CourtListener 10013456•People v. Bowersock CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/24/24 P. v. Bowersock CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B324814
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA019046)
v.
MARK BOWERSOCK,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel B. Feldstern, Judge. Affirmed.
Leonard J. Klaif, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and William H. Shin, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 1996, a jury convicted defendant Mark Bowersock
(defendant) of first degree murder. Many years later, defendant
petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6
(former Penal Code section 1170.95).1 We are asked to decide
whether to reverse the trial court’s order denying the petition
because the court did not grant defendant’s requests to relieve his
appointed attorney under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118
and Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.
I. BACKGROUND
The Los Angeles District Attorney charged defendant with
murdering Laurie Ann Prejean (Prejean), his former romantic
partner. The District Attorney alleged defendant shot and killed
her in retaliation for her testimony against him in a criminal
proceeding. The District Attorney also charged defendant with
robbing Prejean and burglarizing her home.
In June 1996, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree
murder and first degree residential burglary (the jury was unable
to reach a verdict on the robbery charge). The jury also found
true an allegation that defendant used a firearm when he
committed both offenses and a special circumstance allegation
that the murder was committed in retaliation for Prejean’s
testimony. The trial court sentenced defendant to life without
the possibility of parole. The judgment of conviction was affirmed
on direct appeal.
In January 2022, defendant petitioned for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. Defendant requested the trial court
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
appoint counsel, and the court appointed a deputy public
defender to represent him.
In support of his petition, defendant submitted a
declaration stating he did not kill Prejean in retaliation for her
testimony; instead, he claimed he had been released from custody
as a result of her testimony. Defendant also claimed he harbored
no malice aforethought because he went to Prejean’s home only to
return her tax statements and to pay his portion of shared utility
bills. Defendant additionally asserted gunshot residue tests
showed Prejean pulled the trigger of the murder weapon.
The People opposed defendant’s petition. The People
argued defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law
because the record of conviction (mainly, the jury instructions
given at his trial) reveals he was not convicted pursuant to the
felony murder rule, the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or any other theory of imputed malice.
In July 2022, the trial court held a hearing to ascertain how
much time the defense needed to respond to the People’s
opposition. During the hearing, the court advised the parties it
had received two written statements by defendant “relating to his
legal representation for th[e] petition” and would need to address
the statements ex parte with defense counsel. The court
accordingly calendared what it described as an ex parte
“‘Marsden hearing.’”2
2
Before that hearing, defendant personally filed a reply to
the People’s opposition and argued he would be entitled to relief
following a complete evidentiary hearing if certain items of
allegedly exculpatory evidence, which had been withheld from his
trial, were produced. Defendant’s appointed attorney also filed a
reply to the People’s opposition. That reply argued defendant
3
The trial court held the “Marsden hearing” in September
2022 (with only defendant and appointed counsel present). The
court began by briefly describing the two letters it had received
from defendant: the first of which was dated May 25, 2022, and
entitled “Conflict of Interest with the Public Defender” and the
second of which was dated June 10, 2022, and entitled “Marsden
Motion Conflict of Interest.” The letters asked the court to
appoint a new attorney or allow defendant to retain counsel of his
choosing.
The court advised defendant that it believed he was not
entitled to a Marsden hearing, to fire his court-appointed counsel
without court approval, or to represent himself because the
proceedings before the court were post-conviction. Nonetheless,
the court stated it would consider defendant’s request as a
“Marsden-like motion.”
The court gave defendant the opportunity to speak to the
purported conflict of interest and defendant argued a conflict
existed because, during his criminal prosecution, “the public
defender’s office worked hand[-]in[-]hand with the district
attorney’s office to cover up this evidence that proves [his]
innocence.” In addition to alleged misconduct by his trial
attorney, defendant claimed his current attorney was “against
him” and had “made it clear she would not argue on [his] behalf
in [his] best interest.” In questioning defendant about these
assertions, the court inquired about recent events (including the
statements he submitted in connection with his petition) and
about more distant occurrences found in the court’s file, such as a
had made the requisite prima facie showing for relief and urged
the court to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing.
4
post-conviction discovery request made in 2008 and the
appointment of a lawyer who headed a post-conviction discovery
unit not connected with the public defender’s office.
After hearing from defendant and asking questions to
better understand the basis of his concerns, the court invited
defendant’s appointed attorney to respond. Defense counsel, who
was not involved in the representation of defendant at his earlier
criminal trial, explained the steps she had taken on defendant’s
behalf since being assigned to the case, including case research
(i.e., reviewing trial transcripts, jury instructions, and closing
arguments) and communicating with her client. She
acknowledged defendant did not agree with her assessment that
the “odds [we]re not in his favor” on the petition, but she asserted
she had done everything possible to assess his petition and
provide him with the best legal advice. Defense counsel added
that she had explained to defendant how the facts of his case fit
within the parameters of section 1172.6 multiple times and
defendant indicated he understood her explanations. As for
defendant’s claims of innocence, defense counsel stated she had
advised defendant repeatedly to pursue those claims with a non-
profit innocence project. When asked directly by the court,
counsel stated she had no conflict of interest in representing
defendant.
The trial court gave defendant a further opportunity to
speak in light of defense counsel’s response. Defendant told the
court that prior to Prejean’s death, the public defender’s office
had represented Prejean in connection with an altercation she
had with him and had “declared conflicts of interest” with
defendant in the past. When the trial court observed that it had
reviewed the case file from “top to bottom” and had found no
5
record of a conflict of interest finding or even a notation that a
potential conflict of interest had been raised during the trial
proceedings, defendant offered nothing in reply. Instead,
defendant repeated the claim that his appointed attorney told
him he was not going to prevail on his petition.
The trial court ruled that there was no conflict of interest
that would warrant relieving the public defender’s office from
representing defendant and denied defendant’s request to relieve
his attorney.
The court then turned to defendant’s expressed interest in
retaining private counsel. Defendant told the court that a friend
was actively looking for an attorney to represent him and
requested a 30-day continuance of the prima facie hearing on his
section 1172.6 petition. In view of the fact that his petition had
been pending for almost nine months, the court expressed
reluctance to continue the matter. Defense counsel, however,
reminded the court that this was defendant’s first request for a
continuance to attempt to find retained counsel, and the court
thereafter agreed to the requested continuance. In addition, the
court held open the possibility for a further continuance to allow
private counsel to get up to speed on the petition if he or she
promptly advised the court of his or her retention.
Less than two weeks before the continued prima facie
hearing date, defendant filed a motion for “pro per status.”
Defendant explained that he wanted to represent himself “only if
I do not have my paid attorney hired in time for the Oct. 26, 2022
prima facie hearing.” In his supporting declaration he reiterated
the same position: “In the event I do not have an attorney hired
by [October 26, 2022], I want to proceed with pro per status for
my prima facie hearing . . . .”
6
On October 26, 2022, the trial court held the continued
prima facie hearing. Defendant was not present at the hearing
and he had not retained private counsel. He continued to be
represented by the appointed deputy public defender.
Based on the record of conviction, in particular the jury
instructions, which the trial court reviewed in some detail on the
record, the court found defendant was “not convicted of murder
under the felony murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or any other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person solely on that person’s participation in a
crime.” The court found “defendant was convicted under a
currently valid theory of murder as a direct perpetrator of the
willful, deliberate, and premediated murder of Laurie Ann
Prejean,” and ruled he was, as a matter of law, ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6.
The court also addressed defendant’s self-representation
request during the same hearing and explained its reasons for
declining to relieve defendant’s appointed attorney. The court
stated defendant had made repeated representations over many
months that he was in the process of retaining private counsel,
but no such attorney had contacted the court in advance of the
hearing. In addition, in view of defendant’s submissions alleging
collusion between defense counsel and the prosecution in the
willful hiding of exculpatory evidence during his trial, the court
concluded it was in defendant’s best interests that he be
represented by a trained lawyer. The court also “note[d], just
parenthetically,” that under Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal.,
Fourth Appellate Dist. (2000) 528 U.S. 152, a defendant does not
have a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself in a post-
conviction proceeding.
7
II. DISCUSSION
Our Supreme Court has held “there is no federal
constitutional right to counsel under subdivision (c) of section
1172.6, and the right to counsel at [the prima facie] point in the
proceedings is purely statutory.” (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14
Cal.5th 216, 227.) The parties likewise agree defendant did not
have a right under the Sixth Amendment to represent himself at
a section 1172.6 proceeding. The parties, however, disagree
about whether Marsden and Faretta principles can nevertheless
apply in a post-conviction proceeding like this one. That is a
question we need not decide to resolve this appeal; we will
assume for argument’s sake that Marsden and Faretta principles
apply.3
The record shows the trial court conducted an adequate
Marsden hearing in which defendant’s asserted conflicts of
interest and appointed counsel’s competence were addressed.
Based on the information developed at that hearing, there was no
abuse of discretion in denying defendant’s request to appoint new
counsel under Marsden. The trial court also did not err in
denying defendant’s request to represent himself. Defendant’s
request was equivocal, and the law is well established that a
court need not grant an equivocal self-representation request.
3
Regarding defendant’s claim that the court erred in
refusing to permit him to represent himself, we adopt the Faretta
framing and mode of analysis defendant asks us to employ.
8
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendant’s
Marsden Request
“‘When a defendant seeks to obtain a new court-appointed
counsel on the basis of inadequate representation, the court must
permit him or her to explain the basis of [the] contention and to
relate specific instances of inadequate performance. The court
must appoint a new attorney if the record clearly shows the
current attorney is not providing adequate representation or that
the defendant and counsel have such an irreconcilable conflict
that ineffective representation is likely to result. [Citations.]’”
(People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 69; accord, People v. Ng
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 500.)
“‘“When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed
counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate
representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to
explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances
of the attorney’s inadequate performance. [Citation.] A
defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the
first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation
[citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled
in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is
likely to result.”’ [Citation.] The decision whether to grant a
requested substitution is within the discretion of the trial court;
appellate courts will not find an abuse of that discretion unless
the failure to remove appointed counsel and appoint replacement
counsel would ‘substantially impair’ the defendant’s right to
effective assistance of counsel.”’” (People v. Vines (2011) 51
Cal.4th 830, 878; see also Ng, supra, 13 Cal.5th at 500-501.)
Here, the trial court conducted an adequate hearing on
defendant’s Marsden request. The court not only allowed
9
defendant to voice his complaints against the public defender’s
office with regard to the conduct of his current attorney and his
former trial attorney, it also clarified the nature of defendant’s
complaints by asking him questions about his written and oral
statements and about items in the court file regarding post-
conviction discovery requests. In addition, the court allowed
appointed counsel to respond to defendant’s grievance and to
describe her representation of defendant and the communications
they had concerning the petition’s merits. That was sufficient.
(See, e.g., People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1069, 1101-1103
[Marsden motion properly denied after trial court provided
defendant “ample opportunity” to explain basis for complaints].)
The record the trial court developed also discloses no
grounds to conclude the court abused its discretion when finding
that replacing appointed counsel was not required. There is no
evidence the deputy public defender’s representation of defendant
was compromised by a conflict of interest, a lack of diligence or
competence, or an irreconcilable breakdown in communications
between counsel and her client. Defense counsel may have
expressed views defendant did not want to hear (that it would be
difficult to prevail on his section 1172.6 petition), but those views
were, by all appearances, well-informed. There was no reason to
replace defendant’s attorney for giving her client a candid
assessment of his case.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendant’s
Faretta Request
“A trial court must grant a defendant’s request for self-
representation if three conditions are met. First, the defendant
must be mentally competent, and must make his request
10
knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers
of self-representation. [Citations.] Second, he must make his
request unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he must make his
request within a reasonable time before trial. [Citations.]”
(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729; accord, People v.
Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 397.)
The requirement that a Faretta motion be unequivocal
helps to ensure that the defendant “truly desires” to represent
himself. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 23.) A
defendant’s request for self-representation is equivocal if the
defendant’s “‘statements or actions create any ambiguity as to his
desire to represent himself.’” (Ibid.) “[V]acillation between
requests for counsel and for self-representation amounts to
equivocation or to waiver or forfeiture of the right of self-
representation.” (Id. at 22.) An equivocal request is sufficient on
its own to warrant denial. (Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 27
[upholding the denial of the defendant’s Faretta motion on the
independent ground that the request was equivocal]; People v.
Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1109-1110 [“we reject defendant’s
claim that the court erred in denying his subsequent Faretta and
Marsden motion . . . . For one thing, the record does not reflect an
unequivocal assertion of the right of self-representation”].) In
determining on appeal whether the defendant unequivocally
invoked the right to self-representation, we examine the entire
record de novo. (Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 24-25; People v.
Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 218.)
The record here “does not convey an unmistakable desire to
forego counsel.” (Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 26.) To the
contrary, the record shows the opposite: defendant wanted the
assistance of counsel—he just did not want the assistance of the
11
public defender’s office or the particular deputy public defender
appointed. That, of course, is an equivocal request, and the trial
court did not err in denying it. (People v. Tena (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 598, 609 [affirming denial of Faretta request where
defendant’s conduct showed that his request was “born of
frustration at his public defender’s decisions” and “from his
frustrated desire for representation by private counsel,” rather
than from “a desire to represent himself”]; People v. Williams
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1592-1593 [holding Faretta request
was equivocal because defendant’s “request for substitute
counsel, and then to represent himself, came only as a result of
Williams’s disagreement with defense counsel”]; People v. Scott
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204, 1205-1206 [Faretta request
equivocal where defendant said, “‘if I can’t get a [new] state
appointed attorney, then I[‘ll] represent myself’”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J. KIM, J.
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