CourtListener 10027793•People v. Ruiz CA2/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/1/24 P. v. Ruiz CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B332947
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA232116
v.
ANTHONY RUIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
Brad J. Poore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2003, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Anthony
Ruiz of three counts of willful, deliberate and premeditated
attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and one
count of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). On the murder
count, the jury found true the special circumstance allegation
that the murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at
another person or persons outside of the vehicle with the intent to
inflict death. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21).)2 The trial court sentenced
Ruiz to life without the possibility of parole on the murder count,
as well as three consecutive sentences of life with the possibility
of parole on the attempted murder counts.
In 2022, Ruiz filed a petition for resentencing under former
section 1170.95.3 The trial court appointed counsel on Ruiz’s
behalf. The prosecution filed an opposition, arguing Ruiz was
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 The jury also found true various allegations that a
principal was armed with a firearm during the commission of the
offenses, and found gang allegations not true on all counts,
though none of those findings has any direct bearing on this
appeal.
3 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute. For the sake of
simplicity, we will refer to the statute by its new code section.
That section provides relief for certain individuals convicted of
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequence
doctrine, as well as certain individuals convicted of murder under
an imputed-malice theory of liability. (See § 1172.6.)
2
ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the record of
conviction demonstrated the jury was never instructed on the
felony murder rule, natural and probable consequences doctrine,
or any other theory of imputed-malice liability. The prosecution
noted the jury was only instructed Ruiz was guilty of murder and
attempted murder because he harbored the intent to kill. Along
with its opposition, the prosecution attached the jury instructions
from Ruiz’s trial. The trial court denied Ruiz relief as a matter of
law, noting the record demonstrated the jury was not instructed
on the felony murder rule, natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or any other theory of imputed-malice liability.
Ruiz timely appealed, and we appointed counsel to
represent him. On January 31, 2024, appellate counsel filed a
brief raising no issues and requesting discretionary independent
review of the record under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216. On March 4, 2024, Ruiz filed a supplemental brief.
DISCUSSION
In his brief, Ruiz argues: (1) by not raising stronger
arguments at the resentencing hearing in the trial court, his trial
counsel was ineffective in violation of Ruiz’s constitutional rights;
(2) the evidence adduced at Ruiz’s trial does not demonstrate
Ruiz acted with premeditation or the intent to kill; (3) by not
raising stronger arguments on appeal, and by not thoroughly
reviewing Ruiz’s case file, appellate counsel was ineffective; (4)
the prosecution fabricated certain facts surrounding Ruiz’s
convictions; and (5) the jury’s not true findings on the gang
allegations bolster the argument that Ruiz is entitled to section
1172.6 relief. We are unpersuaded.
As the trial court correctly explained, Ruiz’s jury was never
instructed on the felony murder rule, natural and probable
3
consequences doctrine, nor any other theory of imputed-malice
liability. Indeed, a review of the jury instructions reveals that, in
order to convict Ruiz of murder and attempted murder, the jury
necessarily needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he
harbored the intent to kill. Because the record shows the jury
convicted Ruiz of murder and attempted murder under theories
that are still valid under current law, the trial court was correct
in concluding Ruiz is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a
matter of law. We therefore reject Ruiz’s assertions that the court
erred in denying him relief.
Nor are we persuaded by Ruiz’s arguments that his counsel
at the resentencing hearing and on appeal were ineffective. To
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Ruiz must show he
was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674].) He has not done so. Because Ruiz is ineligible for section
1172.6 relief as a matter of law, there is nothing counsel could
have done to obtain a better outcome. Because Ruiz cannot
demonstrate prejudice, i.e., because he has no chance of obtaining
a more favorable outcome on remand, his ineffective assistance of
counsel claims are without merit.
We lastly reject Ruiz’s arguments that the facts of his case
demonstrate he is eligible for section 1172.6 relief. It is clear from
the record that Ruiz was not convicted of murder or attempted
murder under an imputed-malice theory of liability. For this
same reason, the jury’s not true findings on the gang allegations
are of no assistance to Ruiz. In short, as explained above, because
Ruiz is ineligible for relief under the plain language of the
statute, there is no chance he can receive a more favorable
outcome, and remand is unwarranted.
4
In addition to rejecting the arguments Ruiz raised in his
supplemental brief, we have exercised our discretion to
independently review the record, and we conclude no arguable
issues exist. (See People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
232.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Ruiz section 1172.6 relief.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CURREY, P. J.
We concur:
COLLINS, J.
ZUKIN, J.
5
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