CourtListener 10003667•Bowen v. Burns & McDonnell Engineering Co., Inc.
Bowen v. Burns & McDonnell Engineering Co., Inc.
CourtListener 10003667Calctapp15.07.2024
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/17/24; Certified for Publication 7/15/24 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
EUGENE BOWEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. A166793
BURNS & MCDONNELL
ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC., (San Francisco County
et al., Super. Ct. No. CGC17561849)
Defendants and Respondents.
While working inside a jet fuel tank at the San Francisco International
Airport, Eugene Bowen fell from a ladder and was injured. At the time,
Bowen was employed by sub-tier independent contractor Team Industrial
Services, Inc. (Team). He sued general contractor Burns & McDonnell
Engineering Company Inc. (Burns) and subcontractor HMT, LLC (HMT)
(collectively defendants)—who hired Team—alleging a premises liability
cause of action based on defendants’ negligence and negligent supervision.
The trial court granted defendants’ respective motions for summary
judgment based on the Privette doctrine (Privette v. Superior Court (1993)
5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette)), which limits a hirer’s liability for on-the-job injuries
sustained by an independent contractor or its workers unless an exception
1
applies. Bowen appeals, arguing triable issues of material fact exist as to
whether an exception to the Privette doctrine applies. We disagree and
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
In 2017, Burns was the general contractor for a fuel systems
improvement project at San Francisco International Airport. Burns hired
HMT as a subcontractor to replace the floor of a jet fuel tank; HMT, in turn,
retained Team as a sub-tier independent contractor to inspect HMT’s
welding. Bowen worked for Team; he was tasked with taking radiographic
images of the welding work HMT had performed on the jet fuel tank.
Team’s contract with HMT required Team to “furnish all material,
equipment and labor necessary to perform the work.” HMT did not control
any of the methods or means by which Team did its work. Due to the
potential radiation exposure, only Bowen and designated Team employees
were allowed in the jet fuel tank while Bowen was working.
In February 2017, Bowen worked inside the jet fuel tank on two
separate days prior to the incident. His job was to capture images of the wall
sheets to examine the door welds. Another Team employee, Tom
Polkinghorn, worked on the outside of the tank. On February 15, Bowen
entered the tank for a third time while Polkinghorn worked on the outside.
Before entering the tank and beginning work, both Bowen and Polkinghorn
signed the daily “Job Safety Analysis” (JSA) sheet. The JSA required them to
list the hazards they observed both outside and inside the tank before
starting work. The JSA also included a disclaimer allowing the signatory to
stop work “if conditions change and/or the job becomes unsafe.” Polkinghorn
inspected the exterior of the jet fuel tank and listed both the observed
1 We recite only those facts relevant to the dispositive issues before us.
2
hazards and controls to reduce or eliminate the hazards. Bowen was
supposed to inspect the interior of the tank, but Polkinghorn is unsure if
Bowen ever did so; nonetheless, Bowen signed and initialed the JSA.
When Bowen began his work inside the tank on February 15, he
observed a ladder and scaffolding, which HMT had installed for HMT’s own
employees to use. HMT did not supply the subject ladder or scaffolding for
the use of any sub-tier contractor or Team, nor did it agree to provide such
equipment. HMT had not received a request from Bowen or Team to use the
ladder and scaffolding, and it did not know Bowen would use them. Bowen
did not recall if the ladder and scaffolding had been present during his
previous work visits. Bowen also did not recall seeing a “green work permit”
on the scaffolding, which would have indicated the scaffolding was built and
ready for use. Bowen noticed the ladder was “just tied off at one side at the
very top,” but he did not shake or test the ladder. On previous projects,
Bowen had not used ladders tied off in this manner. Nonetheless, Bowen
decided to use the ladder to capture images at a higher elevation. Bowen was
wearing a harness with lanyards he clipped to the ladder and scaffolding.
The ladder “felt good going up.” On his descent, after releasing his lanyard,
“the ladder came out from underneath” Bowen; he was about four feet off the
ground when he fell. Bowen fractured his hip and sustained other injuries as
a result of his fall.
Bowen attributed his fall to the flexible metal floor at the bottom of the
fuel tank and the sand on that floor. The floor was made of pieces of metal
welded together. When walked on, the surface would “raise up and down like
a waterbed,” “flex” and “pop and move.” There was sand on the floor of the
tank, underneath the ladder. Bowen did not notice the sand before he
decided to use the ladder.
3
Bowen received workers’ compensation benefits through Team in
connection with the incident. He also filed a lawsuit against defendants and
others. The operative first amended complaint alleged a single cause of
action for premises liability. Bowen averred defendants negligently owned,
maintained, and operated premises with dangerous conditions that caused
his injuries, including a ladder that was not properly secured to the
scaffolding, an unbalanced floor, and debris on the floor.
Defendants filed separate—nearly identical—motions for summary
judgment, arguing they did not owe Bowen a duty of care because the Privette
doctrine applied; any duty of care was properly delegated to Team; and an
exception to the general duty of care existed when a danger was open and
obvious.
In opposition to the summary judgment motions, Bowen contended
there were triable issues of material fact as to whether exceptions to the
Privette doctrine applied. More particularly, Bowen asserted it was not
within the scope of his responsibility to inspect the scaffolding, ladder, and
floor of the jet fuel tank which were all concealed unsafe conditions; there
were triable issues of fact as to whether defendants actively contributed to
his injury when HMT erected scaffolding and a ladder to perform its own
welding work; and defendants retained control over the safety of the ladder
and floors in the jet fuel tank, failed to warn him of the flexible nature of the
steel floor, and represented to Bowen and Team that the ladder tied to the
scaffolding was safe.
The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment. The court
first found that defendants met their initial burden of demonstrating the
Privette doctrine applied because they presented evidence that they hired
Team to perform work at the work site and Bowen was injured while working
4
for Team. The court then ruled there were no triable issues of material fact
as to whether an exception to the Privette doctrine applied. With respect to
Burns, the court observed that it did not own, install, or tag the ladder or
scaffolding, nor did it direct or control the means by which Team did its work.
Relative to HMT, the court stated HMT demonstrated it had a contract with
Team providing that Team would “furnish all material, equipment, and labor
necessary to perform the work.” Additionally, HMT presented evidence that
it installed the scaffolding and ladder for its own work. Bowen did not
dispute these facts or introduce evidence that Burns or HMT directed Teams
or Bowen or required them to use HMT’s equipment. The court therefore
entered judgment for defendants.
DISCUSSION
Bowen argues the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motions for
summary judgment because there were triable issues of material fact
regarding the applicability of an exception to the Privette doctrine. At the
trial court and in his opening brief, Bowen invoked three “exceptions” to the
Privette doctrine—namely, the unsafe concealed condition exception under
Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659; the provision of unsafe or
defective equipment “exception” under McKown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 219 (McKown); and the exercise of retained control
exception under Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th
198 (Hooker).
At the outset, we observe that Bowen’s framing of the exceptions at
issue is somewhat flawed because McKown did not, in fact, establish a
separate and distinct exception to the Privette doctrine based on a hirer’s
provision of unsafe equipment to an independent contractor; rather, McKown
was a “companion case” to Hooker in that it also dealt with the retained
5
control exception. (See Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 42
(Gonzalez); Miller v. Roseville Lodge No. 1293 (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 825, 836
[“furnishing unsafe equipment is simply one example of exercising retained
control, rather than its own separate exception to the Privette doctrine”].)
Further, in his reply brief, Bowen withdraws his contention regarding the
unsafe concealed condition exception under Kinsman v. Unocal Corp., supra,
37 Cal.4th 659, agreeing with defendants that this exception only applies to
landowners. As such, this appeal implicates only the retained control
exception to the Privette doctrine under Hooker and McKown.
I. The Privette Doctrine and the Retained Control Exception
Under the Privette doctrine, “a hirer is typically not liable for injuries
sustained by an independent contractor or its workers while on the job.”
(Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 41.) As originally articulated, the doctrine
was grounded on the principle that it would be unfair for the hirer of an
independent contractor to be held liable for injuries to a contractor’s
employee when the contractor’s own liability would be capped by the limits of
its workers’ compensation coverage. (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 698.)
More recently, our high court has emphasized “delegation” as the “key
principle” underlying the Privette doctrine, reasoning as follows: “Because
the hirer presumptively delegates to the independent contractor the
authority to determine the manner in which the work is to be performed, the
contractor also assumes the responsibility to ensure that the worksite is safe,
and the work is performed safely.” (Gonzalez, at p. 41.)
However, an exception to the Privette doctrine may exist when a hirer
fails to effectively delegate all responsibility for workplace safety to the
independent contractor. (Gonzales, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 42.) As relevant
here, under the retained control exception set forth in Hooker, supra, 27
6
Cal.4th at page 202, the hirer may be liable to a contractor’s employee where
the hirer “exercises . . . retained control over any part of the contractor’s work
in a manner that affirmatively contributes to the worker’s injuries.”
(Gonzalez, at p. 42, italics added.) But “ ‘passively permitting an unsafe
condition to occur rather than directing it to occur does not constitute
affirmative contribution.’ ” (Degala v. John Stewart Co. (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 158, 170 (Degala).)
Rather, for the retained control exception to apply, there must be
something more—i.e., some indication the hirer directed that the contractor
perform its work in a certain way or interfered with the means and methods
by which the work was to be accomplished. (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at
pp. 214−215.) For example, in McKown, the California Supreme Court
imposed liability on a hirer who requested that an independent contractor
use the hirer’s own defective forklift in performing the contractor’s work.
(McKown, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 225.) Additionally, in some instances, an
“omission may constitute an affirmative contribution,” such as where a hirer
promises to undertake a particular safety measure and negligently fails to do
so. (Brannan v. Lathrop Constr. Assocs., Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1170,
1177 (Brannan).)
II. Standard of Review
“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with
a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine
whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their
dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843
(Aguilar).) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (a)(1) 2 a
“party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
7
contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the
action or proceeding.” Such a motion must be granted “if all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Id.,
subd. (c).)
A defendant moving for summary judgment meets its burden of
showing a cause of action has no merit if it shows that one or more elements
of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete defense to
that cause of action. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant has made the
required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable
issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or defense. (Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.)
“In the context of summary judgment, the Privette doctrine gives rise to
a rebuttable presumption that affects the burden of producing evidence.”
(Degala, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) If the moving party establishes
that it hired an independent contractor to perform certain work, and that the
injured plaintiff is an employee of that independent contractor, the “burden
shifts to the opposing party to come forward with evidence raising a triable
issue of fact as to whether an exception to the Privette doctrine applies.”
(Ibid.) “Nevertheless, the burden of persuasion remains with the party
moving for summary judgment.” (Ibid.)
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
we apply a de novo standard of review, “considering all the evidence set forth
in the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made
and sustained,” “liberally constru[ing] the evidence in support of the party
opposing summary judgment,” and “resolv[ing] doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006)
8
39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) We will find no error in a trial court’s grant of
summary judgment “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” (§ 437c, subd. (c).)
III. Analysis
Here, it is undisputed that the Privette doctrine applies, and Bowen
bears the burden of raising a triable issue of fact as to the applicability of an
exception to the doctrine. (See Degala, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.)
Bowen fails to meet this burden.
A. Retained Control Exception Under Hooker
Bowen’s contention regarding the applicability of the retained control
exception under Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th 198 is somewhat unclear. Bowen
asserts that HMT “failed to meet its burden on summary judgment to show
that there was no triable issue of material fact” regarding HMT’s retention of
control over safety conditions; he further contends HMT “effectively” retained
control because it was contractually responsible for the safety of its
subcontractors and negligently set up a ladder and scaffolding for Bowen to
use. 3 But these arguments erroneously place the burden on HMT to
demonstrate the lack of a triable issue of material fact when, as stated ante,
it is Bowen’s burden to raise a triable issue of fact as to an exception to the
Privette doctrine once defendants demonstrate the applicability of that
doctrine. (See Degala, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)
Bowen fails to meet this burden as he does not dispute the facts
3 Bowen’s arguments regarding the applicability of the retained control
exception are directed solely towards HMT and not Burns. As such, we deem
waived any assertion of error relative to the trial court’s granting of Burns’s
motion for summary judgment. (See Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 779, 784–85.)
9
underlying the trial court’s ruling and still points to no evidence indicating
that defendants affirmatively contributed to his injuries. For example, apart
from arguing that HMT “negligently” set up the ladder, Bowen does not
present any evidence that HMT directed that he perform his work in a
certain way or that it interfered with the means by which he was to
accomplish his work. (See Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 214−215.)
Further, the evidence indicates that HMT did not require Bowen to use the
ladder or scaffolding, and that prior to entering the fuel tank Bowen
knowingly executed a JSA that listed hazards observed at the work site and
authorized him to stop work if he deemed the site or circumstances unsafe.
Lastly, with respect to Bowen’s argument regarding HMT’s contractual
responsibility for the safety of its subcontractors, Hooker established that this
type of contractual obligation does not implicate the retained control
exception where there is no evidence the hirer affirmatively contributed to the
worker’s injuries. (See Hooker, at p. 202.)
Brannan, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th 1170, cited by defendants and
decided by our colleagues in Division One, is instructive. In Brannan, the
hirer scheduled work at the project site in a way that resulted in the plaster
subcontractor’s scaffold being left in an area where the masonry
subcontractor had to work. (Id. at pp. 1173, 1174.) The masonry
subcontractor asked the general contractor when the plaster scaffold would
be removed but otherwise believed its crews could work around the scaffold.
(Id. at p. 1174.) One rainy day, one of the masonry subcontractor’s employees
slipped and fell when he tried to cross over the scaffold to lay masonry in an
area underneath it. (Ibid.) No one told the employee to take this route, but
he believed crossing through the scaffold was the only way to access his work
area. (Ibid.) The employee sued the general contractor who successfully
10
moved for summary judgment. (Id. at p. 1172.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding no triable issues of material fact.
(Brannan, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1173.) The court noted that though
the employee argued he was left with no other option than to climb over the
scaffold, the general contractor did not direct the employee’s work or tell him
to gain access under the scaffold in that manner. (Id. at pp. 1178−1179.)
Clarifying it would be a “different case” if the masonry subcontractor had
asked that the scaffold be removed for safety, the general contractor had
promised to do so, and then negligently failed to follow through, the Court of
Appeal found that the general contractor’s act of allowing the scaffold to
remain in place while the masonry work proceeded was not an exercise of
retained control over safety. (Id. at p. 1180.) Accordingly, the Court of
Appeal found the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
the general contractor. (Ibid.)
So too here. Bowen has presented no evidence HMT directed his work
or told him to use the scaffold it left in place for its own employees. In fact,
the evidence indicates that HMT was completely unaware Bowen would use
its ladder and scaffold; Bowen had not used a ladder or scaffold on his prior
work visits; and Bowen himself stated he chose to use the ladder for his own
convenience so he would not have to repeatedly move his camera to capture
images of the horizontal seam in the jet fuel tank. Nor has Bowen presented
evidence that he or Team asked HMT to remove the scaffold, that HMT
agreed to do so, and that HMT then negligently failed to follow through. (See
Brannan, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1180.)
Accordingly, Bowen fails to raise a triable issue of material fact as to
whether HMT exercised retained control over Team’s work in a manner that
affirmatively contributed to Bowen’s injuries.
11
B. Retained Control Exception Under McKown
Bowen further contends that HMT failed to demonstrate the absence of
a triable issue of fact concerning HMT’s negligent provision of unsafe
equipment. More particularly, Bowen asserts the trial court erroneously held
the contract between HMT and Team required Team to furnish all of its own
materials for Team’s work on the project, including items such as scaffolding
and ladders, and that there were triable issues of material fact as to whether
HMT “effectively” requested or required him to use HMT’s ladder and
scaffolding when it hired him to capture radiographic images of the door
welds in the jet fuel tank. In reply, Bowen adds that he was required to use
the ladder and scaffold, and HMT’s use of the green tag system for its
scaffolding demonstrates a triable issue as to whether HMT requested that
Bowen use HMT’s scaffold. We are not persuaded.
First, Bowen again misstates the legal standard. As defendants have
demonstrated the application of the Privette doctrine, the burden has shifted
to Bowen to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact triggering a Privette
doctrine exception. (See Degala, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) Bowen
fails to do so. A triable issue exists only if the “evidence would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”
(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 845.) Further, “A party cannot avoid
summary judgment by asserting facts based on mere speculation and
conjecture, but instead must produce admissible evidence raising a triable
issue of fact.” (LaChapelle v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2002) 102
Cal.App.4th 977, 981.)
Here, Bowen presents no evidence HMT asked or directed him to use
the ladder and scaffold that HMT set up in the jet fuel tank for its own work.
12
Further, the contract between the parties evidences that Team was required
to furnish its own equipment and Bowen’s execution of the JSA on the
incident date indicates Team maintained responsibility for its own safety
measures. It also cannot be reasonably concluded that HMT’s mere use of a
safety tag system for its own scaffolding was tantamount to requesting that
Team use HMT’s equipment. A conclusion to the contrary would stretch the
concept of a “request” beyond absurdity.
Similarly, no evidence supports Bowen’s contention that HMT required
him to use its ladder and scaffolding. Bowen notes that at deposition,
Burns’s person most knowledgeable (§ 2025.230) stated that he “speculate[d]”
that Team may have needed to access HMT’s scaffold to take the
radiographic images needed. But such speculation is insufficient to create a
triable issue of material fact. (See LaChapelle v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.,
supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 981.) Further, even if Team felt it may have
needed to use the scaffold to perform its own work, this would not amount to
an exercise of retained control where HMT did not instruct Team to use the
scaffold. (See Brannan, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1178−1179.)
Bowen’s reliance on Tverberg v. Fillner Construction (2012) 202
Cal.App.4th 1439 is also misplaced. In Tverberg, the plaintiff was hired to
construct a metal canopy over some fuel-pumping units, while another
subcontractor was hired to dig four-foot wide holes nearby and erect eight
“bollards” (i.e., concrete posts) to prevent vehicles from colliding with the fuel
dispensers. (Id. at p. 1442.) Defendant failed to adequately mark or cover
the holes, despite plaintiff’s request. (Id. at p. 1443.) Plaintiff subsequently
fell into one of the holes and was injured. (Ibid.) Under these circumstances,
the Tverberg court found there to be triable issues of material fact as to
whether the hirer retained control over the worksite given that it directed the
13
digging of holes in the area where plaintiff was working and affirmatively
assumed responsibility for the safety of workers by marking the bollard holes,
among other things. (Id. at p. 1448.)
Contrary to Bowen’s argument, the partially secured ladder and sand
on the floor do not present similar issues of material fact here. In contrast to
Tverberg, there is no evidence HMT exercised any retained control over the
worksite that affirmatively contributed to Bowen’s injuries. Rather, the
evidence demonstrates HMT completely vacated the jet fuel tank area when
Bowen was capturing his radiographic images due to the radiation risks, did
not direct or interfere with Bowen’s work in any way, and did not agree or
undertake to provide Team with any materials for its work.
In sum, Bowen fails to raise a triable issue of material fact as to
whether the retained control exception to the Privette doctrine applies.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
14
_________________________
DESAUTELS, J.
We concur:
_________________________
STEWART, P.J.
_________________________
MILLER, J.
Bowen v. Burns & McDonnell (A166793)
15
Filed 7/15/24
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
EUGENE BOWEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A166793
v.
BURNS & MCDONNELL (San Francisco County
ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC., Super. Ct. No. CGC17561849)
et al.,
Defendants and Respondents. ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION
FOR PUBLICATION
BY THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on June 17, 2024 was not
certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, the request
for publication by Association of Southern California Defense Counsel is
granted.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105, the opinion in the
above-entitled matter is ordered certified for publication in the official
Reports.
Dated: __________________ _________________________P.J.
1
Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. E. A. Karnow
Attorneys for Plaintiff Zarmi Law
and Appellant: David Zarmi
Attorneys for Defendants Christensen Hsu Sipes LLP
and Respondents: Jennifer K. Stinnett
2
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