CourtListener 10008010•In re X.C. CA5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/19/24 In re X.C. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re X.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENTT OF F087580
HUMAN SERVICES,
(Super. Ct. No. JD143121-00)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. OPINION
E.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Christie Canales
Norris, Judge.
Gregory M. Chappel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, and Elizabeth M. Giesick, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Smith, J.
Appellant E.C. (mother) is the mother of X.C. (the child), who is the subject of
this dependency case. Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order issued at a Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.261 hearing that resulted in her parental rights being
terminated. Mother contends the court and the Kern County Department of Human
Services (department) failed to comply with their duty of inquiry under the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA). The department concedes that it failed to conduct an adequate
inquiry into the potential Indian ancestry of the child, and it does not oppose remand for
the limited purpose of conducting further ICWA inquiry.2 We agree with the parties and
conditionally reverse the court’s order terminating parental rights and remand for
proceedings to ensure ICWA compliance.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
In March 2022, the child and his two older siblings, L.C. and I.C., were taken into
protective custody by law enforcement. Mother was arrested on various charges after the
execution of a search warrant. An investigating social worker spoke with mother shortly
after the removal, and mother claimed Indian ancestry through an unknown tribe. The
department filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging the child was described by
section 300, subdivision (b). The allegations involved mother’s ongoing substance abuse.
At the initial detention hearing held on March 8, 2022, mother was present and
appointed counsel. The juvenile court inquired of mother regarding Indian ancestry.
Mother believed that she had Indian ancestry through the child’s deceased
great-great-grandmother, but she did not know the identity of the tribe. The maternal
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise specified.
2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)
3 The sole issue on appeal concerns ICWA; therefore, we primarily restrict our facts
to those bearing on that issue.
2.
great-grandmother, G.T., was identified as a person with more information about the
ancestry, and contact information was provided for her on mother’s Parental Notification
of Indian Status form (ICWA-020).
The juvenile court made temporary findings to detain the child and his siblings
from mother. The hearing was continued to March 10, 2022, at mother’s request. At the
continued detention hearing, the child was detained from mother’s custody and a
combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing was set for April 26, 2022. The court also
recognized F.C. (father) as the child’s presumed father, and the department was directed
to conduct further inquiry regarding possible Indian ancestry.
On April 13, 2022, mother informed the department that her family’s ancestry was
through the Apache tribe, and she denied that any of her family members were enrolled
members of the tribe. The maternal great-grandmother also identified the Apache tribe as
her grandparents’ ancestry, but she was unable to provide any names or birthdates for her
grandparents. The department sent Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child
form (ICWA-030) to the relevant Apache tribes. None of the tribes responded that the
child was either a member or eligible for membership in their tribe.
The department’s jurisdiction report, dated April 22, 2022, recommended that the
allegations in the original petition be found true. On April 26, 2022, the juvenile court
found the allegations in the original petition true, and the disposition hearing was
continued to May 25, 2022.
The disposition report, dated May 24, 2022, recommended that the child remain in
out-of-home care with family reunification services provided to mother and father. The
child was placed with I.C. in a resource family home. L.C. informed a family finding
social worker that she would like to be placed with the maternal great-grandmother, G.T.
I.C. identified her maternal uncle, Gabriel T., as a potential placement option.
Mother was raised by the child’s maternal great-grandmother. The maternal
grandfather was deceased, and mother did not have contact with the maternal
3.
grandmother. Mother and father had been married since 2011, but father was deported to
Mexico in 2017. Father was currently living in Mexico, and he was provided with notice
of the upcoming disposition hearing. Father denied having any Indian ancestry when
contacted by a paralegal for the department.
The maternal uncle, E.B., and his spouse, J.H., were interested in placement of the
child and his siblings. Maternal great-grandmother G.T. also expressed a desire to take
placement of the child and his siblings. G.T. explained that she was currently living in a
senior living home, and she previously lived “from motel to motel” with mother and her
children. Attempts were made to reach the child’s paternal grandmother in Mexico, but
she could not be reached by phone. The family finding social worker sent letters to
several maternal relatives with information on relative placement. J.H. and G.T. were
provided with information on the resource family approval process, but none of the
relatives had submitted an application at the time of the disposition report.
On May 25, 2022, the juvenile court found that ICWA was not applicable because
there was no reason to believe or know the child was an Indian child. The disposition
hearing was continued due to a late report at mother’s request. At the continued
disposition hearing held on June 9, 2022, mother was present and represented by counsel.
After all parties submitted, the child was removed from the parents’ custody and family
reunification services were ordered for mother and father. A six-month review hearing
was set for December 9, 2022.
The report prepared for the six-month review hearing recommended that mother’s
family reunification services be continued and father’s family reunification services be
terminated. The paternal grandmother contacted the social worker on July 8, 2022, to
explain that father was in a rehabilitation center in Mexicali. She expressed her interest
in placement and visitation with the child and his siblings. The ICWA section of the
report included the juvenile court’s previous finding that ICWA was not applicable
without any additional information.
4.
At the six-month review hearing held on December 9, 2022, mother’s family
reunification services were continued and father’s family reunification services were
terminated. A 12-month review hearing was scheduled for April 26, 2023. The 12-month
review report, dated April 14, 2023, recommended that mother’s family reunification
services be terminated and the setting of a section 366.26 hearing for the child. A
permanent plan of adoption or guardianship was not suitable for the child’s siblings, and
the siblings were recommended to remain in foster care with a permanent plan of
placement with a fit and willing relative. On April 26, 2023, family reunification services
were terminated for mother, and a section 366.26 hearing was set for the child on
August 24, 2023.
The department’s section 366.26 report, dated August 11, 2023, recommended that
the juvenile court terminate the parental rights of mother and father and order a
permanent plan of adoption for the child. The ICWA section of the report provided no
additional information regarding ICWA. In a subsequent report, dated January 29, 2024,
the department provided additional information on its ICWA inquiry of the child’s
paternal family. The social worker mailed letters about information on relative placement
to paternal relatives on January 25, 2024. A voice message was left for a paternal aunt,
M.C., after she failed to answer the social worker’s phone call. The paternal grandmother
denied that there was any Indian ancestry in their family.
At a continued section 366.26 hearing held on February 5, 2024, the juvenile court
terminated parental rights and selected a plan of adoption for the child. The court also
found that there was no reason to know the child was an Indian child.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court and department failed to adequately discharge
their duty of initial inquiry by failing to inquire of the child’s extended family members
regarding possible Indian ancestry. The department concedes this point, and we accept its
concession.
5.
A. Applicable Law
ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect Indian children and to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum
federal standards that a state court, except in emergencies, must follow before removing
an Indian child from his or her family. (25 U.S.C. § 1902; see In re Isaiah W. (2016)
1 Cal.5th 1, 7–8.) In any “proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child and the Indian child’s
tribe … have a right to intervene” (25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)), and may petition the court to
invalidate any foster care placement of an Indian child made in violation of ICWA
(25 U.S.C. § 1914; see § 224, subd. (e)). An “ ‘Indian child’ ” is defined in ICWA as an
unmarried individual under 18 years of age who is either (1) a member of a federally
recognized Indian tribe, or (2) is eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe
and is the biological child of a member of a federally recognized tribe. (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4), (8); see § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting federal definitions].)
In every dependency proceeding, the department and the juvenile court have an
“affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian
child .…” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a);4 see § 224.2, subd. (a); In re W.B. (2012)
55 Cal.4th 30, 53; In re Gabriel G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1165.) The continuing
duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian child “can be divided into
three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to
provide formal ICWA notice.” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.)
The initial duty to inquire arises at the referral stage when the reporting party is
asked whether it has “any information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (a).) Once a child is received into temporary custody, the initial duty to inquire
includes asking the child, parents, legal guardian, extended family members, and others
4 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
6.
who have an interest in the child whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.
(§§ 224.2, subd. (b), 306, subd. (b).) The juvenile court has a duty at the first appearance
of each parent to ask whether he or she “knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) The court must also require each parent to complete a
Parental Notification of Indian Status form (ICWA-020). (Rule 5.481(a)(2)(C).)
Next, a duty of further inquiry arises when the department or the juvenile court has
“reason to believe” the proceedings involve an Indian child but “does not have sufficient
information to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child .…”
(§ 224.2, subd. (e).) As recently clarified by the Legislature, a “reason to believe” exists
when the court or department “has information suggesting that either the parent of the
child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
If there is a reason to believe an Indian child is involved, the juvenile court or the
department “shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child,
and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) Further inquiry
includes, but is not limited to, “[i]nterviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and extended
family members,” and contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the State Department of
Social Services, and the tribe and any other person who may have information. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C).)
The final duty component arises when the juvenile court or department has
“ ‘reason to know’ ” the child is an Indian child. (In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at
p. 567.) A “reason to know” exists if one of the following circumstances is present:
“(1) A person having an interest in the child … informs the court that the child is an
Indian child[;] [¶] (2) The residence … of the child [or] the child’s parents … is on a
reservation or in an Alaska Native village[;] [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding
… informs the court that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an
Indian child[;] [¶] (4) The child … gives the court reason to know that the child is an
7.
Indian child[;] [¶] (5) The court is informed that the child is or has been a ward of a tribal
court[; or] [¶] (6) The court is informed that either parent or the child possess[es] an
identification card indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (d)(1)–(6).)
If the juvenile court makes a finding that proper and adequate further inquiry and
due diligence have been conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an
Indian child, the court may make a finding that ICWA does not apply, subject to reversal
if the court subsequently receives information providing reason to believe the child is an
Indian child. If the court receives such information, it must direct the social worker or
probation officer to conduct further inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
B. Standard of Review
Where the juvenile court finds ICWA does not apply to a child after completion of
an initial inquiry, “[t]he finding implies that … social workers and the court did not know
or have a reason to know the children were Indian children and that social workers had
fulfilled their duty of inquiry.” (In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885.) We
review the court’s ICWA findings for substantial evidence. (In re Hunter W. (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1467.) We must uphold the court’s orders and findings if any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them, and we resolve all
conflicts in favor of affirmance. (In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 446.)
The appellant “has the burden to show that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
findings and orders.” (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
Pursuant to its duty under section 224.2, the department asked mother and father
whether they had any Indian heritage. Father denied having any knowledge of Indian
ancestry in his family, and the paternal grandmother also denied having Indian ancestry.
However, mother disclosed possible Indian ancestry through the Apache tribe, and the
maternal great-grandmother confirmed this potential ancestry. The child’s maternal
8.
uncle, E.B., and his spouse, J.H., expressed interest in being considered for placement of
the child early in the proceedings.
The department was required under section 224.2, subdivision (b) to ask available
extended family members about the child’s possible Indian ancestry. Extended family
members include adults who are the child’s stepparents, grandparents, siblings,
brothers- or sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and first or second cousins.
(25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).) There was at least one additional extended
family member, the maternal uncle E.B., who was in contact with the department during
the proceedings. The department either failed to ask the maternal uncle about Indian
ancestry or did not document it.
Under the circumstances, we conclude the department did not fulfill its statutory
duty of inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) As a result, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA
did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence that the department conducted an
adequate, proper, and duly diligent inquiry, and its contrary conclusion was an abuse of
discretion. Because the failure in this case concerned the department’s duty of initial
inquiry, only state law is involved. “Where a violation is of only state law, we may not
reverse unless we find that the error was prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [‘No
judgment shall be set aside … unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including
the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in
a miscarriage of justice’].)” (In re Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742.)
“ ‘[T]o be entitled to relief on appeal from an alleged abuse of discretion, it must
clearly appear the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of
justice’ [citations], and California law generally interprets its constitutional miscarriage of
justice requirement ‘as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it reasonably
probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the
error.’ ” (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 606–607 (K.H.).)
9.
However, in In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, the Supreme Court “recognized that
while we generally apply a Watson[5] likelihood-of-success test to assess prejudice, a
merits-based outcome-focused test is not always appropriate because it cannot always
adequately measure the relevant harm. [Citation.] In other words, where the injury
caused by the error is unrelated to an outcome on the merits, tethering the showing of
prejudice to such an outcome misplaces the measure, at the expense of the rights the law
in question was designed to protect.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609, italics
omitted.)
As we explained in K.H., “ ‘ICWA compliance presents a unique situation .…’ ”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 608.) “ICWA is not directed at reaching, or protecting,
a specific outcome on the merits.” (Id. at p. 609.) Rather, “ ‘[t]he purpose of ICWA and
related California statutes is to provide notice to the tribe sufficient to allow it to
determine whether the child is an Indian child, and whether the tribe wishes to intervene
in the proceedings’ [citation], and an adequate initial inquiry facilitates the information
gathering upon which the court’s ICWA determination will rest.” (Id. at p. 608.) Yet,
“while the appealing party is usually a parent, parents do not bear the burden of gathering
information in compliance with ICWA [citations], and parents may raise the claim of
error for the first time on appeal.” (Ibid.) Further, the ultimate determination whether a
child is an Indian child rests with the tribe, not with a parent, the department, or the
juvenile court. (Id. at p. 596.)
“[I]f the inquiry is inadequate at the outset, the likelihood that the opportunity to
gather relevant information will present itself later in the proceeding declines
precipitously.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609.) Thus, “the relevant injury under
ICWA is not tied to whether the appealing parent can demonstrate to the juvenile court or
a reviewing court a likelihood of success on the merits of whether a child is an Indian
5 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 820.
10.
child [under a standard Watson analysis]. The relevant rights under ICWA belong to
Indian tribes and they have a statutory right to receive notice where an Indian child may
be involved so that they may make that determination. It necessarily follows that [in the
context of ICWA and consistent with In re A.R.,] the prejudice to those rights lies in the
failure to gather and record the very information the juvenile court needs to ensure
accuracy in determining whether further inquiry or notice is required, and whether ICWA
does or does not apply. Many cases do not proceed beyond the inquiry at the first stage
in the compliance process and, therefore, ensuring adequacy and accuracy at this step is
critical if the rights of tribes under ICWA and California law are to be meaningfully
safeguarded, as was intended by Congress and our state Legislature.” (K.H., at p. 591.)
As we explained in K.H., “where the opportunity to gather the relevant
information critical to determining whether the child is or may be an Indian child is lost
because there has not been adequate inquiry and due diligence, reversal for correction is
generally the only effective safeguard.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 610.) Here,
the department’s inquiry “fell well short of that required to gather the information needed
to meaningfully safeguard the rights of the tribes, as intended under ICWA and California
law .…” (Id. at p. 620.) “Where a record is silent or nearly silent with respect to an
ICWA inquiry at the first step, a finding of harmlessness necessarily rests on speculation”
and “is at odds with the statutory protections that ICWA and California law intend to
afford Indian children and Indian tribes.” (Id. at p. 611.) Therefore, the error is
prejudicial.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally reversed,
and the matter is remanded to the court with directions to order the department to comply
with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2, subdivisions (b)
and (e) and rule 5.481(a)(5). If, after determining that an adequate inquiry was made
consistent with the reasoning in this opinion, the court finds that ICWA applies, the court
11.
shall proceed in compliance with ICWA and related California law. If the court instead
finds that ICWA does not apply, the court shall reinstate its ICWA finding. In all other
respects, the court’s order terminating mother and father’s parental rights is affirmed.
12.
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