CourtListener 10020179•People v. Washington CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/29/24 P. v. Washington CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B331039
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA099458-01
v.
DARNELL WASHINGTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig E. Veals, Judge. Affirmed.
Lenore De Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Stefanie Yee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Appellant Darnell Washington was convicted of carjacking,
and other crimes.1 On appeal, Washington insists the judgment
must be reversed because there is insufficient evidence to support
the jury’s finding that he took the victim’s car by force or fear.
We conclude otherwise and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the early morning on September 2, 2012, Sheriff’s
Deputy John Marquez was on traffic patrol in a marked car in
South El Monte. While waiting at a traffic light, Marquez saw a
woman jaywalk and enter a convenience store. He pulled into a
parking lot across the street intending to issue the woman a
warning or citation when she emerged. As he waited, Marquez
ran the license plates of cars parked in the lot, believing one
might belong to the woman. The return on a Ford Explorer
indicated the individual associated with the vehicle was wanted
for something serious and triggered a dispatch alert. Marquez
repositioned his patrol car to face the Explorer and got out.
As Marquez emerged from his car, he saw a man (later
identified as Washington) get out on the passenger side of the
Explorer holding a shotgun with the barrel pointed up.
Washington then leveled the shotgun, pointing it toward
Marquez. Believing he was about to be shot, Marquez fired at
Washington and the two exchanged gunfire before Washington
ran off. Marquez was shot but continued to pursue Washington.
The jaywalker joined Washington as he ran. Marquez saw
Washington approach a vehicle turning onto a nearby street.
Jishan Kader, the driver of that car, had slowed to make a right
1 Our factual and procedural recitation is limited to facts
relevant to the carjacking or useful for context.
2
turn. As he did so, Kader saw Washington and a woman running
towards his car on the driver’s side. They were a few feet away
and Washington was holding a large weapon (long gun). Kader
“got really scared” and quickly sped away before the couple
reached his car.
Marquez chased Washington toward a residential area
where a bystander directed Marquez to Linard Street. Marquez
saw Washington pull out of the driveway of a house on Linard
driving a black Volkswagen Golf and speed away. Other deputies
arrived to assist Marquez, who was taken to a hospital and
treated for shotgun pellet wounds on his temple, left and right
forearms and thighs.
Isabel Soto lived on Linard Street with her 60-year-old
brother and 66-year-old sister-in-law, who had an unspecified
medical condition or disability. Soto owned a black Volkswagen
Golf. On the morning of September 2, 2012, Soto was alone in
front of her house when she was approached by Washington and
a woman. Washington was holding what Soto believed was a
rifle. He asked Soto for the keys to her car. Soto did nothing.
Washington and his companion then went through an open
side gate and entered Soto’s home. Soto followed them in. Soto’s
brother and sister-in-law were in the house. Washington asked
Soto’s brother for the keys to Soto’s car. The brother handed over
the keys and Washington and the woman sped away in Soto’s car.
Marquez saw Washington drive out of Soto’s driveway in her
black Volkswagen. Sheriff’s personnel recovered expended shot
shells and numerous cartridge cases at the scene of the shooting
in the parking lot, and an expended shot shell near the side gate
at Soto’s home.
3
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A February 2023 amended Information charged
Washington with willful, deliberate, and premediated attempted
murder of a peace officer (Pen. Code,2 §§ 664, 187, subd. (a));
attempted carjacking of Kader (§ 664/215, subd. (a)); carjacking of
Soto (§ 215, subd. (a)); possession of a firearm by a felon with two
priors (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)); and assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)). The Information alleged Washington personally
used a firearm as to three counts (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and
personally discharged a firearm as to two counts (§ 12022.53,
subd. (c).) It was further alleged Washington suffered two prior
serious or violent felony convictions for robbery (§ 211) and
carjacking (§ 215) in 2005 (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds.
(a)–(d)).
Among other crimes, a jury found Washington guilty of
carjacking Soto and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury
found true the allegation that Washington personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) in the commission of the
carjacking. At his sentencing hearing, Washington admitted two
prior felony convictions. The trial court struck several
enhancements, and sentenced Washington to 25 years to life in
prison for the carjacking, plus two years for possessing a firearm,
to be served concurrently. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Washington maintains that his conviction for carjacking
Soto must be reversed because the prosecution failed to establish
every element of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt, namely
2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
4
that taking Soto’s car against her will was accomplished by force
or fear.
I. The Standard of Review
We review for substantial evidence a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment. (People v.
Hicks (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 423, 429.) Under this deferential
standard, we review the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Lee (2011)
51 Cal.4th 620, 632.) We must also “ ‘accept logical inferences
that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial
evidence.’ ” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411.) It is the
“ ‘exclusive province of the . . . jury to determine the credibility of
a witness,’ ” and to determine the weight to be given to the
testimony adduced at trial. (Lee, at p. 632; Hicks, at p. 429.) We
will not reweigh evidence nor reevaluate witness credibility.
(People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60 (Albillar).)
To warrant reversal under this standard of review, the
appellant “ ‘bears an enormous burden’ ” to demonstrate that
“ ‘upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998)
18 Cal.4th 297, 331; People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th
500, 508.) “If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of
fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled
with a contrary finding.” (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 60.)
II. The Crime of Carjacking.
Carjacking is the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the
possession of another, from the immediate presence of a person or
5
that of a passenger in the vehicle, against his or her will and with
the intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the
person in possession of the vehicle of that possession,
accomplished by means of force or fear. (§ 215, subd. (a); People
v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 886, overruled on another
ground by People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104.) “The
carjacking statute does not define ‘force,’ [or “fear,”] [b]ut courts
interpreting the carjacking statute have analogized it to the
robbery statute, section 211, as both share similar language and
elements.”3 (People v. Lopez (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1230, 1234.)
Consequently, in evaluating Washington’s argument as to the
element of force or fear for carjacking, we rely on cases
interpreting the disjunctive force or fear element in the context of
robbery.
“Most robberies involve actual or threatened force,
resulting in fear on the part of the victim, at the time the
property is taken. [Citation.] However, the requisite fear need
not be the result of an express threat.” (People v. Flynn (2000)
77 Cal.App.4th 766, 771 (Flynn).) Whether fear exists may be
inferred from the circumstances; it need not result from an
express threat or use of a weapon. (People v. Morehead (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 765, 775 (Morehead).) The victim is not required
to resist, and their fear need not be extreme. (Ibid.) Nor is it
necessary that the victim testify they were afraid. (People v.
Mungia (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1709, fn. 2 (Mungia).) All
that is necessary is that the evidence demonstrates conduct,
3 “Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the
possession of another, from his person or immediate presence,
and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”
(§ 211.)
6
words or circumstances reasonably calculated to produce fear.
(Morehead, at p. 775; People v. Davison (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th
206, 212 (Davison) [The element of fear is satisfied when there is
sufficient fear to cause the victim to comply with the unlawful
demand for their property].) Although the victim must actually
be afraid, that fear may be inferred and need only be enough to
cause them to comply with the demand for the property. (People
v. Cuevas (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 689, 698.)
Intimidation alone may satisfy the “fear” element. “ ‘Where
intimidation is relied upon, it must be established by proof of
conduct, words, or circumstances reasonably calculated to
produce fear. But it is not necessary that there be proof of actual
fear, as fear may be presumed where there is just cause for it.’ ”
(People v. Borra (1932) 123 Cal.App. 482, 484.) Intimidation is a
synonym for fear and a jury may infer fear “from the
circumstances despite even superficially contrary testimony of
the victim.” (People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 857.)
III. Sufficient Evidence Supports Washington’s Carjacking
Conviction.
Washington does not challenge the first three elements of
his carjacking conviction, namely, that he took a vehicle that was
not his own, in Soto’s immediate presence, and against her will.
Rather, the sole issue on appeal is whether sufficient evidence
supports the jury’s conclusion that he used either force or fear to
accomplish the theft of Soto’s car to elevate the crime to
carjacking.
The factor of violence—or the threat thereof—is especially
germane. “[C]arjacking is a particularly serious crime that
victimizes persons in vulnerable settings and, because of the
nature of the taking, raises a serious potential for harm to the
7
victim . . . .” (People v. Antoine (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 489, 495;
accord, People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th 853, 859.) As with
robbery, a “serious potential for harm . . . exists whenever there
is a confrontation between the taker of a vehicle and the victim,
‘and in no way depends on whether the confrontation and use of
“force or fear” occurs before, while, or after the defendant initially
takes possession of the vehicle.’ ” (People v. O’Neil (1997)
56 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133.)
Washington correctly observes there is no evidence he
exerted force to complete the carjacking. He did not engage in a
struggle or have physical contact with Soto or her brother. Nor is
there evidence that Soto took steps to deter or prevent
Washington from taking the keys. Washington maintains that
Soto’s brother merely handed over the keys when asked to do so.
Washington also observes that, in closing, the prosecutor did not
assert that he used force to execute the carjacking, but merely
implied that Washington employed fear to execute the carjacking,
particularly the presence of a rifle, to overcome Soto’s will and
take her car.
Washington’s argument ignores the deferential standard of
review. Reviewing the record as a whole and in favor of
supporting the conviction, we conclude substantial evidence
supports the jury’s conclusion that Washington accomplished the
felonious taking of Soto’s Volkswagen “by means of . . . fear.”
(§ 215, subd. (a).) In the context of robbery, fear means
“ ‘sufficient fear to cause the victim to comply with the unlawful
demand for his property.’ ” (Morehead, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at
p. 774.) “[F]ear may be caused by express threats, by the display
of a weapon, or by intimidation alone.” People v. Collins (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 333, 340–341.) The prosecution must prove
8
“ ‘ “ ‘that the victim was in fact afraid, and that such fear allowed
the crime to be accomplished.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Montalvo (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 597, 612, italics omitted; Mungia, supra,
234 Cal.App.3d at p. 1709, fn. 2.) However, such subjective fear
may be proven circumstantially, by inferring the victim’s fear
“from the circumstances in which a crime is committed or
property is taken.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 690.)
Under the circumstances, the jury could reasonably have
inferred that Soto feared Washington would shoot or otherwise
harm her or her family if she refused his demand. (People v.
Wright (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203, 210 [constructive force for
robbery includes force, not actual or direct, exerted on a victim by
operating on a fear of injury].) “So long as the perpetrator uses
the victim’s fear to accomplish the retention of the [vehicle], it
makes no difference whether the fear is generated by the
perpetrator's specific words or actions designed to frighten, or by
the circumstances surrounding the taking itself.” (Flynn, supra,
77 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.) Soto was alone in her residential
neighborhood in the early morning, when she was approached by
two individuals–presumably in a rush, having just fled the scene
of a shooting. The man was armed with a rifle. Soto lived with
her elderly relatives, one of whom was infirm. A reasonable
inference may be drawn that Soto froze in fear when Washington
first demanded her keys. It may also reasonably be inferred that,
still fearful for herself or her family, Soto took no action after
following the armed man inside her home where he again
demanded the keys. From this evidence it may be deduced that
Soto remained fearful throughout the interaction, and her failure
to act or to refuse Washington’s demand demonstrates, rather
than negates, her fearfulness.
9
Washington instilled fear in his victim to accomplish the
taking just as surely as if he verbalized the threats inherent in
the surrounding circumstances. His brazen demands and
unauthorized entry into Soto’s home while armed with a rifle
revealed his confidence in the powerlessness of the victim. The
fact that Washington was armed and his persistent demanding
behavior throughout the incident, coupled with the reaction of
Soto, who reasonably feared serious harm might be inflicted on
her or her family if she did not comply, permitted the jury to
conclude Washington employed fear to take Soto’s car. To prove
the “ ‘use of fear to facilitate the taking,’ “ the victim may
“ ‘explicitly testify that he or she was afraid,’ ” or “ ‘there must be
evidence from which it can be inferred that the victim was in fact
afraid, and that such fear allowed the crime to be accomplished.”
(Davison, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 212.) We think a brusque
demand for keys by an armed man carries with it a manifest
implied threat of harm should the victim fail to comply.
Davison is instructive. Davison found harmless an
instructional error misdefining the fear element of robbery
because the evidence of fear was compelling. The evidence
showed two men approached a female victim at night at an ATM
and told her calmly but firmly to stand back. The victim believed
she was being robbed, and responded by immediately stepping
back from the ATM. She followed the robbers’ instructions
because she felt they meant business and did not know if they
would hit her or pull out a weapon. The incident took only
seconds. (Davison, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 216–217.)
Davison found this evidence was of such compelling force as to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous instruction
was harmless, in that the jury could not have failed to have found
10
the requisite fear. (Ibid.) Similarly here, confronted by an armed
man in a rush and his companion, Soto was unable or chose to
take no action, understanding Washington meant business and
for fear of being harmed. As in Davison, the facts strongly
suggest that Washington obtained the vehicle by means of fear.
It is true Soto did not testify whether or not she feared
Washington. However, a victim need not explicitly testify that he
or she was afraid in order to prove the element of fear, as long as
there is evidence from which it can be inferred the victim was
afraid and, because of that fear, allowed the crime to be
accomplished. (Davison, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 212.) Here,
a reasonable inference from the evidence was that Soto feared
Washington would hurt her or her family and, for that reason,
did not resist or try to stop him from stealing her car. Indeed,
there would have been no reason for Soto first to freeze and then
to follow an armed man into her home where her family waited
unless she was afraid of such harm. Under these circumstances,
the fact that Soto did not specifically testify about fear does not
require a finding of insufficiency. We are not free to reject a
jury’s determinations of credibility unless the testimony is
inherently improbable. (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285,
302.) “[C]onfusion or lack of clarity on the part of a witness does
not make that witness’s testimony inherently improbable.”
(People v. Myers (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 735, 745, fn. 4,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Wolcott (1983)
34 Cal.3d 92, 101.) The evidence does not reasonably support the
interpretation that defendant engaged in theft without intending
to instill (and instilling) fear. Washington’s use of intimidation
was established by his conduct and the circumstances of the
crime. Indeed, whether Washington intended to instill fear is not
11
germane. Although the taking must be accomplished by force or
fear, the defendant need not have intended the victim to
experience force or fear—only to deprive the victim of the
property permanently. (People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th
989, 995–996.)
A reasonable jury could conclude that Soto had no way to
know what an armed man might do if she resisted his demand.
Her passivity showed she viewed Washington’s armed presence
and demand as an implicit threat he might harm her or her
vulnerable family. The evidence supports a conclusion that
Washington’s demands engendered actual and reasonable fear in
Soto.
On these facts, Washington employed fear to accomplish the
carjacking just as surely as if he had verbalized the threats
inherent in the surrounding circumstances. Washington’s
argument listing the actions Soto did not take to resist ignores
the fact that his confrontation of Soto and display of the weapon
immediately changed what may otherwise have been a less
frightening incident into one in which the victim had significant
fear. To the extent it was Soto’s perception of the vulnerable
nature in which she and her family were placed that caused the
fear, those perceptions were reasonable, and the jury could infer
that Washington took advantage of them in a calculated fashion.
Reasonable inferences drawn from this record demonstrate that
Washington intimidated the victim, who was flanked by an
armed man and his accomplice in a hurry to flee. Substantial
evidence supports the jury’s finding that fear was used to
facilitate the carjacking.
12
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
13
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