CourtListener 10011865•People v. Oakley CA1/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/23/24 P. v. Oakley CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A167068
v.
ANTHONY WILLIAM OAKLEY, (Mendocino County Super. Ct.
No. SCUKCRCR2020359461)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Anthony William Oakley sexually assaulted three of his
former romantic partners, including his wife, and a jury convicted him of
several felonies, including spousal rape by force (former Pen. Code,1 §§ 262,
subd. (a)(1), 264, subd. (a)), and forcible rape (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264,
subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to a lengthy prison term. Oakley
appeals, advancing three claims of instructional error. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I.
The prosecution charged Oakley with 10 felonies. At his first trial in
2021, a jury convicted him of false imprisonment but failed to reach a verdict
on the remaining charges.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
Following the verdict, the prosecution filed an amended information.
As relevant here, the operative information charged Oakley with seven
felonies: assault with the intent to commit rape (§ 220, subd. (a)(1); count 1),
spousal rape by force (former § 262, subd. (a)(1), § 264, subd. (a); count 2),
forcible rape (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264, subd. (a); counts 3 & 4), criminal
threats (§ 422; counts 5 & 6), and false imprisonment (§ 236; count 7). The
information alleged enhancement allegations (§§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)(4),
667.6, subd. (d)) and aggravating circumstances (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421).
II.
At Oakley’s second trial, the parties offered the following evidence:2
A. Amanda J. (count 1)
Amanda J. began dating Oakley while she was in high school. In
2011—when she turned 18—they began living together. They had a child
together the following year. Oakley physically and emotionally abused
Amanda during the relationship. On one occasion, after she refused Oakley’s
sexual advances, he told her to “ ‘shut the fuck up’ ” and held her down. She
tried—unsuccessfully—to push him off of her; in response, he frustratedly
poked his penis in between her legs. He gave up before he penetrated her
vagina.
On another occasion, while Amanda was pregnant with their child,
Oakley texted her that he would “ ‘kill the baby’ ” if she didn’t return home
immediately. Amanda called the police. When they arrived at Amanda and
Oakley’s house, Oakley admitted he sent Amanda the text message and
stated he and Amanda “ ‘had both battered each other during their
2We provide an overview of the evidence here; in the discussion of
Oakley’s claims, we provide additional factual detail.
2
relationship.’ ”3 Another time, he threw a 12-pack of soda at her. A can hit
her in the head and exploded; in response, he told her to clean it up.
Amanda and Oakley broke up in April 2014.
B. Jasmine O. (counts 2 & 5)
Jasmine and Oakley began dating in 2013, while he was still dating
Amanda. Eventually, they moved in together.
The domestic violence began in 2015. While they were shopping,
Oakley punched Jasmine in the stomach so hard she “keeled over” and could
not breathe. Another time, he pulled her off their couch and dragged her
across the floor. Once—after Amanda refused to have sexual intercourse
with him—Oakley took her phone and handcuffed her to their futon because
she wanted to call her parents. He told her that he would let her go when she
was “ ‘ready to be nice.’ ” More than an hour later, he finally released her
and returned her phone, but he warned that if her parents arrived, he would
hold her “ ‘hostage’ ” and “ ‘kill [her] in front of them.’ ” Six months later, he
pushed her into a wall. In 2017, he slapped her face and her lip bled. Oakley
told Jasmine that he had hit, chased, and choked Amanda.
According to Jasmine, Oakley was “[v]ery obsessive” about sex: he “felt
he had a right to it.” He told Jasmine that when they got married, it would
be her “ ‘job to pleasure [him].’ ” Between 2016 and 2018, Jasmine was
working double shifts; she would return home from work exhausted and go
straight to bed. Before she went to bed, however, Oakley warned her not to
fall asleep because he would want to “have sex” later in the evening. Jasmine
told him they were not going to have sexual intercourse, and she asked him
not to wake her. On two occasions—once in 2016 and another in 2017—
Jasmine awoke to him “penetrating” her with his penis.
3 Officers arrested him for threatening Amanda.
3
Jasmine and Oakley married in May 2018. One morning a few months
later, he asked to have sexual intercourse, but she declined. While she cried
and said no, he pinned her down and penetrated her. Afterward, Oakley
asked why she was crying. When she answered, “ ‘[b]ecause you just raped
me,’ ” he got “an evil smirk” on his face. He said, “ ‘I didn’t realize you didn’t
want it.’ ”
In January 2019, Jasmine moved out of Oakley’s home. Thereafter, he
contacted her daily, trying to convince her to come back to him. On one
occasion, “in the middle of the night” in January, he sent her a Facebook
message demanding that she come home and threatening that if he
discovered she was with another man he’d “ ‘go crazy. Like Andrew. Only
worse.’ ”4 The threat scared her because Oakley had previously threatened to
kill her and she was “not really sure what would be worse than what
happened” to her best friend.
Jasmine obtained a restraining order. When she and her new
boyfriend picked up her things from Oakley’s home, he and his father
ambushed the man, repeatedly punching and kicking him.
C. Brianna G. (counts 3, 4, 6 & 7)
Brianna G. moved into Oakley’s home in February 2019, just a month
after Jasmine moved out. During the relationship, Oakley punched her in
the face and stomach, grabbed her, and pushed her. On one occasion, he
threatened to make her suffer while her daughter watched.
Oakley forced Brianna to have sexual intercourse “at least 30 times”
including on March 25 and April 16, 2019. On March 25, he began kissing
Brianna with the expectation that she would have sex with him. She told
4 In 2018, Andrew Crowingshield—Oakley’s best friend—shot and
killed Jasmine’s best friend.
4
him no and rolled away from him. Oakley ignored her refusal; he
overpowered and penetrated her. The next morning, he wanted to have
sexual intercourse, but she again refused. He prevented her from leaving the
bedroom and tried to make her orally copulate him. After more refusals, he
punched her in the face and shoved her into the footboard, splitting open her
chin. On April 16, Oakley touched her in a sexual manner while she tried to
sleep. She “clearly” told him no before he grabbed her, held her so she
“couldn’t move,” and penetrated her. He persisted even after she told him to
stop because it was hurting her. The following day, she accused him of “force-
fuck[ing]” her; he responded: “ ‘I was trying to get you to love me’ ” and
apologized.
Brianna ended the relationship in May or June 2019. In a pretext call,
she asked Oakley, “Do you understand that it’s rape? Do you understand
now that you raped me?” He responded, “Yes, I do.”
D. Defense Testimony
Oakley admitted he hit Amanda during arguments, but only in
retaliation for her hitting him. He acknowledged sending a text message to
her threatening to kill their unborn baby and throwing a soda can “at the
wall.” He denied trying to rape Amanda.
Oakley denied raping Jasmine or penetrating her while she slept.
Although he did text her that he would “go crazy like Andrew,” he did not
intend the text to be threatening. He also conceded he made “moves on her to
wake her up so [they] could have sex in the middle of the night.”
Oakley characterized Brianna’s allegation that he raped her 30 times
as “crazy” and “delusional.” He denied raping her. But as to count 4—
forcible rape—he admitted he may have been “a little too persuasive.” He
also admitted that he had acknowledged raping Brianna during the pretext
5
call and that he had not denied “force-fuck[ing]” her in a text message. He
explained that he apologized for things he had not done, just “to help her feel
better.”
E. Verdict and Sentence
In November 2022, the jury found Oakley guilty of the charges and
found true the multiple-victim allegation. He waived a jury trial on the
aggravating circumstances and the trial court found several allegations true.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (3) & (b)(1).) In 2023, the court
sentenced Oakley to 53 years to life in prison.
DISCUSSION
Oakley advances three claims of instructional error. We address these
arguments notwithstanding his failure to raise them in the trial court. (See
People v. Lewelling (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 276, 294.) We review claims of
instructional error de novo, and the instructions as a whole rather than each
instruction in isolation. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218; People v.
Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 544.) If the claim is that an instruction is
ambiguous, “ ‘ “the test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction.” ’ ” (Nelson, at p. 544.)
I.
Corpus Delicti
Oakley first argues the trial court impermissibly lowered the
prosecution’s burden of proof by omitting one sentence from the pattern
instruction on corpus delicti (CALCRIM No. 359). We disagree.
A. Additional Background
CALCRIM No. 359 provides: “The defendant may not be convicted of
any crime based on (his/her) out-of-court statement[s] alone. You may rely on
the defendant’s out-of-court statements to convict (him/her) only if you first
6
conclude that other evidence shows that the charged crime [or a lesser
included offense] was committed. [¶] That other evidence may be slight and
need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was
committed. [¶] This requirement of other evidence does not apply to proving
the identity of the person who committed the crime [and the degree of the
crime]. If other evidence shows that the charged crime [or a lesser included
offense] was committed, the identity of the person who committed it [and the
degree of the crime] may be proved by the defendant’s statement[s] alone.
[¶] You may not convict the defendant unless the People have proved
(his/her) guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The trial court gave only the first two paragraphs of CALCRIM
No. 359.5
B. No Error in Omitting the Last Sentence of the Corpus Delicti
Instruction
“ ‘In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti,
or the body of the crime itself—i.e., the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the
existence of a criminal agency as its cause. . . . [T]he prosecution cannot
satisfy this burden by relying exclusively upon the extrajudicial statements,
confessions, or admissions of the defendant’; ‘some independent proof of the
corpus delicti’ is required.” (People v. Ramirez Ruiz (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
809, 829.) The quantity of the necessary independent evidence, however, is
“ ‘not great. The independent evidence may be circumstantial, and need only
be a “a slight or prima facie showing” permitting an inference of injury, loss,
or harm from a criminal agency, after which the defendant’s statements may
be considered to strengthen the case on all issues.’ ” (People v. Ledesma
5Oakley does not challenge the trial court’s omission of the third
paragraph of the instruction concerning proof of identity.
7
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 721.) “The corpus delicti rule is a rule of law that
governs the admissibility of evidence. [Citations.] It has no bearing on the
prosecution’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the
offense.” (People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 529.)
The trial court did not err by omitting the final sentence of CALCRIM
No. 359. The first two paragraphs of the instruction “correctly express” the
law. (People v. Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1428.) The last sentence
of the instruction reminds the jury that it may not convict the defendant
unless the prosecution has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. While
this sentence was omitted from the instruction, the jury was provided with
this information. The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 220,
which provides in relevant part: “A defendant in a criminal case is presumed
to be innocent. This presumption requires that the People prove a defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is
true. . . . [¶] . . . . Unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal and you must find him not
guilty.” And during closing argument, the prosecutor and defense counsel
repeatedly emphasized the prosecutor’s burden of proof.
Because CALCRIM No. 220 defined the prosecution’s burden of proof,
the trial court’s failure to include the final sentence of CALCRIM No. 359 was
not erroneous. A “judge need not include a legally correct jury instruction
when it is duplicative of other instructions provided to the jury.” (People v.
San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 675.) Moreover—and reviewing the
instructions as a whole—we find no merit to Oakley’s suggestion that the
omission could have led the jury to believe it could convict him as long as the
“evidence merely supported a ‘reasonable inference’ of guilt.” (Capitalization
8
& boldface omitted.) (See People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144,
1220 [courts presume the jury understands and correlates its instructions].)
We are similarly unpersuaded by Oakley’s contention that the omission of the
final sentence actually lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof. (See People
v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 376 [rejecting argument that CALJIC No.
2.15, which contains similar language and pertains to possession of stolen
property, lowered prosecution’s burden of proof].) As stated ante, the corpus
delicti rule has “no bearing on the prosecution’s burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt all elements of the offense.” (People v. Diaz, supra, 3
Cal.4th at p. 529.)
II.
The Unanimity Instruction
Oakley next argues the trial court erred by “wording the unanimity
instruction” as applying only to count 2, the spousal rape by force of Jasmine.
(Capitalization & boldface omitted.) According to Oakley, the instruction
implied that unanimity was not necessary to convict him of raping Brianna
(counts 3 & 4) and threatening Jasmine (count 5). He is mistaken.
In a criminal case, “the jury must agree unanimously the defendant is
guilty of a specific crime.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132,
italics omitted.) Therefore, “when the evidence suggests more than one
discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the
court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.” (Ibid.)
The trial court gave a unanimity instruction (CALCRIM No. 3500) as to
count 2, spousal rape by force of Jasmine. It did not, however, give a
unanimity instruction with respect to any other charge. No such instruction
was required. As to counts 3 and 4, the prosecutor clearly specified in the
charging document—and in opening and closing arguments—that it was
9
pursuing convictions for raping Brianna on March 25 and April 16, 2019.
(People v. Diaz (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1375, 1382 [unanimity instruction
properly omitted where prosecutor tied specific count to specific act during
argument].) When instructing the jury, the court specified the prosecutor
had to prove Oakley raped Brianna on March 25 and April 16, 2019. As to
count 5, the prosecutor specified during opening and closing argument the
charge pertained to Oakley’s threat to “go crazy like Andrew.” Under the
circumstances, the court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on
unanimity as to counts 3, 4, and 5.
III.
Uncharged Sex Crimes Instruction
Oakley asserts the trial court erred by not defining the term “sexual
assault” when it gave CALCRIM No. 1191A—the pattern jury instruction on
using evidence of uncharged sex crimes to prove propensity. He contends
that without a definition, “the jury was simply left to speculate what those
crimes might consist of,” and the error requires reversal of counts 1 through
4. We are not persuaded.
A. Additional Background
The prosecution elicited testimony on uncharged sex offenses pursuant
to Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a), which provides that evidence
of uncharged sexual offenses may be admissible to show propensity when a
defendant is accused of a sexual offense.
In giving CALCRIM No. 1191A, the trial court stated the prosecution
“presented evidence that the defendant committed other crimes of sexual
assault that were not charged in this case” and that “[t]he crimes of sexual
assault are defined for you in these instructions.” It continued: “If you decide
that the defendant committed the uncharged offenses, you may but are not
10
required to conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or
inclined to commit sexual offenses, and, based on that decision, also conclude
that the defendant was likely to commit assault, rape, forcible rape, and rape
of spouse, as charged here.” The court defined the following crimes:
inflicting injury on a cohabitant; false imprisonment; assault with intent to
commit rape; spousal rape by force; rape by force; making criminal threats;
battery; assault; and attempted rape.
B. Any Assumed Error in Failing to Define the Term “Sexual
Assault” Was Harmless
Assuming for the sake of argument the trial court erred by failing to
define the term “sexual assault” when instructing the jury with CALCRIM
No. 1191A, the error was harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836, or Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 because
overwhelming evidence supported the convictions. (People v. Gonzales (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 494, 502–503.) All three victims testified—describing the
offenses in detail—and Oakley admitted raping Brianna during a pretext call
and in text messages. (People v. Gammage (1992) 2 Cal.4th 693, 700
[uncorroborated testimony of victim sufficient to sustain conviction for sex
crime].) On this record, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the jury
would have reached the same verdict had the term “sexual assault” been
defined in the manner Oakley suggests.6
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
6 We reject Oakley’s cumulative prejudice claim. (People v. Duff (2014)
58 Cal.4th 527, 562 [no cumulative error where nothing to cumulate]; People
v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305 [no cumulative error where only one
harmless error].)
11
STEWART, P.J.
We concur.
RICHMAN, J.
DESAUTELS, J.
People v. Oakley (A167068)
12
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.