CourtListener 10003479•In re Levi R. CA2/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/15/24 In re Levi R. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re LEVI R. et al., Persons B331758
Coming Under the Juvenile Court (Los Angeles County
Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP00930)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
HEATHER G.,
Defendant and Appellant;
NICHOLAS R.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Pete R. Navarro, Judge Pro Tempore. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
Suzanne M. Nicholson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal for Defendant and Appellant Heather G.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel and Jane Kwon, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services.
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Respondent Nicholas R.
____________________
The juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over
Levi R. and Anabella R. because their mother, Heather G.
(mother) and their father, Nicholas R. (father) had a history of
domestic violence and mother had mental health problems she
addressed by using marijuana. The court later placed the two
children with father and scheduled a review hearing pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 364.1 Instead of holding
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code. “ ‘[S]ection 364 . . . governs . . . review
hearings when a dependent child has been placed back in the
custody of one parent.’ [Citation.] At a section 364 review
hearing, ‘[t]he court shall terminate its jurisdiction unless the
social worker or his or her department establishes by a
preponderance of evidence that the conditions still exist which
would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300,
or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is
withdrawn.’ [Citation.]” (In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741,
755, fn. 10 (D.N.).)
2
that hearing, the court decided to terminate jurisdiction at a
nonappearance progress report hearing held approximately three
months prior to the date scheduled for the section 364 review
hearing. Concurrent with its order terminating dependency
jurisdiction, the juvenile court awarded father sole physical
custody of Levi and Anabella, and granted mother only monitored
visits with the children.
On appeal, mother contends this expedited review
procedure violated her constitutional right to due process.
Although not every departure from section 364’s procedures
violates the federal constitution, we conclude mother’s right to
due process was violated here. The Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the
agency) and father acknowledge that the record contains no
evidence that prior to the nonappearance progress report
hearing, mother was served with a significant last minute
information report.2 In that report, the agency
(1) recommended—for the first time—the juvenile court
terminate jurisdiction and award father sole physical custody and
only monitored visitation to mother, and (2) provided evidence in
support of its recommendations. Accordingly, mother was
deprived of adequate notice of this report and an opportunity to
marshal contrary evidence or otherwise rebut the report and its
recommendations. Because DCFS and father fail to discharge
their burden of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
this constitutional violation did not affect the juvenile court’s
2 Mother, DCFS, and father are the only parties to this
appeal.
3
rulings, we reverse and remand the matter for further
proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
We summarize only those facts pertinent to the instant
appeal. In our Discussion, post, we describe additional facts
relevant to the issues before us.
Mother has five children: Matthew (born July 2014),
Hunter (born October 2015), Levi R. (born October 2018),
Anabella R. (born January 2021), and Hope (born April 2023).
Matthew’s and Hunter’s father is Matthew H., Levi’s and
Anabella’s father is Nicholas R., and the parties do not identify
Hope’s father. Because Levi and Anabella are the only children
subject to this appeal, we mention the other children only insofar
as they are relevant to our resolution of this matter.
In March 2022, DCFS filed a petition seeking dependency
jurisdiction under section 300 over, inter alia, Levi and Anabella.
As later modified and sustained, the petition alleged mother and
3 In summarizing the facts, we rely in part on admissions
made by the parties in their appellate briefing, including portions
of their briefs from prior appeals that the parties have
incorporated by reference into their briefing for the instant
appeal. (See Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2
[“ ‘[A] reviewing court may make use of statements [in briefs and
argument] . . . as admissions against the party [advancing
them].’ ”].) We also rely in part on assertions DCFS and father
make that mother does not contest in her reply. (See Association
for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 764, 773–774 [concluding that the appellants
“tacitly concede[d]” a point raised in the respondents’ brief by
“failing to dispute it in their reply”].)
4
father had a history of violent altercations, including an instance
in which mother threw a soda can at father and an occasion on
which father pointed a handgun at Matthew, Hunter, and Levi.
The modified and sustained version of the petition further
averred that mother has mental health problems, mother treats
her problems by self-medicating with marijuana, and her mental
health problems manifested in suicidal ideation and an
expression of being overwhelmed with her children’s care.
At a combined adjudication/disposition hearing held in
April 2022, the juvenile court sustained the petition as modified,
removed Levi and Anabella from parental custody, ordered DCFS
to provide mother and father with reunification services, and
authorized mother to have monitored visits with the children.
Mother appealed the juvenile court’s disposition order; we later
affirmed that order in an unpublished opinion in case
number B320221.
At a six-month review hearing held in November 2022, the
juvenile court found that returning Levi and Anabella to their
parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to the
children’s safety, mother had not complied with her case plan,
and DCFS provided reasonable services to mother. The court
ordered DCFS to continue to provide reunification services to
mother for an additional six months. We later issued an
unpublished decision in case number B325378 wherein we
concluded the juvenile court erred in finding that DCFS provided
reasonable services to mother but upheld the court’s finding that
returning the children to mother’s custody would expose them to
a substantial risk of detriment to their safety.
The juvenile court held a 12-month review hearing in
May 2023. Mother submitted on DCFS’s recommendation to
5
return Levi and Anabella to father’s custody in Michigan. The
court (1) found placing Levi and Anabella with father would not
create a substantial risk of detriment to the children and that
father was compliant with his case plan; (2) released Levi and
Anabella to father; (3) granted family maintenance services to
father, and enhancement services and monitored visits to mother;
(4) ordered DCFS to visit Levi and Anabella in Michigan to
assess if continued jurisdiction was necessary; and (5) scheduled
a nonappearance progress report hearing for June 22, 2023 and a
section 364 review hearing for November 6, 2023.
On June 22, 2023, DCFS filed a last minute information
report in which the agency stated Levi and Anabella had
“adjusted well to the father’s home and . . . developed a positive
healthy bond with father, his partner and the rest of the family.”
DCFS recommended that “jurisdiction continue for another
30 days in order for the father to continue to receive the support
of the state of Michigan in obtaining Anabella’s birth certificate
and for the children to be referred to an Early on Assessment and
successfully be linked to mental health services.”
Also on June 22, 2023, the juvenile court held a
nonappearance progress report hearing at which mother and her
counsel appeared. The court stated it had read and considered
DCFS’s last minute information report. The court scheduled a
further nonappearance progress report hearing for
August 9, 2023 for the court to “address the mother’s request for
unmonitored visitation with the minors and the possibility of
terminating jurisdiction . . . .” The section 364 review hearing
remained calendared for November 6, 2023.
On August 3, 2023, DCFS filed another last minute
information report in which the agency summarized its
6
interviews with, inter alia, father and mother, opined that Levi
and Anabella “appear[ed] to be happy, energetic, and comfortable
in the father’s home,” and recommended that “jurisdiction be
terminated as to . . . Levi R[.] and [Anabella R.] with a family law
order awarding father . . . joint legal, sole physical custody of the
children . . . and monitored visits for the mother . . . .”
The juvenile court convened a nonappearance progress
report hearing on August 9, 2023 at which mother and her
counsel appeared. DCFS’s counsel reiterated the agency’s
recommendation that the court terminate jurisdiction over Levi
and Anabella, award sole physical custody of the children to
father and joint legal custody to both parents, and grant mother
monitored visitation with the children. Mother’s counsel objected
to terminating jurisdiction on the ground that DCFS had not
adhered to the procedures mandated by section 364, which
mother’s counsel indicated had prevented her and her client from
“prepar[ing] a proper response.”
The juvenile court overruled mother’s counsel’s objection on
the ground that she had not previously “object[ed] to the court
setting a hearing on the topic of termination.” The court
remarked, “[T]here is no need to maintain jurisdiction with the
[two] children. They are with the father in Michigan. None of
the parties reside[s] in California.[4] The children are doing fine
under his care.” The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over
Levi and Anabella, awarded father sole physical custody and both
parents joint legal custody, authorized mother to have monitored
visits, stayed the order terminating jurisdiction pending receipt
4Although mother had moved from Michigan to California
in December 2021, mother informed DCFS she moved back to
Michigan in or about fall 2022.
7
of a juvenile custody order, and vacated the November 6, 2023
section 364 review hearing.5
On August 11, 2023, the juvenile court lifted the stay of its
order terminating dependency jurisdiction over Levi and
Anabella and issued juvenile custody orders consistent with the
rulings made at the August 9, 2023 nonappearance progress
report hearing. Mother timely appealed the juvenile court’s
orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding custody and
visitation as to Levi and Anabella.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, mother argues the juvenile court violated her
constitutional right to due process at the August 9, 2023
nonappearance progress report hearing by deciding to terminate
dependency jurisdiction over Levi R. and Anabella R., award
father sole physical custody of the children, and grant mother
only monitored visitation. In addition to her due process claim,
mother contends the court abused its discretion in awarding
father sole physical custody and granting mother monitored
visitation.
We conclude the juvenile court violated mother’s right to
due process by failing to afford her with constitutionally
sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard before
5 It appears that several hours after the August 9, 2023
nonappearance progress report hearing concluded, DCFS filed a
last minute information report indicating, inter alia, mother
provided the agency with a document from the State of Michigan
Department of Health and Human Services concerning “her
infant daughter’s [(Hope’s)] condition.” This filing has no
apparent relevance to the instant appeal.
8
terminating dependency jurisdiction and issuing exit orders
concerning Levi R. and Anabella R.6 Because the juvenile court
must revisit these rulings upon remand, we do not decide
whether the court abused its discretion in issuing the exit orders.
A. Mother Lacked Adequate Notice and Opportunity To
Be Heard on DCFS’s Recommendation To Terminate
Dependency Jurisdiction with Certain Exit Orders
“The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that ‘[n]o State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .’ [Citation.] Except in emergent circumstances, this
provision guarantees reasonable notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard before the state may deprive a person of
a protected liberty or property interest.” (In re J.R. (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 569, 572 (J.R.).) Constitutional “ ‘due process
guarantees apply to dependency proceedings’ ” because
“ ‘parenting is a fundamental right . . . .’ ” (See In re R.F. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 459, 470 (R.F.).) “Because the parties do not
dispute the facts concerning [mother’s] due process claim, the
instant alleged constitutional error presents a purely legal
question that is subject to de novo review.” (J.R., at pp. 587–
588.)
6 “When terminating its jurisdiction over a child who has
been declared a dependent child of the court, section 362.4
authorizes the juvenile court to issue a custody and visitation
order (commonly referred to as an ‘exit order’) that will become
part of the relevant family law file and remain in effect in the
family law action ‘until modified or terminated by a subsequent
order.’ ” (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513 (T.S.).)
9
As noted in our Factual and Procedural Background, ante,
at the 12-month review hearing in May 2023, the juvenile court
placed Levi and Anabella with father and scheduled a section 364
review hearing for November 6, 2023. Section 364,
subdivision (b) provides that “[a]t least 10 days prior to the
hearing,” DCFS must file and “furnish[ ] to all parties” “a
supplemental report . . . describing the services offered to the
family and the progress made by the family in eliminating the
conditions or factors requiring court supervision” and providing a
“recommendation regarding the necessity of continued
supervision.” (See § 364, subd. (b).) Evidence may be “presented
by [DCFS], the parent, . . . or the child” at a section 364 review
hearing. (See § 364, subd. (c).)
Instead of convening the section 364 review hearing
scheduled for November 6, 2023, the juvenile court decided at an
August 9, 2023 nonappearance progress report hearing to
terminate dependency jurisdiction over Levi and Anabella and
issue exit orders awarding father sole physical custody of the
children and granting mother monitored visitation. It is
undisputed that DCFS did not file and serve upon the parties a
formal section 364 report.
DCFS and father maintain the juvenile court’s departure
from section 364’s procedures did not violate due process because
DCFS had submitted other reports documenting the agency’s
observations and recommendations, and mother had actual notice
of “ ‘the possibility’ ” the juvenile court could terminate
jurisdiction prior to the scheduled section 364 hearing. DCFS
and father insist mother “did not object to the setting of further
nonappearance hearings to address . . . termination [of
10
jurisdiction] . . . and never requested a contested, evidentiary
hearing on the issue . . . .”
We acknowledge that because “ ‘due process “is a flexible
concept” ’ ” (T.S., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 515), a deviation
from section 364’s safeguards does not necessarily infringe upon
a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. We conclude for the
reasons set forth below that DCFS and the juvenile court did not
discharge their constitutional obligation of ensuring that mother
had notice and an opportunity to be heard “ ‘ “ ‘at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (See
R.F., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 470.)
To recap, in the last minute information report DCFS filed
on August 3, 2023, the agency recommended “jurisdiction be
terminated as to the children, Levi R[.] and [Anabella R.] with a
family law order awarding the father . . . joint legal, sole physical
custody of the children . . . and monitored visits for the
mother . . . .” This recommendation differed from the agency’s
recommendation in its prior report, the last minute information
report filed on June 22, 2023, in which DCFS recommended
retention of jurisdiction for another 30 days and did not ask the
court to award father sole physical custody and grant mother
only monitored visitation. The report filed on August 3, 2023 was
also significant because it contained evidence bearing on whether
the court should terminate jurisdiction and issue exit orders,
including the agency’s claims that “the children have developed a
positive bond to their father and the rest of [the] family,” and
that mother “stated that she would be willing to do a hair follicle
[drug] test . . . .” Indeed, DCFS and father argue this report
supports the juvenile court’s decision to terminate dependency
jurisdiction and issue its exit orders.
11
Critically, DCFS and father acknowledge “the record
does not . . . include proofs of service with each Last Minute
Information Report for the Court,” and they do not claim the
agency ever provided mother or her counsel with a copy of any of
those reports (including the report filed on August 3, 2023) prior
to the August 9, 2023 hearing.7 This “ ‘failure to provide [a]
parent[ ] with a copy of the social worker’s report, upon which the
court will rely in coming to a decision, is a denial of due process’ ”
because without sufficient advance notice of the report, the
parent lacks “a meaningful opportunity to . . . request an
evidentiary hearing” at which the parent may “ ‘examine
evidence and cross-examine witnesses . . . . [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (See R.F., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 470, 472; see
also id. at p. 473 [indicating that the failure to provide a parent
with notice of the evidence supporting a “chang[e in] custody and
visitation” prior to the entry of exit orders may deprive the
parent of “proper notice and an opportunity to be heard”].)
In sum, we hold these expedited procedures in the juvenile
court violated mother’s right to due process because she lacked a
reasonable opportunity to respond to the agency’s
recommendation to terminate dependency jurisdiction with exit
orders that abridged her custodial rights as to Levi and
Anabella.8
7 (See D.N., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 767 [noting that
respondents are obligated to assist the reviewing court in
sustaining the judgment].)
8 In addressing mother’s due process claim, DCFS asserts
she failed to ask for a contested hearing on August 9, 2023.
Similarly, in discussing mother’s claim the juvenile court abused
its discretion in issuing the exit orders, father faults mother for
12
B. DCFS and Father Fail To Prove—Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt—That the Due Process Violation
Did Not Contribute to the Juvenile Court’s Rulings
DCFS and father argue we should affirm the juvenile
court’s decision to terminate jurisdiction and its exit orders
because mother fails to establish a reasonable probability that
she would have obtained a more favorable ruling had the due
process violation not occurred. The authority upon which the
agency and father rely for the proposition that mother bears the
burden of establishing prejudice is inapposite. In In re Celine R.
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, the high court held that the juvenile court’s
alleged violation of the “solely statutory” right to the
“appoint[ment of] separate counsel” for a minor warranted
reversal only if it was “reasonably probable the result would have
been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error.”
(See Celine R., at pp. 51–52, 59–60, citing People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
failing to request a contested hearing and object to the exit orders
recommended by the agency. Insofar as DCFS and father are
arguing mother did not preserve her due process claim, we reject
that contention because mother lacked a meaningful opportunity
to respond to the agency’s August 3, 2023 last minute
information report; mother’s counsel raised this objection at the
August 9, 2023 hearing. (See Factual & Procedural Background,
ante [noting that mother’s counsel indicated that DCFS’s failure
to adhere to § 364’s procedures prevented her from responding to
the agency’s recommendations]; In re Paul W. (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 37, 58 [“ ‘[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not
consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been
but was not made in the trial court[,]’ ” italics added].)
13
In contrast, we have held the Chapman9 harmless error
analysis applies to “ ‘ “most [federal] constitutional errors,” ’ ”
including violations of a parent’s due process rights. (See J.R.,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 591–592.) “ ‘ “The beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman ‘requir[es] the
beneficiary of a [federal] constitutional error to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
to the [adverse ruling].’ [Citation.] . . . [Citation.]” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]”10 (J.R. at p. 592.)
In support of their position that mother was not prejudiced,
DCFS and father argue, “[T]he court was already well informed
that father complied with his court-ordered case plan, redressed
the issues that necessitated DCFS’s and the juvenile court’s
interventions, and demonstrated insight as to the children’s
needs by actively connecting them to supportive services. . . . The
children were also bonded to father and his family, happy, and in
good spirits in father’s home.” The agency and father further
contend, “[M]other continued using marijuana, was not drug
testing, had not received a psychological evaluation, was not
receiving mental health services with a licensed therapist, and
her visits with the children were inconsistent.” Additionally,
9 (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.)
10 Father also seems to argue the Court of Appeal’s
decision in R.F. requires mother to demonstrate prejudice. R.F.
did not hold that Chapman is inapplicable to due process claims.
Instead, R.F. concluded that the errors at issue there were
prejudicial under either Watson or Chapman. (See R.F., supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 474–475; see also J.R., supra, 82
Cal.App.5th at p. 591, fn. 33 [“ ‘ “[A]n opinion is not authority for
a proposition not therein considered.” ’ ”].)
14
father argues, “[I]t is not reasonably probable the court would
have ordered joint physical custody” because mother “apparently
was unable to drug test” as “[s]he was ‘in complete isolation’ ” in
“prepar[ation] for a bone marrow transplant for her new
infant . . . .”11
In arguing that mother suffered no prejudice, the agency
and father overlook the nature of the constitutional error before
us. As set forth in Discussion, part A, ante, mother lacked a
meaningful opportunity to respond to the August 3, 2023 last
minute information report at the August 9, 2023 nonappearance
progress report hearing. DCFS and father do not argue the
record demonstrates, beyond a reasonable doubt, that even if
mother had been given sufficient notice of the last minute
information report filed on August 3, 2023, she would have been
unable to persuade the juvenile court to issue rulings more
favorable to her. That is the relevant inquiry.12
Given that the juvenile court had already scheduled a
section 364 review hearing for November 6, 2023, a favorable
ruling could have been the court’s exercise of its discretion to
11 Hope appears to be the “new infant” to which father is
referring in the quoted passage.
12 (Cf. In re Armando L. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 606, 609–
610, 620 [“The flaw in the agency’s argument is the absence of
potential evidence [as to custody and termination of dependency
jurisdiction] to the contrary that could have been developed only
in a contested hearing. Mother sought a contested section
364 hearing and was denied any opportunity to testify or present
other evidence on the legally erroneous basis she lacked standing.
We cannot discern what evidence mother could have presented at
the hearing that may have contradicted or elaborated on evidence
in the social workers’ reports.”].)
15
keep that hearing on calendar, at which point the court and the
parties would have benefitted from any additional information
provided by the agency in the supplemental report required by
section 364, subdivision (b) or by mother herself.13 Although the
juvenile court rejected mother’s request that it follow section
364’s procedures (see Factual & Procedural Background, ante),
we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that mother would
not have been able to convince the court to undertake that course
if she had been given timely notice of the August 3, 2023 last
minute information report. With sufficient advance notice of the
report, mother could have assessed the evidence included therein
and attempted to persuade the court to defer ruling on
termination of jurisdiction and issuance of exit orders until the
record was more fully developed. For instance, the
August 3, 2023 last minute information report shows mother had
scheduled a psychological test for November 1, 2023, and that
although the results apparently would not be available until
November 30, 2023, the testing center represented to DCFS that
“this was the earliest available appointment for the mother [and]
she [was] on the cancelation list should another client cancel.” If
mother had a reasonable opportunity to review the report prior to
the hearing, she could have addressed whether the results of
mother’s forthcoming psychological assessment would be
available prior to the section 364 hearing scheduled for
November 6, 2023.
Furthermore, the August 3, 2023 last minute information
report states, “Although Levi still struggles with aggressive
13 (See Discussion, part A, ante [describing the report
required by § 364, subd. (b) and the evidence that may be
considered at a § 364 hearing].)
16
behaviors such as hitting and tantrums, father understands that
these behaviors stem from past trauma and disruptions in his
life.” If mother had been timely served with the August 3, 2023
last minute information report, she could have ascertained
whether father was the source of these vague allusions in the
report to “past trauma and disruptions in [Levi’s] life,” and, if so,
she could have argued father had minimized his role in causing
Levi’s behavioral issues. This is because, in sustaining the
dependency petition, the juvenile court found father had
“brandished and pointed a handgun at” Matthew, Hunter, and
Levi. Additionally, mother could have offered testimony further
elaborating on her allegations that she saw father (1) “brandish[ ]
a gun” in front of mother and the children and (2) “threaten[ ] to
kill Matthew, Hunter, and himself.”
These examples demonstrate that DCFS and father have
failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the due process
violation was harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the juvenile
court’s termination of jurisdiction and its exit orders, and remand
the matter to allow the court and DCFS to cure this
constitutional violation. We express no opinion on how the
juvenile court should rule on the merits of custody and
termination of its jurisdiction.
17
DISPOSITION
We reverse the juvenile court’s orders terminating
dependency jurisdiction over Levi R. and Anabella R.,
and awarding custody and visitation as to the two children.
Upon remand, the juvenile court and respondent Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services shall afford
Heather G. constitutionally sufficient notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, and conduct further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
WEINGART, J.
18
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