People v. York CA2/2

CourtListener 10033802Calctapp07.08.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/7/24 P. v. York CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B331731

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA109089)
v.

EARSELL YORK,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Robert C. Vanderet, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Richard Lennon and Jennifer Peabody, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Lauren N.
Guber, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Earsell York appeals the summary denial of a petition for
resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6. (Former
§ 1170.95, Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
Appellant was convicted by jury on September 11, 1996, of
first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and robbery (§ 211;
count 2). The jury found true the special circumstance that the
murder was committed during the commission of a robbery
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), but found not true the allegation that
appellant personally used a firearm during the commission of the
murder and the robbery (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd.
(a)(1)). The trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison
without the possibility of parole.
Appellant filed a petition for resentencing and request for
appointment of counsel under section 1172.6 on March 27, 2023.
On June 1, 2023, the superior court issued a ruling summarily
denying the petition. The court did not appoint counsel, request
briefing from the parties, or hold a hearing to determine if
appellant had made a prima facie case for relief. In its ruling,
the court stated:
“[T]he petition for resentencing [is] Denied, for the reasons
cited in the opinion of the Court of Appeal denying petitioner’s
appeal from his conviction. As the court stated, ‘The jury’s
rejection of the firearm use allegation does not mean that it must
have been someone other than appellant who fired the fatal
bullet.’ Furthermore, the evidence as to ‘appellant’s exiting the
car with a powerful handgun in his possession for the purposes of
robbing the victim, and then engaging in a struggle with the
victim while that handgun remained in his possession . . .

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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constitutes a conscious disregard for danger to human life.’
These findings satisfy the amended requirements for liability for
murder under the revised felony-murder rules.” (Ellipsis and
bold in original.)
Appellant contends that because he made a prima facie
showing that he is entitled to relief under the statute, the
superior court was obligated to issue an order to show cause
pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (c), and conduct an
evidentiary hearing in accordance with subdivision (d). Instead,
the superior court improperly engaged in factfinding based on
this court’s prior opinion in the direct appeal to determine that
appellant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
Respondent concedes the point. We accept the parties’
agreement: The superior court erred in failing to appoint counsel
and in engaging in factfinding to conclude that appellant is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. These errors were not
harmless, and the matter must be remanded for the superior
court to appoint counsel, issue an order to show cause, and
conduct further proceedings in accordance with section 1172.6,
subdivision (d).
DISCUSSION
The Superior Court Failed to Appoint Counsel and
Summarily Denied Appellant’s Section 1170.95
Petition in Error
A. Applicable legal principles
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), effectively abolishing the natural and
probable consequences doctrine in cases of murder and limiting
the application of the felony-murder doctrine. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830,

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842–843 (Gentile); People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719,
723 (Martinez).) With one narrow exception (see § 189, subd. (f)),
Senate Bill No. 1437 effectively eliminates murder convictions
premised on any theory of vicarious liability—that is, any theory
by which a person can be convicted of murder for a killing
committed by someone else, such as felony murder or the natural
and probable consequences doctrine—unless the People also
prove that the nonkiller defendant personally acted with the
intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless
disregard to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e) [requiring that
participant in specified felony during which a death occurs may
be convicted of murder only if he or she was the actual killer, an
aider and abettor who acted with intent to kill, or a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life]; § 188, subd. (a)(3) [amending the
natural and probable consequences doctrine to require that all
principals act with express or implied malice to be convicted of
murder (with the exception of felony murder under § 189,
subd. (e))]; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 842–843.)
The legislation also enacted former section 1170.95 (now
§ 1172.6), which established a procedure for vacating murder
convictions for defendants who could no longer be convicted of
murder because of the amendments to sections 188 and 189.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
957, 959, 971 (Lewis)); Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843;
Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 722–723.) A defendant
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter may
file a petition under section 1172.6 to have his or her conviction
vacated and be resentenced, if he or she “could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to

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Section 188 or 189 made effective” as a part of Senate Bill
No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
Pursuant to section 1172.6, a properly pleaded petition
must contain the following averments:
“(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed
against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime . . . [;] [¶] (2) The petitioner was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
following a trial . . . [;] [¶] [and] (3) The petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3); § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A); Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960; see also § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(B)
[requiring the superior court case number and year of petitioner’s
conviction] & (C) [petition must state whether petitioner requests
appointment of counsel].)
When a petition for resentencing meets the basic
requirements set forth in section 1172.6, subdivisions (a) and
(b)(1), the superior court must appoint counsel for petitioner if
requested (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp.
962–963, 970), obtain briefing from both sides, and hold a hearing
to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 966; People v. Reyes (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292, 297–298). “If
the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is
entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960; People v.

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Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 931 [when “a
petition satisf[ies] the basic pleading requirements, the court
must appoint counsel, permit briefing, and conduct an initial
hearing under subdivision (c) to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief, and if so, issue an order to
show cause”].)
We independently review the superior court’s denial of a
section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Berry-
Vierwinden, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 930.)
B. The record in this case does not demonstrate as a matter of
law that appellant is ineligible for relief
Appellant contends and respondent agrees that the
superior erred by failing to appoint counsel after appellant filed a
facially sufficient petition under section 1172.6. The error cannot
be deemed harmless. (People v. Mejorado (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
562, 572 (Mejorado).)
Appellant’s petition was facially sufficient: It alleged that
he was charged and convicted of first degree murder under the
felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, and he could not presently be convicted of murder due
to the changes to sections 188 and 189, made effective January 1,
2019. The petition included the superior court case number and
the year of appellant’s conviction, and specifically requested
appointment of counsel. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1); Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 959–960.) The superior court erred in failing to
appoint counsel for appellant upon the filing of this facially
sufficient petition. (Lewis, at pp. 957, 963 [“petitioners who file a
complying petition requesting counsel are to receive counsel upon
the filing of a compliant petition”].)

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The superior court’s failure to appoint counsel at the prima
facie stage of the section 1172.6 petition may be deemed harmless
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 973), but only where the record of
conviction conclusively establishes ineligibility for relief as a
matter of law (Mejorado, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 572 [error in
failing to appoint counsel harmless only where record contains
facts refuting allegations in petition]). Our Supreme Court has
stressed that the superior court should consider the petitioner’s
record of conviction, but “should not engage in ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ”
(Lewis, supra, at p. 972.)
The record of conviction includes jury verdicts, jury
instructions, and closing arguments. (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 54–56 [considering jury instructions and verdicts
to determine whether defendant made prima facie showing of
eligibility]; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 106
[considering sentencing enhancements, jury instructions, closing
arguments, and verdicts at prima facie stage].) It does not,
however, include the factual statement from a prior appellate
opinion. Although a prior appellate opinion is generally
considered to be part of the record of conviction, “the factual
summary in an appellate opinion is not evidence that may be
considered at an evidentiary hearing to determine a petitioner’s
eligibility for resentencing.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 988 (Flores); § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “By logical
extension, the factual summary also may not be used to
determine a petitioner’s eligibility at the prima facie stage.”
(People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1183; see Flores, at
p. 988 [“If [the factual summary in an appellate opinion] may not
be considered at an evidentiary hearing to determine a

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petitioner’s ultimate eligibility for resentencing, we fail to see
how such evidence could establish, as a matter of law, a
petitioner’s ineligibility for resentencing at the prima facie
stage”].)
In denying appellant’s petition at the prima facie stage “for
the reasons cited in the opinion of the Court of Appeal denying
petitioner’s appeal [from] his conviction,” the superior court
improperly relied on the prior appellate opinion to engage in
prohibited factfinding. (See Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
p. 988; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972.) The court
recited the appellate court’s statement that “ ‘[t]he jury’s rejection
of the firearm use allegation does not mean that it must have
been someone other than appellant who fired the fatal bullet,’ ”
and then improperly engaged in factfinding to find “the evidence
as to ‘appellant’s exiting the car with a powerful handgun in his
possession for the purposes of robbing the victim, and then
engaging in a struggle with the victim while that handgun
remained in his possession’ ” demonstrated “ ‘a conscious
disregard for danger to human life.’ ” The superior court
concluded that these facts from the prior opinion “satisfy the
amended requirements for liability for murder under the revised
felony-murder rules.”
Moreover, the record of conviction in this case discloses
that the trial court instructed the jury on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as it applies to murder (CALJIC
No. 3.02, 1992 rev.), first degree felony murder (CALJIC
No. 8.21), aider and abettor liability for first degree felony
murder (CALJIC No. 8.27), and the robbery-murder special
circumstance as applied to a defendant who was not the actual
killer (CALJIC No. 8.80.1, 1996 rev.) Although the jury convicted

8
appellant of first degree murder and found the robbery-murder
special circumstance true, it rejected the allegation that
appellant personally used a firearm during the commission of the
murder.
In light of these instructions, the jury’s verdict and findings
do not establish appellant is ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law. The record does not conclusively show
the jury found appellant was the actual killer, an aider and
abettor to the murder who acted with intent to kill, or a major
participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. (§ 189, subd. (e).) Further, because the jury’s true
finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance predated our
Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, that finding does
not prevent appellant from making a prima facie case for relief
under section 1172.6, “even if the trial evidence would have been
sufficient to support the findings under Banks and Clark.”
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710.)
The superior court’s errors in failing to appoint counsel and
summarily denying the petition therefore cannot be deemed
harmless. Because the record of appellant’s conviction does not
eliminate the possibility that the jury found appellant guilty of
first degree murder under a felony murder or natural and
probable consequences theory, it does not establish ineligibility
for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. Accordingly,
we reverse and remand the matter to the superior court to issue
an order to show cause and conduct further proceedings in
accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision (d). We express no
opinion on the merits of the petition.

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DISPOSITION
The superior court’s order denying the petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 is reversed. The
matter is remanded to the superior court for the issuance of an
order to show cause and further proceedings in accordance with
Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.

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