CourtListener 10010745•People v. Jimenez
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/22/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D081951
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CR117399)
AQUILES G. JIMENEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Yvonne E. Campos, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Aurora E. Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Michael D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Aquiles Jimenez appeals from an order denying his second petition for
resentencing under Penal Code 1 section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6). 2 When
Jimenez filed his first petition, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing
and denied relief based on its own independent finding that he was guilty of
second degree murder as a direct aider and abettor on an implied malice
theory. We affirmed the court’s denial of Jimenez’s first petition solely on
sufficiency of evidence grounds. (See People v. Jimenez (Dec. 1, 2022,
D079630) [nonpub. opn.].) The trial court later denied his second petition at
the prima facie stage on the ground that there was no legal basis to revisit its
prior ruling. We now consider whether Jimenez is entitled to relief on his
second petition.
Jimenez contends on appeal that Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021,
ch. 551 (Senate Bill 775)) and our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 constitute changes in the law which make collateral
estoppel 3 and law of the case inapplicable. Jimenez also contends, in
supplemental briefing, that People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400
(Pittman) changed the law regarding how courts should consider an
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was recodified without
substantive change in section 1172.6, pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 200
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the
current codification throughout this opinion.
3 Although the modern term for collateral estoppel is issue preclusion
(Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326), we will refer to the doctrine as
collateral estoppel to be consistent with the terminology used by the parties.
The People have not made any argument based on res judicata or claim
preclusion.
2
offender’s youth when determining whether he acted with implied malice.
(Id. at p. 417.)
We conclude that since the time of the trial court’s original ruling of
August 2021, there have been significant changes in the law relating to the
culpability of defendants who were young adults in their teens or early 20s at
the time of their crimes. The nature and timing of these rapid developments
are such that we cannot presume the trial court had an adequate opportunity
to consider evidence of Jimenez’s youth (19 years old) and brain development
in deciding whether he acted with malice. Nor can we presume that the
defense had an adequate incentive to present new evidence on the issue
based on the law as it then existed. Because the law has changed
significantly, and we did not decide this issue in the prior appeal, collateral
estoppel and law of the case do not bar Jimenez’s second petition. Although
we express no view on how the trial court should rule on remand, we conclude
that the error is not harmless on this record. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand for a new evidentiary hearing and decision consistent with current
law.
3
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Paul J.’s Killing
We repeat relevant facts as summarized in our prior opinion affirming
Jimenez’s conviction. 4 (See People v. Jimenez, supra, D079630.)
In August 1990, Cynthia Wilson told an acquaintance that she was
upset with the victim, Paul J., because of how he treated her when they were
dating. Wilson told the acquaintance that she wanted to get a gun to shoot
Paul J. to “put him out of his misery.” Around that time, Wilson began
dating Jimenez, and she told him that she was afraid of Paul J. and that he
had hurt her emotionally. Jimenez, who sold and used methamphetamine,
knew Paul J. was a drug dealer. Jimenez was also a gun collector, and at
Wilson’s request, he took her out to practice shooting with one of his guns.
In the middle of a night in September 1990, Wilson asked Jimenez to
drive her to a hotel to meet with Paul J. Wilson had been using
methamphetamine that night, but Jimenez was not using drugs at the time
because he was on pain medication for an injury. When they went to
4 Because Jimenez pled guilty without a trial, our factual summary relies
on the preliminary hearing transcript, which was part of the record for the
evidentiary hearing at issue in the prior appeal. We recognize that this
appeal involves a determination at the prima facie stage, however, and it is
questionable whether we may consider facts from the preliminary hearing at
this stage if they were not admitted by Jimenez as part of his plea. (See
People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 483 [court could not consider
preliminary hearing testimony that defendant shot victim at close range
because defendant never stipulated or admitted to it as a factual basis for his
guilty plea]; but see People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1166–1168,
review granted May 1, 2024, S284232 [court could consider preliminary
hearing transcript to show that defendant was prosecuted only on an actual
killer theory].) This issue is pending before our Supreme Court in People v.
Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, review granted June 28, 2023, S279760.
We need not resolve this question, however, because we would reach the
same result either way.
4
Paul J.’s hotel room, Paul J. offered Wilson methamphetamine and went to
the bathroom to prepare the drugs, where Wilson and Paul J. began arguing.
Jimenez was adjusting the radio when Wilson pulled out a small pistol
belonging to Jimenez, which he usually kept in his truck’s glove
compartment, and shot Paul J. a few times. Jimenez said during a parole
hearing that he did not realize Wilson had taken his gun until that moment,
and that she had hidden it under her jacket. He also denied knowing that
Wilson was going to shoot Paul J.
After Wilson first shot Paul J. and he fell to the floor, Jimenez pulled
the phone out of the wall socket to prevent Paul J. from calling anyone.
During his probation interview, Jimenez said he heard Paul J. ask, “Oh my
God, why did you shoot me?” Wilson then asked Jimenez to also shoot
Paul J., but when Jimenez refused, she shot Paul J. again herself. Jimenez
then took the gun from Wilson and they left the hotel in Jimenez’s truck.
Jimenez told probation that he thought Paul J. was still alive when they left
the hotel room. Later that night, Jimenez threw the gun over the Coronado
bridge.
The following morning, a hotel clerk found Paul J. dead in his room.
An autopsy determined that he died from two gunshot wounds through the
chest and back. During a subsequent search of Jimenez’s residence, law
enforcement officers found ammunition matching the type found in Paul J.’s
room.
Jimenez was 19 years old at the time of the offense, and Wilson was 20
years old.
B. Jimenez’s First Petition for Resentencing
Jimenez pled guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) as part of a plea bargain, and he was sentenced to an
5
indeterminate term of 15 years to life. Jimenez filed his first petition for
resentencing in 2019 pursuant to amended section 1172.6. After the trial
court appointed counsel and held an evidentiary hearing in July 2021, the
court denied Jimenez’s petition in August 2021, finding that he was ineligible
for relief under section 1172.6 because he “was not charged in such a way
that the prosecution could proceed on a felony-murder or natural and possible
consequences theory.”
Alternatively, the court found that the record evidence proved
Jimenez’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as an aider and abettor of second
degree murder who acted with implied malice. The court noted that Jimenez
had weapons and ammunition at his residence that matched the murder
weapon, he drove Wilson to the hotel, he “did nothing to stop the first or
subsequent shots,” and he admitted to pulling the phone out of the wall while
Paul J. was still alive. The court found that Jimenez supplied Wilson with a
gun, he went shooting with her, and he knew that Wilson “hated the victim.”
The court further noted that Jimenez did not attempt to render aid to the
victim or report the crime to the police, and he disposed of the murder
weapon.
Although Jimenez’s attorney made brief reference to Jimenez’s status
as a “youthful offender” at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court’s order did
not mention his age or maturity level.
Jimenez timely appealed the order denying his first petition. We
affirmed the order in an unpublished opinion in December 2022 on the
ground that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that
Jimenez was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of directly aiding and abetting
an implied malice, second-degree murder under current law. (People v.
Jimenez, supra, D079630.)
6
C. Jimenez’s Second Petition for Resentencing
In September 2022, before we issued our opinion in his first appeal,
Jimenez filed a second petition for resentencing under section 1172.6
asserting that he was entitled to relief based on amendments that went into
effect with Senate Bill 775 in January 2022. The People opposed the petition,
arguing that Jimenez was procedurally barred from relief by the collateral
estoppel and law of the case doctrines. Through appointed counsel, Jimenez
filed a reply in December 2022.
In March 2023, the trial court denied Jimenez’s second petition at the
prima facie stage, finding that the changes in Senate Bill 775 do not apply to
Jimenez as the direct aider and abettor in the underlying murder.
Referencing Jimenez’s first petition and our prior opinion, the court further
found there was no legal basis entitling him to a second petition for
resentencing.
Jimenez timely appealed the denial of his second petition.
DISCUSSION
The People contend that Jimenez’s second petition is barred by the
doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case. In response, Jimenez
argues that he is entitled to relief because the law has changed regarding
whether and how the trier of fact may consider an adult offender’s youth in
determining whether he acted with implied malice. Jimenez relies on
Pittman, a case decided in October 2023, in which the Court of Appeal held
that a defendant who was 21 years old at the time of the offense was entitled
to remand for the trial court to consider his youth in determining whether he
acted with implied malice. (Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 416, 418.)
The People argue that Pittman did not constitute a “concrete” or “significant”
change in the law. We agree with Jimenez that there have been significant
7
changes in the law governing young adult offenders since the time of the
hearing and ruling on his first petition. We therefore conclude that the
doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case do not bar Jimenez’s
second petition. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new evidentiary
hearing and ruling.
8
A. Recent Case Law on Youthful Offenders
Pittman is one of the latest in a series of recent cases addressing the
role an offender’s youthfulness plays in various contexts, from sentencing to
assessing guilt. The first to apply this developing case law in a section 1172.6
context was People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, review granted
April 28, 2021, S267802, and dismissed September 28, 2022 (Harris).
In Harris, which was decided in February 2021, the Court of Appeal
reversed an order denying Harris’s petition for resentencing at the prima
facie stage. (Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 961.) The court concluded
that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine, among other things,
whether “given Harris’s youth at the time of the crime” (17 years old) he was
a major participant for felony-murder purposes who was “actually aware ‘of
particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants.’ ” (Id. at p. 960.) In support
of its decision that youth was a relevant consideration, the court cited Eighth
Amendment precedents on cruel and unusual punishment recognizing, in the
context of sentencing for juvenile offenders, that children under the age of 18
are more immature, reckless, and impetuous than adults and may fail to
appreciate the risks and consequences of their actions. (Ibid. [citing Graham
v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48; Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller);
People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354 (Gutierrez)].)
Harris was the only section 1172.6 case on this issue at the time of the
trial court’s August 5, 2021 ruling on Jimenez’s first petition. Critically,
Harris only referred to the Eighth Amendment “case law’s recognition of the
science relating to adolescent brain development . . . .” (Harris, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th at p. 960, italics added.) At that time (and still today), it was
firmly settled that these Eighth Amendment cases establish a “bright line
9
rule” applicable only to juvenile offenders under the age of 18. (People v.
Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 617; see also Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543
U.S. 551, 574 [acknowledging the “qualities that distinguish juveniles from
adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18” but concluding that “a
line must be drawn” at age 18]; People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429
[rejecting invitation “to expand Roper to reach those ages 18 to 21” based on
research showing “that young adults suffer from many of the same cognitive
and developmental deficiencies as adolescents”].)
The first few cases following Harris also involved defendants who were
under the age of 18 at the time of the offense. As we will show, however, the
law on this issue has since expanded well beyond Harris in two important
ways: (1) it has been applied to other mental state requirements, including
implied malice; and (2) even more profoundly, it has been extended beyond its
Eighth Amendment roots to young adults who were in their teens and early
20s at the time of their crimes.
About four weeks after the trial court denied Jimenez’s first petition,
another Court of Appeal decided in In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434
(Moore). In vacating a robbery-murder special-circumstance finding, the
court held that Moore’s age of 16 years old at the time of the offense was a
relevant factor in determining whether he acted with reckless indifference to
human life. (Moore, at pp. 454–455.)
People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970 was decided shortly
thereafter in November 2021. There, the court found that the defendant’s
youth at the time of the offense, as a 15-year-old, “greatly diminishe[d] any
inference he acted with reckless disregard for human life” during an
attempted armed carjacking. (Id. at pp. 990–991.) In concluding there was
insufficient evidence that Ramirez had the requisite culpable mental state,
10
the court reasoned that his “age may well have affected his calculation of the
risk of death posed by using the firearm in the carjacking, as well as his
willingness to abandon the crime.” (Id. at p. 991.)
These early post-Harris cases involved defendants under the age of 18
when they committed their crimes. (See also In re Harper (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 450, 470 [“[a]ssuming without deciding that youth is a proper
factor among many” the court “may consider under the totality of the
circumstances,” but concluding it is not “a decisive factor whenever the
defendant was a minor at the time of the offense” and denying habeas relief
to defendant who was 16 at time of murder]; People v. Keel (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 546, 558–559 (Keel) [“We agree youth can be a relevant
consideration—potentially an important one, depending on the facts of the
case—bearing on whether a juvenile defendant[,]” who was 15 years old at
the time of the offense, “acted with reckless indifference to human life.”].)
In the years that followed, however, courts extended Harris to
defendants like Jimenez who committed their offenses between the ages of 18
and 25. For example, in People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, decided
in July 2022, the trial court expressly considered Mitchell’s youth even
though he was already 18 years old at the time of the offense. The trial court
observed that Mitchell was “just a teenager at the time,” but nonetheless still
found he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference. (Id.
at p. 586.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Mitchell’s petition, but
also took into account his age in noting that “[y]outh can distort risk
calculations.” The court concluded that Mitchell’s youth was “overborne” by
other factors showing his indifference to the victim’s life. (Id. at p. 595.)
In People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076 (Jones), decided in
December 2022, the Court of Appeal concluded that legally sufficient
11
evidence supported a finding that Jones was a major participant in the
underlying robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Id. at
p. 1088.) The court, however, still reversed the order denying Jones’s petition
for resentencing and remanded the case for the trial court to “have a
meaningful opportunity to consider Jones’s youth as part of the totality of the
circumstances germane to determining whether he was a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at p. 1093.)
Notably, Jones was already 20 years old at the time of the underlying offense,
and the court acknowledged that the defendants in Harris and Moore were
both juveniles. (Id. at pp. 1092–1093.) The court also observed that Jones
“volunteered to perpetrate the crime he helped to plan and then grabbed a
loaded gun to do it[.]” (Ibid.) Nonetheless, the court believed it was “in the
interest of justice” to allow the trial court to consider Jones’s youth. (Id. at
p. 1093.)
In People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466 (Oliver), decided in March
2023, the Court of Appeal “acknowledge[d] the trajectory of the legislation
and case law recognizing the psychological and neurological differences
between youthful and adult offenders, which both lessen the culpability of the
young and increase the likelihood of their rehabilitation.” (Id. at p. 488.) The
court declined, however, to decide whether Oliver, who was 23 years old at
the time of the offense, fit the definition of “youthful.” (Id. at p. 489.) The
court also declined to decide whether it is incumbent on a trial court to
expressly consider youth. (Id. at p. 488.) The court instead concluded that
even if the trial court was required to consider Oliver’s youth, any such error
was harmless because there was no evidence that Oliver’s criminal behavior
was motivated by impulsivity or vulnerability to peer pressure, two
12
hallmarks of youthful offenders. (Id. at pp. 488–489, citing Miller, supra, 567
U.S. at p. 461.)
Several months after Oliver came Pittman. Pittman was 21 years old
at the time he and two juvenile cohorts committed a robbery that resulted in
death. (Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 403–404, 405.) In reversing
the trial court’s denial of Pittman’s resentencing petition, the Court of Appeal
concluded that Pittman’s age at the time of the offense was relevant, and that
“[t]he policy interests underlying the felony-murder cases—that youth is
relevant to a criminal defendant’s ability to perceive risk and consequences,
and therefore to the level of culpability—apply equally in the context of
implied malice murder.” (Id. at p. 417.) The court also concluded that the
trial court’s error in not addressing Pittman’s youth was prejudicial because
the evidence showed he committed the offense with younger peers, acted
impulsively and rashly, appeared to have selected weapons spontaneously,
and was motivated to commit the crime by “happenstance.” (Id. at p. 418.)
Even though Pittman was already 21 years old at the time of the offense, this
did “not dissuade” the court, which noted “[t]he defendant in Jones was 20
years old, and yet the court deemed remand warranted to consider his
relative youth.” (Ibid.)
In addition to these developments in the case law, the Legislature has
enacted similar changes by statute in recent years. For example, the
Legislature has raised the cut-off age for youth offender parole hearings to 25
based on “scientific evidence that neurological development, particularly in
areas of the brain relevant to judgment and decision making, continues
beyond adolescence and into the mid-20’s.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15
Cal.5th 834, 846.) Likewise, effective January 1, 2022, prosecutors must now
consider a defendant’s youthful age as a mitigating factor during plea
13
negotiations—with “youth” defined to include “any person under 26 years of
age on the date the offense was committed.” (§ 1016.7, subd. (b).) This
definition has also been incorporated into the determinate sentencing
scheme, which now provides a rebuttable presumption that offenders under
26 years of age should be sentenced to the low prison term. (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(6)(B); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(e)(2).) And the Legislature has
amended section 4801 to provide that, for any prisoner who committed his or
her offense “at 25 years of age or younger,” the parole board “shall give great
weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the
hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased
maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” (§ 4801,
subd. (c).)
B. Analysis
Considering this evolving landscape, and applying de novo review, we
reject the People’s contention that Jimenez’s second petition is barred by
collateral estoppel. (See Thee Aguila, Inc. v. Century Law Group, LLP (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 22, 28 [a trial court’s application of collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion is a question of law subject to de novo review].) Collateral estoppel
“ ‘bars relitigation of issues earlier decided “only if several threshold
requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from
relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second,
this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third,
it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the
decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally,
the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in
privity with, the party to the former proceeding.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The party
14
asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these
requirements.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 451–452 (Curiel).)
Even if these requirements for collateral estoppel are met, however,
“ ‘the doctrine will not be applied if such application would not serve its
underlying fundamental principles’ of promoting efficiency while ensuring
fairness to the parties.’ [Citation.]” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 454.) A
well-settled equitable exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel
“ ‘holds that preclusion does not apply when there has been a significant
change in the law since the factual findings were rendered that warrants
reexamination of the issue.’ [Citation.] ‘This exception ensures basic fairness
by allowing for relitigation where “the change in the law [is] such that
preclusion would result in a manifestly inequitable administration of the
laws.” [Citation.] It also reflects a recognition that in the face of this sort of
legal change, the equitable policies that underlie the doctrine of issue
preclusion—“preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of
judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious
litigation” [citation]—are at an ebb.’ ” (Ibid.)
We conclude that even assuming the threshold requirements of
collateral estoppel are met, this equitable exception applies here. Because
California cases only recently began to require consideration of a young adult
offender’s age in resentencing petitions involving implied malice murder
convictions, there have been material changes in the law since the trial
court’s original ruling which warrant reexamination of the factual question
whether Jimenez acted with malice. Based on the law in effect when the trial
court denied Jimenez’s first petition and found him guilty on an implied
malice theory, the court may well have believed that Jimenez’s youth was
irrelevant because he was not a juvenile at the time of the offense. The only
15
case on the issue at the time was Harris, which involved a 17-year-old
offender—and the court there cited new scientific evidence on “adolescent
brain development” and relied exclusively on Eighth Amendment case law
drawing a bright line between juvenile and adult offenders. (Harris, supra,
60 Cal.App.5th at p. 960, italics added.) In these circumstances, the trial
court could have felt compelled to conclude that Harris’s discussion of youth
did not apply to young adults. The fact that the trial court did not mention
Jimenez’s youth in its ruling on the first petition further supports this
inference. (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1091–1093.)
The timing of the trial court’s August 2021 ruling on Jimenez’s first
petition is similar to that in Jones, which was the first decision to reverse the
denial of a resentencing petition on the ground that the trial court should
consider the maturity level of a young adult. (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1091–1093.) In Jones, as here, the trial court denied the defendant’s
section 1172.6 petition in the months after the Harris decision and before any
of the subsequent cases expanding Harris. (Id. at p. 1092.) At the
resentencing hearing in Jones, defense counsel cited Jones’s age at the time
of the murder (20 years old) and characterized him as immature, but the trial
court did not mention his age or maturity in its ruling. (Id. at pp. 1091–
1092.) In these circumstances, the Court of Appeal concluded “it is unlikely
in this particular instance that the trial court could have known to consider
Jones’s age and maturity level, particularly to the extent now required by
cases issued after” briefing was completed. (Id. at p. 1092, citing People v.
Chambers (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 444, 457 [presumption that the court
follows the law does not apply where the law is not yet established].)
Accordingly, “in the interest of justice,” the Jones court decided “it is best for
16
the trial court to have a meaningful opportunity to consider Jones’s youth as
part of the totality of circumstances. . . .” (Jones, at p. 1093.)
We reach the same conclusion here. As in Jones, principles of fairness
require that Jimenez be given a new evidentiary hearing for the trier of fact
to address his youthfulness under current case law. Although his defense
counsel made passing reference to his youth at the original hearing, his
counsel did not have a sufficient incentive to develop the issue or present
additional evidence on it under the existing case law at the time, which was
limited to juvenile defendants. Jimenez could present additional evidence
and argument at a new hearing, focusing on the “hallmarks” of youth as part
of the totality of the circumstances relevant to determining whether he acted
with malice. (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1388; see § 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3) [parties “may offer new or additional evidence” at the evidentiary
hearing].)
For similar reasons, we also conclude that the law of the case doctrine
does not apply. “ ‘The law of the case doctrine holds that when an appellate
opinion states a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that
principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to through
its subsequent progress in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal.’ ”
(People v. Cooper (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 500, 524.) The doctrine prevents
parties from seeking appellate reconsideration of an already decided issue in
the same case, “ ‘absent some significant change in circumstances.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 524–525.) For the doctrine to apply, the point of law must have been
presented and determined by the court, the issue must have been necessary
to the prior decision, and application of the doctrine must not result in an
unjust decision. (Id. at p. 524.) But the doctrine does not apply “ ‘where the
controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a decision
17
intervening between the first and second appellate determinations.’ ” (People
v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 197.)
Not only has there been a significant intervening change in the law, but
we simply did not decide the legal issue now before us in the prior appeal.
We did not decide whether a new evidentiary hearing should be held for the
trial court to assess the significance of Jimenez’s youth under current case
law in deciding his guilt. We only decided Jimenez’s sufficiency of the
evidence claim, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court’s
ruling. (See People v. Jimenez, supra, D079630.) Whether the trial court
properly considered Jimenez’s youth and brain development in finding him
guilty was not raised or decided in the prior appeal, and the law of the case
doctrine “does not extend to points of law which might have been but were
not presented and determined in the prior appeal.” (Estate of Horman (1971)
5 Cal.3d 62, 73.) Accordingly, we find that the law of the case doctrine does
not bar Jimenez’s youthfulness argument.
We therefore turn next to whether the trial court’s error in omitting
consideration of Jimenez’s age was harmless. The parties agree that the
Watson standard applies, which asks whether it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to Jimenez would have been reached absent the failure
to consider his youth. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) We
conclude that it is reasonably probable because there is evidence that
Jimenez displayed the “hallmark features” of youth discussed in case law
which may be relevant to determining whether he possessed the requisite
mental state. (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1388.)
Jimenez was only 19 years old at the time of the crime and still on the
lower end of the young adult age range. Presumably, the younger the
defendant, the less mature he is. (Cf. Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489
18
[observing about 23-year-old defendant that “the presumption of immaturity
weakens as a defendant approaches 26”].) Wilson, the actual shooter, was
herself only 20 years old at the time. Courts have observed that a youthful
offender may be vulnerable to “peer pressure” from his cohorts, and the
evidence in this case could support an inference that Jimenez was influenced
by Wilson. (See Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 403–404, 418 [finding
“[i]nferences of immaturity and peer pressure may be drawn” from the fact
that the 21-year-old defendant participated in the crime “with two peers who
were 16 and 17 years old”]; Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1093 [noting
concern in Harris and Moore that a youthful offender “was vulnerable to the
influence of others and could fail to appreciate the dangers of his activities
and his cohort’s actions”].) This is especially true given that Jimenez had
only recently begun dating Wilson and could have been particularly
susceptible to the influence of a new girlfriend.
Importantly, evidence supporting an inference that Jimenez was aware
of Wilson’s intent to kill or commit a life-endangering act was only
circumstantial. (See Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1389 [circumstances of
offense are relevant, including whether the youthful offender did not kill or
intend to kill]; cf. Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489 [finding failure to
consider youth harmless where evidence showed defendant was “fully aware”
that his cohort intended to kill the victim if the opportunity arose]; In re
Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 471–472 [defendant’s youth did not
change his culpability because evidence showed he knew the plan was to kill
the victim].) Jimenez had only known Wilson for less than a month before
the offense, and there is no evidence he knew or had reason to know she had
a propensity for violence. The evidence also shows that Wilson was
motivated by personal animus against an ex-boyfriend that may have had
19
little to do with Jimenez. (See Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 562.)
Although other inferences might be drawn, the record at least suggests that
Jimenez could have been “swept up in circumstances” beyond his control.
(Oliver, at p. 489.)
The evidence also shows that Jimenez was less involved in the
underlying offense than the defendant in Jones, who volunteered to
perpetrate the robbery, helped plan it, insisted on taking a loaded gun, was
callous toward the victim, and then laughed about the shooting afterwards.
(Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1088, 1093.) Furthermore, Jimenez may
present additional or new evidence on remand that bears on the trial court’s
youthfulness analysis. Accordingly, as in Jones, we conclude it is in the
interest of justice to give the trial court a meaningful opportunity to consider
Jimenez’s youth “as part of the totality of the circumstances germane to
determining” whether he acted with malice under current law. (Id. at
p. 1093.)
We acknowledge we have already found that the evidence presented at
the first evidentiary hearing was legally sufficient to support a finding of
malice notwithstanding Jimenez’s youth. (People v. Jimenez, supra,
D079630.) We are not suggesting otherwise in this opinion, nor are we
expressing any view as to how the trial court should rule on remand. All we
are holding is that Jimenez is entitled to a new evidentiary hearing so that
the trial court can consider and apply the rapidly developing case law on
youth and brain development in determining whether he acted with malice.
Because we do not act as a trier of fact, this factual question is not for us to
20
decide in the first instance. Accordingly, we reverse the denial order and
remand for a new evidentiary hearing applying current law. 5
DISPOSITION
The order denying Jimenez’s second petition for resentencing is
reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to
issue an order to show cause, conduct a new evidentiary hearing, and make a
new ruling consistent with current law.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
5 The People have not argued, as an alternative ground for affirmance,
that Jimenez is ineligible for relief at the prima facie stage for reasons other
than collateral estoppel or law of the case. We note that Jimenez’s guilty plea
to aiding and abetting a second degree murder—based on a charging
document that generically charged murder without specifying any particular
theory—does not conclusively rule out the possibility that he could only have
been convicted of murder under a now invalid natural and probable
consequences or felony murder theory. (See People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 987–992; People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 976–
979; People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 233–235.) Even assuming
we may consider the preliminary hearing transcript, it does not conclusively
foreclose this possibility either.
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