CourtListener 10014450•People v. Boyd CA2/6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/25/24 P. v. Boyd CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B326779
(Super. Ct. No. 19F-07926)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
TERRI DEE BOYD,
Defendant and Appellant.
Terri Dee Boyd appeals following a trial at which the jury
found her guilty of simple assault (Pen. Code1, § 240; count 1);
battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 2); and
simple battery (§ 242; count 3). Appellant contends the trial
court erred by: (1) failing to instruct on unanimity as to count 3;
(2) not staying the sentence on either count 1 or 2 pursuant to
section 654; (3) not staying the misdemeanor restitution fine for
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
count 1 pursuant to section 654; and (4) imposing fines and fees
when appellant had no ability to pay. Appellant further contends
remand for resentencing is necessary because the trial court
imposed a $1,000 fine without citing a statutory basis.
We conclude no unanimity instruction was required. We
consider the section 654 issue to be moot, except as to the $300
misdemeanor restitution fine, which we will strike. We will
remand with direction for the trial court to (1) impose any
misdemeanor restitution fine without considering count 1; and (2)
specify the statutory basis for the $1,000 fine. On remand,
appellant may request an ability to pay hearing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Evidence
Appellant lived in a home with her mother, Betty Busick.
Kellie Myrick, who is appellant’s sister, and Myrick’s boyfriend
David Bristulf were renovating a small “granny home” on the
same property. One day, Myrick threw away a picture frame she
found on the granny home’s deck. The frame belonged to
appellant, who became upset.
The next morning, Myrick and Bristulf went to the main
home to visit Busick for breakfast. Appellant was cooking bacon
and hash browns in a frying pan, and she was holding a fork.
Appellant and Myrick began arguing. Busick called Bristulf into
the living room so appellant and Myrick could “sort it out.”
After about a minute of verbal argument, the encounter
escalated into a physical fight. Appellant hit Myrick, who hit
back. Appellant used the fork to stab Myrick in the neck, back,
and three times in the left arm. Appellant grabbed Myrick’s
head, brought it to her face, and bit Myrick’s cheek. Myrick
recalled that appellant had Myrick’s hair in both hands. Myrick
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estimated the physical fight lasted no longer than two or three
minutes.
Busick asked her daughters to “[b]reak it up.” Bristulf
returned to the kitchen, and he saw appellant holding Myrick by
the hair, forcing Myrick’s head down. Bristulf said, “Girls, break
it up.” Appellant let go of Myrick, grabbed the bubbling frying
pan, and “swung it like a baseball bat at [Bristulf’s] face.” The
cooking side of the pan—containing bacon, hash browns, and
grease—struck the right side of Bristulf’s face, from ear to cheek.
He walked out of the house and called 911. An ambulance took
Bristulf to the hospital. During the ride, he received fentanyl for
pain. Bristulf later developed an infection near his ear. He
testified he had “looked like a monster.” At the time of trial,
Bristulf was unsure whether he had any visible injury to his face.
Defense Evidence
Appellant testified her relationship with Myrick had
always been problematic. Appellant supported herself by making
art pieces, and Myrick had thrown one (the picture frame) away.
On the day of the altercation, appellant was cooking breakfast
when Myrick came into the house and started screaming at
appellant. Appellant said she would call 911. Myrick blocked
appellant from reaching the phone and grabbed her hair. Myrick
hit appellant in the neck and banged appellant’s head against a
bar. Appellant admitted to grabbing Myrick’s hair, but she
denied hitting Myrick. Appellant did not remember biting
Myrick and questioned whether Myrick even sustained a bite on
her cheek. Appellant could not recall whether she used the fork
during the altercation. At one point, “while all hell was breaking
loose,” the frying pan began to smoke. Appellant grabbed the
pan, and its contents “went everywhere.” Appellant did not
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purposefully throw grease onto Bristulf, nor did she hit him with
the frying pan.
Verdicts and Sentencing Hearing
The jury acquitted appellant on the charge of assault with
a deadly weapon (hot pan with grease) (§ 245, subd. (a)(1))
against Bristulf but convicted her on the lesser included offense
of simple assault (count 1). The jury also convicted appellant of
battery with serious bodily injury against Bristulf (count 2) and
simple battery against Myrick (count 3).
On count 2, the court suspended imposition of sentence and
placed appellant on three years of formal probation. The court
ordered appellant to serve 120 days in county jail. As to the
misdemeanor counts 1 and 3, the court sentenced appellant to
credit for time served.
The court also ordered fines and fees to be paid as directed
by the probation department, including: (1) a $300 felony
restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b) and (d)); (2) a $300
misdemeanor restitution fine (ibid.); and (3) an unspecified
statutory fine of $1,000, suspended if no probation violation.
DISCUSSION
Unanimity Instruction
Appellant contends the trial court erred by failing to
instruct on unanimity as to count 3—the simple battery against
her sister Myrick. We disagree.
“In a criminal case, ‘the jury must agree unanimously the
defendant is guilty of a specific crime. [Citation.] Therefore,
cases have long held that when the evidence suggests more than
one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the
crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same
criminal act.’” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 877-
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878.) This requirement “‘is intended to eliminate the danger that
the defendant will be convicted even though there is no single
offense which all the jurors agree the defendant committed.’”
(People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.)
However, “no unanimity instruction is required if the case
falls within the continuous-course-of-conduct exception, which
arises ‘when the acts are so closely connected in time as to form
part of one transaction’ . . . .” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50
Cal.4th 616, 679.) This exception “‘applies when the defendant
offers essentially the same defense to each of the acts, and there
is no reasonable basis for the jury to distinguish between them.’”
(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 682.)
We review this instructional issue de novo. (See People v.
Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 616.)
The continuous-course-of-conduct exception applies here.
Appellant’s acts of grabbing Myrick’s hair, hitting her, biting her,
and stabbing her with a fork all occurred within a compressed
timeframe. Myrick estimated the physical fight lasted no longer
than two or three minutes. Appellant’s conduct formed a single
transaction. (See, e.g., People v. Mota (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 227,
233-234 [acts of sexual violence spanning approximately one hour
a continuous crime].) Moreover, appellant did not offer “‘entirely
different’” defenses to each act of violence against Myrick.
(People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 880.) During
summation, appellant’s counsel argued self-defense without
clearly distinguishing between the different acts. The jury’s
verdict signifies a total rejection of that defense. Appellant’s
“multiple acts constitute[d] a single criminal event.” (People v.
Napoles (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 108, 116.) No unanimity
instruction was required.
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While acknowledging “this is a continuous course of
conduct fact pattern,” appellant argues a unanimity instruction
was still necessary. Appellant relies upon cases requiring the
instruction where, as here, the prosecutor argued discrete acts.
(People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 571; People v.
Norman (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 460, 466.) However, the
continuous-course-of-conduct exception did not apply in those
cases. That exception does apply here. “‘“Neither instruction nor
election are required . . . if the case falls within the continuous
course of conduct exception.”’” (People v. Leonard (2014) 228
Cal.App.4th 465, 491.)
$1,000 Unspecified Statutory Fine
Appellant contends, and the People concede, the trial court
was required to provide a statutory basis for the $1,000 fine. We
agree. The “failure to specify the amount and statutory basis for
each fine . . . is a ‘legal error[] at sentencing’ that can be reviewed
on appeal ‘“regardless of whether an objection or argument was
raised . . . .”’” (People v. Hartley (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 620,
637.) On remand, the court must specify the $1000 fine’s
statutory basis.
Ability to Pay Fines and Fees
Citing People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157,
appellant argues that because she lacked the ability to pay, the
trial court erred by imposing fines and fees. Even assuming the
fines and fees implicate due process as suggested in Dueñas,
appellant was obliged to create a record demonstrating her
inability to pay. (Cf. People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055,
1074.) While counsel orally indicated appellant lacked the ability
to pay, appellant did not request an evidentiary hearing. The
consequently paltry record cannot support striking all fines and
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fees. However, appellant may raise an ability to pay claim on
remand. We express no view on the merits of any such claim.
Multiple Punishments Under Section 654
The misdemeanor simple assault (count 1) and felony
battery with serious bodily injury (count 2) stemmed from the
same physical act—namely, appellant swinging the frying pan at
Bristulf. Thus, section 654 prevents punishment under both
counts. (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 312.)
To the extent the trial court erred in failing to stay the
term of credit for time served imposed on count 1, the issue is
moot because appellant has already served that term. Staying it
would have no ameliorative effect. Remand on this issue would
be an idle act. (People v. Coelho (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 861, 889
[“[R]eviewing courts have consistently declined to remand cases
where doing so would be an idle act that exalts form over
substance . . .”].) Citing expanded discretion under section 654
after Assembly Bill No. 518, appellant argues we must remand
for the court to decide whether to stay punishment on count 1 or
count 2. (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1, p. 6435.) We are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court would not stay the
punishment on count 2 to impose credit for time served on count
1. (Cf. People v. Berdoll (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 159, 165.) The
court already declined to impose only credit for time served.
However, because restitution fines are punishment, section
654 precluded the court from considering both counts 1 and 2 in
setting the restitution fines. (People v. Le (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th
925, 934.) The court imposed a felony restitution fine pursuant to
count 2. It appears the court also considered count 1 in setting
the misdemeanor restitution fine at $300, given that $300 equals
the typical statutory minimum for a misdemeanor restitution fine
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($150) multiplied by the number of appellant’s misdemeanor
convictions (two). (See § 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) Thus, we will
strike that fine. On remand, the court will impose any
misdemeanor restitution fine without considering count 1.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to strike the $300 misdemeanor
restitution fine. The matter is remanded with direction for the
trial court to (1) impose any misdemeanor restitution fine
without considering count 1; and (2) specify the statutory basis
for the $1,000 fine. On remand, appellant may request an ability
to pay hearing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
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Michael L. Duffy, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Andrea Keith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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