In re B.F. CA2/3

CourtListener 10027799Calctapp01.08.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/1/24 In re B.F. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re B.F., a Person Coming B332389
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF Super. Ct. No.
CHILDREN AND FAMILY 23CCJP00468A
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Vincent W. Davis & Associates and Vincent
W. Davis, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION

Appellant T.J., who is the maternal uncle of the dependent
minor, B.F., appeals the juvenile court’s summary denial of his
petition for a change of court order under Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 388. T.J. contends that the court
abused its discretion in failing to issue an order allowing him to
live with B.F. and her caretaker and to transport the minor. He
further contends that he should be granted a criminal records
exemption and that the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) was estopped
from denying him an exemption because a social worker
purportedly promised him that he would receive Resource Family
Approval (RFA) and be permitted to reside with the minor if he
signed an affidavit. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 30, 2023, T.J. filed a request to change a court
order concerning his niece, B.F., under section 388. He identified
the order as the social worker’s statement that “if the maternal
uncle is around the child, the child will be removed from her
current placement and put in foster care.” In his petition, T.J.
claimed that he “obtained a residence based on the RFA . . . social
worker advising him that he was approved; the child and her
caregiver [have] resided with the maternal uncle; and the child
has been well taken care of.” He asked the court to issue an order
permitting B.F. to reside with him and to allow him to transport
the child. T.J. asserted that the change in order would benefit the

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.

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minor because “[t]he minor is deeply bonded with her uncle; she
has resided with him for most of her life; he provides for her
needs; and he obtained a residence to meet her needs.” He
indicated in his petition that the minor and her caretaker both
agreed with his request.
In his memorandum of points and authorities, T.J.
acknowledged that the “court and social workers have not
approved [T.J.] to be in the home with the child,” but contended
he should be permitted to reside with her because “the child has
been cared for by [T.J.] for most of her life, she is safe with him,
and he obtained a residence based on the RFA social worker’s
statement that he had been approved.”
In his declaration, T.J. stated that “[he] applied for RFA;
and the social worker told [him] that [he] had been approved if
[he] signed an affidavit” and that, “[i]n reliance on the social
worker’s statement, [he] signed the affidavit and leased a three-
bedroom house.” He further stated that B.F. and her caretaker
resided with him but that “[he] was recently told by the social
worker that due to [his] prior convictions; [he] was going to be
denied RFA . . . and had to move out of [his] house or [B.F.] would
be placed in foster care.” T.J. represented that B.F. was “safe in
[his] home and not in harm’s way.”
T.J.’s petition attached a March 2023 letter from the
Department entitled “Notice of Need for Criminal Record
Exemption/Clearance” (the Notice), in which the Department
explained that, in light of T.J.’s criminal record, he must
complete and submit a Resource Family Criminal Record
Statement (Form RFA 01B) and submit three signed and dated
reference letters. A blank Form RFA 01B and blank reference
letter forms were attached to the Notice. The Notice also attached

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the results of a Live Scan that indicated that T.J. had been
convicted of a dozen felonies between 2002 and 2018, including
for the crimes of being a felon in possession of a firearm, grand
theft auto, and robbery.
T.J. also attached various certificates he received between
1994 and 2018 for the completion of educational and vocational
courses. He did not attach the affidavit he signed for the social
worker.
At a hearing held on September 11, 2023, the court asked
counsel for the Department for its view on whether a hearing
should be set for the section 388 petition. Counsel for the
Department stated that T.J. had a criminal record that included
a non-exemptible felony and that no hearing should be set on the
petition. Counsel for the minor joined the Department’s
recommendation and observed that the petition made
representations that T.J. had obtained RFA, although it was
counsel’s understanding, after speaking with other relatives of
the minor, that this was not true. In light of T.J.’s extensive
criminal record, counsel for the minor argued that “it would not
be appropriate or safe for maternal uncle to reside with [his]
clients.” Counsel for the minor’s mother and father did not have
instruction from their clients. The court summarily denied the
petition on the ground that it failed to make a sufficient showing
of changed circumstances.
T.J. timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION2

T.J. argues that the court erred in denying his section 388
petition because he made a prima facie showing of changed
circumstances. He contends that he detrimentally relied on a
social worker’s statement that he had received RFA, submitted
certificates and diplomas, and represented that he has stable
employment and is bonded with the minor. He further contends
that he should have received a criminal records exemption
because he has stable employment, a residence, a good
relationship with the minor, and has been rehabilitated. Finally,
he argues that he should receive RFA under the theory of
promissory estoppel because he detrimentally relied on the social
worker’s statement that he had been approved.
Before addressing these contentions, which we conclude are
without merit, we provide a brief overview of the relevant law
concerning criminal records exemptions for purposes of obtaining
RFA.

2 The argument section of T.J.’s opening brief and his reply brief are

devoid of any citation to the record. An appellant must “[s]upport any
reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page
number of the record where the matter appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) It is well established that “ ‘[i]f a party fails to
support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the
argument [will be] deemed to have been waived. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) T.J.’s citation to
the record in the factual background portion of his opening brief does
not cure his failure to support his arguments with citation to the
record. (City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211,
1239, fn. 16.) However, as the Department does not raise this failure,
we opt to address T.J.’s arguments on the merits.

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1. RFA and Criminal Records Exemption
“The purpose of the RFA [program] is to provide ‘a unified,
family friendly, and child-centered resource family approval
process to replace the existing multiple processes for licensing
foster family homes, certifying foster homes by licensed foster
family agencies, approving relatives and nonrelative extended
family members as foster care providers, and approving
guardians and adoptive families.’ ” (In re Charlotte C. (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 404, 416, quoting § 16519.5, subd. (a).) “An approved
resource family has successfully met both the home environment
assessment standards and the permanency assessment criteria
necessary for providing care for a child.” (Charlotte C., at p. 416,
citing § 16519.5, subd. (c)(1).) The home environment assessment
criteria include “[a] criminal record clearance of each applicant
and all adults residing in, or regularly present in, the home.”
(§ 16519.5, subd. (d)(2)(A)(i)(I).) “If the criminal records check
indicates that the person has been convicted of an offense
described in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (g)
of Section 1522 of the Health and Safety Code, home approval
shall be denied unless the person has received a criminal records
exemption pursuant to clause (iv) of subparagraph (A) of
paragraph (2) of subdivision (g) of Section 1522 of the Health and
Safety Code.” (§ 16519.5, subd. (d)(2)(A)(i)(III).)
Among the convictions described in Health and Safety Code
section 1522, subdivision (g)(2)(A)(i), are convictions within the
past 10 years for “crime[s] against an individual specified in
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code.” According to
his Live Scan report, in 2018, T.J. was convicted of robbery,
which is one of the crimes listed in the Penal Code provision.
(Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(9) [“ ‘violent felony’ ” includes “[a]ny

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robbery”].) Health and Safety Code section 1522,
subdivision (g)(2)(A)(iv), provides that “the department or other
approving entity may grant an exemption for a relative or any
other adult living in the home, who has been convicted of an
offense described in this subparagraph if the applicant is seeking
placement of a specific child or children with whom the applicant
is related, the applicant or other adult living in the home is of
present good character necessary to justify granting the
exemption pursuant to the factors described in subparagraph
(C).” These factors include “[t]he nature of the crime or crimes,”
“[t]he period of time since the crime was committed,” and “[a]ny
longstanding pattern of criminal conduct,” among others. (Health
& Saf. Code, § 1522, subd. (g)(2)(C)(i)–(iii).)
2. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that T.J. failed to demonstrate changed
circumstances.
Under section 388, a parent or other person having an
interest in the child may petition to change or set aside a prior
juvenile court order “upon grounds of change of circumstance or
new evidence,” and the juvenile court shall order a hearing where
“it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be
promoted” by the new order. (§ 388, subds. (a)(1) & (d); see also
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(a).) The petitioner “need only
make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right
to a hearing on a section 388 petition and the petition should be
liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the
[petitioner’s] request. [Citation.] [¶] However, if the liberally
construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie
showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change
would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not

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order a hearing on the petition. [Citations.] The prima facie
requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by
evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable
decision on the petition. [Citation.]” (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77
Cal.App.4th 799, 806.) We review a juvenile court’s decision to
deny a section 388 petition without a hearing for abuse of
discretion. (In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158.)
The Department points out that T.J.’s section 388 motion
did not seek to modify a prior order of the juvenile court. Rather,
the order concerned a social worker’s statement that “if the
maternal uncle is around the child, the child will be removed
from her current placement and put in foster care.” For purposes
of argument, we will assume that T.J. could properly request an
order to reside with and transport B.F. through a section 388
petition even though he failed to identify a relevant court order.
We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that there was insufficient evidence of changed
circumstances to sustain a favorable decision on the petition. T.J.
has an extensive criminal record, including a conviction for
robbery that occurred in the 10 years preceding the petition. In
light of this history, the Notice informed T.J. that he had to
submit a form affidavit and three reference letters within 15 days
to obtain a criminal records exemption that would allow him to
receive RFA. Neither a completed form affidavit nor signed
reference letters appear in the record. Although T.J. makes the
ambiguous claim in his declaration that a social worker told him
he had received or would receive RFA based on signing an
affidavit (the contents of which he does not disclose), the law is
clear that, absent a criminal records exemption, T.J. could not
receive RFA. (§ 16519.5, subd. (d)(2)(A)(i)(III), italics added

8
[“home approval shall be denied unless the person has received a
criminal records exemption”].) There is no evidence that the
Department granted a criminal records exemption, and T.J.’s
memorandum of points and authorities in support of his petition
concedes that he had not received approval from the Department
to reside with the minor. Thus, there is no basis in the record to
conclude that there was a change of circumstances that would
permit the court to issue an order allowing T.J. to reside with or
transport the minor.
T.J. contends that he demonstrated a change of
circumstances because he “had stable employment, his own
residence, he, and the minor were bonded, the minor had resided
with him throughout her life, his driver’s license had been valid
without any infractions for over fifteen years,” “he provided
certificates for anger management and several vocational
schools,” “successfully completed probation, had been clean and
sober for over seven years, he graduated from high school, he
obtained a medical assistant certificate, and he received a
diploma for painting and construction.” He cites no authority for
the proposition that certificates and diplomas or a strong bond
with the minor are an adequate substitution for obtaining a
criminal records exemption.3 The law is plainly to the contrary.
Even if T.J. had adequately demonstrated a change in
circumstances, which he did not do, T.J. also failed to make a
prima facie showing that it was in the minor’s best interest to live

3 T.J. argues in his reply brief that “the Department does not seem to

deny that the Appellant showed a change of circumstances.” We
observe no such concession in the Department’s brief, which argues
that the court correctly found no change of circumstances where there
was no evidence that T.J. had received RFA.

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with him. Contrary to T.J.’s representation in the petition that
the minor agreed to his requested order, her attorney opposed the
petition on the grounds that it would not be appropriate or safe
for the minor to reside with T.J.4
3. Whether T.J. should have received a criminal records
exemption was not before the juvenile court and is not
properly before this court.
T.J. contends that his “nearly twenty-year-old convictions
should not prevent [him] from residing in the same home as the
minor” and that a criminal records exemption should be granted
to permit RFA.
As a preliminary matter, although some of T.J.’s felony
convictions are nearly 20 years old, others, including his 2018
robbery conviction, are not nearly as remote in time as he would
have this court believe.
Moreover, “[t]he decision to grant a criminal records
exemption is an executive function that lies exclusively with the
[county social services agency]. [Citations.] By enacting section

4 The record also casts doubt on T.J.’s claim that he resided with B.F.

for “most of her life.” B.F. was born in July 2009. Although it is unclear
from the record how long T.J. was actually in jail or prison in
connection with his felony convictions during the minor’s lifetime, his
Live Scan report states that, in 2010, he was convicted of receiving
stolen property and of being a felon in possession of a firearm and was
sentenced to three years for each crime; in 2017, he was convicted of
using another person’s personal identifying information for an
unlawful purpose and of grand theft auto and was sentenced to two
years and to eight months for the respective crimes; and in 2018, he
was convicted of committing robbery of an inhabited dwelling and was
sentenced to six years. The record therefore indicates that T.J. may
have been incarcerated for significant portions of the minor’s life.

10
361.4, the Legislature has given the [a]gency ‘the express
authority to veto’ a placement with a relative who has suffered
criminal convictions. [Citation.] [¶] Having given the authority to
grant an exemption to the [a]gency, ‘it is apparent that the
Legislature did not intend to confer such authority on the
juvenile court.’ [Citations.] Accordingly, the juvenile court may
not place a child with a relative who has an unexempted criminal
history, even when the court determines that placement would be
in the child’s best interests . . . .” (In re M.L. (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 210, 225–226.) “If the court determines that the
[county social services agency] did abuse its discretion, it may
direct it to reconsider the request using the appropriate legal
standard, but cannot directly override the request and grant the
exemption.” (Id. at p. 227.) “A review for abuse of discretion must
be highly deferential to the decision maker . . . and requires a
showing that the decision was ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 228.)
T.J.’s contention that an exemption should have been
granted is without merit. “As a general rule, a party is precluded
from urging on appeal any point not raised in the trial court.” (In
re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 411–412.) T.J. did not
argue below that the Department abused its discretion in
declining to grant him a criminal records exemption. Indeed, he
made no reference whatsoever to his criminal record in his
petition or memorandum of points and authorities. Rather, T.J.
argued that the minor should be permitted to live with him
because “the child has been cared for by [T.J.] for most of her life,
she is safe with him, and he obtained a residence based on the
RFA social worker’s statement that he had been approved.” In
other words, T.J. argued that it would be in the child’s best

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interests. Even if the juvenile court had agreed, it lacked the
authority to allow B.F. to reside with T.J. in light of his
unexempted criminal record. (In re M.L., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th
at p. 226; see also § 16519.5, subd. (d)(2)(A)(i)(III).)
Moreover, as discussed, the record does not establish that
T.J. completed the affidavit form or submitted the references
required by the Department in the Notice. T.J. also failed to
identify the contents of the affidavit he purportedly signed.
Accordingly, there is no evidence that T.J. sought a criminal
records exemption in the manner the Department instructed or
that his affidavit addressed any of the criteria the Department
must consider in deciding whether to grant an exemption. We
therefore agree with the Department that the record fails to
support that the question of whether to grant a criminal
exemption was ever properly before the Department. Absent an
exercise of discretion by the Department, there is nothing for us
to review.
4. T.J. fails to establish that he should be permitted to
reside with the minor under principles of promissory
estoppel.
“ ‘The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are “(1) a
promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the
party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be
both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the
estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 945.) T.J.
contends that, in reliance on a statement by the social worker
that he would receive or had received RFA, he obtained a larger,
more expensive residence. He therefore argues that “the RFA
application should be approved, as the social worker stated.”

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T.J.’s memorandum of points and authorities in support of
his section 388 petition did not argue that promissory estoppel
compelled the Department to grant RFA. Thus, we may consider
this point forfeited. (In re Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 411–412.) T.J. also fails to cite authority supporting his
contention that promissory estoppel can compel the Department
or juvenile court to permit an individual with a recent violent
felony conviction to reside with a dependent minor absent
evidence that the individual complied with the Department’s
requirements for obtaining a criminal records exemption. Indeed,
T.J. does not cite any case in which promissory estoppel was
applied in the context of juvenile dependency proceedings.
Considering that the core purpose of the juvenile dependency
system is to ensure that a child’s welfare is protected (Kemper v.
County of San Diego (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1094; see also
§ 202, subd. (a)), we are not persuaded that promissory estoppel
principles would permit a court to issue an order that could place
a child at risk, even if a relative detrimentally relied on a
representation made by a social worker.
Even if we were inclined to overlook either or both of these
issues, and we are not, T.J. fails to establish that a clear and
unambiguous promise was made. Without citation to the record,
T.J. contends that “[h]ere, the social worker informed (promised)
the Appellant that he had been RFA approved and could reside
with his niece.” However, T.J.’s declaration stated that a RFA
social worker told him he “had been approved if [he] signed an
affidavit.” (Italics added). It is unclear what this means.
Notwithstanding the use of the past tense, the conditional portion
of this sentence indicates that the social worker told T.J. that he
would receive RFA if he signed an affidavit. T.J. does not identify

13
the RFA social worker with whom he spoke, what the social
worker told him the affidavit should address, or whether the
contents of the affidavit he signed were consistent with any
instructions he received from the social worker. Thus, his
declaration does not establish the existence of a promise of
“sufficient definitiveness and clarity[] to justify applying
promissory estoppel.” (Lange v. TIG Ins. Co. (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 1179, 1186.)

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DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order denying T.J.’s section 388
petition is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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