CourtListener 10010851•People v. Gomez CA2/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/22/24 P. v. Gomez CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B325002
Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BA279286
v. ORDER MODIFYING
OPINION AND DENYING
ANGEL GOMEZ, PETITION FOR
REHEARING
Defendant and Appellant.
NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT
THE COURT*:
This court has received the petition for rehearing filed by
appellant on July 10, 2024. This court’s opinion, filed June 25,
2024, is modified as follows:
All references to Penal Code section 12022.52 on page 2
of the opinion are modified to instead refer to Penal Code section
12022.53.
This modification does not change the judgment.
The petition for rehearing is DENIED.
____________________________________________________________
CURREY, P.J. COLLINS, J. ZUKIN, J.
Filed 6/25/24 P. v. Gomez CA2/4 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B325002
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA279286
v.
ANGEL GOMEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Shelly Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Scott A.
Taryle, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Angel
Gomez of three counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder. On each count, the jury found true the
allegations that Gomez personally used and personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury to
one of the three victims. In 2022, Gomez filed a petition for recall
and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial
court denied Gomez relief, concluding he was ineligible as a
matter of law. On appeal, Gomez argues reversal is warranted
because the trial court committed prejudicial error. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As noted above, the jury convicted Gomez of three counts of
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 187,
subd. (a); 664; counts one through three). As also noted above, on
each attempted murder count, the jury found true the allegations
that Gomez (1) personally used a firearm (§ 12022.52, subd. (b));
(2) personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (c)); and (3) personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm proximately causing great bodily injury to victim Deyvi
Covarrubia. (§ 12022.52, subd. (d).) The jury also found gang
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute.
2
allegations true on those counts. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)2 The
trial court sentenced Gomez to 120 years to life in state prison.
On direct appeal, a different panel of this court modified
the judgment by striking two previously stayed firearm
enhancements and affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
(People v. Gomez (May 19, 2008, B194839) [nonpub. opn.].)3
In 2022, Gomez petitioned the trial court for relief under
section 1172.6. In his petition, Gomez requested counsel be
appointed on his behalf. Without appointing counsel, the trial
court summarily denied Gomez relief. In denying relief, the court
explained:
In accord with CALJIC 8.66 [ ], a conviction for attempted
murder requires that the “defendant [Gomez] intended to
kill.” Additionally in this matter, the jury specifically
determined [Gomez’s] actions to be willful, deliberate and
premeditated while personally and intentionally
discharging a firearm which caused great bodily injury.
[Gomez’s] conviction was not premised on theories of felony
murder or natural and probable consequences and such
jury instructions were not given. Accordingly, and as a
matter of law, [Gomez] is ineligible for resentencing . . . .
Gomez timely appealed.
2 Though not directly relevant to this appeal, the jury also
convicted Gomez of three counts of shooting from a motor vehicle,
in addition to finding firearm use and gang allegations true on
those counts. (§ 12022.52, subds. (b), (c) & (d); § 186.22, subd.
(b)(1).)
3 We granted Gomez’s request for judicial notice of our
opinion resolving his direct appeal.
3
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Law
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) “to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f); accord, § 189, subd. (e); People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) expanded SB 1437 to include convictions for attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551.)
SB 1437 also added section 1170.95 to the Penal Code,
which, as mentioned above, was later renumbered to section
1172.6. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) This
section permits individuals who were convicted of felony murder
or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
but who could not be convicted of murder following SB 1437’s
changes to sections 188 and 189, to petition the sentencing court
to vacate the conviction and resentence on any remaining counts.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The statute also provides relief for certain
individuals convicted under any “other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime.” (Ibid.) It likewise permits individuals
who were convicted of attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, but who could not be convicted of
attempted murder under current law, to petition the sentencing
court for relief. (Ibid.)
4
A petition for relief under section 1172.6 must include a
declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible for relief
based on all the requirements of subdivision (a), the superior
court case number and year of the petitioner’s conviction, and a
request for appointment of counsel, should the petitioner seek
appointment. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1).)
Subdivision (c) of section 1172.6 provides: “Within 60 days
after service of a petition that meets the requirements set forth in
subdivision (b), the prosecutor shall file and serve a response.
The petitioner may file and serve a reply within 30 days after the
prosecutor’s response is served. These deadlines shall be
extended for good cause. After the parties have had an
opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to
show cause. If the court declines to make an order to show cause,
it shall provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for
doing so.”
II. Remand is unwarranted because the record
demonstrates Gomez is ineligible for section
1172.6 relief as a matter of law
Gomez argues the trial court prejudicially erred by denying
him relief as a matter of law without first appointing counsel and
allowing additional briefing. It is true, as the Attorney General
concedes, that the trial court erred by not appointing counsel and
allowing briefing. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957; § 1172.6,
subds. (b)(3) & (c).) This error, however, was harmless.
As the trial court correctly noted in denying relief as a
matter of law, the jury was not instructed on the natural and
5
probable consequences doctrine nor any other theory of imputed-
malice liability. Rather, the jury was instructed that, in order to
convict Gomez of attempted murder on counts one through three,
it had to conclude Gomez “harbored express malice, namely, a
specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.”
Additionally, the jury was instructed as follows regarding the
allegations, ultimately found true by the jury, that the attempted
murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated: “If you find
that the attempted murder was preceded and accompanied by a
clear, deliberate intent to kill, which was the result of
deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed
upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of
passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is
attempt to commit willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder.”
Viewing the jury verdicts through the lens of the instructions
given, it is clear the jury convicted Gomez of attempted murder
on counts one through three under the theory that he harbored
the intent to kill, not under an imputed-malice theory. The trial
court was therefore correct in concluding Gomez is ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. And because Gomez is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law, it is not reasonably
probable he would receive a more favorable result on remand.
(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957-958 [deprivation of right
to counsel in section 1172.6 proceedings is state law error only,
tested for prejudice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818].)4
4 Gomez argues the prejudice standard articulated in
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) should
apply to the trial court’s error in not appointing counsel. (See
6
Gomez also argues the trial judge erred by ruling on his
petition even though she was not the original sentencing judge.
We need not decide whether there was any error in which judge
was assigned to oversee Gomez’s section 1172.6 proceedings.
Regardless of who the trial judge was, the record conclusively
demonstrates Gomez is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
Because Gomez is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, remand
is unwarranted, as remanding the case would unnecessarily
consume judicial resources and would not lead to a more
favorable result for Gomez.
ibid. [placing the burden on the prosecution to show the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) Even assuming
(without deciding) Chapman applied, because Gomez is ineligible
for relief as a matter of law, any and all purported errors by the
trial court were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
7
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Gomez section 1172.6 relief.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CURREY, P. J.
We concur:
COLLINS, J.
ZUKIN, J.
8
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