Unger v. Gottlieb CA2/4

CourtListener 10010746Calctapp22.07.2024

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Filed 7/22/24 Unger v. Gottlieb CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

AARON UNGER, B320440

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC644128)
v.

LAURA GOTTLIEB,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark V. Mooney, Judge. Affirmed.
Stuart J. Wald and James P. Wohl for Defendant and
Appellant.
Steven P. Krakowsky for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Respondent Aaron Unger loaned appellant Laura Gottlieb1
$600,000 in three installments between November 2013 and
January 2014. Gottlieb made some interest payments on the
loan, then stopped making payments. Unger sued Gottlieb in
December 2016 for breach of contract, common counts, and fraud.
A jury found in Unger’s favor, awarded him actual damages, and
awarded punitive damages of one million dollars.
Gottlieb appealed, and asserts four arguments. She
contends her agreement with Unger was oral, and therefore his
causes of action for breach of contract and common counts were
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Gottlieb also
asserts Unger failed to prove the element of reliance for his fraud
claim. Gottlieb further contends the court erred in denying her
request to bifurcate the punitive damages portion of the trial.
Finally, she argues there was insufficient evidence to support the
award of punitive damages.
We affirm. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s
findings regarding the written nature of the parties’ agreement,
Unger’s reliance on Gottlieb’s statements, and the amount of the
punitive damages award. We also find no error in the court’s
denial of Gottlieb’s belated request to bifurcate the trial.
BACKGROUND
A. Unger’s allegations
Unger alleged the following facts in his first amended
complaint, the pleading relevant to this appeal. In 2013, Gottlieb
lived in a 10,000-square-foot home on a 1.7-acre lot in Malibu

1 Gottlieb is also referred to in the record as Laura Lazar,
her married name.

2
with an ocean view, which was owned by Gottlieb’s father, Daniel
Gottlieb.2 Gottlieb was overseeing the renovation of the property.
Gottlieb told Unger that she needed a loan to buy tile for
renovation of the pool, and she would pay him back once the work
was complete. Gottlieb also told Unger that a neighbor was
planning to sell his property, and Gottlieb wanted to put down a
good faith deposit to secure the property before it was listed for
sale. Thus, Unger loaned Gottlieb a total of $600,000: $45,000 on
November 25, 2013; $505,000 on December 12, 2013; and $50,000
on January 31, 2014. Gottlieb made eight interest payments on
the loans between March and October 2014, but failed to make
any additional payments thereafter.
Unger alleged that Gottlieb never intended to use the
loaned money for the pool or as a deposit on the neighbor’s house,
and in reality, “Gottlieb intended to use the funds she received
from Unger to make speculative investments in numismatic coins
or other speculative investments with her boyfriend/fiancee [sic]
Martin Grant.” Gottlieb continued to promise to repay the loan,
but “[i]n September 2016, Unger discovered that Gottlieb never
had any intention of repaying the loaned funds, [and] instead,
intended to induce Unger not to commence an action.” Unger
alleged that Gottlieb failed to repay any portion of the $600,000
principal.
Unger filed his original complaint on December 16, 2016.
The trial court entered a default judgment against Gottlieb,
which Gottlieb successfully moved to set aside in 2020. Unger

2 We refer to Daniel Gottlieb and Unger’s mother, Joyce
Unger, by their first names to distinguish them from the parties.
No disrespect is intended.

3
filed the first amended complaint on June 4, 2021, alleging
causes of action for breach of written contract, common counts,
and fraud. He sought compensatory damages, punitive damages,
and costs. The case proceeded to a jury trial.
B. Trial
A four-day jury trial was held from November 30, 2021 to
December 3, 2021. On the first and second days of trial,
Gottlieb’s counsel asked that the punitive damages portion of the
trial be bifurcated. As discussed more fully below, the trial court
denied these requests as untimely.
In opening statements, Unger’s counsel described the
alleged loans, Gottlieb’s promises to repay the money, and
Gottlieb’s failure to repay Unger. Gottlieb’s counsel stated in his
opening statement that Gottlieb “did not need the money” Unger
allegedly loaned her because “Laura Gottlieb had $6 million of
her own money. She didn’t need to borrow 10 percent of that[,]
$600,000[,] from Mr. Unger. She was much wealthier. She had
the money, and she didn’t need a loan.” Gottlieb’s counsel argued
that the true purpose of the $600,000 transaction “was to help
Mr. Unger get his hands on some of his mother’s money so he
could invest it, so he could look good to his mother.” The
following evidence was presented.
1. Aaron Unger
Unger testified that he and Gottlieb met in high school,
decades earlier. Gottlieb’s father, Daniel, was a wealthy real
estate developer with extensive real estate holdings; the Gottliebs
lived in a large estate in Beverly Hills. The Ungers lived in a
two-bedroom condominium. Unger’s father died in 2002.
In 2011, Gottlieb told Unger that Daniel had purchased the
Malibu house, a 10,000-square-foot home on a 1.7-acre property

4
with a large swimming pool and spectacular views. It was
located on a cul-de-sac in a gated neighborhood. Gottlieb told
Unger she was going to oversee renovations on the property, then
Daniel was going to give her the house. Gottlieb and her children
moved into the home in late 2012 or early 2013; renovations to
the pool area were unfinished at the time.
Unger testified that in November 2013 Gottlieb told him
she needed a $45,000 deposit for pool tile, and asked Unger if she
could borrow the money from him. Gottlieb told Unger that she
did not want to trouble her father for the money because it was
near the anniversary of her sister’s death. Gottlieb also assured
Unger she had plenty of assets, including a Goldman Sachs
account worth about $1.5 million and an extensive rare coin
collection. She told Unger she would repay the loan in about a
month. Unger testified that he and Gottlieb went together to a
bank and transferred the money from a joint account Unger
shared with his mother, Joyce, into Gottlieb’s account. Unger did
not ask Gottlieb to sign a promissory note for the loan; Unger
testified that he relied on their families’ 40-year relationship in
determining that Gottlieb would repay the loan.
Unger testified that Gottlieb later told him she needed to
borrow $505,000 to make a deposit to buy the house next door to
hers in Malibu. Gottlieb said she would prefer to borrow money
from him instead of liquidating part of her Goldman Sachs
account or her coin collection, which would anger Daniel. Unger
testified that he was hesitant to loan Gottlieb more money, but he
changed his mind after talking to Daniel at a holiday party.
Unger and Gottlieb agreed to an interest rate of eight percent,
and Gottlieb told Unger she would pay him back within about six
months. In December 2013, Unger withdrew the funds from his

5
and Joyce’s joint account using a cashier’s check with “loan” as a
notation. Gottlieb signed the cashier’s check and deposited it into
her account. Unger testified that he asked that “loan” be
included on the cashier’s check “to memorialize the transaction
with some kind of notation that indicated that it was indeed a
loan.” Again, Unger did not request that Gottlieb sign a
promissory note.
In January 2014, Gottlieb told Unger she needed an
additional $50,000 deposit to secure the house next door. Unger
and Gottlieb agreed on the same interest rate for all three loans;
Gottlieb said she would have the full $600,000 repaid within nine
months. Unger withdrew $50,000 from his and Joyce’s joint
checking account and transferred the money to Gottlieb.
Between March and October 2014, Gottlieb made eight
interest payments on the loan in a series of checks made out to
Joyce. Most checks stated in the memo line, “interest on loan”;
one stated “interest on loan $600K.” Unger testified that he
asked Gottlieb to make the checks out to Joyce because he used
the money to help pay for Joyce’s expenses at an assisted living
facility. Gottlieb made the last interest payment in October 2014;
she never made another payment.
Unger testified that sometime after October 2014, Gottlieb
told him she was having trouble getting her deposit back for the
house next door, saying she had retained an attorney to help her.
Unger contacted the attorney, who confirmed that Gottlieb was a
client but said he could not discuss any legal issues due to
attorney-client privilege. Unger testified that he believed
Gottlieb when she said the property owner was refusing to return
her deposit. In March 2016, Unger spoke to Daniel about
Gottlieb’s efforts to get her deposit back, and gave Daniel contact

6
information for the neighbor. Unger testified that in 2015 and
2016 Gottlieb continued to promise to repay the loan. In
September 2016, Gottlieb told Unger she would have the
$600,000 to him within days. Unger sent an email to Daniel
reporting Gottlieb’s promise; the email was introduced at trial.
Gottlieb did not make the payment. Unger testified that he met
with Daniel, then retained counsel in an attempt to recover the
money.
Joyce died in December 2016. Unger testified that he had
been Joyce’s attorney-in-fact since 2006. Unger’s counsel noted
that Gottlieb contended in her discovery responses that Joyce had
given her the money as a gift. Unger testified this was not true;
by November 2013, Joyce was suffering from dementia and was
not making any of her own financial decisions. Unger testified
that sometime before this trial, Gottlieb had sued Martin Grant
in federal court, and Unger learned during that case that Gottlieb
had sent his money to Grant. Unger said he never gave Gottlieb
permission to use his money to invest with Grant.
2. Laura Gottlieb
Unger called Gottlieb as a witness. She confirmed that she
and Unger met in high school in the late 1970s or early 1980s.
Gottlieb testified that her father, Daniel, was a very successful
businessman worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Grant was a
college boyfriend Gottlieb had dated on and off. Gottlieb testified
that she was planning to marry Grant until January 2017,
despite his multiple felony convictions. (Grant later testified that
he and Gottlieb were not engaged.)
Gottlieb testified that she still lived in the Malibu house,
which was a seven-bedroom, ten-bathroom villa with a spa and a
pool house. Gottlieb stated that she was involved in a lawsuit

7
against her brother regarding control of Daniel’s assets, because
Daniel had dementia. When counsel asked if all of her claims
against her brother, in both civil court and probate court, had
been “thrown out,” Gottlieb replied, “That is technically true, but
we have appealed.”
Gottlieb testified that the house next door to her in Malibu
was leased to a drug rehabilitation facility called Passages, but
the owner wanted to sell it. Gottlieb denied that she ever
intended to buy the house next door, and said she never
discussed with Unger the possibility of buying the house.
Gottlieb also testified that in 2016 she changed the password on a
$4.5 million E-Trade account that Daniel had set up for Gottlieb
as an investment, then liquidated the account, angering Daniel.
Gottlieb also liquidated her $1.5 million Goldman Sachs account,
and gave the approximately $6 million to Grant to buy coins
(according to her testimony in federal court) or for various
investments (according to her testimony in this action). Gottlieb
testified that Grant never returned the money, so she and Daniel
sued him.
In the federal lawsuit, Gottlieb testified that she initially
did intend to buy the house next door and she borrowed money
for a down payment, but then she realized she might “not be able
to carry” the loan on that property. Gottlieb acknowledged the
deposit from Unger for $505,000 on December 12, 2013; before
this deposit, Gottlieb’s bank account was overdrawn by
$19,546.65. On December 16, 2013, Gottlieb transferred
$400,000 to Grant. Gottlieb alleged in the federal trial that
Grant had defrauded her. Grant represented himself at trial,
and the lawsuit was resolved in his favor.

8
On the second day of trial in the instant case, Gottlieb
testified that the money she received from Unger represented
gifts from Joyce that were not intended to be repaid. She
testified that she and Joyce had a “very nice friendship.” She
said Unger had access to Joyce’s accounts, and he needed
permission from Joyce or her accountant before he could
withdraw money. Gottlieb acknowledged that in her
interrogatory responses she stated that in 2013 while visiting
Joyce at her assisted living facility, Joyce insisted on giving
Gottlieb $600,000 to help with “projects” Gottlieb was working
on. When questioned about these projects at trial, Gottlieb said
she could not recall what they were, but they were “mostly real
estate projects.”
Gottlieb said that after this conversation with Joyce, Unger
decided to give Gottlieb $45,000, without any input from Gottlieb
about the amount. She also stated there was no further
discussion with Joyce or Unger before Unger called to say that he
wanted to deposit an additional $505,000 into her account.
Gottlieb testified that Unger also unilaterally decided the amount
of the third deposit he gave to Gottlieb.
On the third day of trial, however, Gottlieb testified that
Joyce loaned the money intending that Gottlieb would “help
[Unger] invest the money and learn,” so when he inherited
Joyce’s estate he would not squander it. Gottlieb testified, “She
wanted me, because I was successful in investing, to help her son
be successful in investing.” The intent “was to make money with
[Joyce’s] money,” and then “we return the 600,000.” Gottlieb also
testified that she had six million dollars in her two stock
accounts, and therefore did not need Unger’s money. Gottlieb
stated that when she wrote checks to Joyce, she wrote “interest

9
on loan” at Unger’s insistence as a way to show Joyce and her
accountant that Unger “was able to make money with her
money.” Gottlieb stated that she did not return the $600,000 to
Joyce because she “wasn’t supposed to,” it “was up to [Unger] to
do it.” When Unger’s counsel asked, “You did not return
$600,000 to Aaron Unger; correct?” Gottlieb responded, “Correct.”
Gottlieb testified that she and Grant had been engaged,
and she had never bought any coins from him. She testified that
she had given Grant $6 million for investments, but Grant never
returned the money. Gottlieb testified that with Unger’s
approval, she sent Joyce’s $600,000 to Grant to invest. Gottlieb
also stated that Unger declined her invitation to join her lawsuit
against Grant.
3. Martin Grant
Unger called Grant to testify. Grant said he and Gottlieb
met in 1988 and dated for a few years. Grant was in the business
of buying and selling numismatic or collectable coins. In 2010 or
2011 Gottlieb started buying coins from him; by the time of trial
she had amassed a collection that Grant said was “absolutely
enormous. It’s huge. It’s many millions of dollars’ worth of
coins.” He estimated Gottlieb’s collection was worth $8 million to
$11 million. Grant testified that Gottlieb told him that she
intended to keep the coins, and he had never seen them on the
market again. He also testified that when he visited Gottlieb, he
saw that Gottlieb “had coins stashed in a box in the maid’s
quarters, just a boxful of extremely rare coins, and they were just
hidden behind a mattress. It was against the wall.” When he
mentioned the coins to Gottlieb, “she said she had them stashed
all over the house. I doubt very seriously she remembers where
they all are at this point. It’s a huge house.”

10
Grant testified that when he told Gottlieb rare coins had
become available, “she had this nasty habit of saying, ‘Go get
them,’ and then she wouldn’t pay me.” Thus, in late 2013 when a
new set of coins became available that Grant thought Gottlieb
might want, he told her about them and “I told her that if she
wanted them, we have to pay for them. Like, she really actually
had to pay for them this time.” Gottlieb sent Grant the money for
the coins—$400,000—in December 2013. Gottlieb told Grant
that she had borrowed the money from Unger, and “[s]he wasn’t
worried about paying him back.” Grant was also aware that
Gottlieb had “liquidated $6 million of securities accounts set up
by her father in order to buy coins” from Grant.
Grant testified that Gottlieb had sued him in federal court,
and her allegations against him changed dramatically over the
course of the case. First Gottlieb alleged that she gave Grant
nearly $8 million to make a movie. “Then it changed to, she gave
me the money because I was going to do a real estate deal and a
movie.” By the fourth and fifth versions of the complaint,
Gottlieb alleged that she bought millions of dollars’ worth of coins
but Grant either never delivered them or took them back.
Judgment was entered in Grant’s favor.
On cross-examination, Grant admitted that he had three
felony convictions: two involving contracting without a license
relating to a solar power company, and one involving “title
washing” stolen cars. Grant testified that Daniel had helped him
repay debts related to the car company and had paid his legal
bills. Grant testified that he and Gottlieb had not been
romantically involved since 1992, and they were not engaged
when she was buying coins from him. Grant testified that in

11
2017, after the federal lawsuit began, he contacted Unger and
told him that Gottlieb had sent him Unger’s money.
4. Additional witnesses
Gottlieb called Elvon Teper, who testified that Beverly
Hills Carmel South, the residential care facility where Joyce
lived, generally did not care for patients with dementia. On
cross-examination, Teper testified that he never met Joyce and
he was not familiar with her care at the facility. Gottlieb also
called Roger Ades, a retired CPA who prepared Joyce’s tax
returns. Ades testified that he worked with Unger to invest
Joyce’s money in real estate and he managed some of her real
estate investments. Ades also said he did not manage Joyce’s
accounts in general, and he did not see the checks Gottlieb wrote
to Joyce. Ades testified on cross-examination that he had been
friends with Unger for decades, and that Joyce expressed no
dissatisfaction with Unger.
5. Punitive damages
At the end of the first day of trial, Unger’s counsel told the
court that he had requested financial documents relevant to
Unger’s punitive damages claim, but he had not yet received
anything in response. Gottlieb’s counsel offered Unger’s counsel
some bank statements, and Unger’s counsel said, “This doesn’t
come remotely close to everything that was asked for.” Gottlieb’s
counsel said, “I understand. Most of the items on the list she
hasn’t done. And we haven’t put [in] a request for the trust . . . .”
The court noted that it had advised counsel previously that “it is
in the defendant’s best interest to provide this information,”
because “[i]f they don’t make an adequate response to the [Code
of Civil Procedure, section] 1987 demand, then the jury is

12
instructed that the defendant is presumed to be able to pay
whatever they choose to award.”
At a break on the second day of trial, Unger’s counsel asked
Gottlieb’s counsel if any additional financial documents would be
produced. Gottlieb’s counsel said yes. On the third day of trial,
as Unger’s counsel prepared to question Gottlieb, he stated that
although complete financial records had been requested, Gottlieb
had produced only limited bank statements.
Unger called Gottlieb back to the witness stand to elicit
testimony relevant to his punitive damages claim. Gottlieb
agreed that Daniel was worth “several hundred million dollars,”
that Daniel’s wealth was in a trust, and she and her brother were
engaged in a lawsuit regarding the trust. Daniel was suffering
from dementia. Unger’s counsel presented a petition from the
probate case in which Gottlieb stated that she was entitled to 40
percent of Daniel’s trust upon his death.
Gottlieb testified that she was still living in the house in
Malibu. Her bank records showed deposits of $340,544 for the
first 10 months of 2021. When asked about any documents
showing income, Gottlieb responded that she did not have any.
When asked about the incomplete bank statements produced,
which included only the face page of each statement, Gottlieb
said she did not know anything about her bank statements
because “they’re with my accountant” and she did not request
them.
Gottlieb did not produce any additional documents
regarding income, although just before the day’s testimony
began, she produced an unsigned draft tax return for 2020.
When asked if she owned interests in any companies, Gottlieb
answered, “I don’t know,” explaining that her brother had taken

13
control of certain family assets, which was at issue in their
ongoing litigation. When counsel asked about Gottlieb’s interest
in specific assets—land for a planned $30-million entertainment
complex, a racetrack, two medical office complexes, Daniel’s
various LLCs—Gottlieb continued to state that she did not know
anything and could not answer. Gottlieb admitted that she had
not produced documents regarding any sales of coins, gold, or
silver. Gottlieb testified that Daniel’s company paid her a $2,400
salary per month, and she was provided $35,000 per month “to
manage the estate that I live in and [to] pay my legal bills.”
On cross-examination, Gottlieb testified that she did not
have rare coins. She also testified that she obtained more than
$100,000 by “borrowing against” her grandmother’s jewelry.
Gottlieb said she previously had $6 million in other accounts, but
“all that money went to Martin Grant.”
6. Closing arguments and verdict
In closing arguments, Gottlieb’s counsel asked the jury,
“[W]hy would [Gottlieb,] who had $6 million at her own disposal,
have to borrow $600,000 from Mr. Unger? Doesn’t make sense.
She had much more money than he did. So there was no reason
for her to . . . borrow that money.” When arguing about punitive
damages, Gottlieb’s counsel asserted that Gottlieb had only $60
in her bank account, the $35,000 she received monthly was spent
on maintaining the Malibu property, and she lacked access to the
money tied up in other property interests, so she was “not the
wealthy woman they’re trying to portray her to be – at least not
anymore after she gave $6 million to Martin Grant.”
Unger’s counsel asserted that Gottlieb’s argument that
Joyce gave her money to teach Unger how to invest made no
sense. He noted the many contradictions in Gottlieb’s versions of

14
events, as well as the written notation of “loan” on the cashier’s
check, and “interest” on Gottlieb’s checks.
The jury reached a verdict in favor of Unger. One question
on the special verdict form asked, “Do you find that the contract
was memorialized in writing?” The jury unanimously answered
“Yes.” The jury found that Gottlieb breached the contract. The
jury also found in favor of Unger on his causes of action for
common counts and fraud. The jury determined Unger’s
damages to be $1,028,000, and awarded Unger $1,000,000 in
punitive damages. After thanking and dismissing the jurors, the
court remarked that the jury may have double-counted Unger’s
damages or awarded him pretrial interest, but the parties could
address the issue in post-trial motions.
Gottlieb moved for a new trial and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, arguing in part that the punitive
damages portion of the trial should have been bifurcated, the
contract was oral and therefore Unger’s claims were time barred,
and there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict and/or
the punitive damages award. The trial court denied Gottlieb’s
motions. Unger agreed that the actual damages award should be
reduced to $600,000, and the court granted Unger’s motion for
pretrial interest.
The court entered judgment in favor of Unger for damages
of $600,000; punitive damages of $1,000,000; and prejudgment
interest of $305,051.45 on the fraud cause of action and
$353,148.80 on the contract and common counts causes of action.
Gottlieb timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Gottlieb asserts four arguments on appeal. First, she
contends her agreement with Unger was oral, and therefore his

15
causes of action for breach of contract and common counts were
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Second, she
contends Unger failed to prove the element of reliance for his
fraud claim. Third, Gottlieb contends that the punitive damages
portion of the trial should have been bifurcated. Fourth, Gottlieb
contends there was insufficient evidence to support the award of
punitive damages. We address each argument in turn.
A. Whether the agreement was oral and therefore time-
barred
The evidence showed that Unger gave Gottlieb money in
November 2013, December 2013, and January 2014. Gottlieb
made her last payment to Unger in October 2014. Unger filed his
complaint on December 16, 2016. Gottlieb asserts that even
assuming the money she gave Unger constituted loans, the
agreements were oral and therefore the breach of contract and
common counts claims were both subject to the two-year statute
of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 339, subdivision
(1) (two-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon a
contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of
writing”) rather than the four-year statute of limitations in Code
of Civil Procedure section 337, subdivision (a) (four-year statute
of limitations for “[a]n action upon any contract, obligation or
liability founded upon an instrument in writing”).
The parties agreed to include a question in the special
verdict to have the jury determine as an issue of fact whether the
contract was written. The jury found that it was. Gottlieb’s
argument is therefore a contention that the evidence does not
support the jury’s verdict.
“When a civil appeal challenges findings of fact, the
appellate court’s power begins and ends with a determination of

16
whether there is any substantial evidence—contradicted or
uncontradicted—to support the trial court findings. [Citation.]
We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable
inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor.” (Schmidt v.
Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582.) “We do not
review the evidence to see if there is substantial evidence to
support the losing party’s version of events, but only to see if
substantial evidence exists to support the verdict in favor of the
prevailing party.” (Pope v. Babick (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1238,
1245.) The judgment “is presumed to be correct and the burden
is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed
an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)
Here, the jury found that Unger’s inclusion of “loan” on the
December 2013 cashier’s check and Gottlieb’s notations of
“interest on loan” and “interest on loan $600K” were sufficient to
demonstrate that the parties had reduced their agreement to
writing. The evidence supports this finding; the jury was shown
copies of each of the relevant documents, and Unger testified
about the parties’ understanding of their agreement.
Gottlieb asserts there was no “meeting of the minds,” but
this argument is not supported by the record. The evidence
shows that Gottlieb requested the money in specific amounts
from Unger, accepted three loans totaling $600,000, made eight
interest payments, and noted on the checks that she was paying
interest on the $600,000 loan. Unger testified that he believed
Gottlieb when she explained why she needed the money and that
she would pay it back, he loaned her the amounts she requested,

17
and then accepted interest payments on the loans. The written
instruments show a meeting of the minds about the material
terms of the loans—the money Unger gave Gottlieb constituted
loans that Unger expected to be repaid, and Gottlieb was paying
interest on the consolidated loan.
Unger points out that a nearly identical scenario was
addressed by the Supreme Court in Tanzola v. De Rita (1955) 45
Cal.2d 1. There, the plaintiff’s allegation was “based upon two
written instruments, i.e., checks with the word ‘loan’ written
upon their faces . . . . Consequently, as held by the trial court,
the four-year limitations’ statute applies. (Code Civ. Proc., § 337;
[additional citations].) The fact that plaintiff in his original
complaint alleged that he and decedent ‘entered into an oral
agreement whereby’ plaintiff agreed to loan $12,000 to decedent
and that pursuant to such oral agreement plaintiff delivered the
two $6,000 checks to decedent does not establish this action as
one upon an oral rather than written obligation; the oral
agreement was obviously merely preliminary to the delivery of
the written checks upon which the action is based, and by which,
as plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint, the loan was
made.” (Tanzola v. De Rita, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 9.) Tanzola
relied in part on O’Brien v. King (1917) 174 Cal. 769, 773, in
which the Supreme Court stated, “A loan being established by the
writing, a promise to repay is implied by necessary inference of
law and fact. Such promise is embodied in the language of the
writing, although not expressed in the words ‘I promise to pay.’”
(See also Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co. (1958) 50
Cal.2d 654, 662 [“The promise which the law implies as an
element of the contract is as much a part of the instrument as if
it were written out”].) These long-settled cases are relevant and

18
applicable. Gottlieb did not file a reply brief and does not directly
address these cases, nor does she point to any authority that
holds to the contrary.
Gottlieb argues there was no written agreement regarding
the interest rate on the loan, so “no contract exists as a matter of
law.” The case she cites for in support of this argument, Peterson
Development Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 103,
does not support her proposition; it involved a commercial lender
and an unsigned “letter of commitment” for future real estate
financing, which is not the case here. Moreover, as Unger
correctly points out, certain provisions of California law
acknowledge that a loan may be made without expressly stating
the interest rate in writing. (See, e.g., Cal. Const., art. XV, § 1
[“The rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods, or things in action, or on accounts after demand, shall be 7
percent per annum but it shall be competent for the parties to
any loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in action to
contract in writing for a rate of interest”]; Civ. Code, § 1914
[“Whenever a loan of money is made, it is presumed to be made
upon interest, unless it is otherwise expressly stipulated at the
time in writing.”].)
Substantial evidence therefore supports the jury’s finding
that Unger and Gottlieb’s agreement was one “founded upon an
instrument in writing,” and the four-year statute of limitations in
Code of Civil Procedure section 337, subdivision (a) applies to the
contract and common counts causes of action. We therefore need
not address Unger’s alternative arguments that Gottlieb was
estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as an
affirmative defense, and that Gottlieb’s answer was insufficient
to preserve a statute of limitations defense. (See, e.g., Martin v.

19
Van Bergen (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 84, 91 [“The failure to
properly plead the statute of limitations waives the defense”].)
B. Unger’s reliance on Gottlieb’s statements
Gottlieb asserts that the evidence does not support a
finding that Unger relied on Gottlieb’s alleged
misrepresentations, and therefore the evidence does not support
the verdict on the fraud cause of action. She acknowledges that
Unger testified that Gottlieb told him she needed money for pool
tile and to secure the property next door, but asserts that “other
than [Unger’s] self-serving statement,” there is no evidence of
reliance. She also asserts that Unger did not verify Gottlieb’s
representations, and rather than relying on Gottlieb’s statements
he relied on his history with Gottlieb’s family and her family’s
wealth in determining that Gottlieb would pay him back.
This argument is meritless. Actual reliance occurs when a
misrepresentation is an immediate cause of the plaintiff’s
conduct, such that the plaintiff, in all reasonable probability,
otherwise would not have entered into the contract or transaction
at issue. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15
Cal.4th 951, 976 (Engalla).) Here, Unger testified that he relied
on Gottlieb’s statements that she needed money for the pool tile
and as a deposit on the house next door, and her promises that
she would pay him back within months. He further testified that
her false promises induced him to loan her money on three
different occasions. What Gottlieb characterizes as “no evidence”
other than Unger’s “self-serving statement” is sufficient to
support the verdict. (See, e.g., Sieg v. Fogt (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
77, 88 [“A single witness’s testimony may be sufficient to satisfy
the substantial evidence test”]; Consolidated Irrigation Dist. v.
City of Selma (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 187, 201 [“The testimony of

20
a single witness, even if that witness is a party to the case, may
constitute substantial evidence.”].)
Moreover, additional evidence presented at trial supports
Unger’s testimony that he relied on Gottlieb’s representations
that she would repay the loans. He loaned her money three
separate times, and had the word “loan” written on the cashier’s
check for $505,000, showing that he relied on her promise that he
would be repaid. He accepted Gottlieb’s interest payments,
showing that he believed she was acting in good faith regarding
the loans. That Unger loaned Gottlieb money a third time—a
second loan supposedly related to the house next door—supports
the inference that Unger believed Gottlieb’s representations
about why she needed the money and that she would pay him
back. No evidence presented at trial suggested that Unger would
have loaned Gottlieb money in the absence of her false
statements.
It is irrelevant that Unger may have also relied on other
sources in making his decision. Gottlieb argues—without citation
to the record—that Unger “felt safe because he believed that
Daniel Gottlieb would pick up the check for his daughter,
something that [Gottlieb] never told him.” Even assuming this
statement is accurate, it would not negate Unger’s reliance on
Gottlieb’s representations. “‘It is not . . . necessary that [a
plaintiff’s] reliance upon the truth of the fraudulent
misrepresentation be the sole or even the predominant or decisive
factor in influencing [the plaintiff’s] conduct . . . . It is enough
that the representation has played a substantial part, and so has
been a substantial factor, in influencing [the plaintiff’s] decision.’”
(Engalla, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 976-977.) Substantial evidence
supports the element of reliance.

21
C. Bifurcation
1. Background
Gottlieb argues the trial court erred in denying her request
to bifurcate the punitive damages portion of the trial. On the
first day of trial, after the jury had been sworn, Gottlieb’s
counsel, Morris Getzels, requested that the court bifurcate the
punitive damages phase of trial. The court responded, “A little
late for that. We’ve started trial. That request needed to be
made before then. And I specifically asked that question.”
At the end of the second day of trial, Getzels asked if the
defense case would be presented, then the punitive damages case.
The court responded, “No, no, no, no. It’s not bifurcated.” Getzels
responded that his team had been at the law library that
morning and they were able to “look at some of the cases on
bifurcation. The only one we could find that made an exception . .
. was one where . . . there were five days of testimony at the trial
before the request to bifurcate.” The court responded, “Counsel,
at the file [sic] status conference, I asked about bifurcation. First
day of trial, I asked if it was bifurcated. The answer was no. We
picked our jury. The jury was asked questions about punitive
damages and whatnot. You know, you can’t come in after the trial
has begun and say, ‘Now I want to bifurcate.’ [¶] So it’s a little
late in the game to do that.”
Getzels said he asked to bifurcate before testimony began,
and the court said, “We had already started. Okay, yes, we
hadn’t had any testimony, but I’d asked the questions. All right?
Counsel had prepared for his case already, and I was told no
bifurcation. There was no motion to bifurcate at any time until
you made an oral motion . . . right before we were about to do
opening statements.” The court continued, “[I]t’s something that

22
should have been done 30 days before trial . . . , or at least at a
minimum at the final status conference so we can have an idea of
how we’re going to proceed on the case. [¶] So the motion to
bifurcate was denied. I assume you’re making a motion for
reconsideration and that motion for reconsideration is also
denied.”
2. Analysis
Gottlieb asserts she was entitled to bifurcation under Civil
Code section 3295, subdivision (d): “The court shall, on
application of any defendant, preclude the admission of evidence
of that defendant’s profits or financial condition until after the
trier of fact returns a verdict for plaintiff awarding actual
damages and finds that a defendant is guilty of malice,
oppression, or fraud in accordance with Section 3294.” Gottlieb
also contends she was prejudiced by the court’s ruling because
“[e]very time that Gottlieb took the witness stand, Unger’s
counsel would hammer on her alleged wealth.”
The trial court denied Gottlieb’s motion to bifurcate
because it was untimely. “A request under section 3295,
subdivision (d) is essentially a motion in limine, and ordinarily
should be made before trial.” (Las Palmas Associates v. Las
Palmas Center Associates (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1241.)
The Los Angeles County Superior Court rules require bifurcation
motions to be filed and served “with timely statutory notice so as
to be heard on the day of the final status conference.” (Super. Ct.
L.A. County, Local Rules, rule 3.25(f)(2).) Even “a statute written
in mandatory language” such as Civil Code section 3295,
subdivision (d) “must . . . come within the trial court’s discretion
when a party delays seeking its rights to the detriment of the
opposition.” (Las Palmas Associates, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at

23
p.1240; see also Wegner et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Trials &
Evid. (The Rutter Group 2023) Ch. 4-G, ¶ 4:385 [“Delay may
waive defendant’s right to a bifurcated trial on punitive damages
or to exclusion of evidence on defendant’s wealth”].)
We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of
Gottlieb’s belated request for bifurcation. Gottlieb’s counsel first
asked to sever the punitive damages issue after the jury trial
began. Under the circumstances, the court’s denial was not an
abuse of discretion. Gottlieb should have filed a motion to
bifurcate the trial before the pretrial conference, but she did not.
Her request was a last-minute attempt to limit the scope of the
issues to be considered by the jury moments before Unger’s
counsel was about to make his opening statement, and granting
the request would have been prejudicial to Unger.
Moreover, Gottlieb provided no explanation for the delay.
Unger requested punitive damages in his complaint and had
requested financial information relating to punitive damages
before trial. Nothing prevented Gottlieb from making a timely
bifurcation request. The trial court was well within its discretion
in denying the motion.
In addition, Gottlieb has not shown that any prejudice
resulted from the court’s order. Jury voir dire is not included in
the record, so it is unclear what the jury heard about punitive
damages before it was sworn. (See, e.g., Jameson v. Desta, supra,
5 Cal.5th at p. 609 [failure to provide an adequate record on an
issue requires that the issue be resolved against the appellant].)
Gottlieb asserts that she was prejudiced because Unger’s counsel
“hammered on” her alleged wealth during her testimony, but
Gottlieb’s own theory at trial—from her opening statement to her
closing argument—was that she was so wealthy that she never

24
would have borrowed money from Unger. Thus, Gottlieb has
failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s denial of her belated
request for bifurcation constituted reversible error. (See, e.g.,
TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra (2024) 15 Cal.5th 766, 786 [a
judgment may not be reversed on appeal unless the error caused
a miscarriage of justice]; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
D. The punitive damages award
Gottlieb contends Unger presented insufficient evidence to
support the amount of the punitive damages award. She asserts
the Malibu house was her father’s and she had no access to its
value, there was no evidence presented about the value of her
share of her father’s trust, and any future entitlement to wealth
through inheritance cannot be a basis for a punitive damages
award.3
“The amount of punitive damages is determined in the
discretion of the jury. An appellate court will not reverse the
jury’s determination unless the award as a matter of law is
excessive or appears so grossly disproportionate to the relevant
factors that it raises a presumption it was the result of passion or
prejudice.” (Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 623.)
“Evidence of a defendant’s financial condition is a legal
precondition to the award of punitive damages. [Citation.] We

3 When a party challenges a punitive damages award as
excessive under state law, a court may consider (1) the
reprehensibility of the defendant’s acts, (2) the amount of the
compensatory damages award and its proportion to the punitive
damages award, and (3) the financial condition of the defendant
at the time of trial. (Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1978) 21
Cal.3d 910, 928.) Gottlieb challenges only the sufficiency of the
evidence as to her financial condition.

25
examine the record to determine whether the challenged award
rests upon substantial evidence. [Citations.] If it does not, and if
the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to make the
requisite showing, the proper remedy is to reverse the award.”
(Soto v. BorgWarner Morse TEC Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 165,
195.)
Gottlieb’s argument ignores much of the evidence presented
about her financial condition. Gottlieb herself testified that her
father and his accountant gave her $37,400 each month, while
she has lived for a decade rent-free in a 10,000-square-foot,
seven-bedroom, ten-bathroom villa in Malibu that her father
intends to give her. Bank records showed that by the end of
October 2021, Gottlieb had deposited $340,544 into her bank
account so far that year. Grant testified that Gottlieb has a rare
coin collection worth $8 million to $11 million, Grant had seen
rare coins at Gottlieb’s house, Gottlieb told him coins were
stashed all around the house, Gottlieb said she would never sell
the coins, and Grant had never seen certain rare coins on the
market again. Grant’s testimony was supported by Gottlieb’s
own admission that she had liquidated $6 million worth of stock
accounts and had given that money to Grant. The jury also heard
that Gottlieb sued Grant alleging fraud relating to investments,
but she lost the case. In addition, Gottlieb admitted that she held
interests in multiple commercial properties and LLCs, even
though Gottlieb claimed not to know the value of those interests
or the percentage of her shares.
Moreover, to the extent Gottlieb’s finances were not more
thoroughly proved at trial, it was a result of Gottlieb’s own
recalcitrance in responding to Unger’s document requests and
questions at trial regarding her financial condition. In response

26
to Unger’s document requests, Gottlieb produced only incomplete
bank statements and an unsigned 2020 tax return. When asked
about her assets at trial, Gottlieb repeatedly said she did not
know, despite having ample notice that her financial condition
would be addressed in the punitive damages portion of the trial.
While discussing jury instructions, Unger’s counsel noted the
“absolute paucity of evidence regarding [Gottlieb’s] financial
condition.” The court acknowledged this, and said it would give a
jury instruction about a party having the power to produce
stronger evidence.4 Gottlieb cannot rely on her own failure to
produce competent evidence as a basis to complain that the
punitive damages award is insufficiently supported by evidence.
(See, e.g., Garcia v. Myllyla (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 990, 995 [“a
defendant who thwarts a plaintiff’s ability to [prove the
defendant’s financial condition] may forfeit the right to complain
about the lack of evidence of his or her financial condition”];
Fernandes v. Singh (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 932, 942 [“A defendant
is in the best position to know his or her financial condition, and
cannot avoid a punitive damage award by failing to cooperate
with discovery orders”]; Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 1308, 1337 [“A defendant who fails to comply with a
court order to produce records of his or her financial condition
may be estopped from challenging a punitive damage award
based on lack of evidence of financial condition to support the
award”].)

4 Presumably the court was referring to CACI No. 203, which
states, “You may consider the ability of each party to provide
evidence. If a party provided weaker evidence when it could have
provided stronger evidence, you may distrust the weaker
evidence.”

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Unger is entitled to his costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.

MORI, J.

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