CourtListener 10015456•In re A.P.
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/28/24 Certified for Publication 7/26/24 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re A.P. et al., B327857
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP05017)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Lidia P.,
Defendant and Appellant;
Luis M.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Pete R. Navarro, Judge Pro Tempore. Reversed
with directions.
Carol A. Koenig, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Lidia P.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent Luis M.
___________________________
Appellant Lidia P. (Mother) asserts the juvenile court erred
by denying her request for a restraining order protecting her
from respondent Luis M. (Father). The juvenile court found that
Father recently committed multiple acts of domestic violence
against Mother and one of her children. The court nevertheless
declined to issue a restraining order, finding it unnecessary
because Mother and Father no longer resided together. The court
instead orally ordered both parents to stay away from one
another.
The parties no longer residing together was not a proper
basis on which to deny Mother the protection afforded by a
restraining order. Nor was the oral stay-away order a proper
substitute. We therefore reverse and remand for a new hearing
on Mother’s restraining order request.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother has two children: A.P. (born 2016) and D.P. (born
2018). Father is D.P.’s presumed father, and has requested
presumed father status for A.P. as well. On December 27, 2022,
the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
2
Services (DCFS) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section
300 petition alleging A.P. and D.P. were at substantial risk of
harm because of domestic violence between Mother and Father
(counts a-1, b-1), Mother’s mental and emotional problems (count
b-2), Father’s severe epilepsy and his driving the children
without proper safety restraints (count b-3), Father’s marijuana
use (count b-4), and Father’s physical abuse of A.P. (counts b-5, j-
1). With regard to domestic violence, count a-1 alleged that on
December 10, 2022, Father forcibly grabbed Mother’s head with
his hands causing her pain, and that on December 18, 2022, he
pushed Mother to the ground causing pain in her right leg.
Count b-5 alleged that Father had twice hit A.P. in the head, once
with a closed fist and once with an open hand.
Prior to the filing of the section 300 petition, on
December 20, 2022, Father agreed with DCFS to a safety plan in
which he would leave the family home. The next day, a social
worker found Father still at the home. Both Mother and Father
claimed he had not slept there the previous night and had
stopped by to retrieve some belongings; both children said Father
had slept in Mother’s bedroom the previous evening. At some
point soon after December 20, 2022, Father indisputably moved
out of the residence.
On December 28, 2022, Mother filed a request for a
restraining order pursuant to section 213.5, seeking protection
for herself from Father based on his alleged domestic violence.
The juvenile court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and set the matter for a future hearing on whether a permanent
1 All unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
3
restraining order would issue.2 Among other things, the TRO
prohibited Father from contacting Mother or coming within 100
yards of Mother or her home. After the TRO was issued, Father
violated it by going to Mother’s home on two or three occasions to
attempt contacting her. Call logs indicate Mother telephoned the
police on January 7, 15, and 29, 2023 to report Father’s violations
of the TRO. On January 30, 2023, a DCFS social worker
explained to Father the possible consequences of continuing to
violate the TRO. Father promised to stay away from Mother, and
there is no evidence in the appellate record that he contacted
Mother after that discussion.
As permitted by section 213.5, subdivision (c)(5), the
hearing on the permanent restraining order took place
simultaneously with the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on
February 22, 2023. Mother testified that she remained in fear of
Father. At the hearing, the juvenile court sustained count b-1
related to domestic violence by Father upon Mother, count b-2
related to Mother’s mental and emotional problems, and counts
b-5 and j-1 related to Father’s physical abuse of A.P.; the court
struck the remaining counts. The court removed the children
from both parents. Among other things, Father was ordered to
participate in a domestic violence perpetrator’s class, and Mother
in a program for domestic violence victims.
2 We use the term “permanent” to distinguish a restraining
order issued after notice and hearing from a TRO issued ex parte.
(Compare § 213.5, subd. (a) [TRO] with § 213.5, subd. (d)(1)
[permanent order].) Such an order is not permanent in the sense
that it remains in force indefinitely, as permanent orders cannot
exceed three years in length. (Ibid.)
4
The court declined to issue a permanent restraining order,
and dissolved the TRO, finding that the parents living separately
had accomplished the same result a restraining order would. The
court instead orally ordered both parents “not to visit together.
Father not to call Mother, not to go down to her house. Same
thing with Mother. Stay away from the father.”
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We apply both the substantial evidence and abuse of
discretion standards to determine whether a juvenile court
properly denied a section 213.5 restraining order request. (In re
S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 670.) When reviewing for
substantial evidence, “ ‘ “we draw all reasonable inferences from
the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do
not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but
merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the
findings of the trial court. [Citations.] ‘ “[T]he [appellate] court
must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that
the order is appropriate].” ’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
“The substantial evidence standard of review takes on a
unique formulation where . . . ‘the trier of fact has expressly or
implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did
not carry the burden and that party appeals.’ [Citation.] ‘Where
the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the
5
question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’
[Citation.] Specifically, we ask ‘whether the appellant’s evidence
was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 671.)
“Review for abuse of discretion is . . . focused not primarily
on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court
abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded
the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 641.) Whether a trial court applied the
correct legal standard in exercising its discretion is a question of
law that we review de novo. (N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
595, 601-602.)
B. The Juvenile Court Erred in Denying Mother’s
Restraining Order Request
1. Section 213.5
“Under section 213.5, and as pertinent here, a juvenile
court has the authority to issue a restraining order lasting up to
three years that protects . . . ‘any parent . . . of the [dependent]
child’ from harassment by a parent. (§ 213.5, subds. (a) & (d); see
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630(a).)” (In re Lilianna C. (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 638, 643-644.) When a dependency matter is
pending, the juvenile court has exclusive authority to issue such
restraining orders; the parent of a dependent may not seek one
from another division of the superior court. (§ 213.5, subd. (a).)
Section 213.5 directs the juvenile court to issue such restraining
6
orders “in the manner provided by [s]ection 6300 of the Family
Code.” (§ 213.5, subd. (a).) Given the cross-reference in section
213.5 to Family Code section 6300, courts have analogized the
issuance of a section 213.5 restraining order to the issuance of
protective orders under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act
(DVPA), Family Code section 6200 et seq. (In re N.L. (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 1460, 1466; In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183,
194.)
Like the DVPA, a protective order issued pursuant to
section 213.5 enjoins the restrained party among other things
“ ‘from molesting, attacking, striking, . . . stalking, or battering’ ”
any parent of the dependent child. (In re B.S., supra, 172
Cal.App.4th at p. 193.) “Accordingly, evidence that the
restrained person has previously molested, attacked, struck, . . .
stalked, or battered” the parent to be protected is not necessary
but “certainly sufficient” to support the issuance of a restraining
order under section 213.5. (Ibid.) Section 213.5 does not require
a reasonable apprehension of future physical abuse by the party
to be protected for issuance of a restraining order. (In re Lilianna
C., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 644.)
If granted, a section 213.5 restraining order must be issued
on approved Judicial Council forms and entered in the California
Law Enforcement Telecommunications System or “CLETS.”
(§ 213.5, subds. (h), (j).) An order’s entry into CLETS “permits it
to be enforced by law enforcement officers.” (In re Marriage of
Reichental (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 396, 405.) A “non-CLETS”
order, such as the juvenile court’s order here for the parties to
stay away from one another, is not entered into CLETS and thus
is typically not enforced by law enforcement. (Ibid.)
7
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
Finding that Father Committed Domestic Violence
Neither parent contests the court’s exercise of dependency
jurisdiction, which was based in part on findings that Father
committed multiple acts of domestic violence. At the combined
hearing on jurisdiction/disposition and Mother’s restraining order
request, the juvenile court found Father committed domestic
violence against Mother on December 10 and 18, 2022. It further
found Father had committed two acts of domestic violence
against one of Mother’s children. Father does not contest that he
perpetrated domestic violence and admits the court did not deny
Mother’s restraining order request based on a failure of proof
that such abuse occurred.
With regard to Mother’s restraining order request, we are
satisfied substantial evidence supports the court’s domestic
violence findings. Father admitted grabbing Mother by the neck
on December 10, 2022, and pushing Mother on December 18,
2022, resulting in her falling down. Mother told police
responding to the December 10, 2022 incident that Father was
acting erratically, had grabbed her neck with both hands, and
had held on for approximately two minutes before letting go.
Although Mother told police Father did not attempt to strangle
her while grabbing her neck, Mother told her sister that Father
had in fact attempted to strangle her. Mother told DCFS that on
December 18, 2022, Father had taken Mother’s phone away and
pushed her to the ground when she attempted to retrieve it. A.P.
told DCFS that Father had previously hit A.P.’s head with a
closed fist hard enough to fracture A.P.’s skull and send him to
the hospital, and another time hit A.P.’s mouth with an open
hand and knocked a tooth out.
8
Father also admitted going to Mother’s home in violation of
the TRO. Under the DVPA, engaging in behavior that violates a
TRO constitutes an additional act of abuse. (Fam. Code, § 6203,
subd. (a)(4); see also N.T. v. H.T., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at
p. 602.) We see no reason to reach a different result under
section 213.5. Section 213.5 permits a juvenile court to enjoin
“contacting” as well as “coming within a specified distance of” a
protected party, and the TRO contained these prohibitions.
(§ 213.5, subd. (a).) Father contacted Mother at her home in
violation of the TRO more than once, requiring Mother to call
police to enforce the TRO. Father’s counsel acknowledged at the
February 22, 2023 hearing that Father knew he violated the
TRO, and such knowing violations are neither de minimis nor
technical but substantive acts of further abuse. (N.T. v. H.T.,
supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 603.)
3. The Juvenile Court Abused its Discretion in Denying
the Requested Restraining Order Because the Parents
No Longer Lived Together
Conceding the court’s findings regarding his domestic
violence, Father instead argues the court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to issue the requested restraining order
despite those findings. Father initially characterizes the juvenile
court as having granted Mother’s request in part by issuing a no-
contact order under section 213.5 and denying it in all other
respects. That is not what occurred. The court’s oral ruling and
its minute order make that clear the court denied all of Mother’s
requests pursuant to section 213.5; it did not grant some and
deny others. The court did not issue its stay-away order on a
Judicial Council form, which would have set forth with more
specificity what the order prohibited Father from doing, and the
9
court did not transmit the order for entry into CLETS so that
police could enforce it—both of which section 213.5 would have
required. (§ 213.5, subds. (h), (j).)
Father next argues that even if the stay-away order was
not issued pursuant to section 213.5, Mother suffered no
prejudice or miscarriage of justice because the stay-away order
combined with the parents no longer residing together provided
Mother any necessary relief. We disagree. Physical separation is
not a substitute for the protection provided by a restraining
order. Nor is a non-CLETS stay-away order.
A court may not deny a restraining order request under the
DVPA on the basis that one parent no longer lives in the same
residence as the other parent. (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M.
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 119-120, citing Fam. Code, § 6301,
subd. (b).) The rationale for this rule is that given “ ‘the
recognized seriousness of domestic abuse, domestic violence
survivors must not be denied critical protection under the DVPA
merely [because] they have succeeded in extracting themselves
from the immediate risks posed by living with their abuser.’ ” (In
re Marriage of F.M. & M.M., supra, at pp. 119-120.) That
rationale applies with equal force to a section 213.5 restraining
order, particularly given that such orders are issued “in the
manner provided by [s]ection 6300 of the Family Code, if related
to domestic violence.” (§ 213.5, subd. (a).) Given section 213.5’s
reference to Family Code section 6300 and the juvenile court’s
exclusive authority over restraining orders sought by a parent
while dependency proceedings are on-going, a domestic violence
survivor in Mother’s position should not receive less protection
than she would in a family law court simply because the parents
no longer live together.
10
The “use of residential separation as a substitute for a
[restraining order is further] inappropriate given that the parties
still have to coparent,” which means “further interactions
between the two are unavoidable.” (In re Marriage of F.M. &
M.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 120.) The facts here illustrate
this point. Following the denial of the restraining order, the
court made a home of Mother order in September 2023 and
granted Father unmonitored visitation; the court later made
home of parents orders with Father having primary custody and
the parents exchanging the children for their respective custodial
times.3 The parents may no longer live together, but their
parenting responsibilities necessitate that they continue to
regularly meet and interact with one another.
The mutual stay-away order was a similarly flawed
substitute for the protections afforded by a section 213.5
restraining order. That the juvenile court felt compelled to issue
such a stay-away order “suggest[s] that the . . . court believed
there was a need to admonish [Father] from the bench that he
must continue to stay away and have no contact with [Mother]”
because of concerns that future abuse might occur “but without
giving [Mother] the legal protection of a restraining order.”
(Cueto v. Dozier (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 550, 562.) As noted
above, a restraining order is entered into CLETS and is
immediately enforceable by police. The stay-away order the court
3 We grant Mother’s request for judicial notice of the court’s
March 28, 2024 minute order, and on our own motion augment
the record to include the minute orders from the September 21,
2023 and January 19, 2024 hearings, all of which reflect the
court’s custody orders. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.155(a)(1)(A),
8.252(a).)
11
made was non-CLETS; should a violation occur, it would not
provide Mother legal protection though immediate enforcement
by police but instead require a more extended after-the-fact court
process affording significantly diminished protection.
4. Remand for New Hearing
Mother requests that we order the juvenile court on
remand to issue a restraining order. Because the juvenile court
used an incorrect legal standard, it did not make factual findings
related to the issuance of a restraining order beyond its finding of
past abuse. Courts have discretion to issue a domestic violence
restraining order based only on past abuse, and that discretion
should be exercised liberally in favor of protecting survivors. (See
Parris J. v Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 116.) If all
material evidence relevant to the court’s exercise of discretion
was undisputed, we could determine Mother’s entitlement to a
restraining order as a matter of law. But the court expressed
concern with Mother’s veracity as to any issues beyond the
specific allegations it sustained because she was not taking her
psychotropic medication and suffered from paranoid delusions.
We further note that during the February 22, 2023 hearing,
Mother made repeated disruptive outbursts, which the court
stated were “symptomatic of some underlying disorder.” As
factual disputes remain beyond the finding of past abuse, and if
the court issues a restraining order it must further decide the
terms and length of that order, we remand the matter to the
juvenile court for further proceedings.
12
DISPOSITION
We reverse the juvenile court’s denial of Mother’s
restraining order request. We remand the matter for a new
hearing on Mother’s request consistent with the views expressed
in this opinion.
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
13
Filed 7/26/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re A.P. et al., B327857
Persons Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP05017)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND ORDER CERTIFYING FOR
FAMILY SERVICES, PUBLICATION
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LIDIA P.,
Defendant and Appellant;
LUIS M.,
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on June 28, 2024, was
not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now
appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports, and it is
so ordered.
________________________________________________________________________
WEINGART, J. ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.