CourtListener 10028738•People v. Trotter CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/2/24 P. v. Trotter CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099147
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 05F03192)
v.
ANDY TROTTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Andy Trotter appeals from denial of his postconviction petition for
relief under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Counsel for Trotter filed a brief seeking our
independent review under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, to determine
whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. Trotter also filed a supplemental brief in
propria persona. Rejecting Trotter’s claims of error, we will affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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BACKGROUND
Trotter and Roger Renard Adams were members of the Nogales Gangster Crips, a
gang involved in a war with the Elm Street Bloods. One night, they drove by an Elm
Street Bloods hangout and fired at people outside, shooting one person in the hand and
also hitting an occupied vehicle. Police in the vicinity apprehended them.
A jury found Trotter and Adams guilty of two counts of premeditated attempted
murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), discharging a firearm from a vehicle (former § 12034,
subd. (c)), and shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246). The jury also found firearm and
gang enhancements alleged against both defendants true. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1),
12022.53, subd. (c).) The trial court sentenced Trotter to an aggregate prison term of 30
years to life, plus 40 years. Defendants appealed their conviction, and another panel of
this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Trotter (Jan. 15, 2009, C055472) [nonpub.
opn.].)
When Trotter filed his first petition under section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6),2 the
statute did not cover an attempted murder conviction. On appeal, another panel of this
court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the petition. (People v. Trotter (Oct. 14,
2020, C089578) [nonpub. opn.].)
The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back to this
court with directions to vacate the previous decision and reconsider the matter in light of
Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2),
which amended section 1172.6 to expand those eligible for relief to, among others,
persons convicted of attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences
2 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the
statute. Although Trotter filed his petition under former section 1170.95, we cite the
current section number throughout this opinion.
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doctrine, and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952. Upon reconsideration, we
concluded that Trotter was not prosecuted on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine nor was the jury instructed on this theory. Therefore, summary denial of
Trotter’s petition was appropriate. (People v. Trotter (Apr. 25, 2022, C089578) [nonpub.
opn.].)
On September 30, 2022, Totter filed a second petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. Trotter contended that Senate Bill 775 clarified he was eligible for
resentencing. The People filed a response arguing that, to be eligible for relief under the
amendments to section 1172.6 made by Senate Bill 775, the petitioner must have been
convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The People maintained that Trotter was not convicted of attempted murder under the
natural and probable causes doctrine because the jury was not instructed on that doctrine.
The People’s response attached the amended complaint, the verdicts, and the jury
instructions from the trial, as well as this court’s opinion on transfer from the California
Supreme Court.
The trial court conducted a hearing on Trotter’s prima facie showing of eligibility
for relief under section 1172.6. The court ruled that Trotter was ineligible as a matter of
law, explaining that Trotter “was not prosecuted for attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequence[s] theory. The Amended Information did not make that
allegation and the jury was not instructed on such. The Information alleged that
attempted murder was committed willfully, deliberately and with premeditation, and the
jury was so instructed and the jury so found.”
Trotter filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Under Delgadillo, we must “evaluate the specific arguments presented in [the
defendant’s supplemental brief],” but we are not compelled to undertake an “independent
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review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (People v. Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) We proceed accordingly.
In his supplemental brief, Trotter argues he was eligible for relief because section
1172.6 was amended to add the phrase “or other theory under which malice is imputed to
a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)),
which he contends authorizes defendants convicted of attempted murder not based
expressly on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for relief.
However, under the terms of the statute, this phrase only applies to defendants convicted
of murder, not attempted murder. Section 1172.6, subdivision (a), provides that “[a]
person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition . . . .”
Trotter also argues that the cumulative effect of the language of other instructions
given to the jury tends to prove the same theory of malice as the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. We disagree. Section 1172.6 “applies by its terms only to
attempted murders based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v.
Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.) Accordingly, section 1172.6 does not apply to
an attempted murder conviction where jurors were not specifically instructed on that
doctrine. (Coley, at p. 548.) As the court in People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588
explained: “In many instances, additional information from the record will establish that
a defendant’s conviction was not based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, and that the jury must have convicted the defendant on the basis of his own
malice aforethought. For example, if the jury did not receive an instruction on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, the jury could not have convicted the defendant on
that basis, and the petition should be summarily denied.” (Id. at p. 599; see also People v.
Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 395; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52;
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People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205; People v. Daniel (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677; People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1056.)
Next, Trotter contends that, under Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Assembly Bill 333) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5, effective Jan. 1, 2022), the trial court erred
in denying a request to bifurcate trial on the gang enhancements (§ 1109, subd. (a)), and
there was insufficient evidence to prove the gang enhancements found true by the jury
under section 186.22 as amended. These issues are outside the scope of this appeal.
“The mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition does not afford the petitioner a new
opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury’s findings.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947; see
also People v. Rodriguez (2024) __ Cal.App.5th __, __ [2024 Cal.App. LEXIS 431, *7]
[§ 1172.6 “does not permit ‘ “litigat[ing] anew” any trial issues or allowing “a petitioner
to challenge any aspect of the factfinding from the original trial that [they] wish[] to
revisit” ’ ”], petn. for review pending, premature petn. received July 15, 2024, S285924;
People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438 [§ 1172.6 “does not permit a petitioner
to establish eligibility on the basis of alleged trial error”].)
In any event, the California Supreme Court recently held that section 1109 does
not apply retroactively. (See People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 7-8.) Further, the
amendments to section 186.22 enacted by Assembly Bill 333 are retroactive only to cases
that are not yet final. (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207.) Trotter’s
judgment was final long ago. (People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 162.)
Finally, Trotter claims that: (1) the testimony of an investigator qualified as a
gang expert was insufficient to establish the “primary activity” element of a gang
enhancement; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the believability of the
expert’s opinion and hearsay testimony; (3) the gang enhancement evidence was
unreliable and prejudicial because it was “lumped” into evidence of the underlying
charges; (4) the jury was erroneously instructed on weighing defense evidence; and
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(5) the prosecutor misled the jury on the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. These claims are also not cognizable on appeal from denial of a
section 1172.6 petition. (People v. DeHuff, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 438.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Trotter’s petition for resentencing under section
1172.6 is affirmed.
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
MAURO, J.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
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