People v. Llamas CA2/6

CourtListener 10007962Calctapp19.07.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/19/24 P. v. Llamas CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B330248
(Super. Ct. No. 2022028437)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

VICTOR JOSE LLAMAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Victor Jose Llamas appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of resisting an executive officer. (Pen. Code,1 § 69,
subd. (a).) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and
ordered him to serve two years of formal probation. Llamas
contends: (1) the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress
evidence, (2) insufficient evidence supports his conviction, (3) the
court misinstructed jurors on the intent required to resist an
executive officer, and (4) the court should have reduced his
conviction to a misdemeanor. We affirm.

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Dustin Heersche, a uniformed Ventura County sheriff’s
deputy, was patrolling a Moorpark business area just after 11
p.m. when he heard what he “recognized to be possibly like a
large metal roll-up door being manipulated in some fashion.” He
looked over and saw Llamas next to the door of a tire store.
Llamas was wearing a heavy jacket and had a bicycle next to
him. Heersche approached Llamas, suspecting a commercial
burglary may be in progress. When he made contact, Llamas was
argumentative and refused to answer his questions. He smelled
of alcohol.
Llamas asked Heersche who he was. Heersche said he was
a sheriff’s deputy. He explained that Llamas was being detained
and was not free to leave.
Heersche said that it looked like Llamas was tampering
with the door to the tire store and that Llamas did not work
there. He said that Llamas was “so drunk, it’s ridiculous.”
Llamas said that he would just go home.
While Heersche waited for backup, Llamas repeatedly
asked him who he was and why he was there. He refused to
consent to a patdown search. Heersche conducted one and placed
Llamas under arrest.
As Heersche tried to get him into his patrol vehicle, Llamas
called Heersche a “white-ass motherfucker” and threatened to
headbutt him in the face. He then kicked Heersche in the face.
Heersche’s jaw had an “irritation” as a result of Llamas’s kick.

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DISCUSSION
Motion to suppress
Llamas first contends the trial court erroneously denied his
motion to suppress the evidence obtained during his detention
and arrest. We disagree.
1. Background
Prior to trial, Llamas moved to suppress evidence obtained
during his detention and arrest. At a hearing on Llamas’s
motion, Heersche said that during his patrol on the night of
Llamas’s alleged crime he heard a noise consistent with a large
metal door being manipulated. A tire store in the area had such
doors. Llamas was near one of them. He was bent over and
balancing a bicycle in one hand.
Llamas stood up and “nervously walked away from the
door” to the tire store when Heershce approached. Heersche did
not think these actions were consistent with someone who
worked at the store. He thought Llamas may be trying to break
in, and detained him to investigate.
Llamas appeared to be intoxicated. He denied that
Heersche was a sheriff’s deputy, and put the bicycle between the
two of them. He called Heersche names, using racist and
homophobic language. He told Heersche to take off his badge so
the two of them could fight. Based on these actions Heersche
believed that Llamas was obstructing the investigation and that
there was a high likelihood of having to use force to get him to
comply. He arrested Llamas for obstruction and searched him.
The trial court denied Llamas’s motion to suppress. The
incident occurred late at night, in an area where all businesses
were closed. Heersche heard a noise consistent with “a tool being
used to try to pry open [a] door.” At that point he “would have

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been derelict in his duties if he” did not investigate. When he
approached the store, Llamas appeared “nervous” and then
became aggressive. Llamas smelled of alcohol and refused to
cooperate. Based on these circumstances Heersche had
reasonable suspicion to detain Llamas and probable cause to
arrest him. He then properly searched Llamas incident to arrest.
2. Discussion
The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable
searches and seizures” by the police. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.)
Evidence obtained in violation of this guarantee may not be used
in a subsequent prosecution. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643,
655.) On review of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence,
we view the facts most favorably to the prosecution and uphold
the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial
evidence. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) We
independently decide whether a search or seizure was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26
Cal.4th 876, 924.)
A law enforcement officer may “temporarily detain a
suspect based . . . on a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the suspect has
committed or is about to commit a crime.” (People v. Bennett
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 386-387.) Reasonable suspicion is a
less-demanding standard than probable cause, but still requires
“specific, articulable facts that are ‘reasonably “consistent with
criminal activity” ’ ” (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078,
1083); mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch will not suffice (Terry v.
Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 22). Whether reasonable suspicion for a
detention exists requires an independent examination of the
totality of the circumstances. (People v. McCullough (2013) 56
Cal.4th 589, 595-596.)

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An arrest is valid if supported by probable cause. (People v.
Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1037.) Probable cause “exists if facts
known to the arresting officer would lead a person of ordinary
care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion
that an individual is guilty of a crime.” (Ibid.) There is no
“ ‘exact formula’ ” for determining whether probable cause exists.
(People v. Maltz (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 381, 390.) Each case must
be decided on its own facts and circumstances. (Ibid.)
The totality of the circumstances reveals that Heersche had
both reasonable suspicion to detain and probable cause to arrest
Llamas. As to the detention, Heersche testified that late one
night he was patrolling a commercial area when he heard a noise
that sounded like something hitting a metal door. A nearby tire
store had this type of door and Llamas was crouched next to it.
But the store had long been closed. When Heersche went over to
ask what Llamas was doing, Llamas appeared nervous and began
to walk away. Heersche also noticed a strong odor of alcohol and
Llamas appeared to be drunk. Heersche told Llamas, “You don’t
work here and you smell like alcohol. So, you’re being detained
so I can investigate what’s goin’ on.” These facts, considered in
their totality, provided Heersche with reasonable suspicion to
detain Llamas and investigate whether a crime had been
committed or Llamas was attempting to burglarize the tire store.
(See, e.g., U.S. v. Dawdy (8th Cir. 1995) 46 F.3d 1427, 1430
[reasonable suspicion where defendant near a closed business
attempted to leave when police car approached].)
Heersche’s reasonable suspicion soon ripened to probable
cause. Llamas repeatedly questioned whether Heersche was a
sheriff’s deputy, put a bicycle between himself and the deputy,
became aggressive, and refused to cooperate. At that point

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Heersche had probable cause to arrest Llamas for obstructing his
investigation (see, e.g., People v. Lloyd (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d
1425, 1429; In re Michael V. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 676, 681-683) or for
public intoxication (see § 647, subd. (f)). The trial court properly
denied the motion to suppress evidence.
Sufficiency of the evidence
Llamas next contends his conviction must be reversed
because there was no legal basis for Heersche to arrest him and
therefore insufficient evidence that he resisted any such attempt.
(Cf. In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 816 [resistance must
occur while law enforcement official legally performs their duty].)
But as set forth above, Heersche had probable cause to arrest
Llamas. Heersche was thus engaged in the legal performance of
his duties when Llamas resisted by kicking Heersche in the face.
Reversal on this basis is unwarranted.
Jury instruction on intent
To convict Llamas of resisting an executive officer, the trial
court instructed jurors that prosecutors had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that: (1) Llamas used force or violence to resist
Heersche; (2) when Llamas acted, Heersche was performing his
lawful duty; (3) when Llamas acted, he knew Heersche was an
executive officer; and (4) when Llamas acted, he knew Heersche
was performing his duty. (See CALCRIM No. 2652.) The court
also instructed jurors with CALCRIM No. 250 regarding general
intent:

“The crimes charged in this case require proof of the
union, or joint operation, of act and wrongful intent.

“For you to find a person guilty of the crime[] of
[r]esisting [a]n [e]xecutive [o]fficer [i]n [p]erformance

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of [d]uty, as charged in count [1], or a lesser included
offense, that person must not only commit the
prohibited act, but must do so with wrongful intent.
A person acts with wrongful intent when [they]
intentionally do[] a prohibited act; however, it is not
required that [they] intend to break the law. The act
required is explained in the instruction for that
crime.” (See CALCRIM No. 250.)

Llamas contends the trial court erred in giving this
instruction because the bench notes state that it should not be
given if the charged crime requires a specific mental state. By
instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 250, Llamas contends
the court “remov[ed] . . . an element of the crime, in this case,
mental state,” thereby denying him due process. But Llamas did
not object to this instruction at trial. His contention is forfeited.
(People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 113.)
It also fails on the merits. We independently review
whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on intent and
whether its instructions “accurately state[d] the law.” (People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) We view the challenged
instruction “ ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the
trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood
the jury applied [it] in an impermissible manner.’ ” (Ibid.) Our
job is to determine “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the . . . instruction[] caused the jury to misapply the law.” (Ibid.)
We see no such reasonable likelihood here. “Every person
who attempts, by means of any threat or violence, to deter or
prevent an executive officer from performing any duty imposed
upon the officer by law, or who knowingly resists, by the use of
force or violence, the officer, in the performance of [their] duty, is”
guilty of violating section 69. (§ 69, subd. (a).) “The Supreme

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Court has explained that section 69 ‘sets forth two separate ways
in which an offense can be committed. The first is attempting by
threats or violence to deter or prevent an officer from performing
a duty imposed by law; the second is resisting by force or violence
an officer in the performance of [their] duty.’ ” (People v.
Rasmussen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1417-1418.) The first of
these is a specific intent crime. (Id. at p. 1420.) The second is a
general intent crime. (Id. at pp. 1419-1421.)
Here, prosecutors relied solely on the second version of the
crime. Llamas concedes as much. Instructing jurors pursuant to
CALCRIM No. 250 was therefore proper.
Motion to reduce conviction to a misdemeanor
At sentencing, Llamas moved the trial court to reduce his
felony conviction for resisting an executive officer to a
misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b). He had no
prior felony convictions. He had been present for all court dates
and was respectful during the proceedings. He had not used
methamphetamine for 16 months and had not drunk alcohol for
one month. During that month, he took responsibility for his life
and complied with all terms of his release.
The probation report stated that Llamas had several prior
misdemeanor convictions, including for driving under the
influence and being under the influence of a controlled substance.
He posed a low overall risk of reoffending, but a moderate risk
due to his substance abuse and mental health issues. He had
been wearing an alcohol monitoring device for one month. He
accrued no violations during that time, and had no significant
disciplinary write-ups while in custody.
Prosecutors opposed Llamas’s motion. They argued Llamas
had not yet proven “his ability not to consume alcohol.” Further,

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if the court was considering reducing Llamas’s offense to a
misdemeanor, it should require a showing of at least one year of
sobriety, with no police contacts during that time.
The trial court agreed with prosecutors’ argument. It
explained:

“Okay. Well, Mr. Llamas, I do very much appreciate
the fact that you have stayed sober while you were on
pretrial supervision. Not everybody does that, and I
do appreciate that. I do also appreciate that you
realize the importance of getting sober, getting your
life together, and getting mental health treatment
and you’re finally taking responsibility and getting
into your DUI programs; however, I do agree with
[the prosecutor] in that was—really her thoughts
were my thoughts actually before I took the bench
this morning, but did keep an open mind and wanted
to hear both sides.

“I’ve seen—I’ve been doing—working in the criminal
justice system for 26 years now, and I do see people
who truly want to change their lives and get sober,
but I also see those same people that stay sober for a
bit of time and then fall off the wagon. So I am going
to deny the 17(b) at this time, but if you—if you do
stay sober, you don’t pick up any new offenses, you
don’t throw any dirty tests to probation, and—and
you comply with the—all the terms of your probation,
I will grant a 17(b) after one year.”

Llamas contends this was an abuse of discretion. We disagree.
A trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion
to reduce a conviction to a misdemeanor. (People v. Superior
Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.) When exercising

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that discretion, the court should consider “ ‘the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and
attitude toward the offense, or [their] traits of character as
evidenced by [their] behavior and demeanor at the trial.’ ” (Id. at
p. 978.) “When appropriate, judges should also consider the
general objectives of sentencing.” (Ibid.) A court’s failure to
consider these factors “ ‘exceeds the bounds of reason.’ ” (Ibid.)
There was no abuse of discretion here. Llamas had several
prior drug- and alcohol-related convictions. When he moved the
trial court to reduce his crime to a misdemeanor he had refrained
from using alcohol for just one month. It did not exceed the
bounds of reason for the court to demand a longer period of
sobriety before reducing Llamas’s conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

CODY, J.

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Kristi J. Peariso, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Susan S. Baugess, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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