Dickson v. Mann

CourtListener 10007018Calctapp18.07.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/16/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

NICHOLAS DICKSON, Individually D081851
and as Trustee, etc.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-
v. 00042299-PR-TR-CTL)

JACK MANN,

Defendant;

HIGGS FLETCHER & MACK, LLP,

Third Party Claimant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Julia C. Kelety, Judge. Affirmed.
Higgs Fletcher & Mack, John Morris and Steven M. Brunolli for Third
Party Claimant and Appellant.
Grant & Kessler and Phillip A. Zunshine for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The law firm Higgs, Fletcher & Mack LLP (HFM) appeals from the

trial court’s judgment denying HFM’s third party claim (Code Civ. Proc.,1

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
§ 720.110), in which it claimed ownership of $585,000 in funds it received
from its client Jack Mann pursuant to a flat fee agreement for future legal
representation that HFM entered into with Mann. The disputed funds were
located in HFM’s client trust account when Mann’s judgment creditor served
HFM with a notice of levy on the theory that the funds belonged to Mann.
HFM contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the funds
belonged to Mann rather than to HFM. HFM also challenges the trial court’s
denial of its motion for reconsideration of that ruling, which related to
$53,457.95 of the disputed funds.
We conclude that HFM’s appellate challenge is without merit, and we
accordingly affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the underlying litigation, which arose out of Mann’s alleged
misconduct as trustee of the M. Chris Dickson Revocable Living Trust dated
February 23, 1996 (the Trust), Mann stipulated to the entry of a $12 million
judgment in favor of Nickolas Dickson, individually and in his capacity as

trustee of the Trust (Dickson). Judgment was entered on August 8, 2022.2

2 Concurrently with the filing of his respondent’s brief on December 14,
2023, Dickson filed a request that we take judicial notice of the stipulation for
immediate entry of judgment and the judgment from the underlying
litigation, both dated August 8, 2022. We note that because those documents
are part of the record in the trial court action from which this appeal arises,
Dickson could have submitted them as a respondent’s appendix along with
his respondent’s brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.845 (e)(3.)) Nevertheless,
we grant Dickson’s unopposed request to take judicial notice.
HFM filed a request for judicial notice on September 6, 2023, regarding
the complaint in Nicholas Dickson, et al. v. Jack I. Mann, et al., San Diego
Superior Court case No. 37-2022-00034223-CU-FR-CTL, dated August 24,
2022, in which Dickson sought to set aside allegedly voidable transactions

2
On August 22, 2022, Dickson served HFM with a notice of levy for any
money it was holding in trust for Mann. On September 1, 2022, HFM filed
with the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department a verified third party claim
disputing Dickson’s right to the funds. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 720.110-720.130.)
In the third party claim, HFM explained that due to a written engagement
agreement that HFM and Mann entered into on August 6, 2022 (the
Engagement Agreement), it claimed an “ownership and/or possessory/security
interest” in $585,000 of funds HFM received from Mann and placed in HFM’s

client trust account.3 A petition to decide the validity of the third party claim

was subsequently filed with the trial court.4
The August 6, 2022 Engagement Agreement between HFM and Mann
was attached as an exhibit to HFM’s third party claim. The Engagement
Agreement stated that it covered HFM’s provision of legal services to Mann

entered into by Mann. A court record is a proper subject for judicial notice.
(Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d)). We accordingly grant the unopposed request to
take judicial notice.
3 Although the third party claim was vague as to whether it was
asserting an ownership interest by HFM in the disputed funds or a security
interest, HFM’s subsequent briefing in the trial court proceeded under the
theory that the Engagement Agreement determined the “ownership” of the
funds, which “became the property of HFM” due to that agreement.
Similarly, on appeal, HFM argues that upon the signing of the Engagement
Agreement “the funds belonged to HFM.”
4 Section 720.310, subdivision (a) states that “[n]ot later than 15 days
after the third-party claim is filed with the levying officer . . . either the
creditor or the third person may petition the court for a hearing to determine
the validity of the third-party claim and the proper disposition of the property
that is the subject of the claim.” Although the parties have not provided us
with the petition filed in the trial court regarding HFM’s third party claim,
we infer from entries in the Register of Actions that Dickson petitioned the
trial court to decide the validity of HFM’s third party claim.
3
“relating to [Mann’s] role as trustee of [the Trust], including any actions
seeking to collect thereon,” for which Mann agreed “to pay a flat fee in the
amount of $585,000, inclusive of costs.”
As centrally important here, paragraph 4(c) of the Engagement
Agreement states, “Both [HFM] and [Mann] understand and acknowledge
that (1) [Mann] has the right to have [HFM] deposit the Flat Fee in a trust
account until the fee is earned; and that in such case, (2) [Mann] is entitled to
a refund of any amount of the Flat Fee that is unearned because the services
were not completed. Despite being fully informed of the rights described in
the preceding sentence, [Mann] consents to [HFM] depositing the Flat Fee
into [HFM]’s operating account upon payment and consents to such fee being
deemed earned by [HFM] when received.”
HFM explained in its third party claim that as of the date of the
August 6, 2022 Engagement Agreement, it held $585,000 of Mann’s funds in

its client trust account.5 If Dickson’s levy had not been served on August 22,
2022, HFM would have transferred the $585,000 to its own operating account
at the end of the month, in accordance with its normal business practices. A
declaration from Mann’s attorney at HFM explained that the flat fee of
$585,000 was intended to cover HFM’s provision of legal services in at least
four separate matters. The projected budgets for three of those matters
indicated that if HFM billed for its services at an hourly rate, the value of
HFM’s anticipated legal services on the three matters was expected to be at
least $948,260. HFM presented no evidence during the litigation of its third

5 During litigation of the third party claim, it was established that HFM
had received the $585,000 from Mann in two parts. First, HFM was already
holding approximately $125,000 from Mann in its client trust fund due to its
preexisting relationship with Mann, and on August 3, 2022, Mann
transferred $460,000 to HFM.
4
party claim that it had begun providing any of the legal services covered by
the $585,000 flat fee at the time the notice of levy was served on August 22,

2022.6
In opposition to the third party claim, Dickson relied exclusively on the
fact that the $585,000 was located in HFM’s client trust account when the
notice of levy was served, arguing that the location of the funds was
dispositive. Dickson argued, “Because funds in a client trust account belong
to the client, the Funds belonged to [Mann],” and therefore “[u]ntil the Funds
were paid to [HFM]—by being transferred from the client trust account to
[HFM’s] account—the Funds still belonged to [Mann].” For this argument,
Dickson relied on rule 1.15(a) of the State Bar Rules of Professional

Conduct,7 which it characterized as establishing that “[m]oney in trust
belongs to the client.”
In reply, HFM disputed Dickson’s interpretation of rule 1.15(a). HFM
argued that the rule “does not say that all funds in a trust account are
necessarily client funds, especially where—as here—the express agreement
between the client and law firm dictates otherwise.” According to HFM, “the
contract between the parties controls ownership of the funds,” and under the
Engagement Agreement, “[o]nce the funds are received, HFM’s ownership is
established, regardless of where it holds those funds.” In HFM’s view, “when
Mr. Mann signed the Flat Fee Agreement and paid HFM $585,000, he
intended to, and did in fact, transfer ownership to the $585,000 to HFM.”

6 Counsel for HFM confirmed at the December 7, 2022 hearing on the
third party claim that no such evidence was before the court.
7 Unless otherwise indicated, all further references to rules are to the
current version of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct.
5
The trial court held a hearing on December 7, 2022. After extensive
argument from the parties, the trial court denied HFM’s third party claim.
The trial court rejected Dickson’s contention that the location of the

funds in HFM’s client trust account was “absolutely dispositive.”8 However,
the trial court identified two different grounds for its ruling, neither of which
Dickson had advanced in opposing the third party claim.
First, the trial court looked to the Rules of Professional Conduct, from
which it derived the principle that, even when a client pays a flat fee to an
attorney, “in the event the services for which the fee has been paid are not

completed . . . it belongs to the client.”9 The trial court observed that “there
is no evidence in the record that any of the services for which the [$585,000]
was paid have been completed.” The trial court accordingly concluded, “So as
we sit here today, in the absence of any proof that any amount has been
claimed, I do believe that the full amount is subject to the levy and does not
belong to [HFM] because it has not been earned.”
Next, as an independent basis for its ruling, the trial court relied on the
Uniform Voidable Transactions Act. (Civ. Code, § 3439 et seq.) The trial

8 Specifically, the trial court explained that “since Mr. Mann consented”
to the funds being moved from the client trust account to the operating
account “then perhaps” the fact that the funds were still in the client trust
account was “not an impediment that the Court should consider.”
9 The trial court specifically stated it was relying on “[Mann’s] rights
under Rule 1.15(b)(1).” As we will discuss, that rule states that when a client
enters into an agreement to pay a flat fee in exchange for the provision of
legal services, and that fee is deposited in the lawyer’s operating account, the
client must be informed that “the client is entitled to a refund of any amount
of the fee that has not been earned in the event the representation is
terminated or the services for which the fee has been paid are not completed.”
(Rule 1.15(b)(1).)

6
court acknowledged that the parties had not discussed the Uniform Voidable
Transactions Act in their briefing, but explained that “it’s very clear that act

applies.”10 After discussing certain of the statutory factors that can be used
to determine unlawful intent under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act
(Civ. Code, § 3439.04, subd. (b)), the trial court concluded that Dickson’s
attempt to transfer ownership of the $585,000 to HFM through the
Engagement Agreement was void because Mann “intended to delay or hinder
or defraud” Dickson.
The trial court ordered HFM to turn over the $585,000 no later than
December 13, 2022.
HFM filed a motion for reconsideration on December 13, 2022, in which
it requested that the trial court amend its ruling to allow HFM to keep
$53,457.95 of the $585,000. Specifically, HFM explained that prior to the
August 6, 2022 Engagement Agreement, HFM and Mann entered into an
agreement on April 21, 2021 (the 2021 Agreement), under which HFM agreed

10 The parties did not discuss the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act in
their briefing. However, the trial court mentioned that statute during the
December 7, 2022 hearing and gave counsel an opportunity to discuss its
applicability before ruling on HFM’s third party claim. At the hearing,
counsel for Dickson stated that he did not think it was necessary for the court
to rely on the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act to deny HFM’s third party
claim, but he also argued that “[i]t seems pretty obvious to me what
happened here is [Mann] decided to take his liquid assets and move them to
his attorneys,” which was “absolutely a fraudulent transfer and should go
into the consideration for denying this third-party claim.” Counsel for HFM
argued that the payment was not a voidable transaction. He also pointed out
that Dickson had a pending lawsuit against Mann alleging various
fraudulent transfers, but the lawsuit did not encompass the $585,000
payment to HFM. HFM argued that if Dickson wanted to pursue the theory
that the payment to HFM was subject to the Uniform Voidable Transactions
Act, that transaction should be added to the pending lawsuit rather than
being decided as part of the third party claim.
7
to provide legal services to Mann, with HFM entitled to a lien on any amount
that Mann deposited with HFM under the 2021 Agreement. HFM sought to
rely on evidence showing that (1) $125,000 of Mann’s funds in HFM’s client
trust account at the time of the August 22, 2022 notice of levy were deposited
by Mann in connection with 2021 Agreement; and (2) Mann owed HFM
$53,457.95 for services provided under the 2021 Agreement. Based on those
facts, HFM sought to establish that it had a superior claim to $53,457.95 of
the $585,000.
HFM explained that it did not submit evidence regarding the 2021
Agreement during the litigation of the third party claim because it did not
foresee the basis for the trial court’s ruling. HFM characterized the trial
court’s ruling as having “invalidated HFM’s [Engagement Agreement] with
Mann.” According to HFM, “[b]ecause Mr. Dickson did not previously argue
the [Engagement Agreement] was invalid, HFM did not submit any evidence
of its prior agreements with Mr. Mann under which it previously held funds
paid by Mr. Mann.”
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. The trial court
explained, “[HFM] has two legal theories to support its claim to the funds:
(1) the [Engagement Agreement]; and (2) the prior agreement and fees
incurred. When [HFM] served its third-party claim, it only pursued the first
theory. [HFM] either chose not to pursue the second theory, or did not realize
that the second theory was available. In either event, a party acting with
reasonable diligence would have pursued both theories. This is especially
true in light of [section] 720.130, [subdivision] (b), which provides that
‘[a] copy of any writing upon which the claim is based shall be attached to the
third-party claim. At a hearing on the third-party claim, the court in its
discretion may exclude from evidence any writing a copy of which was not

8
attached to the third-party claim.’ ” The trial court also explained that,
contrary to HFM’s characterization, it “never entered an order invalidating
the flat fee agreement,” but only ordered that Mann’s attempt to transfer the
funds to HFM’s ownership was a voidable transfer.
The trial court concluded, “In summary, [HFM] was aware of the
alleged ‘new’ facts at the time it filed and litigated its third-party claim, and
[HFM] did not act with reasonable diligence in failing to present these
alleged ‘new’ facts. [HFM] has therefore failed to meet the threshold
requirements for reconsideration, and the motion is denied.”
HFM appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying its third party
claim. (§ 720.390 [“An appeal may be taken from a judgment given pursuant
to Section 720.390”]), and, as part of its appeal, it contends that the trial
court erred in denying the motion for reconsideration.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards for the Litigation of Third Party Claims
The Enforcement of Judgments Law (§ 680.010 et seq.) “is a
comprehensive scheme governing the enforcement of all civil judgments in
California.” (Imperial Bank v. Pim Electric, Inc. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 540,
546.) Under the Enforcement of Judgments Law, where personal property
has been levied upon under a writ of execution, a third party who claims
ownership of or the right to possess the property may file a third party claim

with the levying officer. (§ 720.110, subd. (b).)11 Next, “either the creditor or
the third person may petition the court for a hearing to determine the

11 Similarly, a third party who claims a superior security interest or lien
on property, rather than an ownership or possessory interest in property,
may file a third party claim. (§ 720.210.)
9
validity of the third-party claim and the proper disposition of the property
that is the subject of the claim.” (§ 720.310, subd. (a).) A hearing on the
third party claim “shall be held within 20 days after the filing of the petition
unless continued by the court for good cause shown.” (Id., subd. (c).) The
purpose of the third party claim procedure is “to give a quick and effectual
remedy to third parties whose property has been levied upon by mistake.”
(Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Carolina Lanes, Inc. (1995) 31
Cal.App.4th 1323, 1329.) “Third-party claims are, by nature, summary
proceedings.” (Cassel v. Kolb (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 568, 579 (Cassel).)
“There is no requirement of a jury trial in third-party claim proceedings, and
no findings are required.” (Oxford Street Properties, LLC v. Rehabilitation
Associates, LLC (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 296, 307 (Oxford Street) [citing
§§ 720.400, 720.410].)
At a hearing on a third party claim, the third party bears the burden of
proving its interest by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 720.360;
Whitehouse v. Six Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 527, 530.) “Once the third
party establishes its entitlement to the property, the burden shifts to the
creditor . . . to establish that its claim is superior.” (Oxford Street, supra,
206 Cal.App.4th at p. 307; see also Whitehouse, at pp. 535, 537 [after a third
party claimant meets its burden, the judgment creditor may seek to prove
that its interest is superior because the judgment debtor’s transfer of
property to the third party was fraudulent].)
On appeal, we review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial
evidence, and we independently review the trial court’s determination of
questions of law. (See Oxford Street, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 307;
Cassel, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 573.)

10
As the parties agree about the relevant facts relating to the
Engagement Agreement, our analysis turns largely on the legal question of
whether, under the undisputed facts, HFM had ownership of the $585,000 in
its client trust account. As we will explain, the answer to that question
derives principally from the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct.
B. The Location of the Funds in the Client Trust Account Is Not Dispositive
The first issue is whether, as Dickson contends, the $585,000
necessarily belonged to Mann because it was in HFM’s client trust account.
Dickson claims that “[m]oney in trust belongs to the client,” so that, “by
definition, this means the funds belonged to Mann, not [HFM].” According to
Dickson, “the fact that the $585,000 was in [HFM’s] trust account was
dispositive,” and that “to obtain ownership of the funds, [HFM] was required
to move the funds to its operating account.”
To support its assertion that funds in a law firm’s client trust account
necessarily belong to a client rather than to the law firm, Dickson relies
primarily on rule 1.15(a). That rule states, in relevant part, “All funds
received or held by a lawyer or law firm for the benefit of a
client . . . including advances for fees, costs and expenses, shall be deposited
in one or more identifiable bank accounts labeled ‘Trust Account’ or words of
similar import . . .” (Rule 1.15(a), asterisks omitted.)
On its face, rule 1.15(a) addresses only where a lawyer or law firm
should place funds held for the benefit of a client. The rule does not
categorically state that a law firm may never hold its own funds in a client
trust account. Rule 1.15(c) describes the limited circumstances in which a
law firm’s own funds may be held in a client trust account:
“(c) Funds belonging to the lawyer or the law firm shall not be
deposited or otherwise commingled with funds held in a trust
account except:

11
“(1) funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges; and

“(2) funds belonging in part to a client or other person and in part
presently or potentially to the lawyer or the law firm, in which
case the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm must be
withdrawn at the earliest reasonable time after the lawyer or law
firm’s interest in that portion becomes fixed. However, if a client
or other person disputes the lawyer or law firm’s right to receive
a portion of trust funds, the disputed portion shall not be
withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.” (Rule 1.15(c),
italics added; asterisks omitted.)

HFM contends that its interest in the $585,000 became fixed by virtue
of the Engagement Agreement on August 6, 2022, and that it was planning to
withdraw the $585,000 to its operating account at the end of the month
according to its normal business practices. On that premise, HFM could
reasonably argue that rule 1.15(c) permitted it to hold the $585,000 in its
client trust account for a short period of time in August 2022 even though it

claimed ownership of those funds beginning on August 6, 2022.12 Thus, we
cannot conclude that the funds belonged to Mann merely because they were
located in the client trust account. That fact alone is not dispositive.

12 Dickson cites case law to argue that “[i]f an attorney keeps his own
funds in his client trust account, the attorney is committing an ethical
violation.” (Hamilton v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 868, 876; Murray v. State
Bar (1985) 40 Cal.3d 575, 583.) Those cases describe extreme situations in
which an attorney blatantly ignored the applicable rules concerning client
trust accounts, which is not the circumstance here, as the funds were located
in HFM’s client trust account only for a short time pending a planned
transfer to HFM’s operating account. Dickson also cites Prakashpalan v.
Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1123, which
explains that “an attorney’s client trust account is an express trust.” That
case does not specifically discuss the limited circumstances, set forth in rule
1.15(c), in which a law firm is permitted to briefly hold its own funds in a
client trust account.

12
C. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Third Party Claim Because HFM
Presented No Evidence That It Had Earned the Flat Fee
Having determined that the location of the $585,000 in HFM’s client
trust account on August 22, 2022, is not dispositive, in itself, to prove that
Mann owned the funds rather than HFM, we must consider whether the trial
court properly concluded that Mann nevertheless continued to own the funds.
As the trial court explained, it concluded that the funds belonged to Mann
because (1) there was no evidence that HFM had performed any legal services
under the Engagement Agreement to earn the $585,000; and (2) the Rules of
Professional Conduct provide that unearned funds under a flat fee agreement
are to be returned to the client. As we will explain, the trial court reached
the correct conclusion under the applicable rules.
We begin with the rules that govern the type of flat fee agreements set
forth in the Engagement Agreement. Rule 1.5(e) states that “[a] lawyer may
make an agreement for, charge, or collect a flat fee for specified legal services.
A flat fee is a fixed amount that constitutes complete payment for the
performance of described services regardless of the amount of work
ultimately involved, and which may be paid in whole or in part in advance of
the lawyer providing those services.” Although flat fee agreements are
permitted, the Rules of Professional Conduct are clear that a flat fee
agreement may not be denominated as “ ‘earned on receipt’ or ‘non-
refundable,’ ” or using “similar terms.” (Rule 1.5(d).) This is because, as
stated in rule 1.5(d), “A lawyer may make an agreement for, charge, or collect
a fee that is denominated as ‘earned on receipt’ or ‘non-refundable,’ or in
similar terms, only if the fee is a true retainer and the client agrees in writing
after disclosure that the client will not be entitled to a refund of all or part of
the fee charged. A true retainer is a fee that a client pays to a lawyer to
ensure the lawyer’s availability to the client during a specified period or on a

13
specified matter, but not to any extent as compensation for legal services
performed or to be performed.” (Rule 1.5(d), italics added; asterisks

omitted.)13
The Rules of Professional Conduct specify that, although a flat fee
cannot be deemed to have been earned upon receipt, it may nevertheless be
placed in a law firm’s operating account rather than in its client trust
account. However, such an approach is allowed only if certain disclosures are
made to the client, which, taken together, clarify for the client that the funds
are not earned until the legal services are actually provided. Specifically,
consistent with the principle that only a true retainer may be described as
earned on receipt and nonrefundable, rule 1.15(b) states, that “a flat fee paid
in advance for legal services may be deposited in a lawyer’s or law firm’s
operating account, provided: [¶] (1) the lawyer or law firm discloses to the
client in writing (i) that the client has a right under paragraph (a) to require
that the flat fee be deposited in an identified trust account until the fee is
earned, and (ii) that the client is entitled to a refund of any amount of the fee
that has not been earned in the event the representation is terminated or the
services for which the fee has been paid are not completed[.]” (Rule
1.15(b)(1), asterisks omitted.) Further “if the flat fee exceeds $1,000.00,” the

13 Comment 2 to rule 1.15 states that “a lawyer or law firm may enter
into an agreement that defines when or how an advance fee is earned,” but
specifies that the ability to enter into such an agreement is “subject to Rule
1.5.” (Rule 1.15, comment 2, italics added.) Because, as we have explained,
rule 1.5 states that only a true retainer may be denominated as “earned in
advance,” it follows that a lawyer or law firm may not enter into an
agreement stating that other types of advance fees, such as flat fees, are
“earned in advance.”

14
client’s signed consent is required. (Rule 1.15(b)(2).)14 Rule 1.16(e) confirms
that because a flat fee is a type of advance fee (and is not a true retainer), a
flat fee must be refunded to the client if the fee is not earned: “Upon the
termination of a representation for any reason: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) the lawyer
promptly shall refund any part of a fee or expense paid in advance that the
lawyer has not earned or incurred. This provision is not applicable to a true
retainer fee paid solely for the purpose of ensuring the availability of the
lawyer for the matter.” (Rule 1.16(e).) Together, these rules make clear that
a flat fee paid by a client to a lawyer for future legal services does not belong
to the lawyer until the fee is earned through the actual provision of legal
services.
The current rules are the result of “a comprehensive revision,” effective
November 1, 2018. (In re Jenkins (2023) 14 Cal.5th 493, 513. fn. 13.) Prior to
the 2018 revision, the Rules of Professional Conduct did not expressly discuss
flat fee agreements or explain how lawyers were required to treat funds
obtained from clients pursuant to such agreements. (See former Rules of

14 We note that the Engagement Agreement’s language deviates from the
disclosure required by rule 1.15(b)(1) in one substantive manner. The
Engagement Agreement states that “(1) [Mann] has the right to have [HFM]
deposit the Flat Fee in a trust account until the fee is earned; and that in
such case, (2) [Mann] is entitled to a refund of any amount of the Flat Fee
that is unearned because the services were not completed.” (Italics added.)
The italicized words do not appear in the client disclosure described in rule
1.15(b)(1), and they arguably change the meaning of the client disclosure in a
manner that diverges from the allowable treatment of a flat fee agreement
under the Rules of Professional Conduct. By virtue of the additional words,
the Engagement Agreement appears to state that a client has a right to a
refund only if the client chooses to have the flat fee held in the client trust
account rather than in the law firm’s operating account. However, we have
explained, regardless of where the flat fee is held, a client has a right to
refund until the fee is earned through the provision of legal services. (Rules
1.5(d), 1.16(e).)
15
Professional Conduct, rules 4-100 [“Preserving Identity of Funds and
Property of a Client”], 4-200 [“Fees for Legal Services”]; see also Baranowski
v. State Bar (1979) 24 Cal.3d 153, 164 [noting that under the then-applicable
rules it was not clear “whether or not an advance fee payment” other than a
true retainer “is correctly characterized as money ‘received or held for the
benefit of clients’ ” that was required to be placed in a client trust

account].)15 As the Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional
Conduct explained with respect to rule 1.5(d) and (e), “these new provisions
implement a basic concept of contract law; namely that, except for true
retainers, an advance fee is never earned unless and until a lawyer provides
the agreed upon services for which the lawyer was retained.” (Rules Prof.
Conduct, rule 1.5 [eff. Nov. 1, 2018], Commission for Revision of Rules of

Professional Conduct, Executive Summary, p. 2.)16
As the trial court accurately observed, HFM presented no evidence that
it had performed any legal services under the Engagement Agreement to
earn any of the $585,000 flat fee. Because there was no evidence that HFM

15 Due to the lack of clarity in the former rules, federal courts observed
that it was unclear how California treated the ownership of fees paid in
advance by a client. (See, e.g., In re McDonald Bros. Const., Inc. (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1990) 114 B.R. 989, 1001; In re Montgomery Drilling Co. (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
1990) 121 B.R. 32, 38; In re GOCO Realty Fund I (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993) 151
B.R. 241, 251–252; Kun v. Mansdorf (In re Woodcraft Studios, Inc.) (N.D. Cal.
2011) 464 B.R. 1, 12 fn. 9; see also Sarah C. Hays, D. Edward Hays, Good
Help Is Hard to Fund: The Problem of Earned Upon Receipt Retainers and
Pre-Funded Litigation (2016) 33 Cal. Bankr. J. 421, 426, 437–440 [analyzing
whether, under the former rules, a client in California retains an interest in a
flat fee paid in advance of the provision of services].)
16 Available at chrome-
extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Port
als/0/documents/rules/Rule_1.5-Exec_Summary-Redline.pdf [last accessed
July 11, 2024].
16
had performed any services under the Engagement Agreement prior to the
service of the notice of levy on August 22, 2022, HFM had not yet earned any
of the $585,000 flat fee that was located in HFM’s client trust account at that
time.
Even though the Engagement Agreement states that “[Mann] consents
to . . . the Flat Fee . . . being deemed earned by [HFM] when received” (italics
added), the Rules of Professional Conduct are clear that a flat fee is, in fact,
not earned until services are provided. (Rule 1.5(d) [“[a] lawyer may make an
agreement for, charge, or collect a fee that is denominated as ‘earned on
receipt’ or ‘non-refundable,’ or in similar terms, only if the fee is a true
retainer,” italics added].) Because there was no evidence that HFM provided
any legal services under the Engagement Agreement prior to August 22,
2022, the flat fee paid according to the Engagement Agreement belonged to
Mann on that date. The trial court properly denied HFM’s third party claim
because HFM did not establish ownership of the $585,000 that it received

from Mann and placed in its client trust account.17
D. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying HFM’s Motion
for Reconsideration
We next consider HFM’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of its
motion for reconsideration.

17 Because we conclude that the trial court properly denied the third
party claim on the ground that HFM had not yet earned the fees paid under
the Engagement Agreement, we need not, and do not, consider the second
independent ground that the trial court gave for denying the third party
claim, namely that the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (Civ. Code, § 3439
et seq.) was applicable. Among other things, we express no view on whether,
as HFM contends, the trial court “violated HFM’s due process rights . . . by
making a sua sponte finding at the hearing . . . that Mann’s transfer of funds
to HFM violated the [Uniform] Voidable Transactions Act.”
17
Section 1008, subdivision (a) states that a party may “within 10 days
after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based
upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the
same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and
modify, amend, or revoke the prior order.” (§ 1008, subd. (a).) A party
seeking reconsideration . . . must provide a satisfactory explanation for the
failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time.” (New York Times Co. v.
Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212 (New York Times); see also
California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. Virga (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th
30, 46 fn. 15 [“It has long been the view that a party seeking reconsideration
of a prior order based on ‘new or different facts’ must provide a satisfactory
explanation for failing to present the evidence sooner.”].) “The burden under
section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the
moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or
produced it” at the original hearing. (New York Times, at pp. 212–213.) “A
trial court’s ruling on a motion for reconsideration is reviewed under the
abuse of discretion standard.” (Id. at p. 212.)
As we have explained, HFM sought reconsideration to have the trial
court take into account HFM’s 2021 Agreement with Mann. HFM argued
that it had a lien on $53,457.95 of the $585,000 in the client trust account
based on legal services it had provided under the 2021 Agreement. In the
motion for reconsideration, HFM explained that it did not originally submit
evidence relating to the 2021 Agreement because it did not realize that the
trial court would reject its contention that it owned the entirety of the
$585,000 by virtue of the Engagement Agreement it entered into with Mann
on August 6, 2022.

18
We conclude that the trial court was well within its discretion to deny
the motion for reconsideration. It is undisputed that the evidence regarding
the 2021 Agreement existed at the time HFM filed its third party claim.
HFM easily could have identified the 2021 Agreement as a second ground for
its third party claim, but it chose instead to rely solely on its claim of
ownership based on the Engagement Agreement.
HFM has presented no “satisfactory explanation” for its failure to
identify the 2021 Agreement as an alternative ground for its third party
claim. (New York Times, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 212.) HFM argues on
appeal that “it was only after the trial court ruled—based on the fact that
HFM had not presented evidence that any of its services had already been
completed—that HFM could possibly have understood the need for ‘new’
evidence or additional argument addressed to that point.” This argument
lacks merit because HFM’s motion for reconsideration related only to legal
fees owing for services provided under the 2021 Agreement, not the
Engagement Agreement. The motion for reconsideration did not seek to
remedy HFM’s failure to present evidence of legal services provided under
the Engagement Agreement.
Further, section 720.130, subdivision (b) states, “A copy of any writing
upon which the claim is based shall be attached to the third-party claim. At
a hearing on the third-party claim, the court in its discretion may exclude
from evidence any writing a copy of which was not attached to the third-party
claim.” (§ 720.130, subd. (b).) Because the 2021 Agreement was not attached
to the third party claim, the trial court had the express discretion to decline
to consider it and to deny the motion for reconsideration on that basis.
In sum, because HFM failed to attach the 2021 Agreement to its third
party claim and failed to make any argument regarding the 2021 Agreement

19
while litigating the third party claim, even though it easily could have done
so, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for
reconsideration.
DISPOSITION
The judgment denying HFM’s third party claim is affirmed. Dickson
shall recover his costs on appeal.

IRION, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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