CourtListener 10027794•People v. Mendez CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/1/24 P. v. Mendez CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying
on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B330671
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA028945-02
v.
LUIS MANUEL MENDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Nina Bonyak and Nina Bonyak for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Mathews and Daniel C. Chang,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Luis Manuel Mendez has lived in the United States
as a lawful permanent resident since 1992. In 1995, a jury
convicted Mendez of second degree robbery, and a court
sentenced him to three years in prison. More than two decades
after being released from prison, Mendez explored the possibility
of becoming a United States citizen. However, he learned his
robbery conviction rendered him permanently ineligible for
naturalization.
After making this discovery, Mendez filed a motion
to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7.1
According to the motion, sometime before Mendez’s trial, the
People offered him a favorable plea deal. Mendez rejected the
deal without realizing the potential immigration consequences
of that decision. Mendez asserted, had he known a conviction
after trial might permanently preclude him from becoming
a citizen, he would have accepted the plea deal instead of
going to trial.
The court denied Mendez’s motion, finding he failed to
show he would have accepted the plea deal had he realized the
immigration consequences of his decision to go to trial. Applying
our independent judgment, we come to the same conclusion.
Accordingly, we affirm the court’s denial of Mendez’s motion
to vacate his conviction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mendez was born in Mexico in 1975. He moved to the
United States and became a lawful permanent resident (LPR)
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
in 1992.2 Mendez’s mother, father, and siblings are naturalized
United States citizens.
In 1995, a jury convicted Mendez of second degree robbery
(§ 211) and found true a firearm enhancement allegation
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to three
years in prison, consisting of the low term of two years for the
robbery, plus one year for the firearm enhancement. The court
gave Mendez credit for 229 days in custody, which included
153 days of actual custody.
Mendez remained in the United States after serving his
prison sentence, and he renewed his LPR status twice. Mendez
met his wife in 1997, and they married a few years later. They
have two children together. At some point, Mendez started
working as an aviation technician.
Federal agents detained Mendez in 2015. The federal
government sought to remove him from the United States,
citing his robbery conviction. In 2019, an immigration judge
granted Mendez a waiver that allowed him to remain in the
United States, despite the conviction.
After receiving the waiver, Mendez decided he wanted to
work for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Mendez
learned that to be eligible for that type of work, he would need
to become a United States citizen. Initially, Mendez believed
he was eligible to apply for citizenship. However, he discovered
2 According to Mendez’s counsel, Mendez moved to the
United States in 1989 or 1990, when he was 14 years old.
However, counsel did not point to evidence to support that
assertion, nor have we found any in the record.
3
his conviction constitutes an aggravated felony, which renders
him permanently ineligible for naturalization.
In July 2022, Mendez filed a motion in superior court to
vacate his robbery conviction under section 1473.7. According
to Mendez, at a pretrial hearing for his criminal case, “the Public
Defender informed [him] that the District Attorney assigned
to [his] case offered a plea deal. The deal was to plead guilty
and receive credit for time served and 3 years probation.”
Because the plea deal required Mendez to serve less than
a year in custody, the conviction would not have qualified as
an aggravated felony or rendered Mendez permanently ineligible
for naturalization.
Mendez asserted his defense counsel never asked
him about his immigration status, suggested he talk to an
immigration lawyer, or explained “what could happen if [he]
lost at trial.” Accordingly, Mendez “didn’t know that accepting
the plea deal would not have had any immigration consequences,
and [he] would have been eligible to become a citizen.” Had
Mendez “known that [he] would receive 3 years of jail time,
on top of the time [he] had already spent in custody, [he] never
would have gone to trial.” Instead, he “would have gladly taken
the plea deal . . . . No one talked to [him] about the Immigration
consequences, and if they had, [he] would have made different
choices.”
Mendez supported his motion primarily with his own
declaration, in which he asserted most of the facts summarized
above. Mendez also submitted documents related to his
immigration case, letters of support from family and friends,
a letter of reference from an aircraft maintenance technician,
and several documents related to FAA jobs.
4
The People opposed the motion, arguing Mendez’s
primary motivation for going to trial was to prove his innocence.
The People pointed out that Mendez risked a significant prison
sentence by turning down an offer of probation. According
to the People, because Mendez was focused on proving his
innocence, he likely would have gone to trial even if he
had known the immigration consequences of that decision.
At a hearing to consider the motion, the court asked
Mendez’s counsel why he waited so many years to apply for
citizenship. Counsel responded that Mendez could not apply
for citizenship until he turned 21 years old. Counsel did not
explain why Mendez had not applied for citizenship in the
26 years since he turned 21 years old.
The court denied the motion without prejudice, noting
the lack of evidence corroborating Mendez’s contention that
immigration consequences were his priority when he rejected
the plea deal.
Mendez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Relevant law and standard of review
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1473.7 allows a
noncitizen convicted of a crime to move to vacate a conviction
or sentence that “is legally invalid due to prejudicial error
damaging the [noncitizen]’s ability to meaningfully understand,
defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.”
(§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1); Stats. 2021, ch. 420, § 1.) The statute
applies to individuals, like Mendez, convicted after a jury trial.
(People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 5 (Carrillo).)
5
The moving party bears the burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief under
section 1473.7, subdivision (a). (§ 1473.7, subd. (e)(1).) To meet
that burden, the party must show (1) he did not meaningfully
understand the immigration consequences of his conviction or
sentence, and (2) his misunderstanding constituted prejudicial
error. (Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) “[A] defendant
who decides to go to trial, loses, and is sentenced can establish
prejudice for purposes of section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) by
showing there is a reasonable probability that (1) he or she
would have done something differently—that is, would have
taken another ‘path’ [citation]—and (2) the alternate path would
have resulted in an immigration-neutral outcome.” (Id. at p. 20.)
To determine whether there is a reasonable possibility
the moving party would have taken a different path, the court
must consider the totality of the circumstances. (People v.
Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 320 (Espinoza).) Relevant
factors include the party’s ties to the United States, the
importance the party placed on avoiding immigration
consequences, the party’s priorities, and whether the party
had reason to believe an immigration-neutral disposition was
possible. Also relevant are the probability of obtaining a more
favorable outcome if the party had taken the alternative path,
as well as the difference between the likely alternative-path term
and the likely term if convicted at trial. (Ibid.)
We independently review the denial of a motion to vacate
a conviction under section 1473.7. (People v. Vivar (2021) 11
Cal.5th 510, 523–524 (Vivar).) Under that standard of review,
we exercise our independent judgment to determine whether
the facts satisfy the rule of law. (Id. at p. 527.) In doing so,
6
we give deference to the trial court’s factual findings based on
its personal observations of witnesses. (Ibid.) “Where, as here,
the facts derive entirely from written declarations and other
documents, however, there is no reason to conclude the trial
court has the same special purchase on the question at issue;
as a practical matter, ‘[t]he trial court and this court are in
the same position in interpreting written declarations’ when
reviewing a cold record in a section 1473.7 proceeding. [Citation.]
Ultimately it is for the appellate court to decide, based on its
independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice
under section 1473.7.” (Id. at p. 528, fn. omitted.)
2. Mendez has not met his burden to show prejudice
Mendez argues he is entitled to relief under section 1473.7
because he failed meaningfully to understand the immigration
consequences of rejecting the People’s plea deal and going to
trial. Specifically, he argues he did not understand that losing
at trial would permanently preclude him from becoming a citizen.
Nor did he understand he would not have suffered the same
immigration consequences had he accepted the People’s plea deal.
Mendez contends he was prejudiced by these misunderstandings
because, had he known the potential immigration consequences,
he would have accepted the People’s plea deal instead of going
to trial.
Mendez’s argument arises out of the fact that the
immigration consequences of a theft conviction depend on the
length of the sentence imposed. Under federal law, a person
convicted of an “aggravated felony” is permanently barred from
becoming a citizen. (8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(1), (b)(1)(ii).) The
Immigration and Nationality Act lists the crimes that qualify as
aggravated felonies. (See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).) Some crimes—
7
such as murder—always constitute aggravated felonies while
other crimes qualify depending on the “term of imprisonment”
imposed. (Ibid.) As relevant here, a theft offense is an
aggravated felony only if the term of imprisonment imposed
is at least one year. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).) The term
of imprisonment includes “the period of incarceration or
confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any
suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment
or sentence in whole or in part.” (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B).)
According to Mendez, the People offered him a plea deal
that would have given him credit for time served and required
him to be on probation for three years. When the People offered
the deal, Mendez had served less than a year in custody. Unless
the court imposed and suspended a longer sentence, the term
of imprisonment imposed under the deal would have been less
than a year. Therefore, had Mendez accepted the offer, he likely
would not have an aggravated felony on his record. Nor would
he be permanently barred from becoming a citizen.
We will assume, for the sake of argument, that Mendez
accurately recites the terms of the plea deal. We also will assume
that Mendez did not understand the immigration consequences
of accepting or rejecting the deal. Accordingly, the only issue
for us to decide is whether Mendez is credible when he states
he would have accepted the plea deal had he been aware of
those consequences.
On that issue, only Mendez is able to provide direct
evidence of his state of mind. Nevertheless, a “defendant’s
assertion as to his or her state of mind is not accepted at
face value by courts evaluating a section 1473.7 motion.
Such assertions must be corroborated with objective evidence.”
8
(Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 17; see Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 321 [the moving party must provide objective
evidence to corroborate factual assertions in a section 1473.7
motion]; see also Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530 [courts have
“long required” objective evidence to support a party’s assertion
he would not have entered a plea had he understood the
immigration consequences].) “Objective evidence includes facts
provided by declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the
defendant’s immigration concerns or interactions with counsel,
and evidence of the charges the defendant faced.” (Espinoza,
at p. 321.)
Here, the record lacks objective evidence corroborating
Mendez’s claim that he would have accepted the plea deal
had he been aware of the relevant immigration consequences.
At the outset, the difference in immigration consequences
between accepting and rejecting the plea deal were not as
stark as Mendez suggests. As Mendez notes, under current law,
a theft offense qualifies as an aggravated felony if it results in
a prison sentence of at least one year. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).)
The triad for second degree robbery is two, three, or five years.
(§ 213, subd. (a)(2).) Therefore, under current law, any robbery
conviction with a prison sentence imposed qualifies as an
aggravated felony.
However, that was not the law in 1995, when the People
offered Mendez the plea deal. At that time, a theft offense
qualified as an aggravated felony only if it resulted in a sentence
of imprisonment of at least five years.3 (See former 8 U.S.C.
3 The amendments to the definition of aggravated felony
are retroactive. (See Aragon-Ayon v. I.N.S. (9th Cir. 2000)
9
§ 1101(a)(43)(G).) Therefore, even with the one-year firearm
enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), Mendez should have
expected to suffer an aggravated felony only if the court selected
the high term. Given the People offered Mendez a deal with
no prison time—and the court ultimately selected the low term
—it seems highly unlikely Mendez would have anticipated
receiving a high term sentence if he lost at trial.
More importantly, Mendez failed to produce any objective
evidence showing the prospect of suffering an aggravated felony
—however unlikely—was a motivating factor for him in 1995.
The only negative immigration consequence of suffering an
aggravated felony that Mendez identifies is the permanent bar
to naturalization. However, the record is completely devoid
of objective evidence showing, as of 1995, Mendez cared about
preserving his eligibility for naturalization.
The record shows Mendez has significant ties to the
United States. He has lived in this country for more than three
decades, and he is the son, sibling, and father of United States
citizens. Yet, despite these deep connections, Mendez has never
applied for citizenship, instead opting to renew his LPR status
twice.
Nor is there evidence that Mendez had even considered
the possibility of naturalization as of 1995. According to
Mendez’s declaration, he first discovered his conviction rendered
him ineligible for naturalization sometime around 2019, while
206 F.3d 847, 853.) Therefore, when considering the current
immigration consequences of Mendez’s conviction, it is irrelevant
that the conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony when
the court imposed the sentence.
10
he was researching the requirements to work for the FAA.
Mendez does not claim he was seriously considering working
for the FAA in 1995, and he fails to identify any other benefits
of citizenship that were important to him at that time. Nor
does he explain why—if naturalization had been a motivating
consideration for him as far back as 1995—he waited more than
two decades even to research whether he was eligible to apply
for it.
In contrast to the lack of evidence that Mendez cared
about preserving his eligibility for naturalization, there is ample
evidence he had a strong desire to avoid a conviction. The People
offered Mendez a favorable deal, agreeing to release him from
custody immediately on the condition he plead guilty and serve
three years on probation. In terms of time spent in custody,
going to trial was necessarily a worse outcome. Indeed, because
Mendez was in jail pending trial, he was certain to spend more
time in custody by going to trial, even if the jury ultimately
acquitted him. Under these circumstances, the only apparent
motivation for Mendez to go to trial was to avoid suffering
a felony conviction. Although the record does not disclose
precisely why Mendez wanted to avoid a conviction, given he
risked a significant prison sentence by going to trial—up to
six years with the firearm enhancement—it seems that desire
was particularly strong.
Applying our independent judgment and considering
the totality of the circumstances, we conclude Mendez has
not shown a reasonable possibility he would have taken a
different path had he been aware of the relevant immigration
consequences. Mendez failed to produce any objective evidence
that, as of 1995, he meaningfully cared about preserving his
11
eligibility for naturalization. In contrast, there is significant
evidence that Mendez cared deeply about avoiding a felony
conviction on his record. Given these priorities, it is highly
unlikely that Mendez would have accepted the People’s plea deal
had he understood that going to trial carried with it the risk of
a permanent bar to naturalization. That conclusion is bolstered
by the fact that, under the law in effect at the time, such a result
was relatively unlikely. On the record before us, Mendez has
not met his burden to show prejudice. Accordingly, he is not
entitled to relief.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
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