CourtListener 10028740•People v. Reyes CA4/3
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Filed 8/2/24 P. v. Reyes CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G061973
v. (Super. Ct. No. 15NF3441)
JENNY IVONNE REYES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Arthur Martin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina, Lynne G. McGinnis and Elizabeth M. Renner, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Jenny Ivonne Reyes petitioned the trial court
1
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 for resentencing on her 2018
conviction of four counts of attempted murder based on her guilty plea. The
convictions arose out of Reyes’s role in a series of stabbings at a party. The
court denied the petition at the prima facie stage, finding Reyes’s admission
in the factual basis of her guilty plea that she had the “specific intent to
kill . . . [the victims]” made her ineligible for relief. We disagree.
The California Supreme Court decided People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433 (Curiel), after the parties had fully briefed this appeal, so we
invited supplemental briefing on Curiel’s impact on this case. We conclude,
pursuant to Curiel, the trial court erred in denying Reyes’s petition at the
prima facie stage based solely on her admission that she intended to kill the
victims.
The information that charged Reyes with (among other things)
multiple counts of attempted murder showed Reyes was not charged as an
actual perpetrator of the stabbings, but rather as the driver who transported
the perpetrators to and from the crime scene. The information permitted the
People to prosecute Reyes for attempted murder under a theory of natural
and probable consequences, which is no longer a viable theory. Although
direct aiding and abetting is still a viable theory of attempted murder, Reyes
did not admit in her guilty plea all requisite elements of aiding and abetting,
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
including her knowledge of the perpetrators’ intent to kill. Nothing else in the
record of conviction conclusively refutes the allegation in Reyes’s petition that
she could not presently be convicted of attempted murder because of changes
to section 188 or 189.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand with
directions to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing
on the petition. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
CHARGES AGAINST REYES
On July 3, 2017, the People filed an information charging Reyes
with one count of conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1) [count 1]),
eight counts of attempted murder of W.L., C.P., R.P., A.B., B.R., L.B., J.A.,
and E.P. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a) [counts 2-9]), eight counts of assault
with a deadly weapon (a knife) upon the same eight individuals (§ 245, subd.
(a)(1) [counts 10-17]), and one count of street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a)
[count 18]).2 The information further alleged the attempted murders in
counts 2 through 9 were committed willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation. (§ 664, subd. (a).) It also alleged sentencing enhancements for
criminal street gang activity. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
In support of count 1, the information alleged the following: On
the evening in question, Reyes attempted to attend a party but was turned
2
Section 186.22(a): “A person who actively participates in a
criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in, or have
engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes,
furthers, or assists in felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang,
shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail . . . .”
3
away. Reyes left the location of the party, but threatened to return with a
criminal street gang. Reyes then made good on her threat: she drove back to
the party in her vehicle with three male gang members who were armed with
knives. After announcing their gang affiliation, the three gang members
proceeded to stab multiple victims indiscriminately with an intent to kill.
Reyes then drove the three gang members away from the scene in her
vehicle.
II.
GUILTY PLEA AND SENTENCING
On December 10, 2018, Reyes entered a guilty plea to four counts
of attempted murder as charged in counts 2, 5, 6, and 8 and to four counts of
assault with a deadly weapon as charged in counts 11, 12, 15, and 17. As part
of the negotiated plea deal, the prosecution agreed to strike the street gang
allegation for the purposes of sentencing only as to counts 2, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12,
15, and 17. All other counts and allegations were dismissed in the interest of
justice.
As the factual basis for her plea, Reyes admitted the following:
“In Orange County, California, on or about 12/27/15 I did
willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally, with the specific intent to
kill, aid abet and help 6 other people and attempt to murder and kill [W.L.,
A. B., B.R., and J.A.] and I knowingly and unlawfully and intentionally aided,
abetted and assisted in committing an assault upon the person of [L.B.] with
a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife, and when I committed the crimes above I
did so for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with Anaheim
Travelers City criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote,
further and assisst [sic] in criminal conduct by members of that gang and on
the same date I also willfully and unlawfully aid [sic], abetted and helped 6
4
other people commit an assault with a deadly weapon upon the person(s) of
[C.P., R.P., and E.P].”
On December 21, 2018, the trial court sentenced Reyes pursuant
to her stipulated plea agreement to a total of 15 years in state prison,
including seven years for count 2, two years and four months for count 5 to
run consecutive to count 2, two years and four months for count 6 to run
consecutive to count 2, two years and four months for count 8 to run
consecutive to count 2, two years for count 11 to run concurrent to count 2,
two years for count 12 to run concurrent to count 2, one year for count 15 to
run consecutive to count 2, and two years for count 17 to run concurrent to
count 2.
III.
PETITION FOR RESENTENCING AT PRIMA FACIE STAGE
On February 3, 2022, Reyes filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6 and requested appointment of counsel. Reyes’s
petition alleged the following: “1. A[n] . . . information . . . was filed against
me that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . . attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine” “2 . . . . I
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which I could have been convicted
of . . . attempted murder.” “3. I could not presently be convicted
of . . . attempted murder because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and
189, effective January 1, 2019.”
The trial court appointed counsel and set a hearing on the prima
facie finding. Following appointment of counsel, briefing, and a hearing on
the matter, the court issued a written order denying the petition, finding the
record of conviction demonstrated Reyes was ineligible for relief as a matter
of law pursuant to section 1172.6. As part of the record of conviction, the
5
court considered the July 3, 2017 information, Reyes’s guilty plea, the
abstract of judgment, and the parties’ briefing. The court was presented with
the preliminary hearing transcript but declined to consider it. In denying the
petition, the court found “the statement of the defendant’s intent to attempt
to kill multiple victims as written in this plea is as clear and unambiguous a
statement of a defendant’s intent to attempt to murder the victims listed here
as there could be.” Reyes filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
APPLICABLE LEGAL AUTHORITY
In 2017, when the information was filed charging Reyes with
multiple counts of attempted murder, the law permitted the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. At that time, a person who “‘“knowingly aid[ed] and
abet[ted] criminal conduct [was] guilty of not only the intended crime [target
offense] but also of any other crime the perpetrator actually commit[ted]
[nontarget offense] that [was the] natural and probable consequence of the
intended crime. The latter question [was] not whether the aider and abettor
actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was
reasonably foreseeable. [Citation.]” [Citation.] Liability under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine “[was] measured by whether a reasonable
person in the defendant’s position would have or should have known that the
charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act aided
and abetted.”’” (People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 874.)
“Thus, for example, if a person aid[ed] and abet[ted] only an
intended assault, but a murder result[ed], that person may [have been found]
guilty of that murder, even if unintended, if it [was] a natural and probable
6
consequence of the intended assault.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1111, 1117; see People v. Ayala (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1450 [fatal
shooting was a natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s aiding
and abetting an assault with a deadly weapon during a gang confrontation];
People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 922–923 [shooting was a foreseeable
consequence of a gang assault]; People v. Gonzales (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1,
10 [fatal shooting was a natural and probable consequence of a gang fight].)
But after Reyes’s guilty plea and sentencing, the law changed.
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), amending sections 188 and 189, the laws pertaining
to felony murder and murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The legislation also enacted
former section 1170.95,3 which provides a procedure to petition for retroactive
relief for those who could not now be convicted under sections 188 and 189 as
amended. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.)
A petition under section 1172.6 may be filed by “[a] person
convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The allegations of the petition
must be accepted as true but, without engaging in factfinding, the trial court
may look to the record of conviction in determining whether the allegations
have been refuted as a matter of law. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
3
Former section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, with no
change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
7
pp. 971–972.) When the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea
rather than a trial, the record of conviction includes the facts “the defendant
admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea.” (People v. Gallardo (2017) 4
Cal.5th 120, 136; see § 1192.5, subd. (c) [court approving guilty plea must
“cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is
freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea”].)
If the petitioner establishes a prima facie case for relief, the trial
court must issue an order to show cause, conduct an evidentiary hearing to
decide whether to vacate the conviction, and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts if it finds the petitioner entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds.
(c) & (d); People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) We independently
review the court’s prima facie determination that a petitioner is ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
539, 545.)
II.
THE RECORD OF CONVICTION DID NOT REFUTE
THE ALLEGATIONS IN REYES’S PETITION
Reyes’s admission as part of her guilty plea that she had the
“specific intent to kill” the victims was insufficient to rebut the allegation in
her petition that she could not be convicted of attempted murder under
current law. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 461.) Reyes’s allegation in her
petition under section 1172.6 that she “could not presently be convicted
of . . . attempted murder because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and
189” put “at issue all the elements of [attempted murder] under current law.”
(Curiel, at p. 441.) Therefore, her allegation “is not refuted by the record
unless the record conclusively establishes every element of the offense. If only
one element of the offense is established by the record, the petitioner could
8
still be correct that he or she could not currently be convicted of the relevant
offense based on the absence of other elements.” (Id. at p. 463.)
Under current law, aiders and abettors may still be convicted of a
homicide offense based on direct aiding and abetting principles. (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 462.) However, “[attempted] [m]urder liability as an
aider and abettor requires both a sufficient mens rea and a sufficient actus
reus. A finding of intent to kill, viewed in isolation, establishes neither.” (Id.
at p. 441.) “[T]he mens rea required of a direct aider and abettor includes
knowledge of the perpetrator’s intent to commit an unlawful act constituting
the offense and the intent to aid the perpetrator in its commission.” (Ibid.)
“The aider and abettor must know the direct perpetrator intends to commit
the murder or life-endangering act and intend to aid the direct perpetrator in
its commission. It is this mental relationship to the perpetrator’s acts that
confers liability on the aider and abettor.” (Id. at p. 468.)
Here, the factual basis in Reyes’s written guilty plea did not
address Reyes’s knowledge regarding the perpetrators’ intent.4 It stated, in
pertinent part: “In Orange County, California, on or about 12/27/15 I did
willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally, with the specific intent to
kill, aid abet and help 6 other people and attempt to murder and kill [W.L.,
A.B., B.R., and J.A.].”
The People contend Reyes’s guilty plea addresses all elements of
direct aiding and abetting liability because she admitted both her own intent
to kill and that she “aided, abetted, and helped six other people in attempting
to murder and kill the victims.” Perhaps that is what the prosecutor intended
4
No reporter’s transcript of the proceedings relating to Reyes’s
guilty plea was submitted as part of the record on appeal.
9
the plea form to state, but that is not what it actually says. Contrary to the
People’s characterization of the plea language, Reyes did not admit she aided
and abetted and helped others “in their attempt” to murder the victims.
Rather, the plea states Reyes “did willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and
intentionally, with the specific intent to kill, aid abet and help 6 other people
and attempt to murder and kill [four people] . . . .” (Italics added).
Read in accordance with its express terms, Reyes’s plea does not
say anything about the perpetrators’ own intent or, critically, that Reyes had
knowledge of the perpetrators’ intent. It says Reyes willfully, unlawfully,
knowingly and intentionally, and with specific intent to kill, did two things:
(1) “aid abet and help 6 other people” and (2) “attempt to murder and kill” the
identified victims. The People cite no authority that would permit us to
disregard the plain language contained in the plea to infer or otherwise
arrive at a meaning the words themselves do not support.5
In light of our conclusion that Reyes’s guilty plea was insufficient
to rebut her petition and she is entitled to an order to show cause, we need
not address her argument that the trial court should have considered the
preliminary hearing transcript in making its ruling.6
5
We need not decide whether the plea would have been sufficient
to refute Reyes’s petition had it stated, as the People contend, that Reyes
intended to kill and also aided and abetted others in attempting to kill.
6
Both parties submitted the preliminary hearing transcript for
the trial court’s consideration, but the court declined to consider it. The
transcript confirms what was alleged by the People in the information
relating to Reyes: Reyes was alleged to be the driver and not one of the actual
perpetrators who committed the stabbings. Reyes asked the court to consider
the transcript because the prosecutor argued at the end of the hearing that
Reyes would be liable on a natural and probable consequences theory if “it’s
reasonably foreseeable that they’re going to engage in a fight, bringing a gang
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Reyes’s section 1172.6 petition is
reversed. We remand the matter to the trial court with directions to issue an
order to show cause and to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
GOETHALS, J.
back to the party.” The preliminary hearing was not needed for this purpose.
The People charged Reyes generically with attempted murder, which would
have allowed them to proceed on a theory of attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Estrada (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 328, 338.)
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