CourtListener 10020181•People v. Stewart CA2/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/29/24 P. v. Stewart CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B330762
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A037377)
v.
DENNIS LEONARD STEWART,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Judith L. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In 1989, following trial, a jury convicted defendant Dennis
Leonard Stewart of special circumstances murder (Pen. Code,2
§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), premeditated attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), and residential robbery (§ 211).
The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP). After a direct appeal, we affirmed his conviction
and sentence. (People v. Brookins et al. (Jan. 26, 1994, B056728)
[nonpub. opn.].)
In 2022, Stewart filed a motion requesting a hearing
pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 to preserve
evidence in anticipation of a future youthful offender3 parole
hearing under section 3051. Stewart asserted he was 24 years
old at the time of his offenses. The court denied the motion,
finding Stewart ineligible for such a hearing due to his LWOP
sentence.
Stewart now appeals, contending the court erroneously
denied his Franklin motion because section 3051 violates two
constitutional principles: the guarantee of equal protection, and
the prohibition against cruel and/or unusual punishment.
Stewart’s equal protection argument has two facets. The
first is that section 3051 denies equal protection because there is
1 See California Standards of Judicial Administration
section 8.1(1).
2 All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 We refer to those over 18 years of age but younger than
26 at the time of their offense conduct as youthful offenders, and
to those under 18 years of age at the time of their offense conduct
as juveniles.
2
no rational basis to deny a youthful offender with an LWOP
sentence a parole hearing when other youthful offenders receive
one. Our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Hardin (2024) 15
Cal.5th 834, which was issued while Stewart’s appeal was
pending, forecloses this contention. Hardin held that “section
3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders sentenced to [LWOP] is
[not] constitutionally invalid under a rational basis standard,
either on its face or as applied to . . . individuals who are serving
[LWOP] sentences for special circumstance murder.” (Id. at
p. 839.)
Stewart’s second equal protection argument is that section
3051 lacks a rational basis for distinguishing between juveniles
sentenced to LWOP, who are eligible for a parole hearing (§ 3051,
subd. (b)(4)), and youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP, who are
not eligible for such a hearing (id., subd. (h)). Stewart identifies
no court that had agreed with this claim. Instead, the courts to
consider this argument have rejected it, and we agree with their
analysis. (E.g., People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 202-
205; In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, 463-465; People v.
Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 345-349; cf. also In re Jones
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 477, 481 [“LWOP offenders who were
between the ages of 18 and 25 when they committed their
offenses are adult offenders [and] they are not similarly situated
to juvenile offenders”].)
Stewart lastly claims that section 3051’s extension of
youthful offender parole hearings to most but not all youthful
offenders renders his LWOP sentence cruel or unusual. Prior
courts have uniformly rejected the argument that LWOP
sentences imposed on adults between the ages of 18 and 25
violate the protections afforded by the United States and
3
California constitutions against cruel and/or unusual
punishment. (E.g., People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769,
781-782; People v. Windfield (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 496, 525-527;
People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1030-1032;
People v. Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1220-1221.)
Stewart notes that other than Abundio, which was decided
before section 3051 was enacted, these cases addressed only the
Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment, and not the parallel provision in article I, section 17
of the California Constitution, which prohibits cruel or unusual
punishment. He fails to provide any cogent argument, however,
why this distinction makes any difference. Both the federal and
state constitutional prohibitions on cruel and/or unusual
punishment typically run in tandem. (See People v. Marshall
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 938 [the California Constitution
“ ‘separately and independently lays down the same prohibition’ ”
as the Eighth Amendment].) Our Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed that it does not violate either federal or state
constitutional prohibitions on cruel and/or unusual punishment
to sentence youthful offenders who commit a special circumstance
murder to the death penalty (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th
1169, 1234-1235), such that the lesser sentence of LWOP for
special circumstances murder is necessarily constitutional.
4
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
5
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