CourtListener 10004692•People v. Greer CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/16/24 P. v. Greer CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B329995
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA187860)
v.
RONNIE JOE GREER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Ronnie Greer appeals the trial court’s order resentencing
him under Penal Code section 1172.75.1
Greer was convicted of escaping from custody in 2000. He
was sentenced to six years, imposed consecutively to a separate
sentence of 35 years to life on burglary charges.
In 2023, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified Greer’s escape conviction as
eligible for section 1172.75 resentencing. At the resentencing
hearing, the trial court agreed Greer was eligible for resentencing
and reduced Greer’s sentence from six to four years. Greer was
not present at the hearing and was not represented by counsel.
Believing Greer had already served his sentence for escape
concurrently to his indeterminate sentence for burglary, the court
stated it would not appoint counsel for Greer and had not
obtained Greer’s waiver of the right to be present at his
resentencing proceedings.
Greer argues the trial court erroneously denied him the
statutory right to appointed counsel and his statutory and
constitutional right to be present at resentencing. The People
concede the errors. We agree and remand for a full resentencing
in accordance with section 1172.75.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Greer’s Convictions and Sentences
In 1999, Greer was charged with escape from a reentry
facility (§ 4530, subd. (b)). The information also alleged Greer
had two prior strike convictions (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); 667,
subds. (b)-(i)), and had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)). After a bench trial, the trial court found Greer guilty
of this count and found the special allegations true.
Before trial and sentencing on his escape conviction, Greer
was separately convicted in January 2000 of two counts of first
degree burglary and sentenced to 35 years to life. Greer was
sentenced on the escape charge in May 2000. He received a
six-year prison term: a middle term of two years, doubled by a
prior strike enhancement (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); § 667,
subds. (b)-(i)), plus one year for each of two prior prison term
allegations under section 667.5, subdivision (b). Greer’s sentence
for escape was imposed consecutive to his life term for burglary.
B. Section 1172.75 Proceedings
On February 8, 2023, CDCR identified Greer’s case for
resentencing review pursuant to former section 1171.1, now
section 1172.75. The trial court considered Greer’s eligibility for
section 1172.75 resentencing on February 16. The court issued a
tentative ruling as follows:
[P]ursuant to [section 1172.75] the court intends to
strike the one year priors and resentence the
defendant to 4 years. Pursuant to statute the court
must set this matter for hearing, have defendant
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transported from wherever he is housed in the state
of California, have all counsel and defendant present
for OSC.
However, defendant on this matter concluded this
sentence on or about 5-12-2006. The defendant is not
in custody on this matter and defendant is in
prop[r]ia persona, therefore, the court grants the
petition for resentence and modifies the abstract and
minute order to reflect that the defendant is
resentenced to 4 years which expired on or about
2004.
[. . .] The court shall not set this matter for hearing
as this court finds that the defendant will not be
harmed nor prejudiced by not having a hearing
scheduled and because this case has concluded on or
about 5-12-2006 and defendant is not in custody on
this matter.
On March 17, 2023, the court recalled Greer’s previous
sentence and re-imposed a middle term sentence of four years.
Greer was not present at the hearing, nor was he represented by
counsel. The court noted, “The court issued an order on 2/16/23,
and sent that out to Mr. Greer in state prison. The problem,
however, is that I don’t have anything from Mr. Greer that says,
‘Okay,’ Okay with us simply going forward without him.”
Nevertheless, the court stated, “this is harmless error to not have
Mr. Greer present.”
Greer timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
A. Legal Background and Standard of Review
“Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b)
required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement
for each true finding on an allegation the defendant had served a
separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody
for at least five years.” (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
375, 379-380.) “Senate Bill No. 483 added section 1171.1 to the
Penal Code, which was subsequently renumbered without
substantive change as section 1172.75. [Citation.]
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides that ‘[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Once the
[California] Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
identifies those persons ‘currently serving a term for a judgment
that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a)’ to the
sentencing court, ‘the court shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.’ (§ 1172.75, subds. (b) & (c).)”
(People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399.)
“Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), states that the
resentencing ‘shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety,’ and further, resentencing ‘shall not result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.’” (People v. Garcia
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855.) The resentencing court must
5
apply “any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion” and “may consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75,
subds. (d)(2) & (d)(3).)
By its own terms, section 1172.75 ensures the defendant’s
“right to be present, represented by counsel, and present evidence
at the hearing.” (People v. Montgomery (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
768, 773 (Montgomery), review granted May 29, 2024, S284662;
see § 1172.75, subds. (d)(3), (d)(5), & (e).) Additionally, the
California and federal constitutions guarantee the defendant’s
right to be personally present at all critical stages of criminal
proceedings, including sentencing and resentencing. (See
People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663, 673-674 (Velasco)
[§ 1172.75 proceeding]; People v. Santos (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
666, 677, review granted May 29, 2024, S284341 (Santos)
[same].)
A defendant’s statutory and constitutional right to be
present at resentencing “may be waived.” (Velasco, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 673; accord, Santos, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th
at p. 677.) Such a waiver must be voluntary, knowing and
intelligent. (See Santos, at p. 677; see also § 977, subd. (b)
[providing for waiver of defendant’s right to be present at
sentencing].) “[D]efense counsel may waive the defendant’s
presence, ‘but only if there is evidence that the defendant
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consented to the waiver. [Citations.] At a minimum, there must
be some evidence that the defendant understood the right he was
waiving and the consequences of doing so.’” (Santos, at pp. 677-
678; see § 977, subd. (b)(2), (b)(2)(A)-(B).)
“‘Under the federal Constitution, error pertaining to a
defendant’s presence is evaluated under the harmless-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 . . . .’ [Citations.] ‘Under that standard,
the error “may be deemed harmless only if we can conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not affect the
outcome of the proceeding.”’” (Santos, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 678; accord, Velasco, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 674.) We
assess denial of a statutory right to counsel in resentencing
proceedings under the Watson standard for state-law error:
whether there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of
the error, the defendant would have obtained a more favorable
result. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957-958
(Lewis), citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836
(Watson).)
B. The Trial Court Denied Greer’s Right to Be Present and His
Right to Appointed Counsel at the Resentencing Hearing,
and the Error Was Not Harmless
Greer asserts, the People concede, and we agree the court
prejudicially erred by resentencing Greer without appointing
counsel and without Greer’s presence in court or a valid waiver of
his presence. The court noted Greer was absent from the
proceeding and had not waived his right to be present. Although
the court stated there was “a public defender here,” the court did
not appoint counsel for Greer or hear argument from Greer.
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Proceeding with resentencing under these circumstances was
contrary to Greer’s constitutional and statutory rights. (See
Montgomery, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 773; Velasco, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 673-674; see also § 1172.75, subds. (d)(5),
(e).)
These errors were not harmless. (See Santos, supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at p. 678, citing Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 23 (Chapman); see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 974, citing Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Although the
court believed Greer had already served his sentence on the
escape conviction, Greer’s sentence for escape was imposed
consecutive to his indeterminate life sentence, such that
resentencing on the escape conviction would affect Greer’s total
time in custody. Further, at his resentencing hearing Greer was
not present, and he did not have counsel or the opportunity to
present any argument or evidence. Greer avers that he could
have “offered evidence about his rehabilitation efforts in prison
over the past 24 years,” “argued that the strike allegation should
be dismissed because it is more than 30 years old,” or “asked the
court to impose the low term.” (See Velasco, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 674 [defendant’s absence from resentencing
not harmless error because he “was not able to present evidence
of any of [section 1172.75’s postconviction] factors”].) We
conclude Greer’s inability to be present at his hearing and to
have counsel present such evidence and arguments was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman, at p. 23.) It
is also reasonably probable that appointed counsel would have
obtained a more favorable result by assisting Greer in presenting
postconviction evidence and clarifying the details of Greer’s
sentence for the court. (See Watson, at p. 836.) Therefore, as the
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People concede, Greer is entitled to a full resentencing hearing,
including the appointment of counsel, the opportunity to be
present at the hearing, and to offer postconviction evidence. (See
Velasco, at p. 674.)
DISPOSITION
The resentencing order is reversed and the matter is
remanded to the trial court with instructions to conduct a full
resentencing hearing consistent with section 1172.75.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
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