CFT meeting, “DCFS gave
Aunt every benefit of the doubt,” but some of the foster agency
social workers “brought up some of their ongoing concerns about
Aunt’s ability if the case closed to protect from Mother.”
According to the caregiver, DCFS then told her several weeks
later that “they [sic] decided not to move N[.] as they were not
sure it was” in her best interest. At the time, the caregiver stated
that N. was “suffering from separation anxiety and fear of
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strangers” and that N.’s mental health was in question. She also
stated that she was “all for” the bonding study when it was
proposed by a foster agency social worker during the CFT, but
DCFS “felt very strongly there was no point to such a study,” and
that “there was no question for them N[.] was bonded to me.”
The caregiver stated that she was “surprised” when DCFS
brought up the bonding study “many months later,” but said “if
the judge ordered it that would be fine, I was just getting worried
N[.] had now been put through a lot over the past year.” She also
attached a letter from the owner of N.’s preschool, opining that
separating N. from the caregiver would be “damaging to her
mental health” and could further set back her developmental
milestones. The caregiver attached a letter from N.’s pediatrician
with similar statements.
Both aunt and the caregiver attended the section 361.3
hearing on November 16, 2022. Counsel for DCFS argued that
placing N. with aunt at that point was not in N.’s best interests.
N.’s counsel stated that N. should be placed with aunt in
accordance with the relative placement preference and because
there was nothing in the record to indicate why aunt “could not
have safe placement of my client. She’s been RFA approved since
March. It’s unclear why there wasn’t even a movement prior to
today.” She noted that aunt continued to have monitored visits
for seven months after she was approved in March, but DCFS’s
reports did not “indicate the reason why they were monitored,
given that the maternal aunt was already RFA-approved.” N.’s
counsel also noted that aunt had “called in to every hearing since
detention on August 17[, 2021]. She’s made it clear that she’s
wanted placement” of N. and “at every substantive hearing, she
has requested to be assessed for placement.”
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Mother’s counsel agreed with N.’s counsel, arguing that
DCFS “does not get to break the rules throughout and then come
back and say that it’s too late to have placement with the
maternal aunt.” She noted that the “department never gave a
reason why N[.] was not placed” with aunt after RFA approval,
even though aunt “checks off all of the requirements. She has a
safe home. She is willing to provide permanent placement for
N[.]. Everything that she has been asked to do, she has qualified
to do.” The court continued the hearing to December. The court
also asked about the caregiver’s de facto parent motion, then set
for hearing on February 3. The caregiver asked the court if it
could be heard in December so that she could “weigh in on the
361.3 hearing.” The court denied that request.
At the continued hearing on December 1, 2022, the
caregiver appeared with counsel, who noted the “request for de
facto status on file.” The court agreed to proceed with hearing
the de facto motion. The court found that the caregiver had been
caring for N. since she was two days old, had been meeting N.’s
“medical, educational, psychological needs on a daily basis and
going above and beyond what is required. The child seems well
bonded to the caregiver, and the caregiver is aware of the child’s
special needs and is accessing all the needed services from
regional center and other providers.” The court therefore granted
de facto parent status to the caregiver.
Turning to the section 361.3 hearing, DCFS argued that it
would be in N.’s best interest to remain in the caregiver’s home.
The parties and the court discussed whether the relative
placement preference applied post-disposition. The court agreed
with DCFS that the preference did not apply and also stated that
“even if I could exercise my discretion, is it in the best interest of
19
this child at this point when the child is extremely bonded to the
caregiver . . . and the child seems to be thriving in her care.” The
court stated that it “wasn’t like [DCFS] just delayed, delayed,
delayed” in terms of completing the assessment for aunt. The
court also cited the opinion by the pediatrician opposed to moving
N.
N.’s counsel argued that it was in N.’s best interest to place
her with aunt, noting that aunt could address any anxiety issues
N. might experience because aunt “had been the conservator for
mother and has addressed her mental health issues. Not only
that, but [aunt’s] daughter N[.]’s cousin has shown she’s had
some social anxiety, and [aunt] has adequately cared for her
daughter . . . with those issues.” N.’s counsel also noted again
that aunt had been approved for placement since March but was
not given unmonitored visits until October, “without any kind of
reason by the department. This was all preventing [aunt] from
having placement or greater bond” with N. Mother’s counsel
agreed, arguing that DCFS was “slow walking the whole thing”
and that aunt was “more than capable of taking care of her niece
. . . and she has been trying to get placement from the very
beginning of the case.” The caregiver’s counsel argued that the
relative preference no longer applied, that DCFS did not fail to
timely assess aunt, and that it would not be in N.’s best interest
to move her.
The court found that the relative placement preference did
not apply, because the case “does not fall into one of the
designated categories under which the preference would apply
after disposition.” The court stated that even if it exercised its
discretion, it “does not find it would be in this child’s best interest
to be placed with the maternal aunt,” given N.’s strong bond with
20
the caregiver and N.’s “special psychological and emotional
needs.” The court therefore denied the motion under section
361.3.
V. Termination of Parental Rights
On April 6, 2023, the court ordered adoption as the
permanent plan. The court held the section 366.26 hearing on
August 9, 2023. Mother was present and objected to termination
of her parental rights, stating that she believed it was in N.’s best
interest to be placed with her or a member of her family. The
court terminated the parental rights of mother and father and
designated the caregiver as the prospective adoptive parent.
Mother timely appealed from the December 2022 order
denying placement pursuant to section 361.3 and the August
2023 order terminating her parental rights. We consolidated the
appeals for the purposes of briefing and decision.
VI. ICWA Proceedings
Mother submitted an ICWA-020 Parental Notification of
Indian Status form on September 29, 2021. She stated that
maternal great-grandfather said he “may be partially Native
American.” No additional information was provided. Father
submitted a form indicating no Native American ancestry.
At the September 30, 2021 hearing, the court found that
ICWA did not apply as to father. The court asked mother for
further information regarding her report of possible Native
American ancestry. Mother identified Debra D., a prior partner
of maternal grandfather, as someone who might have further
information. Counsel for DCFS suggested that DCFS could
inquire of aunt if she had any further information. The court
agreed and deferred an ICWA finding as to mother.
21
DCFS contacted aunt, who confirmed that there was Native
American ancestry in the family, but she did not know which
tribe. Aunt then spoke to Debra D. and reported to DCFS that
Debra D. did not have further information but offered to contact
paternal great-aunt to inquire further. Aunt contacted DCFS a
few days later and relayed that according to paternal great-aunt,
a maternal great-grandfather had Native American ancestry
through the Ute Colorado tribe. DCFS mailed ICWA notices on
October 5, 2021 to Sioux and Ute tribes, listing names for mother
and MGM, and well as maternal great-grandfather’s name, but
placed in the section for maternal great-grandmother. No
information was provided for father.
In November 2021, DCFS reported receipt of ICWA
responses from several tribes, indicating that N. was ineligible
for enrollment. At the disposition hearing in February 2022,
DCFS reported to the court that it had provided notices to the
Sioux and Ute tribes and had received responses that N. was not
eligible or had received no response. The court found that there
was no reason to know ICWA applied.
On October 7, 2022, the court asked aunt about possible
Native American heritage. She responded that she was told by
Debra D. that the family was part of the Ute tribe in Colorado.
Aunt stated that Debra D. was now deceased, but she identified a
maternal great-aunt named Lisa who might have additional
information. Aunt provided Lisa’s phone number. Counsel for
DCFS also noted that it had previously noticed the Ute Mountain
tribe and the Southern Ute tribe and had been notified that N.
was not a member. The court found that notice had been
provided and ICWA did not apply.
22
On February 2, 2023, counsel for DCFS informed the court
that it had become aware of deficiencies in the ICWA report and
was looking into them. Maternal grandmother responded to the
CSW’s inquiry and stated that a maternal great-grandfather,
Aurelio, had mentioned being a part of the Mescalero Apache
Indian tribe but had never registered. Aurelio was deceased.
Maternal grandmother agreed to call the CSW back with
Aurelio’s date of birth and date of death. In March 2023, DCFS
mailed out ICWA notices to Apache and related tribes. DCFS
received several response letters indicating that N. was not
eligible.
In May 2023, maternal grandmother told DCFS that she
would not provide any further information because they were not
getting custody of N. and it was “very upsetting” for her. Aunt
also stopped responding to DCFS inquiries regarding ICWA. In
June 2023, the court found that ICWA did not apply.
DISCUSSION
Mother raises two notice issues in this appeal. Her first
argument is that the court failed to provide proper notice of
proceedings to aunt, who was mother’s conservator. Mother also
contends she did not receive proper notice of the necessity to seek
writ review to preserve a challenge to the court’s order
terminating reunification services. We conclude that the court
erred in both respects. The court’s failure to provide notice to
mother and its inattention to her incapacity were also prejudicial,
requiring reversal of the termination of reunification services and
parental rights. Substantively, mother argues that the court
erred in denying her request for relative preference pursuant to
section 361.3. We agree that the juvenile court erred and that
the error was prejudicial. Finally, mother contends that DCFS
23
failed to properly conduct its inquiry under ICWA. We direct
DCFS and the court to address any ICWA deficiencies on
remand.
I. Notice to Conservator
Mother contends that DCFS failed to serve notice of all
proceedings on aunt, as mother’s appointed conservator, and that
the court failed in its duty to appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL)
for mother or to order her conservator to appear on mother’s
behalf. She asserts that these errors require reversal of the order
terminating her parental rights.
Mother argues that DCFS and the juvenile court knew that
aunt had been appointed as her conservator at least as of
November 2021, and that the corresponding duty to involve aunt
in the dependency proceedings flowed from that point onward.
DCFS counters that apart from a few “scattered unsupported
verbal representations,” the record does not contain evidence of
mother’s conservatorship or whether DCFS or the court was
advised of it. What DCFS ignores, however, is that several of the
references in the record to mother’s conservatorship come from
DCFS and the court. In November 2021, DCFS reported that it
had been informed by mother’s social worker that aunt was
appointed as conservator for mother. Then, at a hearing in
October 2022, N.’s counsel stated that aunt was present as
mother’s conservator, a fact later echoed by the court. A month
later, DCFS reported that mother “continues to be under LPS
conservatorship.”5 As such, DCFS and the juvenile court both
5 This refers to a conservatorship of a person under the
Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act. (§ 5000 et seq.) “The LPS Act
governs the involuntary detention, evaluation, and treatment of
24
acknowledged throughout the dependency proceedings that aunt
was acting as mother’s conservator. DCFS cannot reverse course
on appeal and claim that it was unaware of aunt’s appointment.
Given aunt’s status as conservator, mother contends that
DCFS was required to serve aunt with notices of all dependency
proceedings but failed to do so. Specifically, mother asserts that
aunt was not notified of the disposition in February 2022, several
review hearings in June 2023, or the section 366.26 hearing in
August 2023. We agree that service on aunt as mother’s
conservator was required. In In re Daniel S. (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 903, 911 (Daniel S.), the court looked to Code of Civil
Procedure section 416.70, which provides that service of a
summons on a conservatee may be made by delivering a copy to
the conservator. The court concluded that DCFS was excused
from serving notice on the mother, as her significant mental
illness rendered her incapable of comprehending it, but that
DCFS was required to provide notice of the proceedings to the
mother’s conservator. (Id. at pp. 911-912.) DCFS does not
dispute that it did not serve all notices on aunt. That was error.
Mother also complains that the juvenile court was required
to appoint a GAL or order aunt to appear on behalf of mother as
persons who, as a result of mental disorder, are dangerous or
gravely disabled. (§ 5150 et seq.) The Act authorizes the
superior court to appoint a conservator of the person for one who
is determined to be gravely disabled (§ 5350 et seq.), so that he or
she may receive individualized treatment, supervision, and
placement. (§ 5350.1.) As defined by the Act, a person is ‘gravely
disabled’ if, as a result of a mental disorder, the person ‘is unable
to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or
shelter.’ (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).)” (Conservatorship of John L.
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142.)
25
her conservator. “In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally
incompetent must appear by a guardian ad litem appointed by
the court.” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 910, citing
Code Civ. Proc., § 372.) “[W]hen a dependency court is informed
that a conservator has been appointed for a party, the
dependency court also has a sua sponte obligation either to
appoint a GAL for that party or to order that the party shall
appear through his or her conservator.” (In re A.C. (2008) 166
Cal.App.4th 146, 155.) “The effect of the guardian ad litem’s
appointment is to transfer direction and control of the litigation
from the parent to the guardian ad litem. . . .” (In re James F.,
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 910.) The juvenile court’s failure here to
either appoint a GAL or order mother to appear through her
conservator was error.
We further conclude that these errors, particularly in
combination, were not harmless. Regarding the failure to provide
notice of the proceedings, we determine whether the error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Daniel S., supra, 115
Cal.App.4th at p. 913.) On the other hand, the court’s failure to
appoint a GAL or order aunt to appear on mother’s behalf is
reviewed under the harmless error standard. (See In re A.C.,
supra, at p. 157 [“The failure to appoint a GAL or to compel a
person’s guardian to appear is not jurisdictional, but ‘merely
irregular.”].) For the latter, “[w]e do not set aside the judgment
unless a different result would have been probable had the error
not occurred.” (Ibid., citing In re Lisa M. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d
915, 920, fn. 4.)
The errors here were prejudicial to mother under either
standard. DCFS and the court knew that mother was repeatedly
and extensively hospitalized for mental illness and that she
26
lacked capacity to the extent that aunt was appointed as her
conservator. But the court failed to order aunt to appear in the
dependency proceedings on mother’s behalf. While aunt was
present at many of the proceedings, she was not advised that she
could speak for mother. Similarly, although aunt received some
of the notices of proceedings that were sent to her address for
mother, they were not addressed to aunt as mother’s conservator.
Without knowing she had the ability to appear on mother’s
behalf, aunt had no opportunity to voice the family’s concerns
regarding the numerous failures by DCFS and the court,
including the lack of visitation given to either mother or aunt and
the delays in assessing aunt for placement of N. Although some
of these issues were raised by mother’s and N.’s counsel, aunt
could have provided further information as to the severity of the
issues (information that DCFS should have provided in its
reports but did not) and could have urged the court to act.
Certainly, with proper notice, aunt could have been present on
mother’s behalf for key hearings such as the disposition and
section 366.26 hearings. As such, these errors were prejudicial
and require the reversal of the order terminating mother’s
parental rights.
II. Writ Notice
Mother next seeks to challenge the court’s October 7, 2022
order terminating her reunification services and setting the
matter for a section 366.26 hearing. She contends that the court
erred in finding that DCFS provided reasonable services to her
during the reunification period. However, an order terminating
reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing is not
appealable unless “[a] petition for extraordinary writ review was
filed in a timely manner.” (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1); see also In re
27
X.Z. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1248–1249.) “The failure to
take a writ from a nonappealable dispositional order forfeits any
challenge to that order, except if the juvenile court fails to advise
a parent of the writ petition requirement. In that case, the
parent generally has good cause to be relieved of the
requirement.” (In re J.R. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 513, 525, citing
In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 625.) Mother did not
seek writ review of the October 2022 order. She contends her
claim is not barred because the juvenile court failed to provide
her with proper notice of the writ requirement. We agree.
When a juvenile court orders a hearing pursuant to section
366.26, it is obligated to advise the parties of the writ
requirement. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A); Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.590, subd. (b).) If a party is present at the hearing at which the
section 366.26 hearing is set, the court must orally advise the
party of the writ requirement; if the party is not present, the writ
advisement must be mailed by first-class mail to that person’s
last known address. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A); In re A.A. (2016)
243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1239-1240; rule 5.590(b)(2).) When
assessing compliance with the written advisement requirement,
we look to whether the juvenile court sent notice “to an address
where [the party] would likely receive it.” (In re A.A., at p. 1240.)
Mother was not present at the October 7, 2022 hearing, but
aunt was. Moreover, mother’s counsel expressly informed the
court that aunt was present as mother’s appointed conservator.
As we previously discussed, the court was therefore required to
provide aunt with the oral writ advisement on mother’s behalf.
The court’s failure to do so was error. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A).)
The written writ advisement was also insufficient. The
court clerk mailed the writ notification to mother at the mailing
28
address mother listed on her “Notification of Mailing Address”
form (Judicial Council form JV-140). This address was also
aunt’s home address. However, in September 2021, mother told
DCFS that she was in an inpatient mental health facility and
requested that DCFS send her notices to the facility. The DCFS
dependency investigator agreed to send mother’s notices as
requested. DCFS subsequently reported in September 2022 that
mother had been admitted to a different facility and provided the
court with the facility’s address. As such, to the extent the court
was required to serve mother directly, her “last known address”
was the health facility where she was residing at the time of the
October 2022 hearing. In addition, as previously discussed, the
court was required to serve aunt as mother’s conservator with all
notices of the proceeding. It is undisputed that it did not serve
aunt with a written writ advisement.
As a result of the failure to advise mother and aunt of the
writ requirement, mother has good cause to excuse her failure to
timely seek an extraordinary writ regarding the termination of
her reunification services. We therefore reach the merits of
mother’s arguments on that issue.
Mother contends that the order terminating her
reunification services must be reversed because the juvenile court
failed to make the proper finding by clear and convincing
evidence and DCFS failed to provide her with reasonable services
prior to termination.
“A finding that reasonable reunification services have been
provided must be made upon clear and convincing evidence.
‘When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order
is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the
trial court is clear and convincing evidence, the reviewing court
29
must determine if there is any substantial evidence—that is,
evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value—to
support the conclusion of the trier of fact.’” (In re Alvin R. (2003)
108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971 (Alvin R.); see also Serena M. v.
Superior Court of Fresno County (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, 674;
In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306.) “When applying
the substantial evidence test, however, we bear in mind the
heightened burden of proof. [Citation.] ‘Under this burden of
proof, “evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt.
It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating
assent of every reasonable mind.” [Citation.]’” (Alvin R., supra,
108 Cal.App.4th at p. 971, quoting In re Monica C., supra, 31
Cal.App.4th at p. 306.)
Here, when terminating reunification services, the court
found by clear and convincing evidence that DCFS “provided or
offered reasonable services that were designed to aid the parents
to overcome the problems that led to the initial removal and
continued custody of the child.” The court further found that
mother’s compliance with the case plan was not substantial and
mother’s visits had been “inconsistent.” We cannot conclude that
substantial evidence supports the finding that the services
provided by DCFS were reasonable.
Services are reasonable if the Department has “identified
the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services
designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable
contact with the parents during the course of the service plan,
and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where
compliance proved difficult.” (Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 972-973, quoting In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403,
414, italics omitted.) “Visitation is an essential component of any
30
reunification plan.” (Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 972,
citing In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580.) “To promote
reunification, visitation must be as frequent as possible.” (Alvin
R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 972, citing In re Luke L. (1996)
44 Cal.App.4th 670, 679.)
DCFS failed to provide mother with reasonable services to
support her visitation with N. At the August 2021 detention
hearing, the court ordered a minimum of nine hours visitation
per week for mother and a written visitation schedule. DCFS did
not provide a written visitation schedule to mother until after it
was again ordered to do so in February 2022, six months later.
Worse still, DCFS provided no information about any visits
between mother and N. for the first year of dependency
proceedings. The record does not make clear how many virtual
visits mother had, but it appears to be only a few, and both
mother and the caretaker stated that she had not had a single in-
person visit. Although mother was in inpatient programs for
much of this time, there is no discussion of any attempts by
DCFS to coordinate visitation between mother and N. The court
repeatedly ordered DCFS to assess the feasibility of visits at
mother’s facilities, but DCFS failed to do so and the court failed
to enforce its orders. To the extent mother had visits during this
period, DCFS provided no information as to their frequency or
quality. As of August 2022, one year after detention, the
caregiver reported that mother was having 15 to 20 minute
virtual visits once per week. At that time, mother was still
entitled to a minimum of nine hours of visitation per week with
N. There is no record of any attempt by DCFS to provide mother
with anything more than the single, short weekly virtual visit
allowed by the caretaker. Incredibly, DCFS’s failure to provide
31
reasonable services to mother was then used as a basis to deny
her further reunification services. At the October 2022 hearing,
N.’s counsel argued that mother should not get additional
services because, among other issues, she had not been visiting
with N. Mother’s counsel responded that mother had been
attempting to have virtual visits with N. but the caregiver “does
not show up.” The court then terminated mother’s reunification
services, finding that mother’s visitation had been inconsistent.
“Time [is] critical. The longer parent and child live with no
visitation, the less likely there will ever be any meaningful
relationship.” (Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 973, citing
In re Monica C., supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 307.) DCFS’s failure
to assist mother with any visitation for the first year of N.’s
detention, followed by its continuing failure to provide an
adequate amount of visitation, was unreasonable. The court’s
conclusion to the contrary was not supported by substantial
evidence and the order terminating mother’s reunification
services must be reversed.
III. Relative Placement Preference
Mother contends that DCFS and the juvenile court failed to
apply the relative placement preference under section 361.3
throughout the dependency proceedings, beginning with aunt’s
request the day after N. was born in August 2021 and
culminating in the denial of mother’s request to place N. with
aunt at the December 1, 2022 hearing. DCFS contends the court
correctly found that section 361.3 was not applicable because at
the time of the December 2022 hearing, reunification services
had been terminated. Additionally, DCFS argues that any error
was harmless because there was ample evidence supporting the
juvenile court’s determination that retaining N.’s placement with
32
the caregiver was in the child’s best interest. We agree with
mother that the relative placement preference applied in light of
the extensive failures by DCFS and the court and aunt’s early
and repeated requests for placement. We also conclude that this
error was prejudicial and therefore reverse the order denying the
request for section 361.3 preference and the order terminating
mother’s parental rights.
A. Statutory Framework
The Legislature has unequivocally declared the purpose of
dependency law is “to preserve and strengthen a child’s family
ties whenever possible.” (§ 16000, subd. (a).) To that end, the
Legislature has instructed that “[i]f a child is removed from the
physical custody of his or her parents, preferential consideration
shall be given whenever possible to the placement of the child
with the relative as required by Section 7950 of the Family Code.”
(Ibid.) As the Legislature has explained, “Research shows that
children in out-of-home care placed with relatives and
nonrelative extended family members are more stable, more
likely to be placed with siblings, and more likely to stay
connected to their community and extended family. California
statutory and regulatory provisions should maximize the
likelihood that a child will initially be placed in the care of a safe
relative or nonrelative extended family member who is willing to
provide permanent care if reunification cannot be achieved.”
(§ 16519, subd. (d).)
The statutory framework accordingly sets forth a series of
duties and preferences to assist families, DCFS, and the court in
considering placement of a detained child. Within 30 days of
detention, the social worker must conduct “an investigation in
order to identify and locate” all grandparents, parents of a sibling
33
of the child, and other adult relatives of the child, and must
provide those relatives with notification of the removal, a relative
information form, and their “options to participate in the care
and placement of the child and support for the child’s family.”
(§ 309, subd. (e).) Also upon detention, the social worker must
investigate and assess the circumstances and “shall immediately
release the child to the custody of the child’s parent, guardian,
. . . or relative,” unless certain enumerated conditions exist,
including that “[c]ontinued detention of the child is a matter of
immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the child
and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be
protected in their home or the home of a relative.” (§ 309, subd.
(a).)
If a relative “is available and requests emergency
placement of the child pending the detention hearing, or after the
detention hearing and pending the dispositional hearing,” DCFS
“shall initiate an assessment of the relative’s . . . suitability for
emergency placement pursuant to Section 361.4.” (§ 309, subd.
(d)(1).) Emergency placement requires DCFS to “(1) Conduct an
in-home inspection to assess the safety of the home and the
ability of the relative . . . to care for the child’s needs,” and
conduct a check of prior child abuse allegations and criminal
records for all adults in the home, with certain exceptions.
(§ 361.4, subd. (a).) Upon completion of this assessment, “the
child may be placed in the home on an emergency basis.” (§ 309,
subd. (d)(2).) DCFS must then initiate the process for approval of
the relative as a resource family “no later than five business days
after the placement.” (Ibid.)
The relative placement preference is set forth in section
361.3, which states, “In any case in which a child is removed from
34
the physical custody of his or her parents pursuant to Section
361, preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a
relative of the child for placement of the child with the relative.”
(§ 361.3, subd. (a).) “‘Preferential consideration’ means that the
relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be
considered and investigated.” (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).) “The statute
does ‘not supply an evidentiary presumption that placement with
a relative is in the child’s best interests’ but it does require the
social services agency and juvenile court to determine whether
such a placement is appropriate.” (In re R.T. (2015) 232
Cal.App.4th 1284, 1295–1296 (R.T.), quoting In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 320.) “The correct application of the
relative placement preference places the relative ‘at the head of
the line when the court is determining which placement is in the
child’s best interests.’” (Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 1023, 1033.)
“[A] timely request for placement, made in open court, is
sufficient to trigger the investigation and evaluation required by
section 361.3.” (In re Rodger H. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1174,
1185.) In assessing a relative’s request for placement, DCFS and
the court must consider the factors enumerated in section 361.3,
subdivision (a). These factors include “[t]he best interest of the
child, including special physical, psychological, educational,
medical, or emotional needs”; the “wishes of the parent, the
relative, and child, if appropriate”; the provisions of the Family
Code regarding relative placement, including the preference for
relative placement under Family Code, section 7950; the “good
moral character of the relative and any other adult living in the
home”; the “nature and duration of the relationship between the
child and the relative, and the relative’s desire to care for, and to
35
provide legal permanency for, the child if reunification is
unsuccessful”; the safety of the relative’s home; and the ability of
the relative to provide a stable environment for the child, protect
the child from his or her parents, facilitation with other relatives,
and “provide legal permanence for the child if reunification is
unsuccessful.” (§ 361.3, subd. (a).)
DCFS must document its efforts to assess relatives for
placement in the social study prepared pursuant to section 358.1.
(§§ 358.1, subd. (h), 361.3, subd. (c)(2); see also § 16501.1, subd.
(d)(1) [DCFS case plan must include reasons for placement
decision, which “shall consider, in order of priority, placement
with relatives, nonrelative extended family members.”].) If the
court removes the child from the parents’ custody at the
disposition hearing, the court “shall make a finding as to whether
the social worker has exercised due diligence” in identifying,
locating, and notifying the child’s relatives. (§ 358, subd. (b)(2).)
Similarly, “at any permanency hearing in which the court
terminates reunification services . . . the court shall find that the
agency . . . has made diligent efforts to locate an appropriate
relative and that each relative whose name has been submitted
to the agency or entity as a possible caretaker . . . has been
evaluated as an appropriate placement resource. (Family Code,
§ 7950.) “Ideally, the statutory scheme contemplates the Agency
has identified and approved the child’s relatives for placement
before the dispositional hearing. However, ‘[c]onsistent with the
legislative intent for children to be placed immediately with a
responsible relative, [section 361.3] does not limit the county
social worker’s ability to place a child in the home of an
appropriate relative or a nonrelative extended family member
pending the consideration of other relatives who have requested
36
preferential consideration.” (In re Isabella G. (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 708, 719 (Isabella G.), quoting § 361.3, subd. (b).)
B. Applicability of Relative Placement Preference
Despite the family’s numerous requests that N. be placed
with aunt, the juvenile court first considered mother’s request to
place N. with aunt pursuant to the section 361.3 relative
placement preference on December 1, 2022, one year and three
months after N.’s birth. At the time, the court had already
terminated mother’s family reunification services. The court
concluded that section 361.3 did not apply after disposition
unless a new placement was necessary, citing In re M.H. (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 1296 (M.H.). This was error.
The shifting preferences applicable to a child’s placement
are subject to some dispute. On one end, it is settled that until
disposition, the relative placement preference applies. (§ 361.3,
subd. (a); see also M.H., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1303.) On
the other end, after termination of parental rights and selection
of a permanent plan of adoption, a caretaker placement
preference applies “over all other applications for adoptive
placement.” (§ 366.26, subd. (k).) In between those points,
however, the law is less settled. (See In re Stephanie M., supra, 7
Cal.4th at pp. 319–320 [declining to hold that the relative
placement preference does not apply after termination of
reunification services].)
Some courts have concluded that the relative placement
preference applies after disposition only when “a new placement
of the child must be made.” (M.H., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p.
37
1303, quoting § 361.3, subd. (d).)6 Other courts have applied the
relative placement preference “at least through the reunification
period,” even where no new placement is necessary. (In re Joseph
T. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787, 794; In re Sarah S. (1996) 43
Cal.App.4th 274, 285 [“the preference afforded by section 361.3
applies to placements made before the juvenile court has
terminated reunification services”]; In re Jessica Z. (1990) 225
Cal.App.3d 1089, 1098–1099.)
A number of courts have also applied the relative
preference to the period between termination of reunification
services and termination of parental rights, in circumstances like
those present here, where the relative requested placement early
in the process and the delay in assessing placement was due to
failures by DCFS and the court. In Isabella G., for example, the
child’s paternal grandparents sought custody immediately after
detention. The agency failed to assess their home and told the
grandparents that there was a mandatory one-year waiting
period before the child could be moved from the foster family with
whom she had been placed. (Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th
at p. 711.) The agency ignored another request for placement by
grandparents a year later, at which point the parents’
reunification services were terminated. (Id. at p. 712.) After the
6 Section 361.3, subdivision (d), states in relevant part:
“Subsequent to the [dispositional hearing], whenever a new
placement of the child must be made, consideration for placement
shall again be given as described in this section to relatives who
have not been found to be unsuitable and who will fulfill the
child’s reunification or permanent plan requirements.” It is
undisputed that here, N. was doing well in her placement with
caregiver and therefore, no new placement was required absent
application of the relative placement preference.
38
grandparents filed a section 388 petition, the agency quickly
assessed and approved their home. (Ibid.) The juvenile court
found that section 361.3 did not apply. The appellate court
reversed, concluding that the relative preference applied where
the grandparents “requested placement prior to the detention,
jurisdictional and dispositional hearings,” “before the 12-month
review hearing,” and “after the case was referred for a section
366.26 hearing,” and the agency refused to comply with its
obligation to conduct a home assessment on any of those
occasions, “disregard[ing] the legislative preference for relative
placement throughout . . . [the] dependency case.” (Id. at pp. 722-
723; see also R.T., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300 [applying
relative preference where the relatives invoked the preference
before the dispositional hearing, but the agency and court failed
to apply it at disposition].)
Here, aunt did everything she could do to seek relative
placement. She immediately requested placement of N. and
when her initial request to share custody with MGM was rejected
due to a possible issue with MGM’s background, aunt promptly
requested placement on her own and set up a plan to care for N.
while she was at work. She maintained contact with DCFS,
made herself available for a home assessment, and offered to
have maternal uncle move out if his background was an issue.7
She sought visitation with N. and took advantage of the limited
visitation she was given. Moreover, aunt’s request for placement,
or at least a diligent assessment of possible placement, was
echoed repeatedly by mother’s counsel and N.’s counsel
7 Despite some references to a possible criminal waiver for
maternal uncle, there is no evidence that one was sought or
required for aunt’s home approval.
39
throughout the proceedings, along with complaints that DCFS
was failing to do so.
DCFS did not comply with its duty of due diligence in
assessing aunt for possible placement. DCFS has never provided
any explanation as to why it did not assess and/or approve aunt
for emergency placement prior to resource family approval, why
it provided no information to the parties or the court in the first
seven months of the case other than to repeat that the approval
process was pending (despite multiple orders from the court), or
why it did not place N. with aunt immediately upon detaining N.
or in March 2022 after she finally received resource approval and
DCFS indicated its intent to issue a 14-day notice to the
caregiver. It also provided no information to suggest that aunt
would not have been appropriate for placement.
The juvenile court compounded these failures—it failed to
hold DCFS accountable for its lack of diligence, instead
repeatedly issuing orders for DCFS to assess aunt and provide
further information in the next report (which DCFS never did).
The court also violated its own duty to assess aunt under the
relative caregiver preference at the disposition hearing at the
latest. (See §§ 361.3, subd. (b), 361.21.) Aunt and mother were
not required to move for application of the preference, as they
had already repeatedly made clear that aunt wanted to be
considered for placement. (See Isabella G., supra, 246
Cal.App.4th at p. 722 [“The obligation to assess a relative’s home
is triggered by the relative’s request for placement of the child.”],
citing § 361.3, subd. (a).) “If an assessment of a relative’s home is
pending at the time of the dispositional hearing, the juvenile
court should proceed with the dispositional hearing and set a
hearing under section 361.3 to review the relative placement
40
request as soon as practicable. (Id. at p. 722, fn. 11, citing §
361.3, subd. (b).) The court did not comply with these statutory
requirements.
Under the egregious circumstances presented on this
record it would be patently unfair to bar aunt from application of
the relative placement preference simply because DCFS and the
court delayed the requisite analysis until after mother’s
reunification services were terminated. Particularly baffling on
this record of DCFS’s inexplicable delay is the juvenile court’s
finding at the eventual section 361.3 hearing that Isabella G. was
distinguishable because “it wasn’t like [DCFS] just delayed,
delayed, delayed” in terms of completing the assessment for aunt.
We find Isabella G. and similar cases directly applicable and
persuasive. Conversely, we find M.H., on which DCFS and the
juvenile court relied, distinguishable. There, the court found the
relative preference inapplicable because the relative, a great-
aunt, was not included in the then-applicable definition of
“relative” under section 361.3. (M.H., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p.
1303.) Moreover, the great-aunt was not immediately available
for placement and there is no indication that the social work
agency was dilatory in its duties in seeking to assess the great-
aunt, who lived out of state. (See id. at pp. 1299-1302.) We also
agree with the court in In re Joseph T., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at
p. 794, which rejected M.H.’s narrow reading of the statute that
would limit application of the relative preference post-disposition
to instances where a new placement was required. As the court
explained, “[n]othing in section 361.3, subdivision (d), states or
implies such a result.” (Ibid.) DCFS’s contention “that the
relative placement preference applies only at the dispositional
hearing and whenever ‘a new placement is required’ thereafter—
41
drastically curtails application of the preference and is therefore
antithetical to the Legislature’s intent to ‘ensure that the
greatest feasible effort is made to place dependent children with
relatives.’” (Id. at p. 797, citing Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep.
on Sen. Bill No. 270 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 14,
1993, p. 2.)
We therefore conclude that the juvenile court erred in
finding that the relative placement preference did not apply.
C. Prejudicial Error
We must also determine whether the court’s error was
prejudicial. In assessing whether an error is prejudicial, we ask
whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result
absent that error. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59-60;
see also Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 723-724.)
DCFS contends that any error in failing to apply the relative
placement preference was harmless, as the court also found that
it was in N.’s best interests to remain with the caregiver due to
their strong bond. Thus, DCFS contends there is no reasonable
probability of a different outcome on remand. Mother does not
dispute the bond between N. and the caregiver or that the
caregiver was providing a stable and loving home. But she
argues that the court also should have assessed N.’s relationship
with aunt and taken into account the failures of DCFS and the
court throughout the proceedings. We agree with mother and
conclude that the court’s failure to do so requires reversal.
DCFS’s focus remains almost completely on the
relationship between N. and the caregiver. It points to the
evidence, almost entirely supplied by the caregiver and letters
submitted on her behalf, that she and N. were strongly bonded,
that the caregiver provided N. with a loving, stable home and
42
made sure N. had access to the medical care and regional center
resources she required, and that N. might suffer “stress, trauma,
anxiety, and confusion” if taken away from the caregiver. The
juvenile court similarly focused on this relationship, as well as
concerns expressed by N.’s pediatrician about moving N.8
However, DCFS ignores a number of factors that DCFS and the
court were required to consider under section 361.3.
In assessing the relative placement preference for aunt, the
court was required to conduct not a generalized “best interest
inquiry,” but an “independent assessment of the relevant
statutory criteria under section 361.3” (Isabella G., supra, 246
Cal.App.4th at p. 722, fn. 11 citing R.T., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1300), bearing in mind that “preferential consideration shall
be given” to a request for relative placement (§ 361.3, subd. (a),
emphasis added). Here, a number of the relevant factors weighed
in favor of placing N. with aunt, including the strong legislative
preference for placement with a family member. In addition,
mother, N. (through counsel), and aunt all requested placement
with aunt; she had demonstrated her desire to provide a
permanent placement for N. through adoption; she visited and
bonded with N., along with MGM and N.’s cousin, to the limited
degree she was allowed; and she had a demonstrated ability to
care for a child with anxiety as she had helped her own daughter
8 There was no objection to the letters submitted by N.’s
pediatrician below. We note with some concern the weight that
the juvenile court seemed to place on this opinion, without any
discussion of its foundation or this doctor’s expertise, and no
other evidence of N.’s mental state. This is particularly troubling
where the caregiver rejected the proposed bonding study, which
would have allowed a neutral professional with relevant
expertise to weigh in on this issue.
43
work through those issues, and she showed a willingness to seek
treatment for any mental health issues. Indeed, it is telling that
despite its unexplained reticence to place N. with aunt, DCFS
never identified any concerns about aunt or barriers to that
placement. The court was required to weigh these factors against
its best interest finding. It does not appear from the record that
it did so. There was little evidence in the record regarding aunt’s
relationship with N.; DCFS provided minimal details and aunt
did not testify at the section 361.3 hearing or provide a
declaration to counter the evidence supplied by the caregiver.
In addition, the juvenile court’s determination that keeping
N. with the caregiver was in the child’s best interest is
undermined by the host of failures by DCFS and the court
leading up to it. As we have discussed above, for more than a
year the court ordered DCFS to promptly evaluate aunt’s home
for placement, and DCFS repeatedly failed to comply. Instead of
enforcing its prior orders, the court simply repeated them, only to
have DCFS again fail to do its duty. As a result, aunt apparently
was never considered for placement prior to resource family
approval, and she did not receive that approval for more than
seven months. At that point, DCFS indicated it was planning to
move N. to aunt’s care but withdrew that plan due to the
caregiver’s objection. DCFS provided no other basis for its sudden
about-face and the court did nothing to provide aunt with the
relative preference assessment to which she was entitled. DCFS
continued to defer to the caregiver, allowing her to reject the
recommended bonding study out of hand. These failures were
compounded by the unreasonably limited visitation given to aunt
and N. Despite aunt’s requests for additional visitation, echoed
by counsel for N. and mother, DCFS allowed the caregiver to
44
unilaterally determine that visits between aunt and N. for two
hours once a month were sufficient and to reject weekend visits
entirely because the caregiver stated that she was busy using
that time to solidify her bond with N. DCFS also failed to provide
aunt with unmonitored visits, without giving any reason for
doing so and despite all of the evidence indicating that aunt’s
visits were appropriate. Once the court ordered DCFS to provide
aunt with a written visitation schedule, aunt finally began
having unmonitored visits twice per month in October 2022, more
than a year after she first requested placement of N.
This series of events–repeated violations of DCFS’s duty to
follow the law and the court’s failure to enforce its own orders—
resulted in a complete failure to honor the clear legislative
mandate to give early and prompt priority to placement with
family members. As a result, N.’s family was shut out of the
process and N. and her family were wrongly deprived of the
opportunity provided to them by statute for placement within the
family. This also violated N.’s rights to placement with her close
relative and, at a minimum, her right to visit and bond with aunt
and aunt’s daughter (her first cousin). (See § 16001.9, subd. (a)
[dependent children have the right to “be placed with a relative
or nonrelative extended family member if an appropriate and
willing individual is available,” and to “visit and contact siblings,
family members, and relatives privately, unless prohibited by
court order”].) Aunt’s, mother’s, mother’s counsel’s, and N.’s
counsel’s repeated requests for DCFS and the court to perform
their statutory duties were ignored, as were their requests for
more meaningful visitation. After enough time passed that N.
was bonded to the caregiver, DCFS and the juvenile court then
cited that bond as a reason to reject relative placement with aunt.
45
DCFS and the juvenile court cannot completely abdicate
their duties in applying the legislative preference of placing
detained children with a family member, to the detriment of the
child and the family, and then later rely on the passage of time
caused by their own failures to preclude that relative from
seeking placement of the child as a finding based on the child’s
best interests. (See, e.g., In re Mia M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 792,
811 [finding, in the context of parental notification, that
“[a]llowing a child’s best interests to act as a counterbalance to
the agency’s due diligence obligations would turn one of the key
goals of the dependency statutory scheme on its head, reducing
the chance of family reunification while simultaneously
rewarding inadequate efforts” by DCFS].)
We recognize that “[t]he relative placement preference . . .
is not a relative placement guarantee.” (In re Joseph T., supra,
163 Cal.App.4th at p. 798.) In addition, “[t]he passage of time is
a significant factor in a child’s life; the longer a successful
placement continues, the more important the child’s need for
continuity and stability becomes in the evaluation of her best
interests.” (In re Lauren R. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 841, 855.)
However, mother and aunt are entitled to a full and fair
assessment of the relative placement preference and N.’s best
interests, following additional reunification services for mother
and a meaningful chance at visitation for aunt. It is reasonably
likely that such an assessment could lead to a different result
upon remand. (See Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 725.)
46
Thus, the court’s failure to apply the relative placement
preference was not harmless.9
DISPOSITION
We reverse the juvenile court orders terminating mother’s
reunification services and her parental rights and designating
the caregiver as N.’s prospective adoptive parent. The matter is
remanded for further proceedings, including a hearing on aunt’s
placement request pursuant to section 361.3 and further ICWA
inquiry.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COLLINS, ACTING P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J. ZUKIN, J.
9 Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s finding that
ICWA did not apply, arguing that DCFS failed to conduct the
requisite inquiry into possible Native American heritage. She
contends that DCFS failed to contact certain maternal relatives
identified as possibly having additional information (§ 224.2,
subd. (b)) and failed to provide accurate and complete
information in the notices sent to tribes (§ 224.3). Because we
are remanding on other grounds, we do not reach the merits.
Instead, we direct DCFS and the juvenile court to conduct further
ICWA inquiry as soon as practicable. If that inquiry reveals
evidence of Native American heritage, then DCFS and the court
must comply with the additional ICWA requirements, including,
if applicable, updated notice consistent with the notice
requirements of section 224.3.
47
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